Civics Unhinged

Civics Unhinged

Perhaps It Is Only the Second Drop

Notes & Observations on Budapest, Stockholm, and Political Weather

Historians enjoy an advantage unavailable to those who actually live through history: we know where one period ended and another began.

Contemporaries rarely do.

An election takes place. A government falls. A political movement unexpectedly loses ground. Each event is explained by its national circumstances, as it usually should be. Only years later does someone look back, place several apparently separate events side by side, and ask an unsettling question: Were they separate after all?

Europe may have produced two such events this year.

Or perhaps it has not.

In April, Hungarian voters ended Viktor Orbán’s sixteen years in power and gave Péter Magyar and his Tisza party an extraordinary parliamentary victory. The result was immediately—and reasonably—explained in Hungarian terms. Economic stagnation, inflation, deteriorating public services and allegations of corruption had damaged Orbán. Magyar, moreover, hardly represented a conventional triumph of the European left. He came from the political world surrounding Fidesz and offered voters a center-right, pro-European alternative.

Hungary could therefore be regarded as Hungary.

Five months later came Sweden.

There, voters narrowly displaced the right-wing governing bloc. More intriguing was the performance of the Sweden Democrats. After decades during which the party seemed capable only of growing, its support fell by approximately three percentage points, to 17.6 percent. For the first time in a Swedish parliamentary election, the party went backward.

Sweden, too, can readily be explained as Sweden. The Sweden Democrats had moved from insurgency toward responsibility for government policy. Their increasingly severe proposals on immigration may have mobilized opponents. Tactical voting mattered. Swedish voters were responding to Swedish conditions.

There is no compelling reason to connect Budapest and Stockholm.

Not yet.

But historians are trained to become suspicious of the words “not yet.”

Political periods seldom announce their arrival. Nor do they provide notice of their departure.

Consider the United States in November 1960. John F. Kennedy had narrowly defeated Richard Nixon. Nothing in that election result could have told an observer what the following decade would contain: an extraordinary expansion of civil-rights legislation, the Voting Rights Act, Medicare, immigration reform, the War on Poverty, the maturation of the civil-rights movement, Black Power, feminism, the counterculture and a conservative reaction to much of it.

Kennedy did not create those forces. Many were already developing independently of him. His election nevertheless became part of a political and cultural opening through which existing forces accelerated. Only afterward could historians see how profoundly the period had changed.

This is why Hungary and Sweden are worth placing beside one another—not as proof, but as questions.

For more than a decade, European politics has been described partly through the advance of nationalist and right-wing populist movements. Orbán became perhaps the continent’s most successful practitioner of what he himself called “illiberal democracy.” Elsewhere, parties once considered beyond the political mainstream acquired votes, legitimacy and, increasingly, influence over governments that did not formally include them.

That movement has by no means disappeared. Right-wing populist parties remain powerful across Europe. Immigration continues to move political debate in their direction. Two elections cannot sensibly be transformed into a continental trend.

But perhaps that is precisely the point.

Trends are obvious only after enough evidence has accumulated to give them a name.

Hungary did not replace Orbán with a left-wing government. Sweden has not suddenly rejected restrictive immigration policy. If something is beginning to change, therefore, it may be more complicated than a European “turn to the left.”

It might instead represent the earliest suggestion that some voters are becoming willing to separate conservative politics from populist politics—to retain concerns about immigration, national identity or economic security while becoming less persuaded by the political style and governing methods that have accompanied the populist ascendancy.

That possibility would be more consequential than a conventional movement of the electoral pendulum.

It would also be premature to declare that it is happening.

Perhaps Orbán simply remained in office too long.

Perhaps the Sweden Democrats discovered the familiar difficulty of moving from protest to responsibility.

Perhaps Hungary was Hungarian, Sweden was Swedish, and the resemblance between their elections exists mainly in the imagination of observers eager to discover a pattern.

History contains plenty of false beginnings.

But it also contains beginnings that nobody recognized at the time.

That is why the interesting question after Sweden is not whether Europe has rejected right-wing populism. Plainly, Europe has done no such thing.

The question is smaller.

Was Hungary an isolated electoral revolt against a long-serving government?

Was Sweden another unrelated national election?

Or will historians looking backward someday place these two elections on the same page?

We cannot know.

For the moment, there are only two drops.

The mistake would be calling them a torrent.

The other mistake might be failing to notice that it has begun to rain.

—F. P. Dunneagin


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