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            <title><![CDATA[Decentralized Data Marketplaces - Blockchain and Privacy]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@harvardblockchain/decentralized-data-marketplaces-blockchain-and-privacy</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Jul 2022 18:08:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[When Amazon’s Greg Linden applied for a patent for “item to item collaborative filtering” in 1998, he couldn’t possibly have imagined the societal impact it would have. Previously, Amazon had used data based on an individual&apos;s purchases to recommend a product they might like; this approach was inefficient because it recommended things that were extremely similar to what the customer had bought before. In fact, this first method of using data was so bad that Amazon was almost better off h...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Amazon’s <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.amazon.com/Big-Data-Revolution-Transform-Think/dp/0544227751/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2XSOIPDS64VCT&amp;keywords=big+data+a+revolution+that+will+transform&amp;qid=1651602656&amp;sprefix=big+data+a+%2Caps%2C106&amp;sr=8-1">Greg Linden</a> applied for a patent for “item to item collaborative filtering” in 1998, he couldn’t possibly have imagined the societal impact it would have. Previously, Amazon had used data based on an individual&apos;s purchases to recommend a product they might like; this approach was inefficient because it recommended things that were extremely similar to what the customer had bought before. In fact, this first method of using data was so bad that Amazon was almost better off having their team of book critics pick what to promote on the landing page. Linden’s technique was revolutionary because it made associations across products and customers - if there were correlations between buying a bike and sneakers, then a customer who bought a bike would be shown sneakers as well. Today this seems obvious, but this technique is responsible for turning data collecting, buying, and selling into an annual 100 billion dollar industry.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/677192510376af2081f35ab1c900565d9bbd1efb30a802eca93fd574ac27263b.png" alt="Volume of data/information created, captured, copied, and consumed worldwide from 2010 to 2025" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Volume of data/information created, captured, copied, and consumed worldwide from 2010 to 2025</figcaption></figure><h3 id="h-data-is-the-new-oil" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Data is the new oil</h3><p>The practice of using ‘Big Data’ to inform business may have started with Amazon, but now, almost every company with an online presence uses data in a variety of ways. Walmart uses correlation between what products are bought at the same time (and even what the weather is like when certain products are bought) to decide how to organize their store and boost sales. Google records user search data to sell to advertisers so they can decide exactly what to show you based on your interests. At its most extreme, this practice is known as surveillance capitalism; one of the harshest critics of intrusive data collecting, Harvard professor and renowned author <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/20/shoshana-zuboff-age-of-surveillance-capitalism-google-facebook">Shoshana Zuboff </a> defines the web2 business model as the “unilateral claiming of private human experience as free raw material for translation into behavioral data.” New laws aimed at protecting consumers from data leaks and hacks, like the EU General Data Protection Regulation passed in 2018, are a good step to improving privacy but do not address the root issue; that is, companies are incentivized to collect data because it is profitable and therefore will continue to do so unless it stops being profitable.</p><p>The importance and abundance of data will only continue to grow; by 2035, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.thedigitalspeaker.com/book-the-organisation-of-tomorrow/">future tech strategist</a>, Dr. Mark van Rijmenam predicts that “the average person will interact with a connected device every 18 seconds”, meaning there will be a continuously increasing amount of data available for companies to monetize. However, as Dr. van Rijmenam also notes, there is growing demand from consumers to maintain their privacy. Hacks like what occurred to Equifax in 2017 (in which the credit data of 143 million Americans was exposed) hurt profits, tarnish a company&apos;s image, and increase consumer distrust. A solution that increases security and individual privacy during data transfers is needed, but a solution of this sort won’t see widespread adoption if it does not allow for companies to continue to profitably monetize their data.</p><h3 id="h-how-data-flows-today" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">How data flows today</h3><p>Currently, the global distribution of data between companies is handled by many specialized centralized data marketplaces, like DataStreamX, which connect owners of data to buyers. Companies buy data for all sorts of reasons because analyzing it helps them make better decisions and improve the quality of their service. For example, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.amazon.com/Big-Data-Revolution-Transform-Think/dp/0544227751/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2XSOIPDS64VCT&amp;keywords=big+data+a+revolution+that+will+transform&amp;qid=1651602656&amp;sprefix=big+data+a+%2Caps%2C106&amp;sr=8-1">Facebook buys data</a> from one-hundred and fifty companies so that their targeted advertisements can be more accurate. This provides revenue for the companies that sell the data and allows Facebook to charge more for better advertising, providing a net benefit to all parties. However, transferring data between companies and countries through centralized processes like this increases risk because it increases the points of failure and the number of people that get access to the data.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/cb059b58666009849e5663ef2ddbc8a4e997bff3a2c973d20c5d19b2a83b7231.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.webfx.com/blog/internet/what-are-data-brokers-and-what-is-your-data-worth-infographic/">Different types of data</a> is available on various platforms.</p><p>Data flows through many <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://bernardmarr.com/where-can-you-buy-big-data-here-are-the-biggest-consumer-data-brokers/">different marketplaces</a> and between companies themselves; Acxiom, Nielsen, Experian, Equifax, and Corelogic all gather data on millions of people, but each company is specialized in the types of data they hold. Acxiom is focused on consumer behavior, and the data they sell is used to make 12% of targeted marketing sales in the US on a yearly basis. Corelogic collects data on property transactions, and they sell it to real estate companies and banks so they can better determine mortgage rates. The average consumer has very little knowledge of where their information goes and even less control over it. Corporations that want this data for any reason can approach these big data brokers and buy it directly from them, offering no transparency to the consumer and creating an environment prone to hacks and data leaks.</p><h3 id="h-a-new-model-decentralized-data-marketplaces" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">A New Model: Decentralized Data Marketplaces</h3><p>Decentralized data marketplaces use blockchain to vastly improve security and privacy when connecting potential buyers and sellers of data. Entities, such as companies, data unions, or individuals, publish datasets on these marketplaces while maintaining complete control over who gets access to the data. Decentralized systems are uniquely powerful for facilitating data transactions because the inherent transparency increases user trust and the impenetrable security makes hacks and data leaks effectively obsolete. This technology is still in the beta stage and there is still lots of work to be done in terms of increasing user traction, but startups, like the non-profit Ocean Protocol, have proved that it can work and be beneficial for users.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/572c9fe4b62e5e214ccef6662f207a8a9c1392c2f000729275f2fde79360e7f7.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>The most well known decentralized data marketplace, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://oceanprotocol.com/">Ocean Protocol</a>, uses ERC-20 datatokens and “ERC-721 “Data NFTs”” to create an ecosystem in which users can grant access to datasets in exchange for tokens on Ethereum. The tokenization of data is important because it makes data more interoperable with the rest of the crypto and DeFi space. The NFTs represent unique assets and act as a copyright claim over a particular dataset, meaning ownership can never be compromised when sharing data. Each dataset is also given one or more unique tokens; holding a data token allows access to a particular service, so sellers grant access to their dataset by sending a token to a buyer.</p><p>When a seller publishes a dataset on Ocean, this amounts to an “Initial Data Offering” and Ocean automatically creates a unique ERC-20 datatoken and ERC-721 Data NFT to correspond to this new data asset. The seller can fix the price for access or let Ocean Market’s Automated Market Maker (powered by Balancer) auto-discover the price. Balancer provides the proof-of-liquidity service, allowing anyone to stake OCEAN (Ocean’s native token) in a “datatoken AMM pool” corresponding to a specific dataset; the key aspect of proof-of-liquidity is that staking the OCEAN token increases the liquidity in the system because OCEAN is tied to the value of each datasets unique coin.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/d1da2103df74d745127796067c6bb6c344131453b1e15f1c69dae4c93a31498f.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>The more OCEAN that is staked in a specific AMM pool, the higher the price to access the dataset. Individuals are incentivized to stake OCEAN in good datasets because they earn a percentage every time a transaction involving the dataset occurs; the more OCEAN staked, the higher the fee per transaction and the more they earn. Therefore, stakers are also curators because “the amount of stake is a proxy to dataset quality.” Essentially, individuals will try to pick good datasets in which to stake because they are incentivized to make money, and in turn, the quality of datasets will be collectively determined as more OCEAN is staked in better datasets.</p><h3 id="h-compute-to-data-and-increasing-utility" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Compute-to-data and Increasing Utility</h3><p>Using blockchain to power a fair marketplace for data is fascinating by itself, but the most interesting potential utility of Ocean lies with its <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://oceanprotocol.com/technology/compute-to-data">compute-to-data</a> technology; this new integration for its existing marketplace allows potential buyers to train algorithms on datasets that remain on the owner&apos;s premises. Essentially, this means users can train an AI or run an algorithm on a dataset, but never gain access to the individual data points. The transparent nature of blockchain prevents buyers from running any algorithm that the seller does not approve and ensures the data is never compromised. Ocean gives sellers the option to allow potential buyers to see sample data from the dataset; this means buyers can know how much ‘cleaning up’ of the data they will need to do. Sellers are also encouraged to clean the data themselves because people will stop buying it if it’s not useful. Additionally, most of the data that compute-to-data would first be used for is private and therefore well-curated, so buyers generally don’t have to worry about cleaning it before they use it.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/d1eaa70a20174ad22a860f69cc3ee892b6bf163b682ae0a1b3868aeef3bef544.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Compute-to-data is groundbreaking because it allows access to otherwise very private and sensitive data, for example health records. The existing healthcare system doesn’t allow hospitals to share patient records, but pooling information could have <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/compute-to-data-using-blockchain-to-decentralize-data-science-and-ai-with-the-ocean-protocol/">massive benefits</a>. If every hospital in the world shared all of their patient data, doctors would have a much better idea about correlations between symptoms and early indicators of disease, potentially saving millions of lives. Unfortunately, this is currently impossible because sharing this data directly would jeopardize patient information and could lead to hacks in which millions of individuals private health records are exposed.</p><p>Compute-to-data addresses the root issue - the fact that our data is being collected - because consumers can choose whether to make their data available in the first place. Therefore, it offers a path forward to a more secure and private society where individuals will benefit. But there is no easy solution for our data privacy problem; it is completely unrealistic to expect companies to stop recording and selling our data when this has become the dominant business model for web2.</p><p>Even if consumers continue to express their dislike of this system and the government increases regulation (like the new European GDPR), companies will still be incentivized to collect data because it’s so profitable. This is why the first layer of compute-to-data is important; it offers a chance for companies to continue to monetize their data without giving up any of their customers&apos; personal information. Additionally, GDPR prevents data from being shared across borders. This is an obstacle for many companies that want to buy user data, but Ocean allows access to data without transferring it off-premise - therefore making it compliant with this new regulation.</p><h3 id="h-oceans-traction" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Ocean’s Traction</h3><p>There’s still a ways to go to achieve this secure, decentralized method of sharing data, and the first step is the major adoption of blockchain-based marketplaces by brokers and buyers of data. As of this writing, Ocean&apos;s transaction volume is relatively low. However via Ocean&apos;s grants platform, there appear to be at least a dozen active teams building on Ocean, and maybe many more. There was a spike in usage after V3, their latest iteration, was released, but then a decline again due to issues with the staking feature in the marketplace and an increase in Ethereum gas fees. V4, which is still in beta, promises to guarantee safe staking and integrate Ocean with multiple other networks that have low gas fees like Polygon and Binance Smart chain.</p><p>Beyond perfecting the system, the founder of Ocean, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/trentmc0">Trent McConaghy</a>, sees a few traction hypotheses that could lead to a massive increase in the number of users. The most important in the near term and the go-to method for web3 is incentivization through liquidity mining; Ocean will release this shortly after V4. In the longer term, Ocean is working on catalyzing people to create their own projects on the platform through the grant program and other initiatives. This has created a lively and passionate community, which is essential for the long term success of the new data economy.</p><h3 id="h-beyond-marketplaces-data-unions" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Beyond marketplaces: Data Unions</h3><p>Trent recently outlined how Ocean’s technology can be used for applications beyond this first level as well; Ethereum DAO’s can power <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/oceanprotocol/8240426c2ecf">data unions</a> which pay royalties to individuals for the use of their data. Even further along, compute-to-data could be integrated with decentralized social media platforms. Data unions, like <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://swashapp.io/">Swash</a>, are DAO’s that allow individuals to monetize their own activity online using the principle of collective bargaining. Users download a browser extension which collects their cookies when they visit a website. This cookie data is then packaged with other DAO member’s data and listed on Ocean as a dataset. When a buyer pays to access the dataset, all members of the data union receive royalties.</p><p>Swash just collects cookie data, but it&apos;s possible that in the future, data unions will exist for all types of private user data. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.dataunion.app/">DataUnion</a> is an ecosystem that acts as a Shopify for other data unions, allowing others to build new data unions on their platform. Organizations like this are helping to build the new data economy, and if they are successful, it may not be too long before data is gathered ethically and users truly benefit.</p><h3 id="h-motivation-for-adoption-an-ideal-future" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Motivation for Adoption: An Ideal Future</h3><p>There are many reasons both consumers and businesses should be attracted to the utility of decentralized data marketplaces; namely, government pressure, hacks, and changing consumer habits based on greater awareness of how their data is abused. Realistically, the only way companies will stop exploiting the existing business model is a combination of new laws that prevent them from using data in the way they do now, and consumers hurting their profits through choosing to use other services. As more and more data is collected, the existing centralized system will continue to be exposed for lack of security and privacy, driving consumers to seek a new model.</p><p>Awareness continues to grow about Ocean, data unions, and the utility of blockchain in general. Consumers will ultimately decide whether the existing data business model gets replaced by decentralized data marketplaces, but in order for people to choose products like Ocean and Swash, the interface needs to be friendly and users need to have a decent understanding of and trust in blockchain technology. It may take some time to manifest, but the benefits of decentralization for the individual are undeniable - they offer the chance for a future where privacy still exists.</p><h3 id="h-about-the-author" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">About the Author</h3><p>Alexander Liptak is a student of the History of Science and web3 investor and enthusiast. He is interested in the societal impact of emerging technologies and how these will transform the human experience; his research explores the new definition of privacy and the importance of data in the global digital revolution.</p><p>Special thanks to <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/trentmc0">Trent McConaghy</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/roman_0x">Roman Ugarte</a> for their guidance and thoughtful feedback in the process of producing this piece.</p><p>Disclaimer: Harvard Blockchain and the author of this piece are not financial advisors. Nothing contained in this research piece should be construed as investment advice.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>harvardblockchain@newsletter.paragraph.com (Harvard Blockchain)</author>
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            <title><![CDATA[Software Directing Humans: Axes of the DAO Innovation Space ]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@harvardblockchain/software-directing-humans-axes-of-the-dao-innovation-space</link>
            <guid>fhYAJ1plgWKOqwptxHmg</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jun 2022 15:22:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[By: Alex Debayo-Doherty Cover Art: Seerlight - High-RiseExamining the Challenges, Intrinsic Strengths, and Target Design Principles of the Emerging DAO EcosystemIntentionThe intention of the piece is to offer a thesis-driven overview of the DAO innovation landscape and consider which organizational models will prevail in such a nascent space. Any survey of the DAO landscape at present is destined to become quickly outdated. In an effort to provide a more enduring analysis, this piece focuses ...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>By: </strong><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/adebdoh"><strong>Alex Debayo-Doherty</strong></a></p><p><strong>Cover Art: </strong><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://superrare.com/0xb7245b453bc4ace419d64e7cebf65c4eec2dbd1b/high-rise-1"><strong>Seerlight - High-Rise</strong></a></p><h3 id="h-examining-the-challenges-intrinsic-strengths-and-target-design-principles-of-the-emerging-dao-ecosystem" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Examining the Challenges, Intrinsic Strengths, and Target Design Principles of the Emerging DAO Ecosystem</h3><hr><h2 id="h-intention" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Intention</h2><p>The intention of the piece is to offer a thesis-driven overview of the DAO innovation landscape and consider which organizational models will prevail in such a nascent space. Any survey of the DAO landscape at present is destined to become quickly outdated. In an effort to provide a more enduring analysis, this piece focuses on the array of challenges DAOs face, the intrinsic strengths of DAOs as an organizational form, and target design principles—composability, automation, standardization, specialization, and financialization—DAOs should optimize around to ensure scalability, efficiency, and value creation for contributors.</p><p>This piece is long. My hope was to engender the greatest cross-pollination of ideas surrounding the DAO solution space so that the reader is able to connect the dots however is most meaningful to them.</p><blockquote><p>“Computer software is increasingly becoming the single most important building block of our modern world, but up until now search into the area has been focused on two areas: artificial intelligence, software working purely on its own, and software tools working under human beings. The question is: is there something in the middle? If there is, the idea of software directing humans, the decentralized corporation, is exactly that.” - <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin"><strong><em>Vitalik Buterin</em></strong></a></p></blockquote><hr><h2 id="h-outline" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Outline</h2><h3 id="h-1-what-is-a-dao" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">1. What is a DAO?</h3><ul><li><p>1.1 Decentralized Organizations &amp; Autonomous Organizations</p></li><li><p>1.2 Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) Definition</p></li><li><p>1.3 Growth and Scale</p></li><li><p>1.4 Liberation Capital</p></li></ul><h3 id="h-2-history-of-daos" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">2. History of DAOs</h3><h3 id="h-3-dao-challenges" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3. DAO Challenges</h3><ul><li><p>3.1 Summary</p></li><li><p>3.2 Dream vs Reality</p></li><li><p>3.3 Focus</p></li><li><p>3.4 Centralization Risk</p></li><li><p>3.5 Distributing Ownership Effectively</p></li><li><p>3.6 Mergers are Hard</p></li><li><p>3.7 Transparency Challenges</p></li><li><p>3.8 Technical Literacy Deficit</p></li><li><p>3.9 Information Coherence</p></li><li><p>3.10 Task Definability</p></li><li><p>3.11 Pay-for-Performance</p></li><li><p>3.12 One-Way Doors</p></li><li><p>3.13 Venture DAO Regulatory Challenges</p></li></ul><h3 id="h-4-dao-intrinsic-strengths" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4. DAO Intrinsic Strengths</h3><ul><li><p>4.1 Summary</p></li><li><p>4.2 Why Firms?</p></li><li><p>4.3 Efficiency</p><ul><li><p>4.3.1 Efficiency at Scale</p></li><li><p>4.3.2 Minimally Extractive Coordinators</p></li><li><p>4.3.3 High Capital Efficiency</p></li><li><p>4.3.4 Free-Flowing Cultural Memory and Comparative Advantage</p></li><li><p>4.3.5 Internal Economies</p></li><li><p>4.3.6 Co-Ownership and External Economies</p></li><li><p>4.3.7 Web2 Spillover Effects</p></li><li><p>4.3.8 Agility</p></li></ul></li><li><p>4.4 At Scale</p><ul><li><p>4.4.1 Variability in Levels of Trust</p></li><li><p>4.4.2 New Talent Acquisition Model</p></li><li><p>4.4.3 Generative Communities</p></li></ul></li></ul><h3 id="h-5-design-principles-of-the-dao-solution-space" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5. Design Principles of the DAO Solution Space</h3><ul><li><p>5.1 Composability</p><ul><li><p>5.1.1 What is Composability?</p></li><li><p>5.1.2 DAO Composability</p></li><li><p>5.1.3 Metagovernance</p></li><li><p>5.1.4 Arc from DAOstack</p></li><li><p>5.1.5 Zodiac Open Standard by Gnosis</p></li></ul></li><li><p>5.2 Automation</p><ul><li><p>5.2.1 Incentive Design Leveraging Process Automation</p></li><li><p>5.2.2 Automating Governance</p><ul><li><p>5.2.2.1 Conviction Voting</p></li><li><p>5.2.2.2 Liquid Democracy</p></li></ul></li><li><p>5.2.3 Ragequit</p></li><li><p>5.2.4 Automating Conflict Resolution</p></li></ul></li><li><p>5.3 Standardization</p><ul><li><p>5.3.1 ERC-20 Token Standard</p></li><li><p>5.3.2 EIP-4824 - Decentralized Autonomous Organizations</p></li><li><p>5.3.3 Standardizing Governance Procedures (Pairwise Preferencing Governance)</p></li><li><p>5.3.4 Standardizing Sub-DAO Pricing</p></li></ul></li><li><p>5.4 Specialization (Sub-DAO Revolution)</p><ul><li><p>5.4.1 Minion Framework by RaidGuild</p></li><li><p>5.4.2 Fast DAOs by Aragon</p></li><li><p>5.4.3 Bankless DAO Guilds</p></li><li><p>5.4.4 Orca Pods</p></li></ul></li><li><p>5.5 Financialization</p><ul><li><p>5.5.1 Rethinking Cost Centers - Bankless HQ First Quest Team</p></li><li><p>5.5.2 Financialized Governance</p><ul><li><p>5.5.2.1 Quadratic Voting</p></li><li><p>5.5.2.2 Holographic Consensus</p></li><li><p>5.5.2.3 Futarchy from Gnosis DAO</p></li></ul></li><li><p>5.5.3 Disclosure Innovations</p></li></ul></li></ul><h3 id="h-6-pulling-it-all-together" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">6. Pulling It All Together</h3><ul><li><p>6.1 DAOstack Sentiments</p></li><li><p>6.2 Common Stack Project</p></li><li><p>6.3 Regen Network Project</p></li><li><p>6.4 Close</p></li></ul><hr><h2 id="h-1-what-is-a-dao" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">1. What is a DAO?</h2><h3 id="h-11-decentralized-organizations-and-autonomous-organizations" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">1.1 Decentralized Organizations &amp; Autonomous Organizations</h3><p>Before we get into what a DAO is, let&apos;s first talk about what decentralized organizations and autonomous organizations are. A <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/?source=post_page---------------------------&amp;ref=hackernoon.com">decentralized organization</a> (DO) is an organization in which “the activities of [the] organization, particularly those regarding planning and decision making, are distributed away from a central, authoritative location or group (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/primedao/conceptual-models-for-dao2dao-relations-ac2b2d3cc84d">Conceptual Models for DAO2DAO Relations</a>). Democratic systems with governance privilege distributed across an assortment of participants rather than concentrated on a centralized authority is a nice mental model for decentralized organizations.</p><p>Alternatively, autonomous organizations (AO) are organizations that are independent and self-governing. Autonomy can take multiple forms. From an organizational perspective, self-sovereignty and independence from institutions are key. Alternatively, from “a human resources perspective, [autonomy] denotes a (relatively high) level of discretion granted to an employee in his or her work” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/primedao/conceptual-models-for-dao2dao-relations-ac2b2d3cc84d">Conceptual Models for DAO2DAO Relations</a>). Both definitions of autonomy are present in a prototypical DAO. Similar in flavor is the tendency in crypto to conflate “autonomy” and “autonomous.” In the case of DAOs, both concepts are relevant.</p><blockquote><p><em>“DAOs contain automated components, or bots, which share similar design features with distributed systems in automatic control, such as feedback loops in sensor networks. From a political philosophy perspective, however, the salient feature of a DAO is autonomy, in the sense of self-actualization at the organizational level”</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/primedao/conceptual-models-for-dao2dao-relations-ac2b2d3cc84d">Conceptual Models for DAO2DAO Relations</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-12-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao-definition" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">1.2 Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) Definition</h3><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/e77988a794458a39992739ad1dc2ef3192eef74a869b07bef0a616a6dbf30557.png" alt="Tentura #94 - Stanger in the Q" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Tentura #94 - Stanger in the Q</figcaption></figure><p>Most broadly, a DAO is defined cogently by <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/keikreutler">Kei Kreutler</a>:</p><blockquote><p><em>“A capitalized organization in which a software protocol informs its operation, placing automation at its center and humans at its edges. For example, a software protocol could specify the conditions upon which an organization automatically distributes capital to its members. This [leads] to the idea that organizational values could be automated and executed by code.&quot; (</em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/t4F5rItMw4-mlpLZf5JQhElbDfQ2JRVKAzEpanyxW1Q"><em>A Prehistory of DAOs</em></a><em>).</em></p></blockquote><p>The distinction between an AO and DAO lies in the varying levels and prominence placed on decentralization within the organization. DAOs are distinct from decentralized organizations in that “in a DO the humans are the ones making the decisions, and a DAO is something that, in some fashion, makes decisions for itself” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/?source=post_page---------------------------&amp;ref=hackernoon.com">DAOs, DACs, DAs, and More</a>). While there may be “no difference between a certain set of actors making decisions directly and that set of actors controlling all of the information through which decisions are made,” this distinction will become increasingly important as process automation takes on a more meaningful stake of internal DAO activity (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/?source=post_page---------------------------&amp;ref=hackernoon.com">DAOs, DACs, DAs, and More</a>).</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/61bbac123e8d0260e0e49f918d1b9241cf338a790a889e66f7a9fc08ac01c0ea.png" alt="Source: DAOs, DACs, DAs, and More" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: DAOs, DACs, DAs, and More</figcaption></figure><p>The promise of DAOs lies in leveraging process automation via code to squeeze out all of the bureaucratic and economic inefficiencies that are commonplace in other organization types. It is worth noting however that DAOs consisting of humans at the edges and automation at the center is a somewhat restrictive definition of a DAO that has morphed into a broader categorization (i.e. DAOs can be large coordination vehicles with automation directing human contributors or a simple shared treasury between aligned human actors). The various DAO formations will be discussed further below.</p><p>Defined similarly by the concept’s progenitor, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin">Vitalik Buterin</a>, “<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/?source=post_page---------------------------&amp;ref=hackernoon.com">a DAO</a> is an entity that lives on the internet and exists autonomously, but also heavily relies on hiring individuals to perform certain tasks that the automaton itself cannot do.” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/primedao/conceptual-models-for-dao2dao-relations-ac2b2d3cc84d">Conceptual Models for DAO2DAO Relations</a>). The concept of a DAO invokes a confluence between human and machine that seems to be the best of both worlds, but the reality of the nascent DAO space today leaves a lot to be desired.