If you prefer to listen, click here for the spoken edition. If you prefer to read, the dispatch continues below.
A War of Unintended Consequences
There is a peculiar confidence among men who start wars. They generally know what they intend to accomplish, frequently know how they intend to accomplish it, and almost invariably assume that history will cooperate. History, unfortunately, has never considered itself bound by the intentions of those who presume to influence its course.
The difficulty is that wars, once begun, acquire an independence of their own. Governments may determine when the first missile is launched, which targets are struck, and what objectives are announced to the public. They cannot determine how an adversary will respond, which nations will intervene, what alliances will emerge or deteriorate, or how the economic and political consequences will unfold.
History offers no shortage of instruction on this point, although those contemplating war have demonstrated a remarkable reluctance to consult it. Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812 expecting to compel Tsar Alexander I to accept his terms; instead, he began the destruction of the army upon which his empire depended. In 1914, Europe's great powers entered a conflict that many expected to be short, only to discover that they had set in motion a catastrophe that would destroy four empires and reorder the continent.
In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq expecting to overthrow Saddam Hussein and establish a more favorable political order. It accomplished the first objective with remarkable speed. The second proved considerably less cooperative.
Nor were the dangers always unforeseen. In many instances, experienced military officers, diplomats, and advisers had warned of the consequences. Their warnings were not merely discounted; they were subordinated to the determination of political leaders who mistook the strength of their intentions for the likelihood of their success. Having decided what ought to happen, they proceeded as though their determination had settled what would happen. In each instance, the decision to begin hostilities was deliberate. What followed was not.
Donald Trump appears to have approached the war with Iran with considerably more confidence in American military power than appreciation for the consequences of employing it. Under the Trump administration, the United States possessed the means to strike Iranian military installations, destroy infrastructure, and inflict substantial damage upon its adversary. What it did not possess was the ability to dictate Iran's response, guarantee the security of its Gulf partners, preserve the region's energy markets, or compel the international community to accommodate the resulting disorder. That distinction ought to have been apparent before the first missile was launched. Instead, the administration appears to have proceeded on the assumption that America's overwhelming military superiority would somehow translate into control over the political and strategic consequences that followed.
The consequences were not confined to Iran. Across the Persian Gulf, governments that had cultivated close relationships with Washington found themselves confronting the economic and security consequences of a war they had neither initiated nor sought. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and their neighbors had spent years pursuing economic diversification, attracting foreign investment, and presenting themselves as centers of regional stability. Suddenly, their airports, ports, energy infrastructure, and commercial ambitions were exposed to the consequences of decisions made elsewhere. While the United States had demonstrated its capacity to strike Iran, its Gulf partners were left to confront a rather different question: whether Washington could protect them from the consequences of having done so.
For decades, the Gulf states have regarded their relationships with the United States as essential components of their national security. Those relationships were never without complications, but they rested upon a fundamental understanding: American military power would provide a measure of stability in a region where stability has rarely been assured. The war with Iran has placed that understanding under considerable strain. Governments that once regarded Washington as a guarantor of regional security must now consider whether American decisions might themselves become a source of regional insecurity. That does not mean Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, or Oman will abandon their relationships with the United States. Their security and economic interests remain deeply intertwined with America's. But alliances need not collapse to be weakened. It is enough for those who depend upon them to begin wondering whether the protection they were promised might also be the source of the danger they face.
The weakening of confidence in American leadership did not occur in a diplomatic vacuum. Other powers have recognized and seized opportunities created by Washington's decisions, even though they played no part in making them. China, building upon its substantial economic relationships throughout the Persian Gulf, has presented itself as a more predictable partner. And Russia, despite its own military and economic limitations, has exploited the resulting uncertainty, most conspicuously through its ability to offer diesel supplies to markets disrupted by the war. Neither country needed to replace the United States as the region's principal security partner to benefit from the resulting doubts. It was enough that governments already reconsidering their dependence upon Washington had additional reasons to explore alternatives, however imperfect. Thus, a war intended to demonstrate American power may produce an outcome its architects never intended: a region in which American influence becomes less certain precisely because American military power was so emphatically employed.
