Civics Unhinged

Civics Unhinged

Who Decides What the Military Can Afford to Lose?

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Pete Hegseth has decided that the United States military can get along with considerably fewer generals and admirals.

He has ordered a 20 percent reduction in general and flag officer positions, apparently convinced that the armed forces have accumulated more senior military leadership than the nation requires.

Perhaps he is right.

The United States military is a large institution, and large institutions have a remarkable capacity for accumulating positions whose original purposes have long since disappeared. Some generals may indeed be commanding organizations that no longer need commanding. Others may be supervising responsibilities that could be discharged just as effectively by someone wearing fewer stars.

But how does the secretary know which are which?

Presumably, someone has calculated what the armed forces will gain by eliminating these positions. Whether anyone has calculated what the military might lose is another matter.

The departure of an experienced military officer is seldom accompanied by a ceremony for the judgment that departs with him.

There may be a retirement parade, a few speeches, and the customary assurances that the institution will carry on. And, of course, it will. Armies have survived the departure of generals for centuries. Indeed, some have improved considerably as a result.

But an army is not simply a collection of people wearing uniforms. It is also a repository of accumulated experience: the mistakes remembered, the assumptions challenged, the questions asked.

One need only recall the assembly last September of some 800 generals and admirals, a gathering representing an estimated 24,000–28,000 years of combined military service.

Experience, of course, is not infallibility. Some generals have devoted entire careers to preparing for the previous war, occasionally with considerable success, while others are focused on how future wars might be fought.

The question is not whether the military can function with fewer generals and admirals.

The question becomes, then, who determines what the military can afford to lose?

The Secretary's Prerogative

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth describes his proposed reduction initiative as an effort to eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy and improve military effectiveness.

There is nothing inherently unreasonable about that objective.

Military organizations accumulate headquarters, committees, and administrative staffs. Some positions may have outlived their usefulness. Others may duplicate functions that could be performed more efficiently elsewhere.

A smaller leadership structure might also improve decision-making, accelerate adaptations, and free resources for more pressing military requirements.

But the existence of unnecessary bureaucracy does not establish that any particular position is unnecessary. Nor does selecting a reduction of 20% establish that 20% is the appropriate number.

That requires analysis.

 Which positions have become redundant? Which responsibilities will disappear? Which will be transferred to other officers? What additional burdens will those officers assume? What capabilities might be weakened, and what measures will protect them?

These are not arguments against reform. They are the questions that distinguish reform from an exercise in subtraction.

And they are questions members of Congress have begun asking.

Show Your Work

Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, including Republicans who acknowledge that reductions may be justified, have questioned Secretary Hegseth’s explanations and the lack of consultation accompanying his plans.

Their position is hardly revolutionary.

They have not argued that the military must preserve every general's position or that the defense secretary lacks authority to pursue organizational reform.

They want to understand the reasoning behind the decisions.

Why these positions? Why this number? What military requirements support the changes? What operational risks will accompany them?

In other words, Congress is asking the secretary to show his work.

This is a familiar request in American education. Students are encouraged to demonstrate how they arrived at an answer, even when the answer happens to be correct.

The practice has considerable merit in government, where a mistaken calculation can produce consequences somewhat more serious than a disappointing report card.

Yet the distinction between authority and justification is easily obscured.

A defense secretary possesses substantial authority over military organization and personnel, within the limits established by law.

But authority answers the question of who may make a decision.

It does not establish that the decision is wise.

Nor does civilian control of the armed forces eliminate Congress's constitutional responsibilities for military organization, funding, and oversight.

The secretary's authority is not in dispute merely because Congress asks him to explain how he has exercised it. Indeed, the more consequential the decision, the greater the need to understand its reasoning.

The Question of Judgment

The concern extends beyond the number of officers who may leave their positions.

Professional military judgment is not distributed evenly across an organizational chart.

An officer's experience may include knowledge of particular adversaries, coalition operations, logistical systems, or past decisions whose consequences remain relevant long after their authors have departed.

Not every such officer is indispensable. Nor does institutional memory automatically produce sound advice. But an organization contemplating substantial reductions ought to determine which knowledge and capabilities must be preserved.

There is another consideration: civilian leaders are entitled to reject military advice. They are not obliged to accept the recommendations of generals merely because those generals have spent decades in uniform.

But civilian control works best when the advice being rejected has been candidly given.

An officer who warns that a proposed course of action carries unacceptable risks is not necessarily challenging civilian authority. He may be fulfilling his professional responsibility.

A secretary who hears only what he wishes to hear may enjoy exceptionally agreeable briefings. Whether he enjoys equally agreeable results is another matter.

This concern has particular significance because Hegseth's personnel decisions have already prompted allegations of ideological interference in military leadership and promotions.

Those allegations do not establish that the proposed 20% reduction is ideologically motivated. The reasons for particular decisions must be examined on their own evidence.

Those allegations and concerns do not disappear merely because the secretary possesses authority to make personnel decisions.

A credible explanation grounded in military requirements would help distinguish professional restructuring from ideological preference.

Until that explanation is available for examination, the question remains open.

The Cost of an Unanswered Question

The military is already confronting changes in warfare that demand institutional adaptability.

Drones, dispersed operations, vulnerable installations, strained logistics, and rapidly evolving technologies are challenging assumptions about how forces should be organized and commanded.

These developments do not demonstrate that Hegseth's proposed reductions will diminish military effectiveness. They do demonstrate why the consequences of his proposed restructuring deserve careful examination.

The officer who insists that yesterday's methods remain adequate may obstruct necessary innovation. The officer who remembers why those methods were adopted may prevent a costly mistake.

Sometimes they are the same officer.

Determining the difference is a responsibility shared by civilian and military leadership.

So is determining whether a smaller senior officer corps will improve the armed forces' ability to confront current and future challenges—or diminish capabilities that will be difficult to restore.

That assessment should precede consequential reductions, not emerge as an explanation after their effects become apparent.

Congress has an obligation to examine the evidence, not simply register concern. If the Pentagon has conducted a rigorous assessment, lawmakers should scrutinize it. If the assessment is incomplete, they should establish what remains unknown before accepting the proposed changes.

The public record does not establish that no analysis exists or that none has been provided privately. It does establish that lawmakers have publicly questioned whether the Pentagon has an adequate explanation for its plans.

That distinction matters.

So does the larger principle: A defense secretary's authority to reorganize the military is not proof that his reorganization will make it stronger.

The question is not whether Pete Hegseth can eliminate senior military positions.

It is whether he can demonstrate that the military will be better served by their elimination.

And if he cannot, Congress has a responsibility to ask why.

The consequences of his actions will not necessarily depart when the secretary does.

The military can survive the departure of generals.

What it cannot afford is to discover, too late, that it has discarded something it did not know how to replace.

— Dunneagin