Civics Unhinged

Civics Unhinged

The Law the President Cannot Write

On executive orders, constitutional boundaries, and the law that only Congress can make.

If you prefer to listen, click here for the spoken edition. If you prefer to read, the dispatch continues below.

The Constitution contains an inconvenience for presidents who wish to make laws: It gave that job to someone else.

This has not prevented presidents from issuing executive orders, an instrument possessing many of the visual characteristics of signing legislation: There is a desk; there is a document; there are pens. Usually, people stand behind the president looking consequential. The president signs his name, holds up the document, and something has plainly happened.

Sometimes something quite substantial.

Executive orders direct federal agencies, establish the president’s priorities, organize the executive branch, and instruct government officials in carrying out laws Congress has enacted. Presidents of both parties have used executive orders for generations. They are not constitutional contraband smuggled into the White House under cover of darkness.

But they are not laws either.

In the second iteration of Trump’s presidency, that distinction has become increasingly difficult to see, partly because the modern presidency has made executive action so familiar and partly because Congress has often found it convenient to allow presidents considerable room in administering the laws it writes. Over time, the public has acquired a peculiar habit: When a president announces some sweeping new action, we increasingly ask, "Who can stop him?"

The better question should be asked earlier: What allows him to do it?

That reversal matters.

The Constitution begins its description (in Article 1) of the federal government with Congress, and its opening sentence on the subject is remarkably unambiguous: “All legislative Powers herein granted” are vested in Congress.

Article II does something different. It vests executive power in the president. It makes him commander in chief. It gives him powers involving appointments, treaties, pardons, and foreign relations. It also imposes upon him a particularly important obligation: he “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”

Faithfully executed.

Those are words worth lingering over.

The Constitution does not say that the president shall determine which laws would be useful and then faithfully execute those. It does not say that he may rewrite, improve upon, or use an executive order as a substitute for legislation Congress failed to pass.   Nor does Article II contain a final paragraph reading, “and whatever else seems necessary at the time.”

Congress writes the laws.

The president executes the law—as written.

This does not leave the president without a legislative voice. Quite the contrary.  The Constitution expressly permits him to recommend measures to Congress; modern presidents maintain entire staffs devoted to advancing their legislative priorities on Capitol Hill. They propose legislation. They negotiate with members of Congress and the relevant committees. They persuade.  And they may even help congressional offices turn presidential priorities into legislative language. But the distinction remains:  They help Congress make the law. They do not make it themselves.

That division has never been quite as tidy in practice as it appears on paper.  Government would become nearly impossible if Congress had to specify every administrative decision required to carry out every statute. Congress therefore delegates considerable authority to executive agencies, and presidents possess constitutional powers independent of Congress.

Presidential action has plenty of room, though not infinite room.

Harry Truman discovered this in 1952.

The United States was fighting the Korean War. A nationwide steel strike threatened. Truman feared that shutting down the mills would disrupt production needed for the war effort, so he ordered his secretary of commerce to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills.

The circumstances were serious. The president's concern was genuine. The country was at war.

There was only one difficulty: Congress had not authorized him to seize the mills.

The case reached the Supreme Court as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, and the Court ruled against Truman. Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opinion supplied what became one of the most enduring ways of thinking about presidential power.

Jackson essentially described three circumstances. A president acting with authority Congress has granted him stands at the height of his power. When Congress has neither granted nor denied authority, the president enters Jackson's famous “zone of twilight.” But when a president acts against Congress's expressed or implied will, his power reaches its “lowest ebb.”

It is difficult to imagine a more useful constitutional warning label.

The question is not simply whether the president has acted.

The question is where the authority for the action came from.

That brings us to executive orders.

There is nothing inherently suspicious about them. Indeed, the Constitution itself does not mention executive orders, and no general statute creates a presidential power to issue them. Their authority instead derives from something underneath them: a constitutional power belonging to the president or authority Congress has delegated by statute.

An executive order therefore cannot create its own authority merely by announcing that authority exists. This produces a rather curious result: The paper does not empower the president.

Only the Constitution or the law does.

There is another distinction worth remembering. Executive orders frequently do not outlive the president who issued them. A successor may revoke or revise many of them, and changes of administration routinely bring reviews of a predecessor’s executive actions. Laws are different. A new president cannot repeal an act of Congress merely by reaching for another pen.