Nor were the consequences confined to America's allies and competitors. Iran, the intended object of American military power, retained the ability to respond directly or through its proxies in ways that its adversaries could neither fully anticipate nor prevent. The destruction of military installations and infrastructure did not eliminate the country's capacity to disrupt shipping, threaten regional commerce, or impose costs upon governments far beyond its borders. Indeed, the disparity in conventional military strength gave Iran every reason to avoid confronting the United States on terms favorable to Washington. Instead, it could exploit vulnerabilities in the economic and security arrangements upon which the region depended. The result was a familiar paradox of modern warfare: the stronger power could inflict vastly greater destruction, yet the weaker could still impose consequences sufficient to frustrate the stronger power's political objectives.
There were consequences, too, for the military power upon which Washington had placed such confidence. The ability to destroy an adversary's military installations does not mean that the resources required to do so are inexhaustible. Precision-guided munitions, air-defense interceptors, and other sophisticated weapons require years of development, substantial investment, and industrial capacity that cannot be expanded merely because a president wishes it. Every missile expended against Iran represented a weapon that would have to be replaced, frequently at considerable cost and over a period measured in months or years rather than days. Nor were these expenditures without implications elsewhere. The United States maintained military commitments in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, where the availability of precisely such weapons formed an important part of its ability to deter other adversaries. A war undertaken to demonstrate American military superiority could therefore diminish, at least temporarily, some of the resources upon which that superiority depended.
The difficulty was compounded by the administration's apparent confidence that the conflict would be relatively brief. At its outset, Trump spoke of an operation lasting four or five weeks, while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth assured the public that America's munitions were plentiful and that the duration of the campaign remained within Washington's control. Yet the fighting and its consequences proved less accommodating than those assurances suggested. The administration could determine how many missiles it launched, but not how quickly American industry could replace them. It could announce victory but not compel its adversary to accept defeat on Washington's terms. And it could declare its military objectives accomplished without restoring the economic stability, diplomatic confidence, or strategic resources consumed in pursuing them. The distinction between ending an operation and ending its consequences was one the administration's public assurances did little to acknowledge.
The economic consequences were no more obedient to Washington's timetable than the military ones. The disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, damage to regional energy infrastructure, and uncertainty surrounding the availability of oil and refined petroleum products carried the effects of the war into economies thousands of miles from the battlefield. Governments that had played no part in the decision to attack Iran nevertheless confronted rising energy costs, disrupted supply arrangements, and the prospect of economic instability arising from a conflict over which they exercised little influence. Nor could the restoration of normal commerce be accomplished simply by announcing that military objectives had been achieved. Shipping companies, insurers, refiners, and international markets would require assurances that the dangers had actually subsided. A president might declare a war finished, but he cannot order the world economy to behave as though it had never occurred.
The diplomatic consequences presented an even more stubborn difficulty. America's allies had not necessarily shared Washington's enthusiasm for the war, yet many were obliged to contend with its repercussions. Governments accustomed to regarding the United States as a guarantor of international stability now confronted the uncomfortable possibility that American power could itself become a source of instability. Adversaries, meanwhile, were free to draw their own lessons about American judgment, military capabilities, and the willingness of Washington's partners to support its decisions. Some sought new alliances; others began reconsidering their military preparations and dependence on American assurances. None of those calculations required Washington's approval. Indeed, they continued after the fighting stopped, quietly altering the strategic landscape in ways that might not become apparent for years. The United States could decide when to employ its power. It could not decide what the rest of the world would learn from watching it.
America's adversaries had their own reasons to study the conflict carefully. China and Russia, in particular, could observe not merely the performance of American weapons but the larger machinery required to sustain their use: the expenditure of precision munitions, the demands placed upon air and missile defenses, the vulnerability of regional bases, and the difficulties of maintaining military operations while protecting commercial interests and reassuring allies. These are not lessons confined to the Persian Gulf. They bear upon calculations in Europe, the western Pacific, and anywhere else American military power might be called upon to deter aggression or defend an ally. Nor was it necessary for an adversary to defeat the United States militarily to profit from its decisions. It might be sufficient to watch Washington consume resources, strain relationships, and expose limitations that would otherwise have remained less apparent. A war intended to demonstrate American power also provided America's adversaries with an opportunity to study its limits.
