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Ronald Reagan had been president for a little more than two years when he went on television and asked American scientists to do something rather ambitious: Make nuclear weapons obsolete.
The idea became the Strategic Defense Initiative. Everybody else called it “Star Wars.”
Reagan imagined a network of technologies capable of detecting and destroying Soviet ballistic missiles before they reached the United States. It was audacious, enormously expensive, technologically daunting and, depending upon whom you asked, either the beginning of the end of nuclear terror or a splendid way to spend several fortunes discovering that physics had not been consulted.
Star Wars never became the protective shield Reagan envisioned.
But presidential dreams have long shelf lives.
Four decades later, Donald Trump dusted off the idea and gave it a name he had borrowed from Israel: Iron Dome for America.
There was a small problem.
Israel's Iron Dome actually exists.
It is an extraordinarily sophisticated system designed primarily to intercept relatively short-range rockets and other aerial threats aimed at a country roughly the size of New Jersey. The United States is somewhat larger than New Jersey.
Trump wants to protect all of it.
Not merely against short-range rockets, either. His American dome would confront ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, and other threats arriving from considerably farther away than the Gaza Strip.
Eventually, somebody apparently noticed that America wasn't actually building a bigger version of Israel's Iron Dome.
And since Israel already had an “Iron Dome,” there was an obvious branding problem. Donald Trump was hardly going to spend $185 billion to copy somebody else's dome.
Thus, Iron became Golden.
The laws of physics were informed of the upgrade.
Star Wars, Now with Better Branding
The Golden Dome would not really be a dome. No enormous, gold-plated lid would be lowered gently over Kansas, though one hesitates to rule out the commemorative rendering.
Instead, Trump’s Golden Dome concept would combine satellites, sensors and interceptors operating on land, at sea and in space. Some of those technologies already exist. Others would have to be developed, expanded or deployed on a scale never before attempted.
Trump says the system will cost about $175 billion to $185 billion.
The Pentagon wants an initial operational capability before Trump leaves office.
And Trump has spoken of protection approaching 100 percent.
There is something wonderfully Trumpian about 100 percent missile defense. Ninety percent leaves room for improvement. Ninety-nine percent suggests insufficient confidence. One hundred percent says the missiles have been notified.
Unfortunately for Trump, the Congressional Budget Office has also been doing some thinking.
CBO cannot tell us what Trump's Golden Dome will cost because the Pentagon has not publicly revealed enough about precisely what it intends to build. So, CBO did the next best thing: it constructed what it calls a “notional” national missile defense system—essentially, a model based on the capabilities Trump's executive order says the system should have.
Its twenty-year estimate came to approximately $1.2 trillion.
Now, fairness requires saying that Trump's $185 billion and CBO's $1.2 trillion are not estimates of precisely the same system over precisely the same period. But when one estimate is expressed in billions, and the other has acquired a T, it is generally advisable to ask another question before ordering the commemorative shovels.
And then there is space.
The Inconvenience of Orbit
There is an inherent problem with putting part of your dome into space.
Space refuses to stay put.
A space-based interceptor in low Earth orbit does not park itself politely above North Korea waiting for Kim Jong Un to misbehave. It travels around the planet.
While this is considered excellent behavior for a satellite, it is less convenient for a roof.
For portions of each orbit, an interceptor may be positioned where it could respond to a particular missile launch. For the remainder, it is somewhere else—perhaps protecting Nebraska from something that has not been launched from somewhere it isn't.
The solution is obvious.
Add another interceptor.
Unfortunately, that one will move too.
So, add another.
And another.
Pretty soon, you discover one of the fundamental truths of missile defense: once you start trying to defend a continent from space, satellites begin multiplying like rabbits with security clearances.
The numbers get large quickly.
CBO's modeling shows how quickly the cost of space-based interception can dominate the cost of such a system. More demanding threats require more interceptors, more launches, more replacements, and more money.
A lot more money.
This does not mean Golden Dome cannot work.
It means Golden Dome is two words.
Building one requires several more words.
The President Has an Idea
Now the story becomes less about missiles than about presidents.
Presidents are supposed to have large ideas.
Kennedy decided America should put a man on the moon.
Eisenhower championed an interstate highway system across a nation that had never built anything remotely like it.
Reagan asked whether American technology could make nuclear missiles obsolete.
Some presidential ambitions succeed spectacularly. Some succeed partially. Some fail. Some produce useful things while failing to achieve the grand objective that started them.
That is not the problem.
The problem begins when presidential ambition stops being a question posed to government and becomes an answer imposed on it.
Kennedy did not walk into NASA carrying blueprints for the Saturn V rocket.
Eisenhower did not personally determine the proper banking angle of Interstate 95.
Reagan did not announce that because he wanted Star Wars, the technological problems associated with Star Wars had therefore been solved.
Presidents set destinations.
Then comes government: Scientists say whether something is possible.
Engineers say whether it can be built.
Military officers say whether it will work.
Strategists ask what adversaries will do in response.
Budget analysts arrive carrying calculators and ruin everyone's afternoon.
Congress asks how much it costs, whether it makes sense, and whether anybody intends to tell Congress what is actually going on.
Eventually, after everyone has thoroughly annoyed everyone else, a policy emerges.
This can be untidy. It is also the point.
The Tuesday Problem
Trump has always shown a particular affection for solutions that can be reduced to objects.
Immigration is complicated: Build a wall.
International trade is complicated: Impose tariffs.
Missile defense is complicated: Build a dome.
The object becomes the policy.
This was what made the original Iron Dome proposal so revealing. The attraction was not merely military. It was conceptual. A national-security problem of extraordinary complexity could be transformed into something voters could see.
Trump’s pronouncement becomes the solution: We will build a shield. Problem solved.
Except problems do not become simpler merely because presidents give them shorter names.
A wall still must confront migration patterns, geography, law, commerce and human ingenuity.
A tariff still must confront supply chains, retaliation, prices and markets.
And a Golden Dome still must confront orbital mechanics.
Reality is irritating that way.
It insists upon participating.
The Dome We Actually Need
Wanting better missile defenses is not absurd.
The threats are real. Technology changes. Systems that seemed impossible decades ago may become possible tomorrow. A president who never asks government to attempt something difficult is not necessarily prudent. He may simply lack imagination.
So, let presidents dream.
Let them challenge assumptions.
Let them tell scientists and engineers that yesterday's limitations need not become tomorrow's.
Let them ask whether America can do something nobody has done before.
But then comes the part that matters.
They must respect the answers they receive.
Because the scientists, engineers, military officers, budget analysts, and members of Congress surrounding a president are not obstacles placed there to prevent presidential greatness.
They are part of the machinery through which presidential ambition encounters reality.
Sometimes they will say yes.
Sometimes they will say not yet.
Sometimes they will say it will cost six times what you think.
And occasionally they will explain that the satellite you wanted protecting North America is currently over the Indian Ocean.
A reimagined presidency should be ambitious enough to ask extraordinary things of government.
It must also be disciplined enough to hear what government says in return.
Trump wants to build a dome over America.
But before we worry about whether it can stop missiles, perhaps we should make certain it does not stop the one thing every president needs most.
Reality.
—Dunneagin
Earlier dispatch: The Refund That Explained the Tariff
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