Editor’s Note: With The Quiet Erosion of Public Trust, Civics Unhinged concludes its third season.
If you prefer to listen, click here for the spoken edition. If you prefer to read, the dispatch continues below.
Much of this season has examined the changing American presidency: the expansion of presidential power, the weakening of congressional restraint, the politicization of professional government, the substitution of performance for governance, and the consequences when loyalty begins displacing independent judgment.
This final essay considers what may outlast all of them.
Laws can be rewritten. Executive orders can be rescinded. Officials can be replaced. Presidential norms can be restored.
Public trust is different.
Once citizens begin questioning whether official information is reliable, whether professional judgment has become political, or whether government institutions serve the country rather than the person temporarily controlling them, confidence cannot simply be restored by presidential decree.
And eventually the question becomes larger still: Do citizens continue believing sufficiently in democratic government to participate in it?
That is where Season 3 ends.
Not with Donald Trump.
With the democratic inheritance that may remain after him.
— F. P. Dunneagin
Democracies rarely lose public confidence all at once.
There is usually no announcement. No official notice informs citizens that, beginning Monday morning, they should treat statements from their government with greater skepticism. No agency issues a regulation advising the public that professional judgment may now be subject to political revision.
It happens more quietly than that.
A statistic is questioned because someone dislikes what it says. An expert learns that unwelcome information carries professional consequences. An agency once assumed to speak with professional independence and expertise begins sounding suspiciously like the administration it serves.
None of these moments necessarily changes anyone's mind.
But they accumulate.
And eventually a citizen encountering information from his government begins adding a question that once seemed unnecessary:
Can I trust this?
That may be among the more consequential inheritances of the Trump presidency.
Much of the attention paid to Donald Trump's second term has understandably focused on what he has changed: executive authority, the civil service, foreign policy, congressional relationships, regulatory enforcement and the customary boundaries surrounding presidential behavior.
Those changes matter.
But democratic government depends on something less visible than statutes, executive orders and organizational charts.
It depends upon a sufficient number of citizens believing that the institutions exercising public authority are fundamentally worthy of their confidence.
Not agreement.
Confidence.
Americans have never been required to agree with their government. Distrust of authority is practically a national inheritance. We were arguing with government before we had one of our own.
Healthy skepticism is not a democratic defect.
The difficulty begins when skepticism about a policy becomes skepticism about the institution providing the information, and when skepticism about the institution becomes an assumption that professional judgment itself has become political.
That transition can occur almost imperceptibly.
A public-health agency reports something politically inconvenient. Does the citizen accept the information as the product of professional analysis—or first ask whether the president approves of it?
A government economist releases unwelcome numbers. Are those numbers evidence to be evaluated, or another front in a political argument?
A career official offers advice contradicting the preferred presidential narrative. Is that expertise—or disloyalty?
Once those questions become routine, something important has already changed.
The problem is not simply that one president may receive worse information. It is that citizens begin learning the same lesson as the people working inside government: information may have a political price.
And learned distrust is difficult to unlearn.
We have been here before.
Watergate did not destroy the American constitutional system. In important respects, it demonstrated its resilience. Legal prosecutions proceeded. Courts acted. Congress asserted itself. Richard Nixon resigned. Gerald Ford assumed the presidency. Laws were changed, and reforms followed.
Then, in 1976, Americans elected Jimmy Carter.
It was hardly Lyndon Johnson's 1964 landslide. Carter defeated Ford by roughly two percentage points and won just over 50 percent of the votes cast.
But another number hid behind the election result.
Nearly half of the voting-age population did not vote.
That cannot simply be attributed to Watergate. Americans decline to vote for countless reasons, and political disengagement long predates Richard Nixon.
But the juxtaposition deserves attention.
The constitutional system had survived its crisis.
Public confidence had not necessarily survived with it.
Carter entered the White House promising honesty, competence, and a government as good as the American people. He appointed different officials. Congress enacted reforms. The procedures and expectations surrounding presidential government changed.
What neither Carter nor Congress could do was pass a law requiring Americans to trust their government again.
That distinction may become important when the Trump presidency ends.
We naturally tend to think of political restoration mechanically.
A future administration will reverse policies. Laws will be rewritten. Executive orders will be rescinded. Experienced officials will be returned to government. Professional standards will be reasserted. Norms abandoned during the Trump years will be restored on paper.
Some changes may occur remarkably quickly.
Hungary may now be providing an early illustration of both the possibilities and the danger.
For years, Viktor Orbán's Hungary served as an object of admiration among parts of the international populist right—a demonstration of how a democratically elected government could systematically reshape institutions, concentrate authority, and alter expectations surrounding democratic governance.
Now Péter Magyar's government is moving rapidly in the opposite direction, attempting to dismantle the political system Orbán constructed.
The temptation is to view democratic restoration as the film running backward.
It isn't.
Institutions can be changed much faster than political habits. Officials can be replaced faster than expectations. Rules can be rewritten faster than citizens can be persuaded to trust the institutions enforcing them again.
And restoration carries its own danger.
A government determined to repair democratic institutions quickly must avoid adopting the very proposition that helped damage them: that the urgency of the mission excuses weakening ordinary restraints.
That will be one of the challenges confronting post-Trump America as well.
That greater danger may not become apparent until the presidency changes hands.
Laws will be rewritten. Executive orders will be rescinded. Experienced officials will be returned to government. Norms will be restored on paper.
But public trust is different.
Once citizens have learned to ask whether official information is accurate, whether professional judgment has been subordinated to politics, or whether institutions are serving the country rather than the person temporarily controlling them, a new administration cannot simply instruct them to stop asking.
Nor should it.
Trust bestowed automatically is not especially democratic either.
The task will be to make government trustworthy enough that confidence becomes reasonable again.
That will require more than changing presidents.
It will require institutions willing to tell political leaders things they do not want to hear. Career officials confident that professional judgment will not be treated as insubordination. Public information that remains reliable when its conclusions are politically inconvenient. A Congress willing to defend its own constitutional responsibilities regardless of who occupies the White House.
Above all, it will require time.
Erosion works slowly.
So does rebuilding.
And perhaps that is where the deepest consequence of declining public trust ultimately appears—not in opinion polls measuring confidence in Congress, presidents or federal agencies, but in whether citizens continue believing that their own participation in democratic government matters.
We have already seen what happens when enormous numbers of Americans withdraw from that responsibility. Nearly 88 million eligible voters sat out the 2024 election—the 33.4 percent whose absence helped determine what followed.
The satire practically wrote itself: democracy works best when left to somebody else.
A democracy does not require every citizen to admire its government.
It does require enough citizens to believe that participation can still change it.
The inheritance of the next presidency will therefore include not merely institutions requiring repair, but citizens who must once again be persuaded that those institutions deserve their confidence.
The first measure of restored public trust may not be what Americans tell pollsters about government.
It may be whether they believe sufficiently in democratic government to participate in it.
— Dunneagin
Keep reading: The Truths Presidents Hear—or Don't
📬 To receive each new essay by email the day it publishes, subscribe to Civics Unhinged.
☕ Reader editions and collected volumes—including Volumes 1, 2, 3, and The Liar’s Guide to Autocracy—are available on the Fourthwall bookshelf.
If this week’s dispatch aligned with your reading, forward it to an un-unhinged colleague who still keeps an eye on the clockwork.
Reader and listener correspondence is always welcome at dunneagin@dunneagin.net. Questions, observations, or a note on how you first stumbled into the chronicle are particularly appreciated.
A note on the shelf: Every Tuesday dispatch compiles toward a permanent, physical record. We print what the screen forgets.