</p><p>An archetypal DAO has the following elements:</p><ul><li><p>A smart contract-based protocol with a value capture mechanism (e.g., a transaction fee)</p></li><li><p>A token representing governance rights and equity in the protocol</p></li><li><p>A governance process for making updates to the protocol</p></li><li><p>A developer ecosystem building valuable product/protocol integrations</p></li></ul><p>Community initiatives to keep DAO members engaged and activate new members (e.g., working groups, community calls, onboarding sessions, IRL events, hackathons, etc.)&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://p.mirror.xyz/VlaQ_fH2NNXh0MNyhj4CI13wX8zwJ6boctVpagApPLc">Thoughts on DAO Tooling</a>).</p><p>While many DAOs are working toward the above functionality, the reality of the space is many DAOs are no more than group chats with a shared bank account, commonly manifesting as a Discord server and a Gnosis Safe Multisig wallet (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/t4F5rItMw4-mlpLZf5JQhElbDfQ2JRVKAzEpanyxW1Q">A Prehistory of DAOs</a>). While each of the above pillars of a robust DAO is a work in progress, DAOs present the opportunity to work toward a shared mission through “representative ownership of its digital assets through a token, which often simultaneously acts as governance right and network utility” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/t4F5rItMw4-mlpLZf5JQhElbDfQ2JRVKAzEpanyxW1Q">A Prehistory of DAOs</a>).</p><h3 id="h-13-growth-and-scale" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">1.3 Growth and Scale</h3><p>In spite of its infancy, the emerging DAO ecosystem has reached a remarkable scale in a few short years since its inception. As of June 12, 2022, 2223 verified DAOs are listed on <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://deepdao.io/">DeepDAO</a>—a DAO analytics platform—containing $8.8 billion in their treasuries across 3.6 million governance token holders. DAO treasuries listed on DeepDAO went up 40x from $400 million in January to $16 billion in December 2021.</p><p>Equally astonishing are the numbers on participation. “Participants in DAOs went up 130x, from 13k in January to 1.6 million by December 2021.” These numbers indicate the undeniable staying power of this new org structure and suggest that DAOs have empowered contributors with unprecedented ownership of their communities.</p><p>This is a new organization type that is clearly financially distinct from traditional firms through the augmentation of a concept called liberation capital.</p><h3 id="h-14-liberation-capital" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">1.4 Liberation Capital</h3><p>Back in the 1950s, Arthur Rock <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/01/27/silicon-valley-invention-venture-capital-sebastian-mallaby-book/">conceived</a> of the private limited partnership that would align incentives between company success and upper management/junior employees via stock options. Rock’s novel innovation at Fairchild Semiconductor was offering an ownership stake to researchers willing to experiment and incorporate. A scientist turned founder at the time remarked that “[w]e were blown away…. Arthur pointed out to us that we could start our own company. It was completely foreign to us” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/01/27/silicon-valley-invention-venture-capital-sebastian-mallaby-book/">Behind the Power Law</a>).</p><p>This eventually evolved into the widely-known equity culture that is commonplace in the world of early-stage startup culture (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://newsletter.banklesshq.com/p/why-daos-are-the-new-firms?s=r">Why DAOs are the new firms</a>). This model of “liberation capital” is the key innovation whereby a firm’s key contributors are incentivized beyond just salary.</p><p>If we continue along this firm-to-employee incentive alignment spectrum, DAOs are at the most incentive-aligned end. Instead of stock options for important company contributors, “DAOs extend this economic logic to every worker… DAO workers are paid in native tokens (equity). DAOs, therefore, empower workers with the best of both worlds: flexibility and stakeholdership. This gives them an even further vested interest in seeing the DAO organization grow” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://newsletter.banklesshq.com/p/why-daos-are-the-new-firms?s=r">Why DAOs are the new firms</a>).</p><p>Alternatively, DAOs also compensate their contributors with USDC, ETH, or other treasury assets, not unlike the salary-plus-stock-option model that is commonplace in firms with an employee stock option pool. The primary takeaway from this evolution in compensation medium is the higher level of incentive alignment DAOs are able to achieve to motivate the entire community to strive toward a shared mission.</p><h2 id="h-2-history-of-daos" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">2. History of DAOs</h2><p>DAO history has been written about fairly extensively. To avoid reinventing the wheel, check out these pieces chronicling the origin of DAOs:</p><ul><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/t4F5rItMw4-mlpLZf5JQhElbDfQ2JRVKAzEpanyxW1Q"><strong>A Prehistory of DAOs</strong></a></p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.notboring.co/p/the-dao-of-daos?s=r"><strong>The Dao of DAOs - Not Boring by Packy McCormick</strong></a></p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/"><strong>DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide</strong></a></p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/primedao/conceptual-models-for-dao2dao-relations-ac2b2d3cc84d"><strong>Conceptual Models for DAO2DAO Relation</strong></a></p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://linda.mirror.xyz/Vh8K4leCGEO06_qSGx-vS5lvgUqhqkCz9ut81WwCP2o"><strong>A beginner&apos;s guide to DAOs</strong></a></p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://foundation.app/blog/everything-you-need-to-know-about-daos"><strong>Everything you need to know about DAOs</strong></a></p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.coindesk.com/learn/2016/06/25/understanding-the-dao-attack/"><strong>The DAO Attack: Understanding What Happened</strong></a></p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://p.mirror.xyz/cVN3KOss0uqpZwxHQKtC4Syvn1RfXaxofFKHJuKLWS4"><strong>Community DAOs</strong></a></p></li></ul><h2 id="h-3-dao-challenges" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3. DAO Challenges</h2><p>To preface this section, it is important to note that we will be flagging areas that DAOs should be thinking about critically as they mature. Later in the piece, we will explore some design principles DAOs should be mindful of to scale without loss of direction or coordination.</p><h3 id="h-31-summary" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.1 Summary</h3><p>Existing DAO challenges can be broken into three buckets:</p><ol><li><p><strong>People issues:</strong> voter apathy/concentrated DAO contribution, difficulty finding focus in governance and coordination, transparency introducing complications, contributor technical literacy, and pay-for-performance challenges.</p></li><li><p><strong>Structural issues:</strong> centralization risk/importing centralized financial institutions to crypto, mergers &amp; acquisitions difficulties, adaptability in the unknown, and regulatory challenges for investment DAOs.</p></li><li><p><strong>Information issues:</strong> general information quality assurance, multitasking and information overload, and task definability.</p></li></ol><h3 id="h-32-dream-vs-reality" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.2 Dream vs Reality</h3><p>In these early days, there is a wide chasm between the promise of DAOs and the realities of day-to-day life in a DAO. In early March 2022, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/lund_dane">Dane Lund</a> published an insightful piece on this distinction, evaluating the governance status of four prominent DAOs—“RaidGuild, a design and development collective for Web3 products; HoneyDAO, a decentralized venture capital collective; VitaDAO, a collective of longevity scientists and enthusiast; and, LexDAO, a collective of lawyer-engineers” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/0x367B4bDf414Df673Df0129838ebfB9913147427F/Fe5BYyO5oMcVeXyXUK1iZX4QM-KVBc4azAG5jjU6ETM">DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs</a>). He uncovered concerning trends in each DAO when looking at discord engagement, governance proposal distribution, and user voting volume. Below is a graphical representation of the data he pulled:</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/954df8bcb31c0da3ee2af5dc0c68d3ec3ff67bc80576bc48c940f0fc60f30d26.png" alt="Source: DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs / Discord Public Channels (March 8, 2022)" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs / Discord Public Channels (March 8, 2022)</figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/463cc8544de5d4c9b39af77febbd24c908a5e988af8050a12394a29953b395bc.png" alt="Source: DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs / Deepdao.io (March 9, 2022)" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs / Deepdao.io (March 9, 2022)</figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/af7aa7b29298072b44851bbe07948ec46a5827665344194847d17c28b742810b.png" alt="Source: DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs / Boardroom.info (March 9, 2022)" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs / Boardroom.info (March 9, 2022)</figcaption></figure><p>The figures in each data cut demonstrate the vast inequality amongst DAO members&apos; various contributions, following a <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.statisticshowto.com/power-law/">power law distribution</a>. For the Discord voting data, the observed contribution fall-off reveals that the top participants are the most active commenters by a large margin with nominal participation outside of a few core leaders. This data reveals that “the top commenter made an average of 6.8 times more comments than the tenth most frequent commenter” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/0x367B4bDf414Df673Df0129838ebfB9913147427F/Fe5BYyO5oMcVeXyXUK1iZX4QM-KVBc4azAG5jjU6ETM">DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs</a>). This is, in part, a consequence of the novelty of this organization type whereby knowledgeable contributors are hard to come by, but, all the same, these trends highlight a serious issue of the same voices persisting and alone driving the DAOs progress.</p><p>In a similar vein, the steep proposal drop-off beyond the top handful of proposers suggests that the lion&apos;s share of governance proposals are submitted by a small group of active participants. It is important to note that “proposal initiation does not have a strong correlation with the success of the proposal, nor are those who initiate the most proposals necessarily the most frequent in the Discord,” which might preserve hope that DAO contribution between tasks (governance proposals, Discord activity, etc.) may have distinct highly-active contributors (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/0x367B4bDf414Df673Df0129838ebfB9913147427F/Fe5BYyO5oMcVeXyXUK1iZX4QM-KVBc4azAG5jjU6ETM">DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs</a>).</p><p>Finally, the decay in governance votes is not as pronounced as the other two data cuts, which may suggest that voting is more accessible and, therefore, more engaging among the suite of DAO contributor activities. However, there is still a clear centralized brain trust driving internal democratic processes. The decay may suggest that “thought leaders within the collective have a significant incentive to vote in a manner that preserves their elevated status” and point to a large amount of voter apathy across the four DAOs (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/0x367B4bDf414Df673Df0129838ebfB9913147427F/Fe5BYyO5oMcVeXyXUK1iZX4QM-KVBc4azAG5jjU6ETM">DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs</a>).</p><p>In summary, this data summarizing Discord activity, governance proposal generation, and governance voting participation is revealing that the namesake decentralization in these sample DAOs is not as robust as one would hope. The following quote from Dane offers some of the negative implications of concentrated high-value contributions in DAOs:</p><blockquote><p><em>“It would be difficult for a new DAO member to know how to navigate the respective hierarchies or how to become ‘more equal than other DAO members’—and for long term mission direction—hierarchies in DAO collectives emerge, but not in an orderly manner, which could frustrate coordination over the long term, as DAO members aim to align with the idea of a flat organization but have no compass for how to flatten the participation curves in the multiple dimensions of the DAO community.&quot;  (</em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/0x367B4bDf414Df673Df0129838ebfB9913147427F/Fe5BYyO5oMcVeXyXUK1iZX4QM-KVBc4azAG5jjU6ETM"><em>DAO Governance Primer: Flat DAOs</em></a><em>).</em></p></blockquote><h3 id="h-33-focus" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.3 Focus</h3><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/0xfoobar/status/1505255351167463431?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1505255351167463431%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fp.mirror.xyz%2FVlaQ_fH2NNXh0MNyhj4CI13wX8zwJ6boctVpagApPLc">https://twitter.com/0xfoobar/status/1505255351167463431?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1505255351167463431%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fp.mirror.xyz%2FVlaQ_fH2NNXh0MNyhj4CI13wX8zwJ6boctVpagApPLc</a></p><p>Focusing contributor attention on effective work is a massive issue in DAOs today. It is most elegantly described by the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://technosphere-magazine.hkw.de/p/The-Byzantine-Generalization-Problem-Subtle-Strategy-in-the-Context-of-Blockchain-Governance-8UNNcM8VShTpBGWRuob1GP#:~:text=The%20Byzantine%20Generalization%20Problem%20describes,agency%20to%20provide%20the%20solution.">Byzantine Generalization Problem</a> which gets its name from the fun illustrative story, the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byzantine_fault#Analogy">Byzantine Generals’ Problem</a>. This generalization problem is one in which “all issues in an organization or technical system are framed as governance issues. Any question that’s brought before an organization can become a question of who has the agency to provide the solution” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://technosphere-magazine.hkw.de/p/The-Byzantine-Generalization-Problem-Subtle-Strategy-in-the-Context-of-Blockchain-Governance-8UNNcM8VShTpBGWRuob1GP#:~:text=The%20Byzantine%20Generalization%20Problem%20describes,agency%20to%20provide%20the%20solution.">The Byzantine Generalization Problem-Subtle Strategy in the Context of Blockchain Governance</a>).</p><p>In other words, the Byzantine Generalization Problem is one of over-deliberation in governance processes within DAOs. If one considers a DAO like a shared home that is suffering from broken plumbing (a governance issue), this analogy would see the inhabitants of the home debating who is best to take care of the plumbing issue while the pipes continue to leak.</p><p>Particularly in these early days without much formalized DAO infrastructure, the concept of argument surface is important. The argument surface characterizes the terrain through which humans make decisions or “the total optionality [or decision-making space] in a given system or organization,” and it naturally expands as the organization to which it belongs expands. As DAOs grow in size and contributor count, the decision space multiplies in size, limiting action clarity and decisiveness.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/0f419914bfd55ca66d13a7c4c88601f80092daa4415b39c02110260db563f5bf.jpg" alt="Source: The Byzantine Generalization Problem-Subtle Strategy in the Context of Blockchain Governance" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: The Byzantine Generalization Problem-Subtle Strategy in the Context of Blockchain Governance</figcaption></figure><p>Adjacent issues to the generalization problem are the concept of <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/bikeshedding">bikeshedding</a> or <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_triviality">Parkinson’s Law of Triviality</a> which points to over-deliberation or spending “too much time discussing trivial matters, and too little time discussing important matters as a result. It describes the inverse relationship between time spent and the importance of an issue” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://technosphere-magazine.hkw.de/p/The-Byzantine-Generalization-Problem-Subtle-Strategy-in-the-Context-of-Blockchain-Governance-8UNNcM8VShTpBGWRuob1GP#:~:text=The%20Byzantine%20Generalization%20Problem%20describes,agency%20to%20provide%20the%20solution.">The Byzantine Generalization Problem-Subtle Strategy in the Context of Blockchain Governance</a>).</p><p>This happens because individuals prefer to speak on issues that they are most comfortable with which tend to be more easily comprehensible. The consequence is avoidance of challenging, potentially mission-critical topics precisely because they are daunting. As evidenced by the above voter apathy and centralized contributor data from some of today’s DAOs, the competence and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/05/the-confidence-gap/359815/">confidence gap</a> is a real issue in DAOs and will need to be addressed to ensure contributors&apos; actions are directed most effectively.</p><p>These are human collective issues that apply to any organization, not just DAOs, and clever DAO tooling to mitigate these issues is an active area of research and development in the DAO space.</p><h3 id="h-34-centralization-risk" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.4 Centralization Risk</h3><p>A massive risk for DAOs and the crypto space as a whole is centralization risk. For DAOs in particular, how to protect against “DAO ownership becoming largely subsumed and instrumentalized by centralized financial institutions” that are primarily involved for speculatory reasons is a critical question (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.curvelabs.eu/ownership-in-cryptonetworks-96f13f4a113e">Ownership in Cryptonetworks</a>).</p><p>If DAOs do not build systems to protect against outside interests either speculating with internal currencies or gaining substantial governance rights within an underdeveloped governance scheme, the “ideas [of] DAO-governed commons become meaningless over time as DAOs ultimately congeal into speculatory investment vehicles” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.curvelabs.eu/ownership-in-cryptonetworks-96f13f4a113e">Ownership in Cryptonetworks</a>).</p><p>Related to the forthcoming section on one-way doors, “if something is truly decentralized, it becomes very difficult to change, and often remains stuck in time. That is a problem for technology, because the rest of the ecosystem is moving very quickly, and if you don’t keep up you will fail” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://moxie.org/2022/01/07/web3-first-impressions.html">My First Impressions of Web3</a>).</p><p>A second form of centralization risk is social centralization. For instance, if DAOs become concerned about protocol secrets getting leaked and begin to discriminate against anonymous contributors. KYC-ing contributors or forcing them to sign non-disclosure agreements could be a means by which traditional company practices could make their way into DAOs, centralizing these organizations in the process.</p><p>Adjacent to DAO centralization risk is platform centralization risk that commonly afflicts distributed protocols and could introduce further spillover centralization effects to DAOs connected to crypto protocols.</p><blockquote><p><em>“A protocol </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://signal.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/"><em>moves much more slowly than a platform</em></a><em>. After 30+ years, email is still unencrypted; meanwhile, WhatsApp went from unencrypted to full e2ee in a year. People are still trying to standardize sharing a video reliably over IRC; meanwhile, Slack lets you create custom reaction emoji based on your face”</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://moxie.org/2022/01/07/web3-first-impressions.html">My First Impressions of Web3</a>).</p></blockquote><p>Another example of centralization uprooting distributed value creation is NFT platforms like <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://opensea.io/">Opensea</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://zine.zora.co/zora-v3">Zora</a> innovating around the rigid ERC-721 token standard.</p><blockquote><p><em>“Royalties aren’t specified in ERC-721, and it’s too late to change it, so OpenSea has its own way of configuring royalties that exist in web2 space. Iterating quickly on centralized platforms is already outpacing the distributed protocols and consolidating control into platforms”</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://moxie.org/2022/01/07/web3-first-impressions.html">My First Impressions of Web3</a>).</p></blockquote><p>The most salient examples of centralization taking root within a decentralized ecosystem due to improved innovative efficiency are at the protocol level. Ethereum Improvement Proposals (EIP) and equivalent ecosystem improvement mechanisms offer low switching cost solutions to protocol design challenges, but, in the long run, control may consolidate into centralized platforms in a lasting way, stripping distributed protocols and their associated DAOs of innovative pressure. Effective distribution of ownership is a key part of the solution set to prevent an unwanted, centralized takeover, but that too is a challenge in its own right.</p><h3 id="h-35-distributing-ownership-effectively" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.5 Distributing Ownership Effectively</h3><p>Today, the majority of DAOs, particularly those oriented around a product that requires technical expertise, are only partially decentralized. The typical path to decentralizing a DAO is called <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://a16z.com/2020/01/09/progressive-decentralization-crypto-product-management/">progressive decentralization</a> whereby the core team that is chiefly responsible for developing the DAO’s product or core service progressively hands off more responsibility to the community.</p><p>To take an example, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://rabbithole.gg">Rabbithole</a>, a learn-to-earn protocol, is progressively decentralizing the Rabbithole DAO in three phases:</p><ul><li><p><strong>Phase 1:</strong> Creating frameworks and workstreams before heavy growth and onboarding</p></li><li><p><strong>Phase 2:</strong> Handing off work streams to community leaders and pod system</p></li><li><p><strong>Phase 3:</strong> Introducing contracts based governance decision-making to drive the protocol forward</p></li></ul><p>The challenge for Rabbithole DAO and many other progressively decentralizing DAOs is effectively distributing ownership at this community ownership handoff stage. The challenge is determining an effective way to distribute ownership of a network when contributors’ participation level, value add to the DAO, and community engagement level are all variable. Is holding some quantity of a governance token a sufficiently complete way to represent one’s ownership stake in a community?</p><p>Rabbithole’s endgame vision—building a robust and standardized on-chain credentialing system that could be used within the DAO ecosystem—suggests that maybe today’s token-weighted solutions to ownership distribution are insufficient.</p><h3 id="h-36-mergers-are-hard" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.6 Mergers are Hard</h3><p>An interesting byproduct of web3’s open-source ethos is the inversion of competition and cooperation compared to web2. In a competitive sense, building in the open in web3 means code is forkable (i.e. copyable) which implies that anyone can copy and remix a project to their liking. This suggests that instead of traditional sources of competitive advantage like proprietary IP, in web3, community loyalty and network effects are what differentiates good from bad projects. In a cooperative sense, things are more difficult in web3. Mergers and acquisitions, in web2, run comparatively smoothly when dealing with two centralized entities–only the two leadership teams need to be aligned to proceed.</p><p>In web3, however, aligning two distinct communities requires dual consensus which is a challenge (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.curvelabs.eu/ownership-in-cryptonetworks-96f13f4a113e">Ownership in Cryptonetworks</a>). An example of this type of hard merge is exemplified by the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.tally.xyz/governance/eip155:1:0x0BEF27FEB58e857046d630B2c03dFb7bae567494/proposal/100913008905461844936601668456794711523658459114127771687920359665569753117360">merger</a> between <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://rari.capital/">Rari Capital</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://fei.money/">Fei Protocol</a>. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/joey__santoro?lang=en">Joey Santoro</a>, the founder of Fei, notes that “It was really challenging to navigate a proposal this big. There were two whole DAOs worth of cooks in the kitchen. But Jai and the core teams and I were devoted to putting this out there” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2021/12/21/rari-capital-fei-protocol-token-holders-approve-multibillion-dollar-defi-merger/">Rari Capital, Fei Protocol Token Holders Approve Multibillion-Dollar DeFi Merger</a>).</p><p>As the DAO space matures, discovering the best practices for product and community consolidation, cooperation, and overlap will be key for the space to scale and onboard new users. Some potential approaches include <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/api3/announcing-the-api3-partnership-and-token-swap-with-pocket-network-f45420790b6c">token swaps</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://forum.keep.network/t/proposal-keep-and-nucypher-hard-merge/74">hard mergers</a>.</p><h3 id="h-37-transparency-challenges" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.7 Transparency Challenges</h3><p>The social repercussions of the extreme transparency baked into web3 and DAOs present unique challenges. At the heart of web3, the blockchain–an immutable transaction ledger–makes everyone&apos;s on-chain behavior publicly accessible. Everyday on-chain data is becoming more robust and multi-faceted. Such publicity and public vulnerability introduce issues of ultra surveillance, stifling innovation and experimentation.</p><p>In a space in which every action can be scrutinized, there is a risk that for the sake of maintaining reputation, developers and creatives may be disincentivized from experimenting for fear of being wrong. Always-on visibility “may discourage the kind of risk-taking that often leads to technological breakthroughs in the DAO space” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://clay.mirror.xyz/DwJ60O0R1IyRiPAZFBw4L05L3fd8PPxWnzDNedKtOas">DAO Nation</a>). Directly adjacent to stifled experimentation is the challenge of transparency discouraging contributors from speaking up about changes to the DAO’s vision and culture, leading to detrimental in-action as core issues are left undiscussed.</p><p>Similarly, openly discussing traditionally private matters presents challenges. “Public salary negotiations and salary flows remain unpopular for individual workers in the space” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://clay.mirror.xyz/DwJ60O0R1IyRiPAZFBw4L05L3fd8PPxWnzDNedKtOas">DAO Nation</a>). In the most extreme cases, there is the risk of off-chain coercion. “Without procedures to anonymize the voting process, outside parties can target individual stakeholders to influence decisions normally reserved for direct stakeholders, which, in turn, may disrupt the typical alignment between DAO and stakeholder interests” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://clay.mirror.xyz/DwJ60O0R1IyRiPAZFBw4L05L3fd8PPxWnzDNedKtOas">DAO Nation</a>).</p><h3 id="h-38-technical-literacy-deficit" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.8 Technical Literacy Deficit</h3><p>Another key human challenge the DAO space faces is general contributor technical literacy. Particularly in these early days, technical governance proposals to build core infrastructure for DAOs are commonplace. The challenge is finding contributors with a sufficiently technical background to make meaningful contributions to the governance discourse. “Centralization is likely to coalesce around experts, developers, and system architects” given that “only a handful of software developers and system architects understand the ins and outs of specific blockchain protocols to make educated decisions about protocol upgrades” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/token-kitchen/institutional-economics-governance-of-daos-part-2-24e05e3a5e2c">Governance of Blockchain Networks &amp; Other DAOs</a>).</p><p>Related is the resulting <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/principal-agent-problem.asp#:~:text=The%20principal%2Dagent%20problem%20is,roles%20of%20principal%20and%20agent">principal-agent problem</a> that arises when the broader DAO community has to delegate design judgment to experts, making them “the new ‘quasi’ agents in a distributed network where ‘code is law’” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/token-kitchen/institutional-economics-governance-of-daos-part-2-24e05e3a5e2c">Governance of Blockchain Networks &amp; Other DAOs</a>).</p><p>On the other end of the spectrum, “another common critique points to the low participation barriers of DAOs that may bring about scalability issues…. Not everybody will have the knowledge or incentive to make the right call,” yet unspecialized and potentially unqualified contributors may be filling the ranks of DAOs (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://newsletter.banklesshq.com/p/why-daos-are-the-new-firms?s=r">Why DAOs are the new firms</a>). Beyond technical governance proposals, it is important to note that most governance token-holders aren&apos;t plugged-in enough to the community to have an informed opinion about the best course of action.</p><p>This principal-agent problem and low barrier to entry make clear that a robust reputation/skill system is needed to help DAOs scale sustainably and responsibly. One possible solution to this reputation and delegation challenge could be domain-specific reputation scores with corresponding voting power to allow specialists to more heavily driving decision-making in their expertise.</p><h3 id="h-39-information-coherence" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.9 Information Coherence</h3><p>Especially at scale, it can be very difficult for a DAO to follow a clear discussion procedure given multiple channels of communication and the current lack of effective reputation systems. What’s more, all the chatter in Discord channels and Telegram chats are not created equal.</p><p><em>“Where does reliable information come from, and what tools, such as visualizations and decision trees, are required to facilitate such processes? Experience from past protocol upgrades shows that if issues of information, moderation, transparency, aggregation, and reputation are not resolved, decentralization might become a meaningless word.”</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/token-kitchen/institutional-economics-governance-of-daos-part-2-24e05e3a5e2c">Governance of Blockchain Networks &amp; Other DAOs</a>).</p><h3 id="h-310-task-definability" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.10 Task Definability</h3><p>Hand-in-hand with information coherence and actionability is the challenge of task definability. (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.aragon.org/incentive-design-tooling-for-daos/">Incentive Design &amp; Tooling for DAOs</a>) illuminates how variable work in a DAO can be. Below are some considerations from the piece that highlights how many more considerations need to go into defining a task in the absence of hierarchies and direct management:</p><ul><li><p>How much connection or reputation does the potential contributor have in the DAO?</p></li><li><p>Is the task easily definable, and how can you determine whether it has been done or not?</p></li><li><p>How much time does it take to do the required activity?