# The Military Readiness Question No One Wants to Answer

Notes & Observations

![F.P. Dunneagin avatar](https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=32,height=32,format=webp/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/f9f4f828ec9599c1a612328fd5fc68b0a04bc6e95efbf3ad2ac3828090c1c7b7.png)  F.P. Dunneagin     October 27, 2026 · 3 min read      ![Cover image for The Military Readiness Question No One Wants to Answer](https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1920,height=960,quality=90,format=webp/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/d23f99e0bfd004b000e83ae84669380abac402fc174a66def36832152df4af9a.jpg)

There is an important difference between commanding the world's most powerful military and understanding what makes it powerful. The former requires winning a presidential election. The latter requires considerably more.

In an October 16 analysis published by *Le Monde*, Nathalie Guibert examines the increasingly troubled relationship between President Donald Trump, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and the American military establishment. Her assessment raises a question that deserves considerably more attention in Washington: What happens to military readiness when professional judgment becomes subordinate to political loyalty?

The question is neither partisan nor theoretical. It concerns the institutional foundations of American military effectiveness.

Consider the administration's proposed reduction of 20 percent in the number of generals and admirals. There may be legitimate reasons to reduce senior officer billets. Military organizations, like other large institutions, require periodic examination of their structure, efficiency, and allocation of resources.

But the relevant question is not whether the Pentagon has too many generals. It is whether anyone has determined which positions can be eliminated without diminishing the military's capacity to plan, command, coordinate, and sustain operations.

That requires analysis, not applause.

General Christopher Donahue's reported exclusion from consideration for senior commands illustrates another concern. According to reporting cited by *Le Monde*, Donahue's association with the final American withdrawal from Afghanistan appears to have become a political liability, notwithstanding his distinguished military record.

If professional advancement depends increasingly upon political acceptability, the consequences extend well beyond individual officers. Every officer watching such decisions learns something about what the institution rewards—and what it punishes.

An organization in which disagreement becomes professionally hazardous may eventually discover that its leaders have become remarkably agreeable. That is not necessarily an improvement in military effectiveness.

Guibert identifies a second danger: the diminishing influence of experienced military advisers willing to challenge presidential assumptions.

The importance of such advisers is not that they possess an infallible understanding of warfare. They do not. Their value lies in their capacity to examine assumptions, identify operational limitations, and explain consequences that political leaders may prefer not to contemplate.

The war against Iran provides an immediate reason for concern. The expenditure of munitions, the strain on American resources, and the strategic consequences of prolonged operations are not abstractions. They affect the nation's capacity to respond to subsequent contingencies.

Military readiness is not simply a question of how much equipment the United States possesses. It is also a question of what remains available, where it is positioned, how quickly it can be replenished, and whether commanders possess the experienced personnel necessary to employ it effectively.

Nor is readiness improved by treating military education as an ideological indulgence. Modern warfare requires technological sophistication, historical understanding, logistical competence, and the intellectual capacity to recognize when established assumptions have become obsolete.

An armed force that discourages intellectual independence risks becoming less capable of adapting to the very conflicts it is expected to fight.

Finally, *Le Monde* raises the danger of employing military forces for domestic political purposes. This is not merely a constitutional concern, although that concern is substantial. It also threatens the relationship of public confidence upon which an American military serving the nation, rather than a particular president, depends.

The armed forces swear allegiance to the Constitution. That distinction is fundamental.

None of these developments, considered individually, proves that the American military has become incapable of fulfilling its missions. Together, however, they raise a question that Congress should be examining with considerably greater urgency.

What is the cumulative operational cost of removing experienced leaders, discouraging independent advice, redirecting professional education, consuming critical munitions, and introducing political considerations into military decision-making?

That cost may not become apparent during a parade, a Pentagon press conference, or a presidential address.

It may become apparent when the country next requires its military to accomplish something extraordinarily difficult.

And by then, restoring what has been lost may be considerably more expensive than preserving it would have been.

— Dunneagin

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**Source:** Nathalie Guibert, “[Commander-in-chief Trump is putting his military at risk](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2026/10/16/commander-in-chief-trump-puts-his-military-at-risk_6758656_23.html),”

*Le Monde*, October 16, 2026.

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