#  participant makes

> unexpected

**Published by:** [vghrtrw.eth](https://paragraph.com/@vghrtrw.eth/)
**Published on:** 2024-04-24
**URL:** https://paragraph.com/@vghrtrw.eth/participant-makes

## Content

That is, if a participant makes a misbehavior (including unexpected situations), the penalty they receive will increase with the number of other participants who misbehave at the same time as them. (measured as total ETH). This technique is already used in Ethereum's penalty mechanism. However, the emergence of edge case incentives in highly specific attack scenarios that may never occur in practice may Not enough to incentivize decentralization. This post proposes extending similar anti-correlated incentives to more “mundane” failure cases, such as missing a proof, which almost all validators experience at least occasionally. "

## Publication Information

- [vghrtrw.eth](https://paragraph.com/@vghrtrw.eth/): Publication homepage
- [All Posts](https://paragraph.com/@vghrtrw.eth/): More posts from this publication
- [RSS Feed](https://api.paragraph.com/blogs/rss/@vghrtrw.eth): Subscribe to updates

## Optional

- [Collect as NFT](https://paragraph.com/@vghrtrw.eth/participant-makes): Support the author by collecting this post
- [View Collectors](https://paragraph.com/@vghrtrw.eth/participant-makes/collectors): See who has collected this post