# Futarchy won't save DAOs

By [tullu](https://paragraph.com/@tullu) · 2025-04-14

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**Deterministic Outcome Requirement**

Polymarket works well because markets resolve to binary or deterministic events.

Example: Will Biden win the election? Yes/No — and after the event happens, it’s clear who won.

In DAO token futarchy, you're trying to "resolve" to something fuzzy: Did this decision increase the token price?

Problem: Token prices are messy, lagged, manipulated, and don't give you a clean deterministic endpoint.

Plus, timing matters a lot: when do you measure the price post-decision? Immediately? After 24h? Over a 7-day TWAP?

**Decision Market vs Spot Market Discrepancy**

DAO decision markets simulate token price impact, but with poor liquidity and no real settlement, it becomes a self-referential game. People aren’t really incentivized to "predict correctly" — they’re incentivized to play the game for internal rewards, not external truth.

The moment you exit the decision market and compare it to the spot market, you're exposed to:

*   Thin liquidity
    
*   Manipulation ("fuckery")
    
*   Whales arbitraging your decision outcome
    
*   No arb constraints like TWAP / cooldowns / linear vesting, which were protecting you in the decision market
    

**MetaDAO Implementation Weakness**

MetaDAO's approach lacks a clean way to measure the actual outcome.  
Without this, the whole thing risks being just a gamified voting mechanism, not a true prediction market or futarchy.

**Futarchy needs reliable endgames. Without reliable endgames, you get gamification, not governance.**

There must be a solution, or maybe polynya was right

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*Originally published on [tullu](https://paragraph.com/@tullu/futarchy-won-t-save-daos)*