</p></li><li><p>Is the work highly complex, either in the task itself or the skill required to get it done?</p></li><li><p>Is the impact and visibility of this task wide or narrow?</p></li><li><p>How urgent is the activity to be done, relative to everything else?</p></li></ul><h3 id="h-311-pay-for-performance" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.11 Pay-for-Performance</h3><p>Some other human challenges common to any group of utility-maximizing individuals are:</p><ul><li><p><strong>Free-riding:</strong> Contributors slacking off “when incentive mechanisms allow non-participatory members to benefit from the platform without contributing to its governance themselves” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://thomasbcox.medium.com/on-aligning-stakeholder-incentives-in-blockchain-systems-75a89c80be5c">On Aligning Stakeholder Incentives in Blockchain Systems</a>).</p></li><li><p><strong>Gaming:</strong> “Participants may overemphasize the most measurable activities” and forgo working on the more essential but less measurable projects. All work in a DAO is not equal, so incentive schemes to ensure the most important work is prioritized are key (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://thomasbcox.medium.com/on-aligning-stakeholder-incentives-in-blockchain-systems-75a89c80be5c">On Aligning Stakeholder Incentives in Blockchain Systems</a>).</p></li><li><p><strong>Multitasking:</strong> There is a lot of work to be done in a DAO and many of the top contributors wear many different hats, which can leave them too spread thin and unable to make meaningful progress on the work that matters the most.</p></li></ul><h3 id="h-312-one-way-doors" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.12 One-Way Doors</h3><p>One challenge of working with smart contracts is that once deployed its code is fixed, so developers will build mechanisms to implement any necessary protocol updates to help account for unforeseen scenarios. This intentional contract incompleteness mitigates technical or ideological lock-in. The difficulty with DAOs, in particular, is the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tyranny_of_Structurelessness">tyranny of structurelessness</a> which can be characterized as “a poorly lit space filled with vague cultural norms and technical limitations but still anything other than empty” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://technosphere-magazine.hkw.de/p/The-Byzantine-Generalization-Problem-Subtle-Strategy-in-the-Context-of-Blockchain-Governance-8UNNcM8VShTpBGWRuob1GP">The Byzantine Generalization Problem-Subtle Strategy in the Context of Blockchain Governance</a>).</p><p>The roadmap for DAOs is uncharted territory, so it presents a uniquely challenging environment to build for unforeseen circumstances. Along a similar vein, token generation events are a one-way door, meaning that “once launched, it’s extremely difficult to course correct should the initial implementation not satisfy the requirements for the organization or community around it.&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://clay.mirror.xyz/DwJ60O0R1IyRiPAZFBw4L05L3fd8PPxWnzDNedKtOas">DAO Nation</a>). So on top of building with so much uncertainty, monetizing and giving agency to the community, strips the founding team of their ability to act swiftly and decisively, introducing more uncertainty to developing DAOs and their projects. The &quot;Move fast and break things&quot; ethos is no longer true. Founders need to be thinking years into the future; messing up small elements can doom the project from the start.</p><h3 id="h-313-venture-dao-regulatory-challenges" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3.13 Venture DAO Regulatory Challenges</h3><p>A final aside on DAO challenges pertains to the regulatory challenges that afflict investment DAOs in the absence of accredited investor status. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://syndicate.io/">Syndicate DAO</a>—a DAO working on Venture DAOs infrastructure and tooling—is hard at work on this issue. Tom Shaughnessy wrote a great <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/Shaughnessy119/status/1475640658836787200?s=20&amp;t=-KCpSr0LhAh4iQQi-pmRJA">Twitter thread</a> outlining the distinct challenges that Venture DAOs face if you are interested. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.thelao.io/">The LAO</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.raidguild.org/">RaidGuild</a>, and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://molochdao.com/">Moloch DAO</a> are also hard at work on this issue (to be discussed later on).</p><h2 id="h-4-dao-intrinsic-strengths" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4. DAO Intrinsic Strengths</h2><h3 id="h-41-summary" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.1 Summary</h3><p>In summary, DAOs are worth developing because of their unique functionality and efficiency at scale in comparison to web2 firms that have more rigid limitations on size and function. DAO strengths can be split between those related to scalability and efficient operation.</p><p><strong><em>Scalability strengths:</em></strong></p><ul><li><p>Operating with variable levels of trust in parallel workstreams</p></li><li><p>Ability to leverage a more organic talent crowdsourcing talent acquisition model compared to firms</p></li><li><p>Generative and organic contributor-led internal innovation</p></li></ul><p><strong><em>Efficiency strengths:</em></strong></p><ul><li><p>High institutional resilience when cultural memory is able to flow freely between functional groups within and between DAOs</p></li><li><p>Capacity to be agile and swift to action thanks to process automating code.</p></li><li><p>High capital efficiency compared to firms</p></li><li><p>Copy and paste open-source development and low barriers to user movement serving as forcing functions to drive innovation</p></li><li><p>Powerful network effects from emerging internal economies via contributor comparative advantage</p></li><li><p>External economies via DAO-to-DAO co-ownership</p></li><li><p>Powerful conversion effect on web2 firms that will be drawn to the DAO ecosystem for value capture</p></li></ul><h3 id="h-42-why-firms" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.2 Why Firms?</h3><p>Before getting into why DAOs are such powerful and revolutionary organizational structures, it will be helpful to recall why companies or firms have been so integral to enabling greater levels of working coordination. Firms were essential in smoothing out market transaction costs like price discovery, contract negotiation, or onboarding services.</p><p>Firms address these and many other transaction costs, absorbing the cost, increasing market efficiency, and enabling high levels of coordination scale. At a certain point, however, “transaction costs increase through developments like departmental bureaucracy” and the firm reaches a practical limit at which the transaction costs it mitigates are outweighed by internal bureaucracy (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/t4F5rItMw4-mlpLZf5JQhElbDfQ2JRVKAzEpanyxW1Q">A Prehistory of DAOs</a>).</p><h3 id="h-43-efficiency" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.3 Efficiency</h3><h3 id="h-431-efficiency-at-scale" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.3.1 Efficiency at Scale</h3><p>In contrast to the size limitations of firms that introduce undue bureaucracy, DAOs, in theory, <em>increase</em> efficiency at scale. Process automation via code is at the heart of this efficiency. Within a DAO, different functional groups within the whole can pool and manage assets quickly, and “[t]he equivalent process to establish a joint bank account could take months, and in some cases, it wouldn’t be possible for individuals from different jurisdictions to jointly manage a bank account” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/t4F5rItMw4-mlpLZf5JQhElbDfQ2JRVKAzEpanyxW1Q">A Prehistory of DAOs</a>).</p><p>The beauty of DAOs is that they can “incorporate deeper practical knowledge in governance without increasing operational transaction costs: aspiring to become ‘more efficient’ as they scale&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/t4F5rItMw4-mlpLZf5JQhElbDfQ2JRVKAzEpanyxW1Q">A Prehistory of DAOs</a>). As we discussed earlier, at a sufficient scale within a DAOs, human coordination challenges can arise, but with robust frameworks in place to systemize internal processes, many of these challenges can be mitigated, leaving room for efficient operation at scale. ​​</p><p>DAOs do not make sense for early-stage companies. The up-front investment in efficiency doesn&apos;t amortize well and comes at the expense of agility. It is worth noting that many DAOs today are quite bureaucratic and inefficient. The majority would be better run as a corporate entity; however, DAOs in a perfect world with perfect tooling would be able to surmount these coordination challenges and realize their potential at scale.</p><h3 id="h-432-minimally-extractive-coordinators" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.3.2 Minimally Extractive Coordinators</h3><p>A complementary idea to efficient operation at scale is the notion of operating as a minimally extractive coordinator. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/cburniske">Chris Burniske </a>wrote a piece back in 2019 about <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.placeholder.vc/blog/2019/10/6/protocols-as-minimally-extractive-coordinators">Protocols as Minimally Extractive Coordinators</a> in which he outlines how protocols play by different rules to traditional firms. He describes protocols not as businesses but as “systems of logic that coordinate exchange between suppliers and consumers of a service. The flatness with which a protocol treats everyone that interfaces with it are part of what drives its efficiency as a coordinator of exchange (no room for human corruption or capture)&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.placeholder.vc/blog/2019/10/6/protocols-as-minimally-extractive-coordinators">Protocols as Minimally Extractive Coordinators</a>).</p><p>What this means, in the long run, is that protocols are in a race to the bottom to provide the lowest costs to users to outcompete their more inefficient peers. In web3, “both suppliers and distributors are subject to market competition, as opposed to the proprietary selection process that a company goes through for its suppliers and distributors. Competitive markets kill inefficiencies and drive down costs, which should allow protocol-coordinated-services to outcompete company-coordinated-services, accruing to the consumer’s benefit.” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.placeholder.vc/blog/2019/10/6/protocols-as-minimally-extractive-coordinators">Protocols as Minimally Extractive Coordinators</a>).</p><p>The most elegant part of this process is that “any unnecessary extraction from the process of exchange is a tax that will ultimately be weeded out by copy-paste competition in the world of open-source protocols” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.placeholder.vc/blog/2019/10/6/protocols-as-minimally-extractive-coordinators">Protocols as Minimally Extractive Coordinators</a>). The forkability that is built-in to open source projects will necessarily force protocols to become minimally extracted to remain competitive.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/2876d0e61d091ef74ecfb412d92cf327e9e75b4d492cdfceb35e16eea9721c67.png" alt="Source: Protocols as Minimally Extractive Coordinators" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: Protocols as Minimally Extractive Coordinators</figcaption></figure><p>I wager that a similar race to the bottom will be present for DAOs, and this will be a similarly powerful forcing function to maximize contributor utility. Instead of minimal friction, DAOs will be assessed by user experience, process fluidity, and efficacy of automated processes. While it is very difficult to copy and paste community, as the DAO ecosystem matures and contributors are in control of their on-chain credentials, reputation, and identity, DAOs without refined user experiences, value-add to contributors, or inefficient internal capital flows will be outcompeted by those collectives that do.</p><p>Like protocols, the community-building playbook for DAOs is being open-sourced. Everyone has visibility into what works and does not, suggesting that improved DAO operation and contributors&apos; experience will be the product of this copy and paste forcing function. This process of all DAOs learning from each other, adopting best practices, and trending towards the flagship DAOs will be a tremendous innovating pressure that will allow DAOs to far outcompete and scale compared to their web2 analogs.</p><h3 id="h-433-high-capital-efficiency" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.3.3 High Capital Efficiency</h3><p>Another strength of DAOs that will contribute to this <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.jimcollins.com/concepts/the-flywheel.html">flywheel effect</a> is their remarkable capital efficiency compared to companies. The analogy between a company and the DAO is imperfect, and the data to elucidate this analogy is from 2020, but the distinction is quite illustrative of my point. At the time this data was pulled, Uniswap had a $1.4 billion treasury (now $1.9 billion) and Paypal had $14 billion of cash and short-term investments. Interestingly, Paypal had  operating expenses of $18.16 billion, and “Uniswap, on the other hand, has spent over 100 times less than its treasury size.” Assuming generous compensation for the same Uniswap team and $3 million a year to their grants program, as of 2020, Uniswap only “spends at maximum $11m/year… and unlike Paypal, there are no liabilities on Uniswap’s balance sheet — the DAO has unprecedented freedom to spend&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.curvelabs.eu/ownership-in-cryptonetworks-96f13f4a113e">Ownership in Cryptonetworks</a>). The self-sustaining maintenance of Uniswap’s treasury with so few liabilities means the DAOs are able to invest substantially more in its protocol development than a web2 analog would in their product at a comparable scale.</p><p>Vitalik <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://vitalik.ca/general/2021/03/23/legitimacy.html">generalizes</a> this comparison well.</p><blockquote><p><em>“A major power of cryptocurrency (and other digital assets such as domain names, virtual land and NFTs) is that it allows communities to summon up large amounts of capital without any individual person needing to personally donate that capital. However, this capital is constrained by conceptions of legitimacy: you cannot simply allocate it to a centralized team without compromising on what makes it valuable. While Bitcoin and Ethereum do already rely on conceptions of legitimacy to </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://ethresear.ch/t/responding-to-51-attacks-in-casper-ffg/6363"><em>respond to 51% attacks</em></a><em>, using conceptions of legitimacy to guide in-protocol funding of public goods is much harder. But at the </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/growing-list-of-billion-dollar-crypto-unicorns-suggest-the-best-is-yet-to-come"><em>increasingly</em></a><em> </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.theverge.com/2021/3/11/22325054/beeple-christies-nft-sale-cost-everydays-69-million"><em>rich</em></a><em> application layer where new protocols are constantly being created, we have quite a bit more flexibility in where that funding could go”</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://vitalik.ca/general/2021/03/23/legitimacy.html">The Most Important Scarce Resource is Legitimacy</a>).</p></blockquote><p>The coordination and funding of public goods at the application layer he refers to would be coordinated by a DAO. DAOs can facilitate coordination, fundraising, and capital deployment toward a wide range of use cases. This high capital efficiency and capital flexibility is a primary intrinsic strength of the DAO model that positions it well to proliferate as more use cases are uncovered.</p><h3 id="h-434-free-flowing-cultural-memory-and-comparative-advantage" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.3.4 Free-Flowing Cultural Memory and Comparative Advantage</h3><p>Free-flowing cultural memory is another powerful intrinsic benefit of distributed and decentralized work. “Within a DAO network, teams who possess the most relevant expertise can easily share it with the ecosystem. When [one] views DAOs as constellations of teams, not monoliths, DAOs become networks to allow collective memory to flow freely&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.curvelabs.eu/ownership-in-cryptonetworks-96f13f4a113e">Ownership in Cryptonetworks</a>). As will be discussed in the DAO solution space portion of the paper, DAOs benefit greatly from leveraging comparative advantage and empowering contributors who are best equipped to solve specific issues.</p><p>The free flow of problem-solving practices, diverse contributor backgrounds, and functional expertise means that as functional teams within DAOs specialize further and channels for cross-communication remain open, there is the unparalleled capacity to crowdsource and collaborate to organically problem-solve that would be too difficult logistically in a hierarchical firm of a similar size. Composability is a powerful motif in crypto and, as it relates to DAOs, “as long as the collective memory freely circulates within a given crypto network, discovered solutions to problems can be reused.&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.curvelabs.eu/ownership-in-cryptonetworks-96f13f4a113e">Ownership in Cryptonetworks</a>).</p><p>Arguably more impactful is free-flowing cultural memory between DAOs. DAOs are building and public and are able to pick up the institutional knowledge from other organizations, which isn&apos;t really true in web2. At present, institutional memory within DAOs is worse than within companies. It&apos;s hard to keep track of best practices, people aren&apos;t really working full-time, everything just blurs together, etc. With maturity and infrastructure development, however, best practices, internal and external, will be more easily codified and actionable at scale. Decentralized organizations will leverage this institutional knowledge to drive innovation from within in ways that web2 companies cannot at an enterprise scale. So while making cultural memory actionable may be challenging in today’s DAOs, in time, this weakness will become a tremendous strength and means for organic innovation.</p><h3 id="h-435-internal-economies" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.3.5 Internal Economies</h3><p>Related to DAOs’ leveraging comparative advantage and open communication is the potential for DAOs to develop robust internal economies. I think “DAOs as economies” is a more apt analogy than DAOs being likened to firms. “When autonomous working groups are given a pool of capital to use at their discretion, they will begin to standardize around rates for work to better budget and predict expenses, inevitably kickstarting an internal economy” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/daos-as-economic-engines?s=r">DAOs as Economic Engines</a>). As is the case in any open economy, competition induces comparative advantage and specialization which, in the DAO case, serves to bolster the operating procedures of functional groups as capital flows to the edges of the DAO (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/daos-as-economic-engines?s=r">DAOs as Economic Engines</a>).</p><p>In an ideal, mature DAO ecosystem, there will exist within a DAO “complex structures where each node in the network interacts with the others to receive and distribute capital in the form of grants, revenue splits, bounties, paid positions, and more” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/daos-as-economic-engines?s=r">DAOs as Economic Engines</a>).</p><p>Another example that punctuates this analogy is the concept of the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M2V#:~:text=The%20velocity%20of%20money%20is,services%20per%20unit%20of%20time.">velocity of money</a>. In a standard economy, one unit of currency can be spent multiple times on goods and services as it moves through the economy. A similar phenomenon is emerging in the DAO ecosystem. A prime example is Bankless DAO’s $BANK currency moving fluidly through their Guilds (functional groups):</p><blockquote><p><em>“Bankless DAO has recently funded the writers guild. Let’s say that 600 $BANK will go to compensating a new member who has completed the writers guild&apos;s first quest. A third of that payment gets redirected to the First Quest team, who then use the 200 $BANK to pay a designer to create a new graphic. That 200 $BANK has now changed hands three times despite being the same 200 $BANK.&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/daos-as-economic-engines?s=r">DAOs as Economic Engines</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-436-co-ownership-and-external-economies" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.3.6 Co-Ownership and External Economies</h3><p>When it comes to external economies, there is certainly much work to be done when merging DAOs. An alternative to pure-play M&amp;A is co-ownership which allows both participating DAOs to earn financial upside and engage in mutual governance. This induces powerful network effects that will drive a strong “DAOification&apos;&apos; process as co-ownership becomes more common. As outlined by <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/chaserchapman">Chase Chapman</a> on <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://open.spotify.com/show/3Z0n23rYtrhA7FxvxWoWH0?si=759c02e37d174d9f">DAOn the Rabbithole</a> with <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/ddwchen">Diana Chen</a>, “Co-ops, when they exist in isolation fail more often than when they exist in networks of other coops. The reason that happens is you have a lot more cooperation and shared ownership between these different organizations” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://open.spotify.com/show/3Z0n23rYtrhA7FxvxWoWH0?si=759c02e37d174d9f">DAOn the Rabbithole</a> SOEP5). Chase predicts that a burgeoning external economy filled with many more DAO-to-DAO collaborations will likely eat into the traditional SaaS world, coining the term ‘digitally-native DAOification’ in the process. An example of the synergies of DAO co-ownership is elucidated in the same podcast episode:</p><blockquote><p><em>“A perfect example of this is Bankless, which is a media DAO that creates podcasts and newsletters and collaborates with Index, a DAO that creates indexes. They created their own index called the Bed index and have been promoting it via the media they create because they believe in it. It uses Index&apos;s protocol. Bankless gets a percentage for managing it, and Index gets people holding their products. Interesting positive-sum where they made 1+1=3. You have the technology they are leveraging and the distribution which is what Bankless provides”</em> - <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/chaserchapman">Chase Chapman</a> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://open.spotify.com/show/3Z0n23rYtrhA7FxvxWoWH0?si=759c02e37d174d9f">DAOn the Rabbithole</a> SOEP5).</p></blockquote><blockquote><p><em>&quot;Why would you ever want to use a B2B SaaS tool for your DAO when you could use a tool that another DAO built and get a few of their tokens in return and you pay them in your governance tokens. We will be creating this token economy in which it will not make sense to be a B2B SaaS company, which will accelerate the transition from traditional companies to becoming DAO-oriented. From that perspective, I think 10 years from now, we are going to see a lot more DAOs, and it is going to be strange to be a company&quot;</em> - <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/chaserchapman">Chase Chapman</a> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://open.spotify.com/show/3Z0n23rYtrhA7FxvxWoWH0?si=759c02e37d174d9f">DAOn the Rabbithole</a> SOEP5).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-437-web2-spillover-effects" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.3.7 Web2 Spillover Effects</h3><p>The power of co-ownership and external economies that exists natively in DAO-to-DAO contributions is also a powerful means of penetrating and DAOifying web2 entities. “DAOs endogenously structure a self-sovereign, crypto-institutional control network of their own, generally aiming for separation or mitigation from centralized organizations” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.curvelabs.eu/ownership-in-cryptonetworks-96f13f4a113e">Ownership in Cryptonetworks</a>). It is highly probable that web3 and the DAO ecosystem have captured sufficient financial, cultural, and political power that “centralized institutions [will] move towards decentralization to more favorably integrate with the crypto sphere” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.curvelabs.eu/ownership-in-cryptonetworks-96f13f4a113e">Ownership in Cryptonetworks</a>).</p><p>Just as institutional investors and firms historically have moved to participate in value capture in high-growth industries, institutional money and firms will want to capture some of the crypto upside. To participate in the web3-native entities, web2 entities will need to adapt and somewhat decentralize their operations to participate, suggesting that web3 will have a spillover effect into web2, slowly evolving hierarchical organization into something that is more compatible with decentralization and process automation via smart contracts.</p><h3 id="h-438-agility" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.3.8 Agility</h3><p>Finally, agility is a key strength of DAO. Not all DAOs are created the same. Because process automation handles the coordination and compensation processes within the DAO, if needed, DAOs can move very quickly to accomplish time-sensitive tasks. As mentioned previously, larger DAOs are struggling with coordination in their nascent form, but smaller, more fleeting DAOs can collect and deploy capital swiftly.</p><blockquote><p><em>“For example, recently we saw the launch of </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.partybid.app/"><em>PartyBid</em></a><em>, the first known experiment of an ephemeral DAO where 400+ individuals came together to purchase a highly sought after </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.larvalabs.com/cryptopunks"><em>Crypto Punk</em></a><em>. The DAO ownership will last in perpetuity - but had the group not been successful, the capital would have been returned. This novel approach to short-term pooling and distribution of capital is massively unexplored and provides an agile and exciting counterweight to the relative seriousness of protocol DAOs&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://clay.mirror.xyz/DwJ60O0R1IyRiPAZFBw4L05L3fd8PPxWnzDNedKtOas">DAO Nation</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-44-at-scale" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.4 At Scale</h3><h3 id="h-441-variability-in-levels-of-trust" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.4.1 Variability in Levels of Trust</h3><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/3572eab8dae21352993d827f8e4e03646a5f7ae79c48482180c7234a45a86b0e.png" alt="Source: Index Coop Contributor Tiers " blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: Index Coop Contributor Tiers</figcaption></figure><p>At scale, DAOs will benefit greatly from automation sitting at the center of a wide variety of contributors with disparate backgrounds. It is a novel phenomenon to have strangers making financial decisions “together immediately without having time to develop coherence and trust” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/t4F5rItMw4-mlpLZf5JQhElbDfQ2JRVKAzEpanyxW1Q">A Prehistory of DAOs</a>). The DAO model enables high levels of coordination across “different levels of coherence and trust” and experience.</p><p>This need-to-know mentality can allow micro hierarchies and comparative advantage to flourish organically within the DAO in a trust-minimized way whereby contributors only get access to communication channels, documents, tools, and other project-relevant assets in accordance with their designated role, competence, and specialty. This highly precise tiered access will allow workstreams of variable complexity, duration, and coordination to run in parallel as DAOs scale without top-down design contributing to DAO efficiency at scale.</p><h3 id="h-442-new-talent-acquisition-model" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.4.2 New Talent Acquisition Model</h3><p>The process of acquiring skilled laborers for a traditional corporation is often grueling. “Startups can’t afford to hire the wrong people, interviewing is a lengthy and demanding process. Only afterward do both sides feel comfortable entering into a long-term commitment, and even then it’s never usually optimal&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/soft-and-hard-consensus-banklessdaos?s=r">Soft and Hard Consensus - BanklessDAO’s First Week</a>).</p><p>In contrast to the “knife-like precision that startups employ” when identifying hires, DAOs are crowdsourcing talent whereby “when they arrive, people self-organize into niches based on what excites them and autonomously begin to explore those ideas collectively.&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/soft-and-hard-consensus-banklessdaos?s=r">Soft and Hard Consensus - BanklessDAO’s First Week</a>). In DAOs, finding, inspiring, and providing value to contributors happens simultaneously, initiating a much more fluid and attractive user experience for contributors in comparison to web2 hiring.</p><p>The downside to this organic recruitment model is contributors self-selecting into DAOs. At present, active recruiting is far rarer in DAOs which in many cases can yield the highest-value hires.</p><h3 id="h-443-generative-communities" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4.4.3 Generative Communities</h3><p>Complementary to self-organizing talent is the generative nature of a decentralized organization. Individuals collect around the ideas they are passionate about and organically produce new products, functional groups, and ideas from within the DAO to help it evolve. A prime example of this was in BanklessDAO’s early days when they found that “there are enough people to fill into spaces where there are things to do. They literally crop up everywhere. A conversation about legal status turned into the Legal Guild and is slowly beginning to make moves&apos;&apos; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/soft-and-hard-consensus-banklessdaos?s=r">Soft and Hard Consensus - BanklessDAO’s First Week</a>).</p><h2 id="h-5-design-principles-of-the-dao-solution-space" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5. Design Principles of the DAO Solution Space</h2><p>Considering the array of challenges for DAOs to work through and the myriad intrinsic strengths that will facilitate and accelerate innovation of the DAO ecosystem, below are 5 principles DAOs should optimize around to ensure alignment and synergy with their intrinsic strengths.</p><p>These principles are <strong>composability, automation, standardization, specialization, and financialization.</strong></p><p>We will discuss why leaning into each principle will be massively beneficial for developing DAOs and highlight the projects that are setting an example and innovating along these axes. It is also worth noting that these concepts, in practice, are not perfectly distinct. For instance, composability necessarily requires standardizing components and introducing universalized financial assets, but these concepts will be investigated separately. The DAO projects explored below are by no means comprehensive. They are just illustrative examples of designing DAOs with a careful eye on their intrinsic strengths.</p><h3 id="h-51-composability" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.1 Composability</h3><h3 id="h-511-what-is-composability" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.1.1 What is Composability?