None of this suggests that every consequence of a war can be foreseen. History offers too many examples of carefully constructed plans overtaken by events to permit such a comforting illusion. But there is a considerable difference between failing to predict an outcome and failing to consider its possibility. Governments possess intelligence agencies, military staffs, diplomatic services, and generations of accumulated experience precisely because the exercise of power requires more than confidence in its immediate effectiveness. Their purpose is not to guarantee that a president will make the correct decision, but to ensure that the decision is informed by judgments extending beyond the personal assumptions of those most eager to act. Such institutions cannot eliminate uncertainty. They can, however, identify risks, challenge expectations, and ask what happens if the adversary refuses to behave as anticipated. The purpose of experienced counsel is not to make war predictable. It is to prevent uncertainty from being mistaken for impossibility.
The historical record offers little encouragement to leaders who mistake confidence for foresight. Wars have repeatedly begun with expectations of limited duration, manageable costs, and outcomes sufficiently predictable to justify the risks undertaken. Yet the consequences of armed conflict have a habit of escaping the boundaries established for them in conference rooms and presidential briefings. The First World War did not remain the short European conflict many of its participants anticipated. The American intervention in Vietnam did not produce the political stability its architects envisioned. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not conclude with the fall of Saddam Hussein's government, whatever the expectations accompanying that achievement.
Those conflicts differed enormously in their origins, purposes, and circumstances. What connects them is not that their leaders confronted identical problems, but that military action produced political and strategic consequences extending far beyond the initial calculations. History does not insist that every war become a catastrophe. It merely refuses to guarantee that any war will remain the one its architects intended to fight.
The distinction matters because unintended consequences are too easily treated as though they were unforeseeable consequences. The two are not synonymous. A government may not intend to destabilize an ally, disrupt international commerce, exhaust military resources, or encourage adversaries to reconsider their strategic opportunities. But the absence of such intentions does not establish that the possibilities were beyond contemplation. Nor does the eventual emergence of those consequences transform them into accidents for which no one bears responsibility. The question is not whether a president could have predicted precisely how events would unfold. It is whether the risks were sufficiently apparent to warrant serious consideration before the decision was made, and whether the anticipated benefits justified accepting them. Unintended consequences are not necessarily unpredictable consequences. And consequences that were not intended are not, for that reason alone, consequences for which no one is accountable.
The presidency confers extraordinary authority, but it does not confer mastery over events. A president may command the armed forces, direct the instruments of American foreign policy, and commit the nation's resources to objectives he considers necessary. Yet none of these powers can compel other governments to respond as expected, markets to remain undisturbed, allies to preserve their confidence, or adversaries to accept the political conclusions Washington has drawn from its military achievements. The temptation to confuse presidential authority with personal control is especially dangerous in matters of war, where the consequences of a decision extend beyond the reach of the institutions responsible for making it. The greater the power concentrated in a president's hands, the more important it becomes to recognize the limits of what that power can accomplish. The authority to begin a war is not the authority to determine everything that follows.
There is a peculiar conceit in the belief that history begins anew whenever a president decides to exercise American power. The lessons of earlier conflicts are acknowledged, their anniversaries commemorated, and their veterans honored, yet the assumptions that produced so many of their unintended consequences remain remarkably durable.
Each generation of leaders possesses weapons more sophisticated than those available to its predecessors, intelligence systems capable of gathering information on an astonishing scale, and military organizations trained to anticipate contingencies that earlier commanders could scarcely have imagined. None of these advantages, however, has abolished the oldest difficulty in warfare: the enemy retains a will of his own, and the world beyond the battlefield remains indifferent to the intentions of those who initiated the fighting.
Technology may alter the means by which wars are conducted. It does not repeal the independence of those who must live with their consequences. History does not repeat itself because its lessons are unavailable. It repeats itself, in part, because those entrusted with power so often imagine that the lessons apply to someone else.
The war with Iran will eventually take its place among the conflicts historians examine for what its architects intended, what they accomplished, and what they failed to anticipate. The judgments may differ, and the consequences may continue unfolding long after the principal actors have departed the stage.
But one lesson requires no passage of decades to become apparent: Military power can destroy an adversary's installations, disrupt his operations, and alter the immediate balance of forces. It cannot guarantee the political settlement, economic stability, or strategic advantages that those employing it expect to follow. A president may possess the power to begin a war. He does not possess the power to write its ending. History reserves that privilege for itself.
— Dunneagin