This distinction matters most when presidents venture into areas where the Constitution has assigned substantial authority elsewhere.

Consider elections.

In March 2025, President Donald Trump issued an executive order titled Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections. Among other things, the order directed changes involving documentary proof of citizenship on the federal voter-registration form, access to federal databases for citizenship verification, enforcement priorities and conditions involving certain federal election-related funds.

Whatever one thinks of those policies is a separate question; the constitutional question comes first: Where does the president's authority to impose them begin, and where does it end?

That question cannot be answered merely by pointing to the words executive order at the top of the page.

Nor can it be answered by treating Article II as a reservoir into which presidents may lower a bucket whenever Congress declines to act.

This is where arguments over presidential power become more consequential than the individual policies producing them.

Article II unquestionably gives the president substantial authority of his own, including authority to supervise the executive branch. Congress cannot reduce the president to a ceremonial clerk carrying papers from one federal building to another. But acknowledging a strong executive does not require inventing a legislative one.

The executive power belongs to the president.

The legislative power does not.

That distinction may sound elementary, and perhaps it once was.

But the growth of the modern presidency has gradually changed the way Americans experience government. Presidents campaign on promises to “do” things. Television cameras follow them as they sign executive orders. News organizations report immediately on what the president has “ordered.” Agencies begin implementing instructions. Lawsuits follow. Judges issue injunctions. Appeals proceed.

And somewhere during that sequence, the constitutional question has quietly taken refuge.

Instead of asking whether the president possessed the authority in the first place, we wait to see whether a governor, an organization, Congress, or a federal judge can successfully prevent him from exercising it.

Presidential authority becomes the assumption.

Its limits become the thing that must be proved.

That is a significant change in constitutional expectations even when the courts eventually impose those limits.

Consequently, a president need not win every lawsuit to enlarge the practical presidency. A president need only establish the expectation that presidential action comes first and constitutional examination afterward.

The executive order is particularly suited to this development because it is immediate.

Congress is not.

Legislation requires committees, hearings, bargaining, amendments, votes in two chambers and, usually, a presidential signature. It is cumbersome because representative government is cumbersome. The Constitution did not design Congress for speed. It designed Congress to require agreement.

An executive order requires considerably fewer people.

Usually, one—the president.

That makes executive action enormously attractive when Congress is divided, slow, unwilling, or simply absent from the field. It also creates an understandable temptation for every president: if Congress will not provide the policy you want, discover whether executive authority can provide something resembling it.

Sometimes it can.

Sometimes it cannot.

And sometimes the answer will occupy federal judges for months while the government begins moving as though the answer were already yes.

None of this makes executive orders illegitimate; they are indispensable instruments of modern government. Nor does it mean presidents must sit motionless until Congress supplies explicit instructions for every decision.

It means something simpler: authority must precede action.

Not the other way around.

That principle becomes especially important when the subject is elections, because the Constitution does not place the conduct of American elections entirely—or even principally—inside Article II. States possess important responsibilities. Congress possesses important powers. Statutes establish electoral rules. Courts interpret them.

The president participates in that constitutional system; he does not stand above it.

And that is where our next difficulty begins.

Because once Americans become accustomed to presidents testing the outer boundaries of executive authority in ordinary governance, another question inevitably follows: What happens when the thing being governed is the process by which presidents themselves are chosen?

That question deserves its own examination.

For now, it is enough to remember the older and simpler maxim: A president may sign an executive order; he may direct the executive branch.

He may exercise the considerable powers Article II provides him.

He may execute laws enacted by Congress.

But there remains one document no president can produce merely by signing his name.

A law.

—Dunneagin


Keep reading: Trump's Golden Dome

📬 To receive each new essay by email the day it publishes, subscribe to Civics Unhinged.

☕ Reader editions and collected volumes—including Volumes 1, 2, 3, and The Liar’s Guide to Autocracy—are available on the Fourthwall bookshelf.

If this week’s dispatch aligned with your reading, forward it to an un-unhinged colleague who still keeps an eye on the clockwork.

Reader and listener correspondence is always welcome at dunneagin@dunneagin.net. Questions, observations, or a note on how you first stumbled into the chronicle are particularly appreciated.

A note on the shelf: Every Tuesday dispatch compiles toward a permanent, physical record. We print what the screen forgets.