</h3><p>Composability is the cross-compatibility and combinability of components belonging to distinct applications that, when interacting seamlessly, produce efficient and powerful synergies and processes. Within the same composability cluster—applications built within the same virtual machine/application ecosystem—developers are able to use “huge amounts of existing, reliable code and focus only on building the components that are missing for their project… This exponentially increases the rate of experimentation and innovation. Not having to reinvent the wheel (or worry about being sued by regulators and patent trolls) every time you build a business makes Web3 magnitudes more efficient at allocating resources than Web2&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.aragon.org/what-is-composability/">What is Composability?</a>).</p><p>As discussed earlier in the section on minimally extractive coordinators, the “favorable regulation, aggressive patent enforcement, high switching costs, data hoarding, and many other self-preservation strategies” that are commonplace in web2 competitive environments are giving way to “the open-source, permissionless, transparent world of Web3… [where] organizations have to build on the assumption that their code will be reused by others and turn this into the vanguard of their growth strategy” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.aragon.org/what-is-composability/">What is Composability?</a>).</p><p>In the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://ethereum.org/en/">Ethereum</a> ecosystem which is pioneering in the practice of composable systems, the ERC-20 token can run interchangeably on applications built on top of Ethereum (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/monolith/understanding-defi-composability-explained-70f93d9c0f01">Understanding DeFi: Composability explained</a>). As will be discussed below, DAOs are starting to mimic protocol composability in the modules they use like <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://daohaus.club/docs/users/boosts/boosts/">DAOhaus Boosts</a> and Gnosis’ <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/OuhG5s2X5uSVBx1EK4tKPhnUc91Wh9YM0fwSnC8UNcg">Zodiac Open Standard</a> which are standardizing and building composable open standards to allow “anybody, as long as their code adheres to a shared interface, to build their own ‘expansion packs’ as needs emerge within their own communities. Under this paradigm, the ecosystem of DAO plug-ins will grow akin to that of open-source software packages” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/1kxnetwork/organization-legos-the-state-of-dao-tooling-866b6879e93e">Organizational Legos: The State of DAO Tooling</a>).</p><h3 id="h-512-dao-composability" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.1.2 DAO Composability</h3><p>As we discussed, through external economies enabled by co-ownership, the skeleton of a composable DAO system is emerging but is still largely underdeveloped. Despite the ecosystem&apos;s infancy, given that “the switching costs for users are so low and the benefits of interoperability are so high, the dynamics and desire are in place for the industry to align on a shared set of standards as soon as possible&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.aragon.org/what-is-composability/">What is Composability?</a>).</p><p>The question remains: what does DAO composability look like in practice?</p><p>DAO composability can take multiple forms, and one such novel realization of the power of composability as it applies to governance practices is called <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://kydo.substack.com/p/metagovernance-in-crypto?s=r">metagovernance</a>.</p><h3 id="h-513-metagovernance" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.1.3 Metagovernance</h3><p>Metagovernance is simply the process of one DAO voting on proposals in another DAO. It is not dissimilar to investment stewardship in the traditional finance world (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://kydo.substack.com/p/metagovernance-in-crypto?s=r">Metagovernance in Crypto</a>). An example of this in practice is what Fei Protocol—a Defi stablecoin protocol—did in the Aave proposal to add Fei to the Aave—liquidity market protocol. The process went like this:</p><ol><li><p>“Fei community will propose to use its $INDEX to propose on Index Coop.</p></li><li><p>Fei community will propose  IIP-82 (IndexCoop Improvement Proposal): use its $AAVE to list $FEI on Aave.</p></li><li><p>Index Coop will propose AIP-33: list $FEI on Aave.</p></li><li><p>If all of those proposals are passed, $FEI is on Aave!” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://kydo.substack.com/p/metagovernance-in-crypto?s=r">Metagovernance in Crypto</a>)</p></li></ol><p>Governance is an integral feature of DAOs, so the beginning of composable governance between DAOs is a promising step toward the powerful interconnectivity of a fully integrated DAO ecosystem. As a cool aside there is even levered metagovernance by “when DAO #1 uses a small number of tokens to vote on a proposal in DAO #2 that then uses a much larger amount of tokens to vote on a proposal in DAO #3&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/sdalcega/status/1448723818256629760?s=21">Seb’s Tweet</a>).</p><h3 id="h-514-arc-from-daostack" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.1.4 Arc from DAOstack</h3><p>From a DAO infrastructure perspective, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://daostack.io/">DAOstack</a>— an “open source project advancing the technology and adoption of decentralized governance”—is expanding its library of modules for building DAO backends with Arc.</p><p><em>“Arc contains the master contracts that coordinate all the various pieces of DAOs together, as well as any number of flexible “schemes” that enable other DAO functions, such as defining the types of proposals users can submit. These modules can be mixed, matched, and modified to create the complete governance protocol for any given DAO&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://daostack.io/">DAOstack</a>).</p><p>Arc is complemented by ArcHives which provides a “way of organizing and curating the modules within each layer… The ArcHives will be a set of registries for the various types of modules in the stack–Arc contracts, applications, DAOs, and so on–registries that will be curated by the DAOstack community itself.&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://daostack.io/">DAOstack</a>).</p><p>Arc and ArcHives will introduce modular DAO construction and a community-created shopping-like experience for DAO components, contributing to the DAOstack vision of a platform “designed to underpin an entire ecosystem of decentralized organizations — a community of interoperable DAOs, able to share talent, ideas, and learnings with one another. DAOs will even be able to act as members of other DAOs, creating a fluid ‘DAO mesh’ or ‘internet of work’ in which collectives of collectives are commonplace, and in which any given individual might participate in dozens of different DAOs&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://daostack.io/">DAOstack</a>).</p><h3 id="h-515-zodiac-open-standard-by-gnosis" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.1.5 Zodiac Open Standard by Gnosis</h3><p>Also in the DAO infrastructure space, Gnosis—a protocol building a new market mechanism for DeFi—aims to build tools on an open standard to enable composable DAO components. The newly added modules are:</p><ul><li><p><strong>Bridge (Cross-chain DAO asset interoperability)</strong>: “This module allows an address on one chain to control an avatar on another chain using an Arbitrary Message Bridge (AMB). This enables a DAO on one chain to control assets and interact with systems like a Gnosis Safe on a different chain.”</p></li><li><p><strong>Exit (User-empowerment)</strong>: “This module allows participants to redeem a designated token for a proportional share of an avatar&apos;s digital assets, similar to Moloch DAO&apos;s <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/molochdao/status/1115451404242436098">rageQuit()</a> function.”</p></li><li><p><strong>Safe Minion (Composability)</strong>: “This module allows Moloch DAOs to manage a Gnosis Safe’s digital assets based on the outcome of v2 Moloch DAO proposals. Safe Minion enables Moloch DAOs to control collections of NFTs, manage LP positions with AMMs, and initiate any other arbitrary interactions. Even more, it supports DAOs that begin as a Gnosis Safe to later delegate governance to a Moloch DAO.”</p></li><li><p><strong>Seele (Customizability)</strong>: “This module allows avatars to operate with trustless tokenized DeGov, similar to Compound or Gitcoin, with a time-boxed proposal core that can register swappable voting contracts. This enables DAOs to choose from various on-chain voting methods that best suit their needs.”</p></li><li><p><strong>Scope (Variable Levels of Trust/Permissions-control)</strong>: “This guard allows an avatar or module to limit the scope of the functions with which it can interact. This enables a DAO to define granular permissions for different control mechanisms” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/OuhG5s2X5uSVBx1EK4tKPhnUc91Wh9YM0fwSnC8UNcg">Zodiac Open Standard</a>).</p></li></ul><h3 id="h-52-automation" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.2 Automation</h3><p>Automation is the second principle DAOs should lean into where possible to increase efficiency and improve opportunities to scale their DAOs operations.</p><h3 id="h-521-incentive-design-leveraging-process-automation" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.2.1 Incentive Design Leveraging Process Automation</h3><p>Designing incentives to inspire contribution is a key area that needs development in the DAO ecosystem. Automating the invoicing, quality assurance, and payment processes to make doing work in a DAO will be important for scalability. One way to introduce automation to this value creation process is through streams and algorithmic network analysis.</p><blockquote><p><em>&quot;Streams are likely to become the salaries of Web3 because they have many of the same unique properties but provide a more digitally native and logical solution. These programmable cash flows can deliver payments block-by-block to contributors or other parties. For this reason, they are a great way to reward long-term contributors and break the “monthly payment” model institutionalized in much of Web2&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.aragon.org/incentive-design-tooling-for-daos/">Incentive Design &amp; Tooling for DAOs</a>).</p></blockquote><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://sourcecred.io/">Sourcecred</a> is pioneering algorithmic network analysis—“participatory actions and recognition workflows to be created such that the algorithm makes calculations around how value has been created and accrued. Think of it as a bot keeping score of actions, impressions, and other activity in Discord, GitHub, and community forums like Discourse. The greatness of this system is that it removes much of the daily administrative burden for DAO operators and is decentralized” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.aragon.org/incentive-design-tooling-for-daos/">Incentive Design &amp; Tooling for DAOs</a>).</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://linktr.ee/Govrn">Govrn</a> is building on this idea with their Movements Model with “which the community assigns weight to different types of contributions depending on its priorities…. Movement Models may look completely different from one DAO to another, but that’s the idea. The community shouldn’t have to retrofit itself to metrics that were defined elsewhere ” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/1kxnetwork/organization-legos-the-state-of-dao-tooling-866b6879e93e">Organizational Legos: The State of DAO Tooling</a>). <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://coordinape.com/">Coordinape</a> (incubated by <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://yearn.finance/">Yearn</a> as an internal tool initially) is a popular and promising project in this category.</p><h3 id="h-522-automating-governance" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.2.2 Automating Governance</h3><p>Automating lengthy governance procedures should be another priority to improve DAO efficiency and focus on priority tasks for the DAO. Two ways to do this are with conviction voting and liquid democracy.</p><p><strong><em>5.2.2.1 </em></strong><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/giveth/conviction-voting-a-novel-continuous-decision-making-alternative-to-governance-aa746cfb9475"><strong><em>Conviction Voting</em></strong></a></p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/5cc4965088c772feaa63de60cc894b56016d9f5a78f67904be9466b27e10d12d.png" alt="Source: Conviction Voting: A Novel Continuous Decision Making Alternative to Governance" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: Conviction Voting: A Novel Continuous Decision Making Alternative to Governance</figcaption></figure><p>Conviction voting is a decision-making mechanism that “funds proposals based on the aggregated preference of community members, expressed continuously. In practice, that means that voters have ways of asserting their preferences for which proposals they would like to see approved, rather than casting votes in a single time-boxed session. A member can change their preference at any time, but the longer they keep their preference for the same proposal, the stronger their conviction gets&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/giveth/conviction-voting-a-novel-continuous-decision-making-alternative-to-governance-aa746cfb9475">Conviction Voting: A Novel Continuous Decision Making Alternative to Governance</a>). This voting method would address the voter apathy we discussed earlier while allowing contributors to fully characterize their preference profile for other contributors to see. Conviction voting also solves last-minute voting swings, mitigating the intensity of time-boxed governance sessions and the threat of short-term governance swings being used as an <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/apr/18/beanstalk-cryptocurrency-loses-182m-of-reserves-in-flash-attack">attack vector</a>.</p><p><strong><em>5.2.2.2 </em></strong><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/giveth/liquid-democracy-what-that-bd3c63e8df52"><strong><em>Liquid Democracy</em></strong></a></p><p>Liquid democracy allows the voting system to be fractional. “One vote can now be split in any number of ways between multiple delegates or sent entirely to your chosen delegate, and your delegate can delegate to someone else&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/giveth/liquid-democracy-what-that-bd3c63e8df52">Liquid Democracy</a>).</p><blockquote><p><em>“As an example take a busy college student who just doesn’t have time to vote, she could delegate ½ her vote to her mom and ½ her vote to her professor. If either of them wanted they could allocate a portion of the vote or all of it to a popular politically active persona that acts as a representative for the local community and controls an influential % of the total vote&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/giveth/liquid-democracy-what-that-bd3c63e8df52">Liquid Democracy</a>).</p></blockquote><p>The power of liquid democracy and the fractional vote delegation is that &quot;codifying your vote could allow you to tag different delegates to represent you based on the subject matter for the initiative. This means that if one initiative has an economic tag your vote for that initiative would be automatically allocated to the delegate you want to represent you on the economic issues, if another initiative carries the environmental tag your vote would be automatically allocated to your environmental delegate” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/giveth/liquid-democracy-what-that-bd3c63e8df52">Liquid Democracy</a>).</p><h3 id="h-523-ragequit" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.2.3 Ragequit</h3><p>As mentioned earlier, the Ragequit function allows DAO members to pool capital to source and approve investment opportunities (and “rage quit” if they want their capital back). This exit module “allows participants to redeem a designated token for a proportional share of an avatar&apos;s (e.g. DAO sub-unit) digital assets (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/@thelaoofficial/the-path-to-unaccredited-daos-with-minion-8113213f7195">Charting the Path to Unaccredited DAOs with Minion</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/OuhG5s2X5uSVBx1EK4tKPhnUc91Wh9YM0fwSnC8UNcg">Zodiac: The expansion pack for DAOs</a>).</p><h3 id="h-524-automating-conflict-resolution" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.2.4 Automating Conflict Resolution</h3><p>Another area in DAOs for process automation is the conflict resolution process. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://kleros.io/">Kleros</a> self-identifies as a justice protocol and is offering a decentralized arbitration service for disputes in web3, currently servicing the following use cases: small claims, insurance, e-commerce, finance, freelancing, token listing, content moderation, and intellectual property.</p><h3 id="h-53-standardization" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.3 Standardization</h3><p>Standardization is the third principle DAOs should build around, and it goes hand-in-hand with composability. Building standard processes and component templates not only improve contributor user experience, but also codify a common design language that will be the foundation for a composable DAO ecosystem, portable contributor reputation/accolades, and generally a more coherent, interconnected ecosystem that will benefit massively from network effects.</p><h3 id="h-531-erc-20-token-standard" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.3.1 ERC-20 Token Standard</h3><p>The ERC-20 token standard was first proposed in November 2015 and was later formalized in 2017. It “describes how Ethereum tokens should behave, including basic functionality like the transfer of tokens and approval for spending tokens. It allows third-party developers to easily support any token that complies with the ERC-20 standard” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.aragon.org/what-is-composability/">What is Composability?</a>). Realizing the true promise of the DAO ecosystems and composable systems requires standardized DAO design standards. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://daostar.org">DAOstar</a> is trying to create just this with their EIP-4824 regarding Decentralized Autonomous Organizations.</p><h3 id="h-532-eip-4824-decentralized-autonomous-organizations" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.3.2 EIP-4824 - Decentralized Autonomous Organizations</h3><p>DAOStar is working toward a common interface/user experience for DAOs, chiefly through <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://daostar.org/#roundtable">DAOstar One</a>–“a roundtable of key organizations in the DAO ecosystems” collaborating to define the components of common interfaces for DAOs. “In particular, a standard daoURI, similar to tokenURI in ERC-721, will enhance DAO search, discoverability, legibility, and proposal simulation. More consistent data across the ecosystem is also a prerequisite for future DAO standards” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://daostar.org/#roundtable">DAOstar One</a>).</p><p>The <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://daostar.one/EIP">EIP-4824</a> (Ethereum Improvement Proposal) contains modules:</p><ul><li><p><strong>MembersURI:</strong> “Approaches to membership vary widely in DAOs. Some DAOs and DAO frameworks (e.g. Gnosis Safe, Tribute), maintain an explicit, on-chain set of members, sometimes called owners or stewards. But many DAOs are structured so that membership status is based on the ownership of a token or tokens&quot;</p></li><li><p><strong>ProposalsURI:</strong> “The schema we propose is intended to support both on-chain and off-chain proposals, though DAOs themselves may choose to report only on-chain, only off-chain, or some custom mix of proposal types.”</p></li><li><p><strong>ContentURI:</strong> “In many cases, a proposal will have some (off-chain) content such as a forum post or a description on a voting platform which predates or accompanies the actual proposal.”</p></li><li><p><strong>GovernanceURI</strong>: “Instead of trying to standardize these wide-ranging practices or forcing DAOs to locate descriptions of those rights on-chain, we believe that a flat file represents the easiest and most widely-acceptable mechanism for communicating what membership means and how proposals work. These flat files can then be consumed by services such as Etherscan, supporting DAO discoverability and legibility.”</p></li></ul><h3 id="h-533-standardizing-governance-procedures-pairwise-preferencing-governance" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.3.3 Standardizing Governance Procedures (Pairwise Preferencing Governance)</h3><p>Governance procedure is also a process that is ripe for standardization. Governance proposal types can vary drastically so simplifying the contributors’ governance touchpoint is a powerful way to make DAO governance more efficient. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.colony.io/introducing-budgetbox/">Pairwise Preferencing</a> is a voting mechanism in which contributors&apos; votes “take the form of a ‘pairwise preference’ between two competing items (i.e. “A vs B”) [asking not] ‘what is generally good’, preferring instead ‘what is relatively more important’” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.colony.io/introducing-budgetbox/">Introducing BudgetBox</a>). The collection of votes on what initiatives are relatively more important from contributors are consolidated using machine learning techniques and turned into a “probability distribution over the items, where the probability represents the odds of one item being chosen over all the others… These numbers [are interpreted] not as probabilities, but as percentages of a budget&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.colony.io/introducing-budgetbox/">Introducing BudgetBox</a>).</p><h3 id="h-534-standardizing-sub-dao-pricing" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.3.4 Standardizing Sub-DAO Pricing</h3><p>A final example of standardizing DAO practices is standardizing financial engagement between sub-DAOs or pods in the context of the internal DAO economies we discussed earlier. Bankless DAO’s Guilds or sub-units interact with one another and leverage each other&apos;s specialties to produce for the DAO.</p><p>Bankless DAO’s marketing guild is pioneering standardized deliverables within the Bankless DAO ecosystem which is setting a precedent of standard payments rates and token swaps for services within the DAO ecosystem.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/c7f5a996b548bed1945054c78c73f9d7bad6e417ecb9ec7577872b8516a22b92.webp" alt="Source: DAOs as Economic Engines" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: DAOs as Economic Engines</figcaption></figure><h3 id="h-54-specialization-sub-dao-revolution" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.4 Specialization (Sub-DAO Revolution)</h3><blockquote><p><em>“Simply put: I believe particularly assertive DAOs should find and recruit the best collection of squads to grow themselves” (</em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.curvelabs.eu/ownership-in-cryptonetworks-96f13f4a113e"><em>Ownership in Cryptonetworks</em></a><em>).</em></p></blockquote><p>Specialization is the fourth principle DAO should optimize around which further crystalizes the analogy that DAOs function as micro-economies. As outlined in the intrinsic strength section, DAOs with specialized sub-DAOs that have their own specialized leaders and micro-governance schema increase the resilience and ingenuity of the larger parent DAO. One functional group will organically solve problems for another given their distinct expertise and unique backgrounds. This level of autonomy and self-custody is difficult under centralized leadership, setting DAOs apart in their ability to reconcile distinct operations within a collective.</p><p>On the frontier of DAO innovation, there is a sub-DAO revolution well underway. Below I will highlight some of the best examples of why specialized sub-units within a large DAO organization is a key unlock toward DAO operational efficiency at scale.</p><h3 id="h-541-minion-framework-by-raidguild" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.4.1 Minion Framework by RaidGuild</h3><p>The <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/@thelaoofficial/the-path-to-unaccredited-daos-with-minion-8113213f7195">Minion Framework</a> is a sub-DAO architecture built by RaidGuild in collaboration with Moloch DAO. It effectively operates as an internal accounting system that operates effectively as an internal escrow program.</p><p>“Through Minion, Moloch-based DAOs will be able to seamlessly create sub-groups of DAOs, which enable DAO members to segregate and pool funds in a way that will protect investors, manage tax risk, and potentially also decrease the risk of fraud. They also open up the possibility of creating DAOs to interact with liquidity pools” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/@thelaoofficial/the-path-to-unaccredited-daos-with-minion-8113213f7195">Charting the Path to Unaccredited DAOs with Minions</a>). This speeds up the efficiency of new projects with automatic capital allocation and compartmentalizes legal risk for the parent DAO.</p><blockquote><p><em>&quot;These [Baby DAOs] can be thought of as ‘throwaway’ pools that can be used to raise funding or provide investment for a specific project or initiative. For example, when DAO babies are combined with Moloch v2 functionality, you can coordinate a wider range of financial functions and explore more opportunities to cooperate without losing the security and trust assumptions of smart contracts&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/@thelaoofficial/the-path-to-unaccredited-daos-with-minion-8113213f7195">Charting the Path to Unaccredited DAOs with Minions</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-542-fast-daos-by-aragon" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.4.2 Fast DAOs by Aragon</h3><p>A similar solution comes from Aragon with their Fast DAOs whereby the Main DAO is turned into more of a managerial DAO, supported by “several so-called ‘Fast DAOs’ focused on different initiatives like R&amp;D or communications&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://aragon.org/">Aragon</a>).</p><blockquote><p><em>&quot;Fast DAO members can use these payments to compensate contributors or cover expenses without the need for explicit approval from [the Main DAO]&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://aragon.org/">Aragon</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-543-bankless-dao-guilds" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.4.3 Bankless DAO Guilds</h3><p>As mentioned above, Bankless DAO has been a premier example of the division of labor into specialized DAOs or Guilds.</p><blockquote><p><em>“Bankless DAO is organized into 13 guilds. These guilds are talent pools and represent different competencies available for other members of the DAO to join or tap into—writers, developers, analytics, design, legal, etc&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/daos-as-economic-engines?s=r">DAOs as Economic Engines</a>).</p></blockquote><blockquote><p><em>“As expected, many of these guilds have bootstrapped and funded projects that fall within their domain, effectively creating 14 total sources of funding in addition to the singular grants committee. These guilds are limited in their budget, amounting to a fraction of what the grants committee can allocate, which makes guilds perfect for micro-grants that can roll up into larger grants after demonstrating some Proof of Concept (PoC) or MVP&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/daos-as-economic-engines?s=r">DAOs as Economic Engines</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-544-orca-pods" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.4.4 Orca Pods</h3><p>Finally, Orca—a DAO working on building standardized, modular infrastructure for DAO governance and contributor experience—is focused on their Pod structure which they define as “small working groups [aiming] to build governance around people based on their expertise, not just their wallet” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.orcaprotocol.org/">Orca</a>).</p><blockquote><p><em>“Pods are Orca Protocol’s answer to the scaling problems that DAOs face. Pods are small working groups, usually centered around one expertise. In place of—or in addition to—one massive, centralized DAO treasury, each pod has its own multi-sig wallet that is controlled by the pod members. So pods can be thought of as mini-DAOs within a larger DAO. By creating a pod around expertise, certain elements of a DAO can be hardened. This means that it is possible for a DAO to codify specific roles and responsibilities within its ecosystem; we like to call this process podifying. Podifying a DAO will turn slow and inefficient, centralized and rigid structures into fast and fluid organizations&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://orca.mirror.xyz/Y2xvPmB4cJH51srGqY6Mm_g38lV-7cwvtyDePnyzfAE">Pods: The DAOnfall of Token Voting</a>).</p></blockquote><blockquote><p><em>“Orca Protocol recognizes that DAOs are at the frontier of organizational design. As such, it should be left to a DAO and its users to explore the best options for their vision and needs, rather than imposing predefined organizational shapes. Orca Protocol can, thus, be thought of as a set of governance primitives&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://orca.mirror.xyz/Y2xvPmB4cJH51srGqY6Mm_g38lV-7cwvtyDePnyzfAE">Pods: The DAOnfall of Token Voting</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-55-financialization" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.5 Financialization</h3><p>The final tenet DAOs should optimize around is financialization. At scale, with semi-pseudonymous actors making up the contributor base, it is key to note that everyone will behave like a rational agent, so building incentives financial or otherwise to motivate healthy and energetic contributors should be the target. Financializing processes like governance are innovative ways to introduce market dynamics to conventionally non-financial processes.</p><blockquote><p><em>“The individual shareholder is driven by greed; the network, by growth. Squads empowered with ownership navigate and mediate this tension between micro and macro by growing the network in pursuit of squad wealth.”</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.curvelabs.eu/ownership-in-cryptonetworks-96f13f4a113e">Ownership in Cryptonetworks</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-551-rethinking-cost-centers-bankless-hq-first-quest-team" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.5.1 Rethinking Cost Centers - Bankless HQ First Quest Team</h3><p>The first form of financialization comes from Bankless HQ thinking innovatively about how to design novel revenue streams for their expense-heavy guilds. Bankless’ First Quest team is responsible for onboarding new DAO members, and it partners with other guilds for specific onboarding tasks most relevant to the new DAO member. The First Quest Guild is a cost center in the sense that onboarding is not a revenue-generating activity. Bankless DAO has been thinking about how to better incorporate cost centers into its internal economy.</p><p>They envision that eventually “going through First Quest will lead directly to a guild workstream. Like a funnel with multiple outlets, new members can find a guild they most resonate with and jump directly into a guild-specific first quest. For example, the writers guild&apos;s first quest would be to complete an editing or writing task to gauge competency and familiarize new members with how the writers guild operates.&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/daos-as-economic-engines?s=r">DAOs as Economic Engines</a>).</p><p>To integrate this cost center into the internal economy, Bankless “foresee[s] the First Quest team taking a cut of the writers guild first quest bounty (or any guild’s first quest) for each new member referred to the guild. In this way, First Quest has incoming capital flows instead of acting as a pure cost center.&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://frogmonkee.substack.com/p/daos-as-economic-engines?s=r">DAOs as Economic Engines</a>).</p><h3 id="h-552-financialized-governance" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.5.2 Financialized Governance</h3><p>The lion’s share of the financialization opportunities surrounds governance processes. Below we will round out our discussion of novel governance systems like conviction voting, liquid democracy, and pairwise preference voting with three more additions—quadratic voting, holographic consensus, and futarchy. These governance systems demonstrate the power of financialized governance in a way that is sustainable, functional at scale, and avoids the challenges of centralization by whales—wealthy contributors.</p><p><strong><em>5.5.2.1 Quadratic Voting</em></strong></p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/c19521ab467363d7ca1369594b36afdb102c8377bc962b1a5ff5ea7ca4e59bba.png" alt="Source: Quadratic Payments: A Primer" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: Quadratic Payments: A Primer</figcaption></figure><p>Quadratic voting is the process whereby the marginal cost of a vote is proportional to the amount of support that the proposal already has, meaning &quot;your n&apos;th unit of influence costs $n.&quot; In other words, to support a proposal at its conception is fairly inexpensive, but, as it gains popularity, it costs progressively more to back the proposal, diluting the power of wealthier voters when the proposal is broadly known.</p><p>This model is fascinating because it solves the simple voting (&quot;one person one vote&quot;) challenge of weaker voices getting washed out, and, on the other hand, solves the centralization risk of a private-goods market mechanism in which “the individual with the stronger preferences (or the wealthiest) carries everything. As illustrated in the above graph, quadratic voting is positioned squarely between the two extremes, scaling vote cost with the strength of support” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://vitalik.ca/general/2019/12/07/quadratic.html">Quadratic Payments: A Primer</a>).</p><p><strong><em>5.5.2.2 Holographic Consensus</em></strong></p><p>Another financialized approach to governance comes from Gnosis DAO and is called <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/daostack/an-explanation-of-daostack-in-fairly-simple-terms-1956e26b374#c4f7">holographic consensus</a>. This governance process is aimed at solving the tragedy of the common issue with collective decision-making by allowing small groups to make decisions on “behalf of the larger majority in such a way that guarantees perfect alignment between the two” (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/daostack/an-explanation-of-daostack-in-fairly-simple-terms-1956e26b374#c4f7">An explanation of DAOstack in Fairly Simple Terms</a>).</p><p><em>“Since predictors are incentivized to pick out the best, most DAO-aligned proposals, we can lower the passing requirements for the top predicted proposals: these proposals can be passed much more quickly and with fewer total votes than other proposals. This creates a dynamic we call holographic consensus. Here, as in a hologram, a smaller part of the whole (a small group of voters) can be made to effectively represent the whole (all the voters), allowing DAOs to make fast decisions while maintaining value alignment. This effect is compounded by opening the staking system to anyone, be they a voting member of the DAO or not”</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/daostack/an-explanation-of-daostack-in-fairly-simple-terms-1956e26b374#c4f7">An explanation of DAOstack in Fairly Simple Terms</a>).</p><p>The magic of this model is its emphasis on reputation staking whereby “predictors have to ‘bet’ that (if boosted) the proposal will be accepted by the vote. If a bad proposal is likely to be boosted, it creates an incentive (fisherman concept) to predict against it and make a profit by alarming reputation holders to make sure they vote against it, and thus the proposal is rejected. In cases where a good proposal is boosted, and no predictors are predicting against the proposal, the DAO itself will always play the role of the counterparty (predict against any proposal) and thus ensure correct predictions are rewarded&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/daostack/an-explanation-of-daostack-in-fairly-simple-terms-1956e26b374#c4f7">An explanation of DAOstack in Fairly Simple Terms</a>).</p><p><strong><em>5.5.2.3 Futarchy from Gnosis DAO</em></strong></p><p>Gnosis DAO is also innovating with some novel ideas around futarchy—governance by prediction markets.</p><p><em>“That is, elected representatives would still formally define and manage an after-the-fact measurement of national welfare via traditional-democratic processes, but now—market speculators and participants will get to decide on the policies that should be put in place to get the nation to those chosen ends&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/a-deep-dive-into-futarchy-what-national-governments-and-private-organisations-can-learn-from-a-9408aa2fb887">A Deep Dive into Futarchy</a>).</p><p>Here is an example of how it would work:</p><blockquote><p><em>&quot;Let’s say that this end-goal has been selected as the end goal to work towards through a traditional-democratic voting process. Predictions markets will now take over to determine the actual policies that will be implemented to achieve it… For the sake of this little thought experiment, let us use policy “x” as someone’s proposed means of reaching the above end goal, where markets y¹ and y² represent the pricing of the options determining the fate of the policy… If y¹ represents the price of “yes,” and exceeds that of y² representing the price of “no” by the time the market closes, the policy will be implemented, and all trades on the “no” market are reverted.</em>&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/a-deep-dive-into-futarchy-what-national-governments-and-private-organisations-can-learn-from-a-9408aa2fb887">A Deep Dive into Futarchy</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-553-disclosure-innovations" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">5.5.3 Disclosure Innovations</h3><p>A final interesting topic regarding financialization and gamification involves innovation in disclosures as they relate to the DAO ecosystem. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/chris-brummer/">Chris Brummer</a>, a professor at Georgetown Law, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://chrisbrummer.medium.com/introducing-disclosure-nfts-disclosure-daos-and-disclosure-dids-9579e0e739fe">writes</a> about the state of financial disclosure and envisions a future where the novelty of digital scarcity could be used to revamp and even monetize disclosure agreements via NFTs.</p><blockquote><p><em>&quot;Once the disclosures were read, the reader could be directed to answer one or more test questions — or even a game testing their understanding of the app. When the question(s) are answered, or the game was successfully navigated, a disclosure token could be issued to the end-user or investor in the project to their wallet. The tokens disbursed to the end-user would be unique, embedding the fact that a particular person passed the test, but not transferable&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://chrisbrummer.medium.com/introducing-disclosure-nfts-disclosure-daos-and-disclosure-dids-9579e0e739fe">Introducing Disclosure NFTs, Disclosure DAOs, and Disclosure DIDs</a>).</p></blockquote><p>&quot;Disclosure tokens could also double as social tokens, and be used to access portals or gateways for social networking, guild-building and participating in governing DAOs in DeFi&quot; (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://chrisbrummer.medium.com/introducing-disclosure-nfts-disclosure-daos-and-disclosure-dids-9579e0e739fe">Introducing Disclosure NFTs, Disclosure DAOs, and Disclosure DIDs</a>). These disclosure tokens could be powerful axes of the reputation system we have discussed in this piece, offering new dimensions of expertise within DAOs that could all be verified on-chain.</p><h2 id="h-6-pulling-it-all-together" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">6. Pulling It All Together</h2><p>DAOs that have begun to emerge as micro-economies producing content and services in a decentralized way are in need of strong foundation principles to guide their growth and maturation. While this organization type has had little time to wrestle with its most pressing challenges, its intrinsic strength against the backdrop of hierarchical firms, and the five design principles—composability, automation, standardization, specialization, and financialization—I laid out in this piece may offer guidance for challenges to come as the ecosystem evolves.</p><h3 id="h-61-daostack-sentiments" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">6.1 DAOstack Sentiments</h3><p>DAOstack Project shares some powerful sentiments on where this ecosystem could go:</p><blockquote><p><em>&quot;Imagine tens or hundreds of millions of people participating in this kind of collaborative economy — one in which no one wields a disproportionate amount of power, all are rewarded in proportion to the value they contribute, and everyone is incentivized to act in alignment with the common good.”</em></p></blockquote><blockquote><p><em>&quot;The DAOstack project, at its essence, endeavors to use crypto-economics and other technologies to create moment-to-moment micro-incentives that, when multiplied across thousands of individuals and millions of moments, enable crowds to collaborate more resiliently and efficiently than any other system that has yet existed&quot;</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/daostack/an-explanation-of-daostack-in-fairly-simple-terms-1956e26b374">An Explanation of DAOstack in Fairly Simple Terms</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-62-common-stack-project" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">6.2 Common Stack Project</h3><p>In closing, I want to highlight the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://commonsstack.org/">Common Stack Project</a> which I think epitomizes a commitment to all the principles laid out above. While still in development, their framework wishes to harness the power of scalability within standardized and composable systems. They also aim to automate processes and induce comparative advantage through specialized sub-units to make the DAOs that use their product that much more powerful.</p><blockquote><p><em>“We are building commons-based microeconomies to sustain public goods through incentive alignment, continuous funding, and community governance. Our library of open-source, interoperable web3 components will put effective new tools in the hands of communities, enabling them to raise and allocate shared funds, make transparent decisions, and monitor their progress in supporting the Commons.”</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://commonsstack.org/">Common Stack Project</a>).</p></blockquote><p>Their 6 iterations or product modules are as follows:</p><ol><li><p><strong>(Iteration 0)</strong> Fundraising + Research via Trusted Seed Initiative - join the community by providing capital or labor in return CSTK token that denotes ‘Trusted Seed’ reputation.</p></li><li><p><strong>(Iteration 1)</strong> Augmented Bonding Curves - bonding curve system (with early burning disabled) to prevent harmful early speculation.</p></li><li><p><strong>(Iteration 2)</strong> Giveth proposal engine - interoperable governance proposal framework for Commons ecosystem.</p></li><li><p><strong>(Iteration 3)</strong> Conviction voting modules to integrate with ‘giveth’ proposals.</p></li><li><p><strong>(Iteration 4)</strong> Common Analytics Dashboard - &quot;its purpose is to display the operational metrics of a Commons.&quot;</p></li><li><p><strong>(Iteration 5)</strong> The Minimum Viable Commons will be the primary deliverable of this iteration, with a focus on making the entire system easy to deploy and maintain, even for non-technical users. (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://commonsstack.org/">Common Stack Project</a>).</p></li></ol><h3 id="h-63-regen-network-project" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">6.3 Regen Network Project</h3><p>Their example and so many others from Moloch, Orca, Rabbithole, Bankless, Gnosis, Aragon, DAOstack, and DAOstar are shining the way for DAO innovation. The <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.regen.network/">Regen Network</a> is taking some of these innovative models outside the digital-first domain and asking how DAOs can be useful governance collectives to help save our ecosystem.</p><blockquote><p><em>“The </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.regen.network/"><em>Regen Network</em></a><em> project, a public blockchain for ecosystem services, takes another approach to this distribution problem. They have set aside 30% of their tokens for land stewards, climate scientists, and other stakeholders in regenerative land management to form </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/regen-network/community-stake-governance-model-b949bcb1eca3"><em>community DAOs</em></a><em> that participate in network governance…. Stakeholders with practical knowledge, or “tacit knowledge&apos;&apos;, like land stewards in the case of Regen Network, benefit from governance by incorporating informal practices in decision making. Here, DAOs begin to introduce new dimensions that exceed what the operating principles of a digital cooperative notionally encompass.”</em> (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/t4F5rItMw4-mlpLZf5JQhElbDfQ2JRVKAzEpanyxW1Q">A Prehistory of DAOs</a>).</p></blockquote><h3 id="h-64-close" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">6.4 Close</h3><p>Projects like this one are a healthy reminder that the innovation and hard work that goes into refining user experience, organization architecture, governance procedures, and so much more is worthwhile so the world can enjoy the benefits of decentralized coordination. In this piece, I have endeavored to characterize the DAO ecosystem innovation landscape. We explored the challenges and intrinsic strengths of this digital cooperative which led us to five broad principles—composability, automation, standardization, specialization, and financialization—to design around to ensure that the promise of DAOs and decentralized coordination can be realized.</p><p>If you stuck around to the end, I am eternally grateful. More to come soon :)</p><hr><p><em>All suggestions and feedback are welcome! Please do not hesitate to reach out </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/adebdoh"><em>@adebdoh</em></a><em> on Twitter. All views are my own.</em></p><hr><p><strong>About the author:</strong> Alex Debayo-Doherty is a software and crypto growth investor and technology hobbyist. His interests lie at the intersection of crypto/web3 and the future of work, education, climate action, and digital identity. His research looks into how the DAO innovation landscape is evolving, offering DAO design principles to capitalize on the intrinsic strengths of this new organization type.</p><p>Special thanks to <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/roman_0x">Roman Ugarte</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/edchucation?s=21&amp;t=GrrCvoKG807Sqi_Tw_d-fg">Lucas Chu</a> for their guidance and thoughtful feedback in the process of producing this piece.</p><p><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> Harvard Blockchain and the author of this piece are not financial advisors. Nothing contained in this research piece should be construed as investment advice.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>harvardblockchain@newsletter.paragraph.com (Harvard Blockchain)</author>
            <enclosure url="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/f69d097f20e7357bc8884976cb0678fddc30f336e9b7804d14ddef9c2c1bb318.png" length="0" type="image/png"/>
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            <title><![CDATA[Inside the Vault: A closer look at DOVs]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@harvardblockchain/inside-the-vault-a-closer-look-at-dovs</link>
            <guid>NoA4ZXg3PUDX8gV1Hb21</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jun 2022 11:48:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[IntroductionDeFi options have seen phenomenal growth in 2021 and now 2022, with its Total Value Locked (TVL) booming from 92 million dollars a year ago to over a billion as of May 2022.Data from: https://defillama.com/protocols/Options (link accessed 04/10/2022)This article introduces DeFi Option Vaults (DOVs) as a new financial innovation within the DeFi options space and examines how DOVs work and their four unique value propositions: accessibility, sustainable yield, altcoin options liquid...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 id="h-introduction" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Introduction</h2><p>DeFi options have seen phenomenal growth in 2021 and now 2022, with its Total Value Locked (TVL) booming from 92 million dollars a year ago to over a billion as of May 2022.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/a7e468795e0d3f0ad12373d0d905bfaca6a56c36871ae8ed237153ae62466f72.png" alt="Data from: https://defillama.com/protocols/Options (link accessed 04/10/2022)" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Data from: https://defillama.com/protocols/Options (link accessed 04/10/2022)</figcaption></figure><p>This article introduces DeFi Option Vaults (DOVs) as a new financial innovation within the DeFi options space and examines how DOVs work and their four unique value propositions: accessibility, sustainable yield, altcoin options liquidity, and composability. The article will also take a closer look at the yield representation and performance of various protocols to date and provide some thoughts on how best to assess DOVs.</p><h2 id="h-defi-option-vaults-dovs-an-overview" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">DeFi Option Vaults (DOVs) – An Overview</h2><h3 id="h-what-are-dovs" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">WHAT ARE DOVs?</h3><p>DOVs made their debut in early 2021. To understand DOVs, we need to first understand the basics of how options work.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/option.asp#:~:text=Options%20are%20financial%20derivatives%20that,hedging%2C%20income%2C%20or%20speculation">Options</a> are contracts that give its owner the right, but not the obligation, to either buy or sell an asset at an agreed-upon price (“strike price”) by an agreed-upon time. In every option trade, there are two parties: an option writer (seller) and option buyer. The option buyer pays the option writer a premium for the rights to the contract. At the point of expiry, the option buyer can choose to exercise the option, and the option writer is obligated to fulfil it at the agreed-upon strike price.</p><p>DOVs utilize smart contracts to automate the process of selling options for its users. It provides a new source of passive yield generation by selling weekly out-of-the-money (OTM) options while distributing the option premiums to its users as yield. Due to the high volatility of crypto options (vis-a-vis traditional equity markets), the yields of some of these vaults are highly lucrative and can range from 15%-70% APY depending on the asset and market structure.</p><h3 id="h-how-do-they-work" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">HOW DO THEY WORK?</h3><p>DOVs offer options with short term expirations and typically run weekly strategies that DOV users can participate in. Protocols call each of their respective yield cycles an <em>epoch</em>.</p><p>Prior to the start of the weekly epoch, users can deposit assets into various vaults – which are selected based on asset type and options strategy based on their market view. Currently, DOVs offer 2 options strategies: cash-secured puts and covered calls.</p><ol><li><p>Cash-secured puts – suitable for neutral to bullish sentiment, where users/sellers believe the price of the asset will expire above the strike price</p></li><li><p>Covered calls – suitable for a neutral to slightly bullish sentiment, where the price of the asset is on an upward trend, but users/sellers believe it will expire below the strike price</p></li></ol><p>At the start of the epoch, the vaults mint option contract tokens using the collateral deposited. These options are then sold to market makers via <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://ribbonfinance.medium.com/open-auctions-a981ff10db2b">Gnosis Auction</a> or blind Dutch auction via Solana’s RFQ system. The premiums collected from the sale determine the yield percentage of the week.</p><blockquote><p><em>Yield % = (total premium) / (total collateral in vault)</em></p></blockquote><p>Before the option expiry, the assets are locked within the vault. Users can opt to withdraw their deposited assets. However, the assets are only released after the conclusion of the current epoch.</p><p>At expiry, there are 2 possible outcomes:</p><ol><li><p>The option expires in-the-money (ITM) – the option buyer has the right to exercise their option and the assets within the vault are used to pay off the difference between the strike price and current market price.</p></li><li><p>The option expires out-of-the-money (OTM) – the option ends up worthless, and the vault depositor profits with the premiums.</p></li></ol><p>Unless the assets are withdrawn, the vault automatically re-runs the strategy for the next week, compounding the returns for users over time with every successful epoch.</p><h2 id="h-part-1-dovs-four-value-propositions" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Part 1: DOVs’ Four Value Propositions</h2><p>Unlike a typical yield farm or CeFi options, DOVs offer four unique value propositions for their users.</p><h3 id="h-1-accessibility" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">1. Accessibility</h3><p>Options are complex financial instruments that are relatively difficult to understand. To be able to effectively select and apply the multitude of trading strategies to varying market conditions is another new level of difficulty. Typically, traders need to assess a variety of factors to successfully select a strike price that is sufficiently OTM, so that the option expires worthless, and yet close enough to the market price to maximize the premiums collected.</p><p>For most crypto users who are just seeking high returns on their investment and have no interest to acquire a deep knowledge of various financial instruments, DOVs offer a well packaged solution that abstracts the complexities typical in options, including selecting strike prices, expiry dates, etc. DOVs open the door for retail investors to access, participate and earn yield from the otherwise complex options market, which is typically dominated by sophisticated traders and institutions with abundant capital, research resources and experience.</p><p>In addition, instead of users purchasing options individually, which would translate to multiple transactions each week, the vault architecture of DOVs allows for thousands of users (and their transactions) to be aggregated and transacted together. This allows for reductions in high gas fees typically associated with multiple transactions. In addition, DOVs’ auto compounding feature allows users to skip any additional transaction costs should they want to roll over their deposited vault assets into the next epoch.</p><p>In summary, DOVs provide easy and cost-effective access and a simple, straight forward user-experience to a sophisticated financial instrument that can potentially deliver attractive yields.</p><h3 id="h-2-sustainable-real-yield" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">2 – Sustainable Real Yield</h3><p>DeFi is constantly in search of new forms of yield. Currently, a large portion of the yield in DeFi comes from token emissions – where yields are paid out as incentives to support liquidity provision or as staking rewards. However, yields from such protocols are circular and synthetic and require a steady inflow of new users and upward price action to sustain its high projected yield.</p><p>As Jordi Alexander explains in the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://medium.com/@game_theorizing/of-smoke-and-mirrors-part-1-117c1f92e186">law of thermos-ponzinomics</a>, “An economically isolated system cannot create money — it can only redistribute what was put in”. What this means is that if we consider no new buyers—and hence no new money—entering the market, the value within the system cannot magically increase. Thus, emissions might be reframed as a form of dilution – where whilst the number of tokens one owns might be increasing, the percentage owned in relation to the overall market cap remains the same. Over time, as the dilution gets greater and assuming the price remains constant, the first person that sells is the one that is able to extract the highest proportion of the overall market cap, which will result in a more than proportionate fall in price.</p><p>Once the price of the token starts tanking, the yield percentages are similarly eroded. Users seeing falling yields would flee to other sources or forms of yield, putting further sell pressure on the token, which can potentially start a death spiral of panic selling and the ultimate collapse of the yield farm.</p><p>Another source of yield comes from money markets such as Aave or Compound. Here, users earn yield by providing assets which others want to borrow. While these yields are organic, money markets tend to suffer from the “crowding out” effect, where there is far greater demand for easy yield than there is demand for borrowing. As a result, many of these money markets can only offer low single-digit returns.</p><p>In the case of DOVs, their yields are not reliant on emissions by the protocol itself but are instead provided from external sources in the form of premiums – a fee paid by market makers for the provision of a service (in this case the option contract itself). In addition, DOVs’ yields are not affected by the “crowding out” effect, as long as there is sufficient demand from option buyers. Noting the overall size of the derivatives and options markets in TradFi and Cefi, there is plenty of runway for new entrants, both retail users and larger institutions.</p><h3 id="h-3-altcoin-options-liquidity" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3 – Altcoin Options Liquidity</h3><p>The current crypto options market is largely dominated by BTC and ETH, with a majority of its volume routed through the CeFi Deribit exchange. There is an absence of any altcoin options due to the insufficient natural liquidity available to provide efficient spreads.</p><p>Excitingly, DOVs have become the largest trading volumes for altcoin options. DOVs provided the catalyst of a critical liquidity injection to kickstart the altcoin options markets. Working with market makers on the buy end, DOVs provide the supply side options liquidity via the deposited funds within their vaults. As altcoin DOVs continue to grow and market makers take on larger altcoin option positions on their books, altcoin options market will continue expanding with thicker liquidity. With greater confidence in liquid options markets, large institutions and investors can step in to partake in the speculation or yield generation, thereby kickstarting the virtuous cycle. Additionally, analogous to equity markets, the development of derivatives liquidity will inevitably have positive spillover effects to their respective spot altcoin markets.</p><p>New vaults for various asset types are constantly springing up– Ribbon finance even has a $APE vault for the recently launched Apecoin by the Bored Ape Yacht Club team. With more and more altcoin vaults offered, individuals and groups with huge collections of assets, such as investors, institutions, or DAO treasuries, will inevitably be looking to DOVs to capitalize on their assets for additional yield.</p><h3 id="h-4-composability" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">4 – Composability</h3><p>DOVs are still in a nascent state and there are huge opportunities for further development in terms of the range and types of structured finance products, as well as integration into other DeFi legos within the broader crypto ecosystem.</p><p>In addition to the high organic yield which comes from collecting option premiums, DOVs can potentially allow users to plug in and collect other forms of yield as well. For example, across the week before the expiry of the option, protocols could stake the assets to earn additional staking yield. Some protocols might also have emission-based incentives to entice protocol usage, further boosting yield. Additionally, the emergence of new option vaults for productive assets such as Solend’s yield-bearing cTOKENS, Lido’s liquid-staking stTOKENS or Yearn’s yVault Tokens, allow for increased capital efficiency.</p><p>Further innovation can come in terms of new products. While most vaults currently offer only vanilla puts and calls, there are a wide range of possible strategies that could be implemented – from new option strategies or combinations of various structured products. These products can emerge to address DeFi-native use cases. For example, Dopex is reportedly launching a <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.dopex.io/articles/introduction-series/introducing-the-redacted-option-vaults">REDACTED vault</a> that would allow users to bet on interest rates of curve pools. This would further incentivize participation of protocols in the Curve Wars as a new way to hedge against pool APY risks or to provide users with a new avenue to speculate and take advantage of the outcome of the Curve wars.</p><p>As DOV protocols continue to mature and more users are onboarded, more specific and exciting financial products will continue to be created to suit the ever-growing interests and needs of the community.</p><h2 id="h-part-2-while-yield-is-yield-not-all-apys-are-equal" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Part 2: While yield is yield, not all APYs are equal</h2><p>APY, short for annualized percentage yield, is a familiar term that is well known throughout DeFi. It is the real rate of return of an investment accounting for compounding interest. It was popularized with the explosion of DeFi yield farming throughout 2020 and yet again in 2021, with rebasing protocols and their incredibly high APYs, the most prominent being OlympusDAO ($OHM).</p><p>DOVs similarly employ this metric of APY to highlight and compare the returns of various vaults. While the continuation of this familiar term makes it easy to onboard existing DeFi-native users, a reflection on the specific perimeters of the DOVs and the ways in which risk is calculated make this measure a complex one. Unlike rebasing protocols or emission incentives, DOVs’ APY isn’t directly controlled by the protocol. Instead, they are a result of the premiums paid, which are influenced by a variety of factors, including the strike selection, how far OTM the strike is selected, etc. For example, the closer the strike price selected vis-a-vis the current price, the higher the premiums due to their higher probability of being exercised.</p><p>Therefore, what arises is an important tradeoff that various option vaults and protocols need to make: whether to select strikes closer ITM and hence offer a higher, more attractive yield, or to select further OTM strikes for a lower return but higher probability of keeping the entire premium.</p><p>For the DeFi degen, the choice might seem obvious: always select the vaults with the highest APY across the protocols. However, looking at the historical returns of DOVs and their inherent volatility, a single exercised option contract can potentially wipe out 4-10 weeks of unexercised premiums collected. A case in point is the recent Solana covered-call vaults which expired ITM on the week ending 1st April 2022. Due to the rapid price pump, vault users saw a loss of approximately 3-4% across various vaults. In comparison, the average typical weekly yield for this vault is between 0.5-1%. As such, the risk of being exercised across any given week outweigh that of its counterpart.</p><p>This article puts forth the question: considering the mechanisms behind DOVs and the unique risks they encompass, is APY the most accurate mode of measure? Or should a new metric be considered altogether?</p><p>This section will discuss 3 additional factors which DOVs users might consider:</p><ol><li><p>Model of calculation</p></li><li><p>Model for Selection of strike</p></li><li><p>Fees Charged</p></li></ol><h3 id="h-1-model-of-apy-calculation" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">1. Model of APY calculation</h3><p>It’s not possible to compare something objectively if the methods in which they are calculated are different. Currently across various DOVs, there is not a single consistent way of calculation. Some protocols extrapolate the returns of a single previous epoch, resulting in highly irregular APYs that change across weeks. Others average the returns across various time periods from a month to 16 epochs, providing a steadier APY percentage. On top of this, the way in which various protocols account for options that expire ITM, differ: <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://app.friktion.fi/">some</a> count the yield as 0% (excluding the upside lost from the upside) while <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://app.ribbon.finance/">others</a> exclude the ITM weeks from the APY calculation altogether. As a result, these APYs fail to account for losses and thereby project a vault APY with a higher return than its actual performance.</p><p>In addition, there are also differing opinions in the calculation of APY returns in relation to the base asset (in $ETH for an ETH vault or $SOL for a SOL vault etc.) or to their stablecoin values, which further complicate an already inconsistent calculation of true APY returns.</p><h3 id="h-2-strike-selection" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">2. Strike selection</h3><p>As articulated earlier, there is an inverse relationship between how far OTM the strikes selected are and their respective premium payout. Thus, one of the key factors to consider is how the strikes for DOVs are selected. Currently, most protocols target options with a range of 10 to 15 delta, which reflects an OTM option which has approximately a 10-15% chance of being exercised.</p><p>In his <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.samchepal.com/a-quantitative-analysis-of-defi-option-vault-strategies/">article</a>, Sam Chepal backtested this 10 delta covered call strategy for both Ethereum’s and Solana’s historical prices. He noted for Ethereum that “this strategy faced a significant loss in early 2021… although these major shocks tend to be infrequent… just a handful of exceptional tail-events are the primary root cause for the significant underperformance of this strategy”. He also saw similarly significant losses in the case of Solana as compared to just holding spot.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/6f07067cfa05b762f83898f4e5afde3b5427703f29d2884204ddb9cc9e779170.png" alt="Annotation in green by author. Original Image from: https://www.samchepal.com/a-quantitative-analysis-of-defi-option-vault-strategies/ " blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Annotation in green by author. Original Image from: https://www.samchepal.com/a-quantitative-analysis-of-defi-option-vault-strategies/</figcaption></figure><p>However, while Chepal’s analysis might indicate an ineffectiveness of selling options for yield, it is important to note that the study was conducted when Ethereum and Solana were in their early emergent phase. Protocols in their early phases, tend to face greater price movements due to surges of new market entrants and hence might account for the volatility and losses in the covered call strategy. It is important to note that DOVs emerged in the middle to late part of 2021. Hence if we constraint the period of Chepal’s ETH covered call study above (as indicated in the green box in the chart above), despite several small dips of options expiring ITM, we see that the strategy overall has been on a positive uptrend.</p><p>As DOVs continue to mature and with more data points available, I believe we will see different vaults further tailoring their strategies to fully account for the specificity of the different assets over a universal strike selections strategy. For users, beyond just chasing the highest APYs, this means selecting a protocol and vault strategy which best aligns with one’s overall risk tolerance and yield objectives.</p><h3 id="h-3-fees-charged" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3. Fees Charged</h3><p>Hedge funds that are actively managed typically carry a “2/20” fee structure - a 2% management charge on assets under management (AUM) and a 20% profit performance fee. DOVs protocols such as <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.ribbon.finance/">Ribbon Finance</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://friktion.fi/">Frikton</a> or <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://app.psyfi.io/">PsyFinance</a> have adopted this model and carry a similar 10% performance fee on the premiums collected. For these protocols that charge fees, users should ensure that the APY reflected takes into consideration these fees as they impact the net APY.</p><p>In the table below, we compare 3 different APRs (which exclude compounding) and the effects of the various fees on the final APY. <em>Note that for this analysis, we assume that the yield is maximized with all weeks expiring OTM, thus giving a compounding period of 52 weeks.</em></p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/6974cc19fcfabd8c01a7ff2432b1827b4b8c53ad6ee39f64de4757ede1490942.jpg" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Currently, these fee percentages feel exceedingly high considering that these DOVs are only running vanilla covered calls or puts at one-week expiry. Many protocols work off a basis of a specific strike selection criterion based on a specific delta range, which does not require any active trading or propriety strategies.</p><p>These fees present an asymmetrical risk for users, where their yields are reduced and at the same time, they carry the entire investment risk. As a comparison, hedge funds which charge fees have mechanisms such as claw-back or high-water mark to ensure that their performance is aligned to investors’ interests.  Given the “vanilla nature” of current DOVs, instead of adopting the hedge funds fee model, perhaps a more equitable fee model for comparison is to robo-advisors, which on average have charged relatively much lower fees of 0-0.5% AUM.</p><p>Ultimately, no one is sure what is the appropriate fee percentage to be charged or if they should be charged at all. Yet, it would be naïve to underestimate the importance of good fund managers for the health of the vaults. Thus, DOVs must balance the long-term sustainability of the protocol – to incentivize continuous development of new DeFi structured products while offering attractive returns for its users.</p><h3 id="h-what-is-the-correct-measure" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">What is the correct measure?</h3><p>DOVs fundamentally need a different set of metrics for comparison due to their nature and risk profile. Creating a consistent method of APY calculation across protocols might be the first step in making the representation of the DOV yields more transparent and accurate.</p><p>One possible solution for APY calculations might be the use of a time-weighted historical average, including losses, across a fixed period (for instance, 3 months or 6 months), before being extrapolated to a year. The period should be sufficiently long to ensure the calculations reflect a consistency of yield returns. The time-weighted factor would better reflect the present yield return due to current market conditions while safeguarding against singular black-swan events which might excessively skew the APY calculations, disincentivizing new vault entrants. Newer vaults with a less established track record, i.e. shorter than the set period, might indicate this to users on their APYs reflected (for example with an asterisk beside).  The end goal to create a universally understood and measurable means of comparing yield results, which would allow users to make better informed decisions and protocols to better showcase their unique features and performance.</p><h1 id="h-conclusions" class="text-4xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Conclusions</h1><p>DOVs are a remarkable financial innovation, with their unique value propositions of increased accessibility for retail, sustainable real yield, creation of expanding DeFi options liquidity and composability. They hold great potential to completely change the DeFi Options landscape as the de facto source of yield if they can address the gaps and concerns regarding APY calculation, strike selections and management fees.</p><p>With aggregated daily open interest for Bitcoin and Ethereum options within CeFi markets at approximately 7 billion and 5 billion respectively, there is a massive runway for growth for the DeFi options space if they are able to claim a similar market share. With new features, tools and integrations coming out each week, there is no question that DOVs already possess all the necessary tools to continue leading the charge in the development of this space, while onboarding the next wave of new users seeking to speculate and earn yield from the DeFi options market.</p><hr><p><strong>About the author:</strong> Jonathan Ng is a creative technologist and designer working at the intersection of web3, architecture and computational fabrication. His research looks at how new digital paradigms, systems and tools reshape our experiences and interactions within cities.</p><p>Special thanks to Ayush Menon for his guidance and thoughtful feedback in the process of producing this piece.</p><p>Disclaimer: Harvard Blockchain and the author of this piece are not financial advisors. Nothing contained in this research piece should be construed as investment advice.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>harvardblockchain@newsletter.paragraph.com (Harvard Blockchain)</author>
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            <title><![CDATA[HBC 2022]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@harvardblockchain/hbc-2022</link>
            <guid>wzid9z1gDzaypCOTTLT6</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2022 23:17:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[A clear highlight of the club’s first year was HBC 2022, the inaugural blockchain and web3 conference hosted by the blockchain clubs at Harvard Business School, Harvard Law School, and ourselves at Harvard College. The mission behind the conference was to bring together thinkers, investors, builders, and policymakers at the cutting edge of web3 and have them share their perspectives (and maybe spill a little alpha!) on the decentralized economy. The conference was completely free and attracte...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A clear highlight of the club’s first year was <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.hbc2022.xyz/">HBC 2022</a>, the inaugural blockchain and web3 conference hosted by the blockchain clubs at Harvard Business School, Harvard Law School, and ourselves at Harvard College. </p><p>The mission behind the conference was to bring together thinkers, investors, builders, and policymakers at the cutting edge of web3 and have them share their perspectives (and maybe spill a little alpha!) on the decentralized economy. The conference was completely free and attracted over 1200 attendees from the Boston area and beyond. </p><p>We were also fortunate to welcome <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.hbc2022.xyz/speakers">over 100 speakers</a> from across the industry—including HBS alumnus John Wu, Harvard College alumni Jai Ramaswamy and Amy Wu, and Alchemy’s Nikil Viswanathan—over the course of two days for a mixture of panels, fireside chats, and keynotes. We are extremely grateful to them for taking three days out of their extremely busy lives to come speak to members of the burgeoning blockchain scene in Boston. </p><p>In addition to the talks, our attendees were able to meet over 20 teams at our career fair, where they were able to network with industry professionals and learn more about career opportunities in web3. None of this would have been possible without the generosity of <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.hbc2022.xyz/sponsors">our sponsors</a>: a special shoutout to Ava Labs, BitDAO, and EduDAO, who were our largest contributors. We are greatly indebted to them for their support and for sharing our vision to make web3 more accessible to students. Many thanks to Gemini for hosting our welcome dinner for speakers at the Harvard Club, as well as Ava Labs and dYdX for hosting a happy hour and brunch during the conference, respectively. </p><p>We are also very grateful to Jack O’Neill and Jimmy Zheng at the HBS Blockchain &amp; Crypto Club, Sam Altschuler and Maude Wilson at the HLS Blockchain and Fintech Initiative, as well as numerous other HBS, HLS, and Harvard College students involved in planning the event. Without your expertise, pragmatism, and hard work, we’re not quite sure how we would ever have pulled together a conference this successful. </p><p>Most importantly, we want to thank everyone who attended, whether it was Harvard students, students from the Greater Boston Area, alumni, or even students that traveled to Boston for the event. We are truly humbled by your support and it was a pleasure meeting all of you. </p><p>We look forward to seeing you all next year!</p><p>Virat, Muk, and Roman</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/12539d1cdba85e4c6694a233e9d629c3201c61e96232cf1adb360269a66a54b4.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/6fedd61f80a429e60da248c75a62e8970c8e7422d12f8748cb4a2a06e7516d5c.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/6fd81dabd53ab566ed2743449c223b714d3d69dfa40ce634c87933322d7f7fd4.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/c482c3f3f70c114f18d58f5ec34fba06d79298eb8f968d8f564972d0ae516b92.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/45bc949ec71caa6df3b8d54bfc490cac5ce29dc04c2a4c4a8fa3fedb709b5194.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/d8c2ed980543ba0f3760210efb13d18dfcf5c14c6263bd31e083c9945d34b9a1.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/a16104a6ddd03555958e51bd49b1212bc639a767960fb70d8537cc43be65e57a.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/ebd59dd926c38e11bf84749ace3455601e5903e663dec4d15376dd3d3dc21dd5.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/b7d6d47ed49432a4f97d3094159a7517d810be8a260d1da1d633808c9a021165.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/dcdd8223cdba908d2c3c26979552cb805f62e5e600b38d4b8b259aaeef967303.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/19c0e3ac83285e154789e88f2bd95c79b394c7e1037e103ad83edeb695407afd.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/48f92d9dc9f51762b580de5c7e28280445ce1d1e6b7dd59a9f3478ec7a00d360.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/0a42813f5143b51616595696a5cbe82475decf02787536fd206573bcfb6c3d7f.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>harvardblockchain@newsletter.paragraph.com (Harvard Blockchain)</author>
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            <title><![CDATA[Predicting ETH Volatility Using Squeeth]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@harvardblockchain/predicting-eth-volatility-using-squeeth</link>
            <guid>1dpmLrhGglSvvgHMfhoz</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 May 2022 17:20:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Squeeth is a new DeFi product released by Opyn in January. As the first on-chain power perpetual, Squeeth is similar to an option without an expiry date or a strike price. In addition to increasing liquidity in the options market, some have suggested that Squeeth can be used to hedge Uniswap LPs, hedge all ETH/USD options, and predict the volatility of ETH in the short term. This piece will investigate whether Squeeth adequately serves this purpose.Different Types of VolatilityBefore we analy...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://squeeth.opyn.co/">Squeeth</a> is a new DeFi product released by Opyn in January. As the first on-chain power perpetual, Squeeth is similar to an option without an expiry date or a strike price. In addition to increasing liquidity in the options market, some have suggested that Squeeth can be used to hedge Uniswap LPs, hedge all ETH/USD options, and predict the volatility of ETH in the short term. This piece will investigate whether Squeeth adequately serves this purpose.</p><h3 id="h-different-types-of-volatility" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Different Types of Volatility</h3><p>Before we analyze how effective the price of Squeeth is in predicting the future volatility of ETH, we should describe which metric is the most accurate in measuring volatility.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/volatility.asp">Volatility</a> is defined as the dispersion of price of a given stock. In other words, the more volatile a stock is, the riskier an investment in that stock becomes. If the volatility of a given stock is high, then traders should expect the prices of that stock to fluctuate greatly in value. In traditional finance, there are several ways to measure the volatility of a given stock.</p><p>The most common ways that volatility is measured is using either standard deviation or variance. This way of quantifying volatility makes sense as the standard deviation of historical prices of a stock measures the fluctuations and deviations from the average price of the stock: the greater the standard deviation of the prices, the greater the historical prices have moved up or down from the mean. Assuming that the prices of a stock are distributed in a normal distribution, traders can infer that around 68% of all prices of the stock fall within one standard deviation of the mean. Therefore, given the standard deviation as a measure of volatility, traders can make a quantifiable estimate as to the possible region that the price of the stock will be in the future. This type of volatility is called realized volatility.</p><p>Another method of quantifying volatility is to use the beta(ß) of a stock. The beta works by comparing the volatility of the stock to the volatility of another benchmark stock, commonly the S&amp;P 500. In order to calculate the beta of stock A by comparing to the benchmark stock B, we use the following equation:</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/016dfa310680ca93428f93dfba6c0c4e86f3967d1587ee80562707e958e971f5.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>In which R_A represents the returns on stock A and R_B represents the returns on stock B. The way that a beta is interpreted is that if β=0.5, stock A is half as volatile as stock B. So, if beta is greater than 1, stock A is more volatile than stock B. If beta is less than 1, stock A is less volatile than stock B. If beta is equal to 1, then the volatility of stock A and stock B are equal.</p><p>Options can also be a good measure of volatility. The price of options can be used to calculate something called implied volatility. Unlike the other two methods, implied volatility does not directly predict the price fluctuations of a stock, but instead estimates the overall sentiment of traders in the options market of how a stock’s price will fluctuate. This is because the price of an option in the market increases if the volatility of the stock rises, as options are more in demand to hedge stocks if the stocks are riskier. The implied volatility is usually calculated using whichever way that the option premium is calculated, usually using the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blackscholes.asp">Black Scholes Equation</a>.</p><p>In our investigation of how good the price of Squeeth is at predicting the volatility of ETH, we shall look at standard deviation only, as standard deviation is the easiest to interpret.</p><h3 id="h-results" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Results</h3><p>As we have discussed above, we will be comparing the prices of Squeeth to the past realized volatility of ETH prices to analyze how well prices of Squeeth predict volatility.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/304b05dfdb246648c9aa8e1c3f1b4b7bc7ae68a7bd1022e623e5bae41ff81e39.png" alt="Fig. 1: Chart displaying the price of Squeeth compared to the realized volatility of the price of ETH " blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Fig. 1: Chart displaying the price of Squeeth compared to the realized volatility of the price of ETH</figcaption></figure><p>Fig. 1 above displays the price of Squeeth compared to the realized volatility of the price of ETH up until that same time point. What this means is that we are analyzing how well the price of Squeeth predicts an indicator of historical volatility, or the volatility of the price of ETH up until the current time point. The past realized volatility, or the standard deviation, is calculated from the start of when Squeeth was released to the current time point depending on the time point of a particular price of Squeeth. From the data above, we have calculated a polynomial trendline with an equation that can help us predict the realized volatility of the price of ETH given the price of Squeeth, which is as follows:</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/e0548808d347b74e64126baed6322e00f8bcc6452b07fe15e1efb410a9cd39d1.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>This trend line does fall in with our expectation that an increase in the price of Squeeth follows an increase in the volatility of ETH. This is because when the price of ETH becomes more volatile, the demand for options to hedge the price of ETH increases, leading to an increase in the price of Squeeth. Additionally, the trend line is polynomial because the price of Squeeth tracks the price of ETH^2. However, this trend line only has a coefficient of determination (R^2) of 0.642. This means that there are a lot of outliers in the datapoints that we have analyzed, so we cannot use the equation above to calculate with absolute certainty what the volatility of ETH is in the current moment given the price of Squeeth.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/72b373a29e03f0f964ac399b88343d44b1a3856bcfb8e91e07713981de79f2f2.png" alt="Fig. 2: Chart displaying the price of Squeeth and the realized volatility of the price of ETH since the release of Squeeth" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Fig. 2: Chart displaying the price of Squeeth and the realized volatility of the price of ETH since the release of Squeeth</figcaption></figure><p>From Fig.2, which displays the price of Squeeth and the realized volatility of the price of ETH since late February, we can see that the price of Squeeth somewhat tracks the relative volatility in the price of ETH. The correlation coefficient of the two data sets over the time period in the chart above is 0.993, which indicates an extremely positive correlation.</p><p>The realized volatility, or the standard deviation, is calculated by taking the sum of the differences of each data point from the mean of the sample. We shall also analyze how this difference can be predicted as well.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/d9ae812e3afe38ff7bf2552bd11d534d5ceb2a450fc4583b7d4c0263b1e8fd41.png" alt="Fig. 3: Chart displaying the price of Squeeth compared to the absolute difference from mean of ETH prices" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Fig. 3: Chart displaying the price of Squeeth compared to the absolute difference from mean of ETH prices</figcaption></figure><p>Fig. 3 above displays the price of Squeeth in the x-axis compared to the absolute difference between the price of ETH at the same time point and the mean of the price of ETH over the period of time since Squeeth was released. From the chart, we can see that the difference between the price of ETH and the average price of ETH can be predicted accurately using difference equations depending on whether the price of Squeeth is above its average. The equations are as follows: if the price of Squeeth is below the average ($727.07), the equation used to predict the difference is</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/531973a3090332b59382f7e77cb847a945a687ab3c9a76001c9e4dda65df6569.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>If the price of Squeeth is above the average ($727.07), the equation used to predict the difference is</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/72de901dddb3d8a52d76278c5278bd731abfd1666c0cb2e4062531cd024d27a9.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>For the difference when the price of Squeeth is below average, the trend line with the equation given above has a coefficient of determination (R^2) of 0.963. For the difference when the price of Squeeth is above average, the trend line given above has a coefficient of determination of 0.961. These values are both significantly high, which indicates that the price of Squeeth is greatly correlated with the difference of the price of ETH from its average. What this implies is that the price of Squeeth is an effective predictor for how much ETH deviates from its average, which essentially quantifies the volatility of ETH. Using difference equations given whether the price of Squeeth is above or below average, we can predict how much risk the price of ETH exposes us to.</p><h3 id="h-conclusion" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Conclusion</h3><p>From our investigation into how Squeeth tracks the volatility of ETH, we have found that there is a polynomial relationship between the price of Squeeth and the realized volatility in the price of ETH up until the same time point. This is an indication of how well Squeeth tracks the historical volatility of ETH. The price of Squeeth and the realized volatility in the price of ETH are also positively correlated. Finally, we have found that the price of Squeeth is a good predictor for how far the price of ETH has deviated from its mean.</p><p>The implications of the findings in this piece is that traders should use Squeeth as a strong indicator for the volatility of ETH going forward. Squeeth is a similar predictor for the volatility of ETH to the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vix.asp">VIX (CBOE Volatility Index)</a>, which predicts the volatility of the S&amp;P 500 index using option prices. Squeeth is different to the VIX in that Squeeth does not have an expiration date and VIX relies on options with expiration dates in the near future (within 30 days). Whether or not this difference makes Squeeth more reliable has not been investigated in the scope of this paper.</p><p>In addition, Squeeth is an alternative to any USD/ETH option as there is exposure to <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/convexity.asp">pure convexity</a> and there are no expiration dates or strike prices. However, it is important to note that traders who are long Squeeth have to pay a daily funding rate to make up for this constant exposure to decreased risk and increased reward.</p><p>About the author: Shelly Liu is a rising junior at Harvard College studying computer science. She is currently an intern at Google working in software engineering.</p><p>Special thanks to Zubin Koticha for his guidance and thoughtful feedback in the process of producing this piece.</p><p>Disclaimer: Harvard Blockchain and the author of this piece are not financial advisors. Nothing contained in this research piece should be construed as investment advice.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>harvardblockchain@newsletter.paragraph.com (Harvard Blockchain)</author>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Guide to NFT 2.0 Investing]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@harvardblockchain/the-guide-to-nft-2-0-investing</link>
            <guid>QL1DWfRwhk623QZYM5ZT</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 May 2022 21:29:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Recent innovation in the NFT space has unlocked more growth potential by introducing utility. These NFT 2.0 projects are distinguished by their team-led initiatives to grant users deliverables, including yield generation, merchandise, private yacht parties, exclusive access to Michelin-starred omakase, coffee beans, membership to alpha groups, play-to-earn video games, musical compositions, meetups with celebrities, and IRL events and parties. Where NFT 1.0 projects like CryptoPunks and Art B...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recent innovation in the NFT space has unlocked more growth potential by introducing utility. These NFT 2.0 projects are distinguished by their team-led initiatives to grant users deliverables, including <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.cyberkongz.com/banana">yield generation</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://shop.doodles.app/">merchandise</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.inputmag.com/culture/bored-ape-yacht-club-nft-nyc-ape-fest">private yacht parties</a>, exclusive access to Michelin-starred <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.flyfishclub.com/">omakase</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://coffeebros.com/blog/the-first-ever-coffee-nft-project/">coffee</a> beans, membership to <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://collective.proof.xyz/">alpha groups</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://bigtime.gg/">play-to-earn video games</a>, musical compositions, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="http://www.starstyle.com/cara-delevingne-apefest-bored-yacht-club-warehouse-party-sp543158/">meetups with celebrities</a>, and<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://sxsw.doodles.app/"> IRL events</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://laguestlist.com/event/azuki-garden-party/">parties</a>. Where NFT 1.0 projects like CryptoPunks and Art Blocks triumphed by building gated cliques around their digital collectibles, NFT 2.0 teams instead focus on storytelling and worldbuilding using the Web3 tech stack, creating positive system dynamics. NFT 2.0 teams try to build a socio-cultural milieu—a belief system—that lends itself to organically forming Web3 lifestyle brands that are collectively and decentrally owned and governed.</p><p>This development has made the space more difficult to navigate. As such, this piece aims to help the reader identify quality projects. As someone who’s been embedded in the NFT space for several years, I present a methodology for appraising NFTs, particularly avatar or “metaverse” NFTs on Ethereum as they account for the vast majority of today’s volume.</p><h3 id="h-evaluating-nfts" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Evaluating NFTs</h3><p>Whereas NFT 1.0 projects were appraised as art, NFT 2.0 projects can be appraised as ventures. Namely, the life of a project hinges on smart monetary resource allocation that will produce long-term holder benefits that, in turn, feed back into increased demand for the underlying NFT. As business sustainability is a precondition for long-term value generation, identifying successful NFT collections becomes analogous to identifying successful growth companies with sound business models.</p><p>Through this lens, early-stage (floor price less than 2 ETH) and growth-stage NFTs should be evaluated differently. Early-stage projects are more focused on narratives, storytelling, and experimentation, while later-stage projects focus more on granting utility to holders and generating revenue through sound treasury management. Accordingly, NFT appraisal should be approached using both fundamental and technical analysis, looking specifically at innovation potential, management, community strength, on-chain metrics, and macroeconomics.</p><h3 id="h-innovation-potential" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Innovation Potential</h3><p>Does the NFT project have a unique way of pushing the space forward? Does it have some sort of distinctive edge? Broadly speaking, innovation can come in many forms:</p><ul><li><p><strong>Technological</strong>: <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://docs.doodles.app/space-doodles-documentation">Space Doodles</a> (non-dilutive, or non-airdrop, value additions and re-customization of NFTs)</p></li><li><p><strong>Artistic</strong>: <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://cyberbrokers.io/">Cyberbrokers</a> (fully on-chain art composed of compressed SVGs)</p></li><li><p><strong>Financial</strong>: <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.nanopass.io/">Nanopass</a> (each pass will generate a weekly BlackBox of loot funded by the community vault)</p></li><li><p><strong>Ideological</strong>: <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.lootproject.com/">Loot</a> (decentralized and composable world-building), <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/101419/pak-nft-burning-platform-burn-art-token-ash">$ASH</a> ecosystem by Pak (burn Pak NFTs for $ASH through <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://burn.art/">burn.art</a>)</p></li><li><p><strong>Social:</strong> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://collective.proof.xyz/">Proof Collective</a> (token-gated alpha group)</p></li></ul><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/8f320cffa6b17b348b05b83c944884bae6a2b0bd277d1500c8f43ff5639a3e43.svg" alt="Cyberbrokers &quot;Fact&quot;" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Cyberbrokers &quot;Fact&quot;</figcaption></figure><p>Gaining a competitive edge comes from finding projects that are pushing the space forward, not merely extensions of past trends or, worse, copycats of existing projects. The next Bored Ape Yacht Club will not be the Bored Monkey Jet-Ski Club. Although Yuga Labs sent anxious trend-chasers scrambling for “the next big profile-pic NFT series,” the truth is hard to stomach. According to a <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://decrypt.co/87563/most-profitable-nft-trades-minting-secondary-opensea">Chainanalysis report</a>, while flipping NFTs on the secondary market results in a profit 65% of the time, “only 29% of sales of NFTs bought when they were brand new resulted in a profit.” A recent <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://urecomm.com/2022/03/28/nft-minting-behavior-what-does-the-data-teach-us-about-the-market/">Nansen report</a> further cautions that “on average, one in three NFTs minted go on to become a dead collection with little or no trade activity” and another one in three also has “a trading floor price below the mint costs.” Clumsily chasing after fads is a negative expected value play, and sure enough, the copycat trend has cannibalized itself with an unsustainable incentive structure. Understanding how a project is trying to change the space and holding a part of that project for the long term is the path to success.</p><h3 id="h-management" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Management</h3><p>NFTs are not primarily technical innovations, but fiscal and cultural innovations. They are a new medium of social communication and organization. Thus, storytelling is one of the most underrated but important metrics when it comes to evaluating an NFT project. Good management knows how to control the narrative, meaning they under-promise and over-deliver and drive expectations by inciting hype and FOMO using deliverables. For example, airdrops are new NFTs that are freely delivered to current NFT holders and have proven to reflexively provide positive-sum gains for BAYC, CloneX, and Azuki. When done right, airdrops have increased capital flow into the entire NFT ecosystem by attracting priced-out holders, anchoring higher floor prices, and galvanizing the community. Airdrops are but one of many value-add deliverables and management of such deliverables could make or break a project.</p><p>Furthermore, it is important to spend time on due diligence on the team. Who is the founder, are they doxxed, and can they lead, grow, and push the space forward? Do they have a good balance of artists, community moderators, and engineers? Although the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://opensea.io/collection/mekaverse">MekaVerse collection</a> had great art and was launched long before some of the current top projects, the management proved to be incompetent when it came to sustained growth and poorly handled the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://chaindebrief.com/mekaverse-fraud-allegations-floor-price-collapse/">fraud </a>scandal and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://nftevening.com/mekaverse-discord-hacked-their-team-issue-a-warning-to-users/&amp;sa=D&amp;source=docs&amp;ust=1653091078451053&amp;usg=AOvVaw1iF6pL-SZ7gsa1F_IQU8lF">Discord hack</a>. The collection has since faded into obscurity, falling from an 8-9 ETH floor price to 0.4 ETH.</p><p>The Doodles team is an example of a strong team with good balance. Evan Keast, known as Tulip in the community, is a product marketer and NFT consultant who comes from Kabam Games (Net Marble), Dapper Labs, and CryptoKitties. Poopie (Jordan Castro), another co-founder, was also known for directing the CryptoKitties team at Dapper Labs. The artist—Scott Martin, who works under the alias Burnt Toast—has a distinctive art style that is instantly recognizable in the NFT space and beyond. His past clients include WhatsApp, Google, Snapchat, and more.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/89f44c63f2c015600c1dc3680d1653f202f628f5b327feb655b7e2cef6534882.png" alt="Example of Burnt Toast&apos;s Work. More at https://burnttoast.myportfolio.com." blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Example of Burnt Toast&apos;s Work. More at https://burnttoast.myportfolio.com.</figcaption></figure><p>While decentralization is a core principle of Web3, most NFT projects, at least initially, require the leadership of a strong, centralized team. While you’re investing in a project, it’s important to remember that you’re also investing in people: make sure to spend time understanding who’s working behind the scenes.</p><h3 id="h-community-strength" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Community Strength</h3><p>As a natural follow-up to the previous point, the strength of a community depends on the team. More specifically, a team must be driven by mission, value, and vision, and the leadership must effectively mobilize resources within the community. MekaVerse became famous after this <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacksonweimer/2021/10/05/the-mekaverse-an-nft-project-with-100k-discord-members-in-48-hours/?sh=84bdaf159418">Forbes article</a> for getting over 100k Discord members, yet the members did not translate into long-term believers in the project. In contrast, Azuki and BAYC both have strong core values that they build on, and relying on them helped founders weather storms and adhere to their roadmaps. Teams with these elements find that after healthy retracements, speculators are washed out and replaced by firm believers. Teams without such value-based conviction find the opposite.</p><p>With that said, there are simple ways of gauging a community’s strength. Check their Discord and read the chats. Check Twitter: what are people saying about it? How many followers do they have? What’s the engagement/followers ratio? Is there engagement artificially inflated through tactics like giveaways? Are people trying really hard to get on the whitelist? Check Google search statistics. Check other Discords channel’s alpha chats: are they talking about it? Perhaps most importantly, are big whales involved? One big whale following a project is worth more than 1000 anonymous followers. Of course, beware of whales who are paid by projects to advertise, and exercise discretion.</p><p>It is also important to gauge community strength by thinking from the founder’s perspective. In my opinion, there are two approaches teams can take with community building: top-down and bottom-up. Good teams beget good communities because the holders can grow with the brand (many BAYC members became influencers through their NFT). Doodles launched the Doodlebank in October, allowing the community to pitch ideas to the team that will be built by the community and funded from the treasury that accrues from the royalty fees. Azuki intends to do the same for its holders with the “Azuki Grants” initiative. It could be simple Twitter posts retweeting artists’ fan art, or it could be community moderators chatting with holders in the Discord, but look for teams that are actively reaching out because their communities will grow stronger.</p><p>The other approach for community building is bottom-up. Web3 is ultimately about decentralized ownership and the increased liberation of creators. This leads to memes—a whole lot of memes. If there are great memes and derivatives being spun off of a project, the community will grow stronger as well. For example, the Mfers by Sartoshi collection has no centralized team whatsoever and makes <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/sartoshi.eth/QukjtL1076-1SEoNJuqyc-x4Ut2v8_TocKkszo-S_nU">no promises of value-adds to its holders</a>, yet has seen tremendous growth. Mfers are also CC0, so anybody can do with the NFTs what they please. This freedom has resulted in an explosion of Mfers’ cultural influence that embodies the genesis of the Mfer utopia where all holders vibe in a state of harmony. “Begone with the Apollonian babble,” says the cigar-smoking, sovereign Mfer draped in a black hoodie: “let us drink to Dionysus!” As Sartoshi himself wrote: “I didn’t know what that would ultimately look like--and that was the point…nobody does. … my view of what is most valuable for me to offer to mfer holders is to amplify the best of their ideas and creations to reach vastly greater audiences.”</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/cf757f134a9994ddf9e94d34e1914e07d163057f01138a79e917fbd8e47a8d81.png" alt="Mfer #7409 by Sartoshi" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Mfer #7409 by Sartoshi</figcaption></figure><h3 id="h-on-chain-indicators" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">On-Chain Indicators</h3><p>Tracking volume, floor price, and sales are table stakes; to elevate your NFT analysis, I recommend a few additional strategies. In particular, it is crucial to track “whales,” or ultra-wealthy traders, since so much of the NFT market is determined by them.  These whales usually have group chats where they can sharpen their edge in the market by sharing exclusive information, organizing floor sweeps, or collectively dumping. By looking at <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://nftgo.io/whale-tracking/whale">NFTGo</a>, you can track what whales are minting, buying, and selling; act accordingly.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/a5ce0b5056ab1986aed535860f756703150bcf18824386aab4609d0f4c520891.png" alt="🐋 1,505 whales hold NFTs worth $5.87B, occupying 30.49% of the global market cap of $19.24B." blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">🐋 1,505 whales hold NFTs worth $5.87B, occupying 30.49% of the global market cap of $19.24B.</figcaption></figure><p>To demonstrate basic quantitative metrics analysis, we will look at the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mobile.twitter.com/degentoonz">Degen Toonz</a> Collection which launched last month.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Degen Toonz #7626</figcaption></figure><p>First, look at the data for the number of NFTs listed in view of the floor price. The lower the number of listings, the thinner the floor, and the lesser the selling pressure and thus the greater the potential for upside. When there is more listed, it means that people are more willing to sell and the floor will either drop (due to undercutting) or will at best stay consistent. The graphs below show a strong inverse correlation between the number listed and floor price. A handy proxy for diamond hands is the following formula: (collection-number - listings) / collection number. For Degen Toonz that would mean (8888-984)/8888 = 88.9%. Not too shabby for a burgeoning project.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/997229305b68d2b0bd6bd33a5f97c2560580f9c1a484d8af14ff826e6af685c8.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Next, we turn to the holding distribution. Degen Toonz has comparably many diamond-handed owners due to the number of people who never sold since buying.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/4feb45554b84b7b1471b4a688d613e8a97020b7fbfedee34e4b6d076ca4e6743.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>At the same time, we can analyze the holding amount distribution; we see that individual holders control 64.71% of Degen Toonz NFTs, meaning that it is more or less resistant to whale dumping. Furthermore, as 65% of holders have only one Toonz, they are less inclined to sell because of their inability to fractionalize their holdings, meaning that psychologically, they are afraid that they might miss the run-up and the additional utility (airdrops, for example) in the future. This leaves less room for flippers who are immune to this mentality and exert sell pressure because they hold many.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/9809f4734d81fdb44491c17acd28e2abe8c45d609f1349b21188e71be3192ebe.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Lastly, it is also important to check the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://coniun.io/collection/degentoonz-collection/holders/compare">mutual holders’ list</a>. Although it is promising that 167 Mutant Ape owners also own 450 Toonz, it is not a good sign that Bored Ape, Punk, Doodles, and Azuki holders have not taken major positions in the collection, so I would argue that Toonz so far does not have the necessary backing to see explosive growth.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/08f85abe9855c9c22ec5902ac4bb64b54ee25081ee8cb23f5a8a3f0298d5ab9e.png" alt="Coniun Compare Function for Degen Toonz" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Coniun Compare Function for Degen Toonz</figcaption></figure><p>These metrics must be studied holistically and do not give a definitive picture of the collection. Yet, if at least three or four of the aforementioned metrics are bullish, as is the case, it could be a good buy even as the floor hovers above 0.3 ETH.</p><p>Recommended tools: <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://cryptoslam.io/">CryptoSlam!</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://nftgo.io/">NFTGo</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://coniun.io/">Coniun</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://originsnft.io/">Origins</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://nftnerds.ai/">NFTNerds</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.flips.finance/">Flips</a>, and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://pro.nansen.ai/">Nansen</a>.</p><h3 id="h-macroeconomics" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Macroeconomics</h3><p>Crypto remains highly correlated with the performance of the public markets, and NFTs are crypto assets. If broader markets are fragile, NFTs may crash. In our current moment—with the Russo-Ukrainian war, the rising inflation, and panics in public markets—NFTs should only be bought with disposable income and with extreme caution.</p><p>As fear, uncertainty, and doubt ease, however, blue-chip NFTs—loosely defined as collections with a floor price of over 2 ETH and trading volume of over 10k ETH—will recover first. Further, they are less volatile because the price of small-cap growth projects will be adversely affected due to high gas fees. This is because as ETH price gains momentum, traders move to buy altcoins on DEXes which will clog up the network. This makes trading NFTs prohibitively expensive, and thus eliminates a big chunk of investors. The prices of blue-chip NFTs have also corrected with the sharp drop in the currency market. But because of large buy-side pressure, NFTs experience quick rebounds when the price of ETH stabilizes. Overall, when ETH rallies or dumps, NFTs are negatively impacted because they reside at the end of the asset class risk curve. Notably, during downturns, the perception of blue-chip NFTs is more likely to be USD-based rather than ETH-based. Lastly, volume in the NFT market is an important indicator of the demand for NFTs in the market and lower volume usually signals a bear market. Overall, although the impact of macroeconomics on NFT prices remains disputed, and legitimate concerns signal a risk-off environment for the foreseeable future, the long-term dynamism in the space warrants an optimistic outlook.</p><h3 id="h-intraproject-appraisal" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Intraproject Appraisal</h3><p>Once you’ve decided to invest in a particular project, it’s sometimes a challenge to pick the correct rarity of the NFT within the collection. Usually, floors (the most common NFTs in a collection) give better value per NFT due to potential deliverables for a lower base fee. For example, CloneX clones have yielded 3 drops worth 2-3x their public sale price, and Bored Apes have given holders Mutant Apes, Kennels, and APE coins. Buying 5 floors instead of a single rare one could mean 5 times the deliverables. Floors also offer superior liquidity over rares and are more sensitive to price fluctuations because floor NFTs are de facto fungible (when it comes to value) and most PFP collections follow a lognormal distribution of prices (whereas rarity is distributed on a bell curve) where most NFTs trade at floor value. Thus, for most investors, floors are the best choice.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/19c7d03988101e4b210ae1e4d02ea36378873e9b384fa25abaf402ce2034000a.png" alt="Azuki Rarity Score vs Last Sale Price. Clearly, modal peak around the floor and a long tail." blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Azuki Rarity Score vs Last Sale Price. Clearly, modal peak around the floor and a long tail.</figcaption></figure><p>Although mid-tier rares suffer from low comparative per-basis value, poor price discovery, and illiquidity, super rares may be an attractive option for long-term investors. They hold value better and can outperform floors in raw returns due to their ability to capture long-tail gains. At the top end of a collection, NFTs take on more properties of fine art because whales will come together and collude to anchor the floor price of the rares (of course, if there is low volume, fire sales can still happen). These grails can trade at 5x-25x floor: however, for mature collections like CryptoPunks, that multiple could be as high as 120x (the 8000 ETH alien punk for example). Some collectors derive very high utility from owning the very best.</p><p>Furthermore, there is a Web3 native reason to own grails: whales are incentivized to keep the community robust. Whereas owning many shares of General Electric does not compromise the integrity of the firm, one more NFT for a whale who already has a hundred means one less available to purchase for someone who truly associates with the identity of the brand but can only afford one. At one point, Pranksy owned over 1200 Bored Apes. This directly translates to 1200 fewer potential BAYC members who could’ve better promoted the community and strengthened the brand. An erratic billionaire could have bought the entire BAYC collection for a measly 800ETH back in April. Contemplating this counterfactual, Yuga Labs would be done with. Thus, the positive-sum strategy for whales who are bullish on a particular collection is to buy grails. The cherry on top is that grail PFPs can be strategically utilized because having a Golden Ape or Alien Punk bestows an ipso facto aura of legitimacy. If you are in here for the long run and have spending power, super rares are your best bet.</p><h3 id="h-liquidity-sourcing" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Liquidity Sourcing</h3><p>An avid investor sources liquidity from multiple avenues. There are marketplaces that allow users to find buyers and sellers of NFTs via order books, the most popular being OpenSea, though LooksRare and X2Y2 have gained some traction with their novel incentive designs. However, most markets end up being illiquid for the long tail of assets. Thus, it is common practice for traders to source liquidity ad hoc by approaching buyers to do OTC deals. Complex trades involving a combination of NFTs from multiple collections and fungible tokens are common. Yet, this method of trading is inherently very risky. Stay away unless you are tech-savvy and comfortable with what you are doing. I only recommend using NFTTrader, an audited escrow service, if you must. NFTs can also be purchased through aggregators like Gem as liquidity is better because they pool liquidity from all marketplaces.</p><p>Lastly, the increasing DeFi-ification of NFTs has provided novel solutions to liquidity sourcing. P2P lending protocols like <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.nftfi.com/">NFTfi</a> are being augmented by P2Pool lending platforms like <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://pine.loans/">Pine</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.benddao.xyz/">Bend</a> that offer instantaneous time-to-liquidity based on machine learning and algorithmic valuation. 0xmons has even developed an <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blog.sudoswap.xyz/announcing-sudoamm.html">AMM NFT DEX</a> for Sudoswap. Although an in-depth analysis of these new forms of liquidity sourcing is beyond the scope of this article, the trends seem to point to increasing fractionalization, collateralized loans, yield-bearing protocols like <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.gradient.city/">Gradient</a>, and NFT derivatives, contracts, and other exotic structured products like <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://app.abacus.wtf/">Abacus</a>. In particular, I am looking forward to trading floor perpetuals via <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://nftures.com/">NFTures</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://smartliquidity.info/2022/04/22/injective-pro-launches-nft-floor-price-perpetuals/">Injective Pro</a>. In any event, exchange-backed NFT marketplaces will introduce sidelined capital into the space and make NFT trading more accessible, while better front-end design and integration with <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://officialplugchain.medium.com/plug-chain-what-exactly-is-socialfi-16136d11bda3">SocialFi</a> will ease price discovery and ignite the next surge of NFT adoption.</p><h3 id="h-conclusion" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Conclusion</h3><p>As NFT 2.0 projects should be most closely evaluated as businesses, a successful investor must leverage intuition, market conditions, technical, and fundamental analysis to form a thesis into why they believe the project will return value in the future through deliverables. On a high level, however, when appraising a PFP NFT, I suggest asking yourself if you would use it as your profile picture. Philosopher Walter Benjamin wrote that “ownership is the most intimate relationship” one can have with an object; would you want this JPEG to represent <em>you</em> in the Web3.0 space? Furthermore, always remember that it is impossible to lose by being liquid; there will always be more investment opportunities. Resist the urge to trade every day and adopt a more long-term view.</p><p>I leave the reader with a lingering thought: should one buy NFTs only for their exchange value? Contemporary artist Damien Hirst laments: “I used to give a lot of art away to people,” but “they’d always sell it after a lot less time than I thought they would … they’d sell it to buy handbags. And I’d be like, ‘Damn, I hate that!’” Hirst is interested in discovering where the line between collecting and profiteering can be drawn, and if it can be drawn at all. Every NFT investor should also have this on their mind when they hover their mouse over the buy button.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/4a8f8c7ee216582b0f0e7ec08ac9907f532890fc681cac568ac49f6073b45101.png" alt="A piece titled &quot;Can&apos;t you just be as sweet as she says,&quot; from Hirst&apos;s NFT Collection, Currency" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">A piece titled &quot;Can&apos;t you just be as sweet as she says,&quot; from Hirst&apos;s NFT Collection, Currency</figcaption></figure><p><strong>About the author:</strong> Andy Zeng (Boba Epicure) is a rising junior at Harvard College studying Philosophy from Shanghai, China. He is a voting member of Harvard Blockchain, a previous Community Ambassador for Axie Infinity, and an investor at Dragonfly Capital Partners. He is an Azuki maxi and likes to read about ancient Rome and the Romance of the Three Kingdoms in his free time. He has previously authored <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/bobaepicure.eth/j9pehBZpRYr5XRiqR7fjhpa0Q-wxXARP6SFoqa3rfBw">The End of History and the Philosophy of Crypto</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/harvardblockchain.eth/FQa1LIPeWnaQ_mkJbyZJuAyi7fCjoPNBpLWoCP3y4hY">Looking Onward for Crypto Gaming</a>. He can be reached <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/bobaepicure">here</a>.</p><p>Special thanks to Haseeb Qureshi and Ashwin Ramachandran for their thorough edits, and thanks to Jihoz and DeeZe for their guidance and thoughtful feedback in the production of this piece.</p><p>Disclaimer: Harvard Blockchain and the author of this piece are not financial advisors. Nothing contained in this research piece should be construed as investment advice.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>harvardblockchain@newsletter.paragraph.com (Harvard Blockchain)</author>
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            <title><![CDATA[Looking Onward for Crypto Gaming]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@harvardblockchain/looking-onward-for-crypto-gaming</link>
            <guid>nlcfofN8MJgDruDDuSNt</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Dec 2021 05:52:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[By Joshua Yang and Andy Zeng In the 80s, text-based, MUD (multi-user dungeons) games dominated the landscape. Adventurers enjoyed multiplayer real-time RPGs featuring rich lore, fantasy worlds, cogent mechanics, and RNG-based gameplay with P2P elements roped in; this sounds a little like, what we would call in 2021, the metaverse. But back then, one critical piece of the puzzle was missing: vibrant in-game economies powered by blockchains. Prodigious progress has been made since then followin...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>By </strong><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/Joshuayang212"><strong>Joshua Yang</strong></a><strong> and </strong><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/bobaepicure"><strong>Andy Zeng</strong></a></p><p>In the 80s, text-based, MUD (multi-user dungeons) games dominated the landscape. Adventurers enjoyed multiplayer real-time RPGs featuring rich lore, fantasy worlds, cogent mechanics, and RNG-based gameplay with P2P elements roped in; this sounds a little like, what we would call in 2021, the metaverse. But back then, one critical piece of the puzzle was missing: vibrant in-game economies powered by blockchains. Prodigious progress has been made since then following a whitepaper by Satoshi Nakamoto. With the introduction of Ethereum, smart contracts, DeFi, and NFTs, we have witnessed the emergence of on-chain gaming like Ether Bots and Crypto Crabs, the exponential growth of play-to-earn games like Axie Infinity, and the birth of gaming guilds like YGG. Layer 1s like Solana and Wax have emerged as the rails for new entrants with their cheap transaction costs and high efficiency, and a lot of VC money has poured into the industry (FTX and Lightspeed Venture Partners’ $100 million and Binance and Animoca’s $200 million, for example). This year also saw the birth of Dom Hofmann’s The Loot Project—“Randomized adventurer gear generated and stored on chain”—a bottom-up reimagining of MUD games in Web3.0, leading us full circle.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/4ccd575e08951532a71e1f3e07263cec2d82c3a78cb4d8541ad6412e03369522.png" alt="Loot and a Return to the MUD Games" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Loot and a Return to the MUD Games</figcaption></figure><p>There is a lot to look forward to. The synergy is palpable: blockchains foster the organic formation of neoclassical gaming economies as the games provide utility and adoption for the blockchain while the chain provides security and real asset value to games in return. For example, Axie Infinity, a Pokemon-like card game, has provided many pandemic-stricken families with a way to earn income by selling the axie NFTs or ERC20 tokens like $SLP through their play-to-earn model. Many new gamers and nongamers alike—with stimulus checks in hand—learned what Ethereum, DeFi, proof-of-stake, impermanent loss, and broader blockchain technology all were as they interacted with the game and through Katana, Axie’s own decentralized exchange (DEX) for their sidechain Ronin, kickstarting a virtuous cycle. Axie Infinity’s governance token $AXS has a total market cap of over eight billion dollars.</p><p>These assets are the first true bridge into the metaverse, and projects like Loot and Axie are no doubt a step in the right direction. But they are not enough to onboard the next centimillion users into the metaverse. In this paper, we take a normative approach to argue that the current landscape is more hype than substance and present a word of caution to GameFi (blockchain gaming) enthusiasts while highlighting three specific problems that need to be addressed: the “crypto first, game second model,” the facade of decentralization, and the appearance of user control and governance. We first provide a brief history of the space and then present our thoughts and provide potential solutions.</p><h2 id="h-gamefi-where-we-are-today" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">GameFi: Where We Are Today</h2><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/ed8bc0df92b43690a50add81eedf4f7c723ef79cc057f1061b6bcee392668509.png" alt="Our GameFi Chart" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Our GameFi Chart</figcaption></figure><p>Very few people today doubt the powerful synergy of blockchains and video games. The idea is simple: before blockchains, assets in video games are managed top-down by the gaming studio. They are mutable, fungible, and not in the user’s control, as they exist solely on the servers of the production company. Games rarely allow for the trading of assets between players, especially on third party sites, and the ones that do are heavily regulated, only legally allowing for the licensing of their in-game items. Even in games where you can trade, you don’t legally own the assets, as studios have little incentive to volunteer their profits.</p><p>With blockchain, all assets rest on a publicly distributed decentralized ledger, where they can be easily transferred between parties. Furthermore, the tokenization of gaming assets allow for a market economy to develop, strengthening the inherent values of items even outside of specific gaming ecosystems. A new way to earn money has emerged for players in addition to just spending: the play-to-earn (P2E) model, where a player can earn money by utilizing the NFTs they acquire in-game through various means (selling or by staking to produce yield, for example). Vice versa, NFTs, or non-fungible tokens, gain value from gaming integration.</p><p>NFTs are particularly powerful tools for the gaming industry. The standardization allows any in-game item (think guns, spaceships, elixir, farmland, or even a cute cyber dolphin) to be used across various games and different blockchains, even if they were built by different studios. Individual wallets also replace specific accounts for each individual company, allowing for further interoperability. Though NFTs have not been on the scene for long, we can separate them into four different levels.</p><p><strong>Level 0: Collectibles</strong></p><p><em>Examples: CryptoPunks, Bored Ape Yacht Club, Cool Cats, Doodles</em></p><p>CryptoPunks are the prime example of Level 0 avatar NFTs. In some ways, we believe that Punks capture the beta of metaverse growth. Punk ownership also means membership of an OG club in the NFT space: you become a serious collector with immense clout. Having a Punk as your profile picture really does provide access to exclusive networks and free mints on other NFT collections like Meebits. Bored Ape Yacht Club has more partnerships and collaborations than one can reasonably count.</p><p><strong>Level 1: Basic Interactions</strong></p><p><em>Examples: CryptoKitties, Crypto Crabs, Ether Bots</em></p><p>Besides the speculation and clout, Punks possess no further utility. CryptoKitties, on the other hand, provide an additional, gamified component: breeding. Players can trade cats and try to unlock rare traits, but that’s about it. There is little real gaming besides interacting with smart contracts through your Metamask (browser) wallet. Alternatively, there were also turn-based tactical games like Crypto Crabs or Ether Bots that ran every move on the blockchain. These games, though not like the CryptoKitties, have faded from existence because of the high gas fees (transaction costs) on Ethereum.</p><p><strong>Level 2: Exploration</strong></p><p><em>Examples: Decentraland, Sandbox</em></p><p>Sandbox and Decentraland represent the development of Level 2 games: virtual platforms that allow users to create, experience, and monetize content and applications. Land in Sandbox and Decentraland are permanently owned by players. Land has a fixed supply and was bought by users from blockchain-based ledgers of parcels. Landowners control what content is published to their portion of land, which is identified by a set of Cartesian coordinates. Contents can range from static 3D scenes to interactive systems such as games. Land is a non-fungible, transferrable, scarce digital asset stored in an Ethereum smart contract. In Decentraland’s case, it can be acquired by spending an ERC-20 token called $MANA. $MANA can also be used to make in-world purchases of digital goods and services. Players can roam these lands on their PCs and interact with a Minecraft-esque 3D world that is oddly reminiscent of VRChat. Though big names like Travis Scott have appeared on Decentraland, mainstream adoption has yet to come because the game itself is again not engaging, with the exception of the casino. More directly, the NFTs within Level 2 games cannot yet be used to generate direct yield, unlike Level 3 NFTs.</p><p><strong>Level 3: Complex Gameplay (GameFi)</strong></p><p><em>Examples: Axie Infinity, Gods Unchained</em></p><p>Improving upon Level 2, the Level 3 games that grew rapidly in early 2021 finally have a deliverable game. Instead of playing a breeding minigame happening on chain through a browser wallet interface, users can open a client and enjoy gripping graphics, mechanics, and be paid to play. Again, Axie Infinity is leading the charge here. Axie users make investments to acquire the Axie NFTs and the $AXS native token to begin play. From there, they can earn $SLP by playing, as the tokens earned can then be exchanged for other crypto assets or fiat. Many users in the Philippines are earning more than their usual monthly salary simply by playing Axie Infinity, all during the economic hardship brought on by COVID-19.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/cd6b3948908667e6b6d88775625ae9f2e46e446dbe144852c388c55e79cb8b57.png" alt="Axie Infinity Game Interface" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Axie Infinity Game Interface</figcaption></figure><p>The problem with Level 3 games like Axie Infinity is that payout is based on token inflation that must be counteracted by continuous capital injection from new players to keep the economy balanced. The economy is dependent on new money and will systematically collapse due to overinflation of Axies and SLP if the growth rate of new players decreases or old players stop reinvesting, making everyone a potential “rug puller.” Level 3 play-to-earn economies are contingent upon people committing their capital and only profit when others buy in: in this regard there is no social surplus. Admittedly, many successful businesses survive with unsustainable models that eventually become lucrative through economies of scale and increasing returns to scale. Axie has plenty of cash to burn as they have many institutional investors, from a16z to Mark Cuban. Yet, as we show later in the paper, Axie’s problem is that with growth, buy-in prices inflate so much that it further destabilizes the economy.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/c8b0d4e80ba8d1d3c5128c886e23b6358e908b41ccb981c0c393d0f786e12798.png" alt="Axie In-Game Economy" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Axie In-Game Economy</figcaption></figure><p>Underlying all Level 3 games is this fundamental problem: if the game is no longer profitable, will people still play? We think not, at least not yet. Current GameFi projects lack the complexity and mechanics to make a truly enjoyable experience. Most players play purely for profit, as the game without its current high levels of profitability is inadequately designed. As Axie prices continue to appreciate, the growth will undoubtedly slow. Currently, to play, let alone win, a game of Axie Infinity users must pay a minimum (as of Nov 8 2021) of around $100 USD per Axie for a team of three and several hundreds in additional gas fees. For a meta level team that can climb the ladders consisting of a simple beast, aquatic, and bird Axie, one can spend upward of one ETH ($4400 USD). Furthermore, there is a deflationary cycle. When players leave, they dump their assets into the market, which lowers the market value of the items. When the market value decreases, people are more likely to leave the game, which will only further deflate the value of game items. Momentum works both ways—games can crash just as quickly as they lift off.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/b3fc4bd061c97397eb8a43ad56632b55ccb5e0f38bd15ccf7d2943d262735cad.png" alt="Recent Crash from BSC Game CryptoMines" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Recent Crash from BSC Game CryptoMines</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Level 4: Pipeline Games</strong></p><p>We have decided to classify Level 4 games as a basket of exciting projects that plan to improve upon Axie Infinity and Gods Unchained games in some significant way. Currently, we are looking at Gala Games’ Mirandus, Star Atlas, Phantom Galaxies, Aurory, Untamed Isles, Shrapnel, and others. These games lie in different categories and are headed in different directions. Some have adopted Unreal Engine 5 while others have opted for a much more blocky, cartoonish art style. Some are first-person shooters while others remain TCGs at heart. Some are planning partnerships with DeFi projects to build synergistic dApps, while others are working on cross-chain interoperability.</p><p>With that said, there are three core problems with existing games that we wish to highlight in this paper because we believe they will be especially important when it comes to making the next level of games.</p><h2 id="h-1-crypto-first-game-second" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">1. Crypto First, Game Second</h2><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/6970677d1090d81b26b6d99fa594f26b309ab012820ab3276ee9fd79c95e56d8.png" alt="Messari&apos;s GameFi Map" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Messari&apos;s GameFi Map</figcaption></figure><p>The crypto first, game second model—popularly adopted by studios that prioritize cryptonomics and fundraising over gameplay—is the first of the three challenges that must be addressed by current level 3 games. Notably, this model has one major comparative advantage: it makes it easier to raise funds for indie developers like Star Atlas’ studio either through NFT collection sales before the game comes out, token pre-sales to investors, or the old-fashioned way of raising money by selling equity. This has been crucial to the growth of many pipeline Level 4 games and was also instrumental in the success of various DeFi projects. Yet, we argue that it has created an ecosystem of asset risk and speculation, which leads to game quality dilution and a negative user experience.</p><p>Excessive hype and previous success stories like Axie Infinity fuel asset inflation even before a game is released. Companies are able to set their origination prices well above that of a non-crypto game, creating a huge barrier to entry. For example, the Calico Guardian in Star Atlas, a game that comes out in 2-10 years hypothetically, costs at least $25,000 USD. Even medium ships of poor quality cost at least $1,500 USD. This is the developer’s listed price, and all sales go directly towards their pockets. The Titan Ships, as the Discord has been hyping them up, could yield upwards of one million dollars.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/591f4192ee7adaf6262c40d1357b0bc8fb6180d9d6e3b8fe43bfe9963fe10cd5.png" alt="Star Atlas Ship Price According to Their Brochure" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Star Atlas Ship Price According to Their Brochure</figcaption></figure><p>The incredibly high asset prices alienate would-be gamers from access to the game and fueling the ecosystem. These price points not only exclude potential players but force gamers to invest large amounts of money just to play a subpar game or force them into the in-game equivalent of indentured servitude if they don’t want to invest large amounts(through scholarships). This forces the gamers to take on an incredibly high amount of risk due to the volatile nature of crypto assets. This issue is made significantly worse due to the tiering of assets. As in order to encourage the purchasing of higher-tier assets, game companies massively boost the power level and consequent earnings of more expensive NFTs. This means that the ratio of price to return (both financially and opportunistically) is much lower for lower cost items. 10 low tier $100 NFTs will have much lower power compared to a single $1000 NFT.</p><p>For example, Axie Infinity’s division of land into five categories (Savannah, Forest, Arctic, Mystic, and Genesis) forces individuals to contribute a lot or excludes them from the upside. A recent plot of Genesis land sold for 550 ETH, whereas Savannah trades for 3.5 ETH. However, tiered land systems mean that certain buildings can only be built on more expensive land or on multiple connecting plots of land, which generates even more income through both economies of scale and increasing returns to scale. The highest tiered land usually guarantees that the per-unit cost of producing a product falls as the scale of production rises, and having multiple conjoined plots (bought in batches) means that the productivity per unit of labor rises as your scale of production rises. In other words, the tiered nature of the Axie economy not only gives proportionately better return to the whales that can afford it, but actively excludes individuals from accessing content. By some estimates based on the potential distribution of AXS play-to-earn rewards, a single plot of Genesis can be worth 343 plots of Savannah, which would mean that its true valuation could exceed 1130 ETH.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/ea813d520f82d092e91748973af37c60e06d45c982dacc86f130c11ce4d423d5.png" alt="Estimates from the Axie Discord" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Estimates from the Axie Discord</figcaption></figure><p>Other games like Star Atlas suffer from the same problem: even though there are more affordable ships like the Opal Jet and the Pearce X4 than the ones listed above, these ships only allow for a bare-bones player experience that pales in comparison to what higher-tiered, more expensive ships promise (e.g., lacking the ability to mine asteroids). For example, how can an Opal jet even get close to the “medium security zone” if a $28,900 USD C9 capital class ship can vaporize it with laser cannons in a matter of seconds?</p><p>Ultimately, the “crypto first, game second” model presents a conundrum: gamers are forced to either be a worker or an investor. The people who are willing to shell out huge amounts are forced to become investors as they have to take on the risk of these expensive assets. Gamers who have smaller portfolios, investment appetites, or simply do not want to be extremely involved in the game, on the other hand, are forced to become workers under the “scholarship” system—where they borrow expensive assets from the investors and earn with them while giving them most of the profits—a type of 21st century serfdom where a rent-seeking guild sits between them and the game.</p><p>Thus, it attracts speculators and big lending guilds like YGG—not real gamers—which is good for the short term price of the coin but ultimately detrimental to the project&apos;s long term growth. This is principally because speculators don’t actively contribute to the game community while simultaneously occupying vast amounts of valuable NFT resources that could otherwise be owned by more decentralized individual gamers who will make the game better. In other words, YGG and other guilds have models that are not necessarily positive for game community building because they encourage wage labor. It is also important to emphasize that the scholars are mainly wage takers from third-world countries and have very little negotiating power in terms of their pay; this is hardly the “future of gaming” that we dreamed of.</p><p>In the end, we would like to point to the fact that although a tiered and pay to win system exists in traditional games, the very nature of GameFi and the play to earn model of all crypto games exacerbates this problem one-hundred fold and becomes totally critical to the life and death of a game. Unlike traditional Gacha games which can get away with easy profits from a cheap play-to-win dopamine rush through in-app purchases, GameFi projects will collapse when this is tried.</p><p>One solution is the “game first, crypto second” model. This model highlights the gaming experience aspect while keeping the crypto components unintrusive: having fun and making money are not mutually exclusive, but it is important to emphasize the former. We envision that new content from different developers and studios could be added to the game by being voted in by different nodes one day in the near future. Specifically, what makes a game fun in the long term is the slow acquisition of skills—through developing a deep understanding of both game logic and mechanics—or the slow progression that one feels through time invested, rather than just buying extremely expensive high-tiered assets. Simply put, games can be designed to reward skill, like League of Legends, or be designed to reward hard work (resource acquisition), like Clash of Clans. Some of the most popular games like Clash Royale have a balance of both of these elements: units can get upgraded for ladder climbing to increase rewards, cards are reasonably tiered by rarity, and competitive play happens with all cards reset to the same level.</p><p>In essence, the “game first, crypto second” model means that not everyone who simply plays will earn, but only that everyone who plays has the chance to earn, and how much they earn is dependent only minutely on how much capital they have lavished but, more importantly, on their gaming skills and time spent in-game. Even people without deep pockets can make money due to their unique skill and understanding of the game rather than just being forced to be weaker due to the cheaper nature of particular assets. This is all plausible if gaming studios with gamer backgrounds are more reluctant to allocate most of their presale tokens to private buyers, which may influence the economy.</p><h2 id="h-2-decentralization" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">2. Decentralization</h2><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/a76d361f5f3c70c71c1110031b11c1b272325700e88b0713d673ec1750fa1365.png" alt="Banned Axies" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Banned Axies</figcaption></figure><p>The second challenge that the Level 3 games must address is decentralization. The selling of in-game assets is by no means an exclusive GameFi phenomenon, but the crypto gaming industry pitches their game assets as totally independent and uncontrollable markets. This is deceptive: there are ways studios maintain control over assets, and, in most cases, these games remain centralized despite the marketing of many crypto gaming leaders.</p><p>The first and most fundamental question is whether or not these games should or need to be as decentralized as gaming leaders claim they will be. In “centralized gaming” (CSGO on Steam, for example), accounts can easily be trade-banned. This has led to many issues where millions of dollars worth of assets are locked up in trading bot accounts. While many may counter that these locked-up assets inflate the equilibrium price up by lowering total supply, the ban was justified to some extent. Being able to stop bots from simply transferring their assets to another account and continuing to hack and violate terms of service is important in stabilizing the game economy. However, there are also many reasons why the decentralized nature of blockchain assets is altogether worth being protected. If we assume that decentralization is something we want to keep and enforce, it raises the question: does the current crypto gaming ecosystem reflect these ideals? And how can these games evolve to better create the ultimate decentralized metaverse?</p><p>In the current crypto gaming landscape, while studios cannot directly prevent the trading of assets as they are secured separately on the blockchain, they can drastically lower the value of the asset by banning it from their games. This removes much, if not all, of the asset’s utility. If appropriately marked on exchanges and other trading platforms (like on the Axie Infinity marketplace), it would be effortless to essentially replicate the trade-banning functions of centralized games. For example, when Axie Infinity found out Chinese studios were paying people to play multiple accounts at once to maximize yield, they banned all of their Axies and took to Twitter to caution the community against further violations. Of course, the Axies themselves can still be traded, but they cannot be used in-game by anyone, which makes their de facto trading value worthless. As game companies have a monopoly over the reduction and removal of the asset’s value, these assets remain highly centralized.</p><p>Taking it a step further, games like Star Atlas claim to be developer agnostic, meaning that they are open to the idea of having themselves phased out over time and for other studios to take their place. They have claimed in many town halls that new developers could replace the development team over time if the community desired. In their whitepaper, the studio claims that “Blockchain technology using the Solana protocol” allows for a “largely serverless and secured gameplay experience. Non-fungible tokens obtained and traded within Star Atlas creates an economy that replicates the tangibility of real-world assets and ownership.” Given that they have no servers, they reason, in the event that they fail, another company would simply build off their assets, thereby maintaining all their original value and their user base.</p><p>However, we believe that due to the speculative prices discussed above, companies are more incentivized to simply start a new game and sell their own tokens to raise money since customer acquisition is a low cost due to the hype and fast-spreading nature of crypto. For example, this is what happened with Crytomines, a GameFi project on Binance Smart Chain that claimed to have over 230k users. When the development team failed to control the FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) that hit the project and saw their token price plummet from $801 to $4 within two weeks, they proposed a complete shutdown of the game and promised the launch of a new one completely independent from the original NFTs, rendering them worthless.</p><p>In reality, there are several structural barriers that need to be overcome in order for this problem to be solved. First is the question of intellectual property: while companies have no control over the trading and transferring of the NFTs themselves, the art and names used in-game are all protected rights. We acknowledge the importance of IP protection and need to prevent a separate game studio with more funding from simply starting Mirandus 2 or Axie Infinity 2 using existing assets and, in so doing, fracturing the user base. While protecting and growing intellectual property is important to the growth of a game, there needs to be a clear transition plan. Unlike other forms of protection, such as patents, trademarks have no explicit expiry date and can be maintained in perpetuity, so there needs to be explicit directions to transfer ownership.</p><p>What we propose is to have the trademarks remain owned by the companies for a predetermined, public, but flexible time period, allowing the company to grow its intellectual property through partnerships, marketing, lore, design, etc. Afterwards, the trademarks would be transferred to the game’s DAO or DAO-like structure, where the community can vote on partnerships. These partnerships would be proposed to the DAO and voted on consequently: they would require a minimum amount of game native tokens or NFTs, which would be locked up by smart contract over a vote-determined period to align interests and prevent one-off marketing schemes.</p><p>Furthermore, there is also the issue of the servers that run the game itself. This can be addressed in two ways. Firstly, Gala Games currently uses a service of nodes that they claim could “run a decentralized platform for game hosting” in the future. We see massive potential for this framework. New content from different developers and studios could be added to the game through being voted in by different nodes. This allows for the hypothetical withdrawal from Gala dependency. Alternatively, we propose that a studio start a fund directly financed by themselves until the point where they determine that they no longer want to support the game, at which point they publicize the fund and give legal control over to the DAO. This way, the community can decide to maintain the server if the game is still popular or migrate fully over to new servers in due course. This would be paid for from the revenue of the exchange where the studio makes its profit and from new content creators who want to keep the economy growing.</p><p>In practice, new content creators can choose to build off the existing infrastructure by adding new playable content, or they can work to create a completely different game which incorporates the same NFTs. If the new game provides a much better platform then the original game, the DAO could vote to suspend payment for the original game servers and move funding to the new game, hence phasing out the original developers.</p><p>Overall, we should expect a future where there are blockchain games built on top of various layer-one blockchains like Ethereum, Solana, Wax, Cosmos, etc. Users will be able to switch games with ease, and they will be able to bring their assets, such as NFTs in the form of skins, avatars, or weapons, with them.</p><h2 id="h-3-governance-the-grand-illusion" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3. Governance: The Grand Illusion</h2><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/4b6be62e62f4b7c3bebb5bd2a6c7470354bea34d64bdab07e8337aa05afd1cba.png" alt="Axie Infinity Governance Token Distribution" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Axie Infinity Governance Token Distribution</figcaption></figure><p>The illusion of majoritarian governance—where stakeholders decide on-chain proposed protocol or game changes through casting votes with their tokens—must be questioned for current Level 3 crypto games and beyond. While games need user feedback and data to design the best possible product and maximize consumer experience, moving governance on-chain has failed to resolve any of the age-old problems of democracy that the anti-majoritarian framers of the Constitution had to face.</p><p>First, majoritarian governance will prove to be detrimental long term because individuals lack the skills, knowledge, and long-term incentives to maximize game growth. Given that most game development teams have the expertise required to design the complex economic structures that are necessary to balance play-to-earn games, it makes sense to trust the team to make decisions while allowing for user feedback and input. We believe that promising projects with a long-term vision, like Untamed Isles by Phat Loot Studios, will continue to listen to user feedback as they have in the past for the art design of their characters. Note here that this could be accomplished through data collection and pools rather than a token, with a note reflecting on their NFT holdings, which developers could choose to take into account.</p><p>This also raises another issue regarding exclusion and alienation as many people already put large amounts of funds into the game through the purchase of the NFTs that are actually crucial to the functioning of the game. This system of token-based governance forces individuals to buy this token as well and punish those who allocated their funds to the in-game NFTs. In terms of incentives, it seems impractical to give the power to change fundamental parts of the game to those with more money, who have incentives to protect their interests rather than the balance and health of the overall game. This can result in changes and votes based on protecting the higher tier assets which they hold even if the power imbalance alienates players.</p><p>While few governance policies have been made in the crypto gaming space due to the lack of implementation of any kind of governance structure, the ramifications of a crypto whale can be seen in other instances of governance in the crypto space. In April 2021, on the largest DeFi platform on Binance Smart Chain, PancakeSwap, a proposal to change a pool was submitted. The change (which was supported by the developers) was swept away by a single whale who pledged over 94,500 votes using his own $CAKE tokens. This made him the single largest voter claiming a majority of 65% against the proposal. Holding almost double the amount of tokens as the entire proposition, this whale singlehandedly blocked a vote which a majority of people desired or were ambivalent to. This highlights the potentially destructive nature of giving power to those whose incentives may not always align with the collective. What happened next is equally concerning: the Binance dev team kept proposing it again and again until the whale just gave up trying. Decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols constantly strive for quality and fairness, but many fall short due to their governance voting mechanisms: moving decision-making processes on-chain sound like the next blockchain revolution, especially for player owned gaming, but its effectiveness remains de jure.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/611758c369fc3629364fdb8c26f27fb85bc2415fa059fd91711c74902b90fc09.png" alt="PancakeSwap Governance Failure" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">PancakeSwap Governance Failure</figcaption></figure><p>There is clearly an incentives problem: whales will only allow for changes that do not harm their portfolios. Of course, we also then have to ask, since whales are the ones who put so much of their assets in-game, are they not entitled to do so? After all, they bear most of the risk. Even if we try to bypass the whale problem by instituting the common alternative of one wallet one vote instead of one token one vote, we face an equally disconcerting conclusion: the Sybil attack problem. One user can create five hundred wallets using scripts to skew governance or to unfairly take advantage of airdrops, ruining democratic participation.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/3782217c5a42633ce2652e060101bb0ef0b0dc9d132c26348b73643db51606ed.png" alt="Cheating in the MekaVerse Raffle" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Cheating in the MekaVerse Raffle</figcaption></figure><p>Furthermore, a token-based voting system alienates relevant parties and creates a power imbalance between the haves and the have nots. Not only does it exclude those who own fewer tokens, but even those with other holdings such as in-game NFT assets who are most directly invented in the game itself are forced to maintain a large supply of tokens to prevent harmful policies. This could be potentially disastrous for the NFT asset holders who are actually most affected by the game. Taking Axie Infinity as an example, the people most affected by game changes are land and Axie players. Yet, the people who vote on game development proposals are AXS holders. Though land in the game is proposed to yield AXS tokens in some way, the majority of AXS tokens are in the hands of AXS speculators, who will no doubt try to maintain their economic interest. Ultimately governance needs to be done on a case by case basis rather than a default used to raise funds and build voting infrastructure later.</p><p>Secondly, the current framework of game-based DAOs touts few successful implementations. Hardly any policies have been voted on due to the lack of transparency and progress into DAO development. Little information is given on concrete examples or structures of how votes will be conducted. While some games such as Axie Infinity and Star Atlas have proposed a base governance and proposals structure, there have yet to be any votes, nor have any announced regular votes that investors can expect. Notably, games who desire to be truly decentralized could incorporate some of the ideas stated previously in their DAO voting guidelines as a baseline of clear voting procedures.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/d22a4f61ab6a92dea633a703eca47ea3c1539388a559f7bd7a7665644164fb57.png" alt="Star Atlas Governance Token Distribution" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Star Atlas Governance Token Distribution</figcaption></figure><p>Thirdly, the current implementation of the DAO structure is hindered by the early distribution of tokens. If we assume the worst, then teams who plan to do rugpulls (scams and schemes) will dump all of their tokens and disappear. Even if we give developers the benefit of the doubt, due to the need to raise funds at early stages and to reward employees, many if not all of the tokens are distributed to private sale owners and employees. Thus, even if major players are able to get a large portion of the valuable tokens on the market, they will still lack relative voting power. Note that this is not just a problem in a few games, but is rather a problem across the space. The average distribution to the team and private round investors is 20.3% and 13.2%, respectively, and the ownership for the public sale is 9.17% (based on an average of 3 games: Axie Infinity, Star Atlas, and Splinterlands). As can be gleaned from the data of the top games, in some of the extreme cases like Star Atlas, the public sale of POLIS (their governance token) token represents only 2% of the distribution of POLIS token whereas the private sale participants own 22.5%, leaving much to be desired in terms of publicly controlled, democratic land governance. Even in more balanced cases like Axie Infinity, where the public sale represents the same percent token distribution as the private sale, the team retains a majority of the tokens, giving them the final say.</p><p>While many claim that this distribution is likely to change over time through the inflation of coins through play-to-earn and staking, we counter by arguing that this tactic is also available to the private sellers, who may earn even more due to their first mover status. Either way, it is likely to take years before the public even gets close to having a final say on governance policy. At the start of the game, when the most important decisions are made, the companies and funds would have controlling power in the absence of the governance token. Thus, the solution is to either remove governance and not include it as a strategic buzzword aimed at fundraising, or give power to the people fully like Loot and disappear from the scene.</p><h2 id="h-conclusion" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Conclusion</h2><p>Given the playability and economic value of gaming and NFTs, GameFi presents an opportunity to onboard the next centimillion users into the crypto space. Since mid-2021, we have seen the initial breakout of crypto games. More than two times the number of unique wallets have interacted with gaming and NFTs and gaming than DeFi. YGG (Yield Guild Games) now claims a valuation of six billion dollars as they and other on-chain guilds continue to introduce users from emerging economies, like the Philippines, to the crypto-economy. Sandbox one day will be a bigger company than Roblox, and there will be many more Sandboxes to emerge. If we can begin to address the problems with the “crypto first, game second” model, the facade of decentralization, and governance troubles, the gaming revolution will be inevitable.</p><p>We will leave the readers with a quote from the Loot Project website:</p><blockquote><p>A storm is brewing and it intends to swallow us whole. Can you feel it in the wind?</p><p>This world needs us once more. Will you join and fight for it? Or will you watch from afar, singing past travails and flipping for coin?</p></blockquote><p><strong>Disclaimer</strong>:</p><p>The contents of this paper are for informational purposes only and should not be misconstrued as legal, tax, investment, financial, or other advice. The authors also personally own assets in many of the aforementioned games.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>harvardblockchain@newsletter.paragraph.com (Harvard Blockchain)</author>
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