To ensure the long-term sustainability and resilience of a DAO's financial resources, it is essential to strategically allocate funds from auctions to multiple treasury accounts for future use. Additionally, with this strategy, the DAO can mitigate the risk malicious arbitrage and securing capital for future proliferating endeavors. I propose a simple mechanism that splits auction proceeds into three treasury accounts, each designated for specific years ahead. At the end of each year, unspent funds would be either burned or redistributed, depending on a social contract established between DAO members. The mechanism of splitting auction proceeds and the burn/redistribution mechanism should be implemented in the contracts and backed by a social agreement among members that would promote transparency and accountability. Embracing the idea of Three Treasuries would enable the DAO to navigate challenges with confidence and uphold its commitment to long-term success.

What if the money from the auction were split as 50%, 30%, and 20%, and then allocated to three treasury accounts named Treasury-A, B, and C?

Subsequently, Treasury-A would be used in the current year, Treasury-B in 2024, and Treasury-C in 2025.

At the end of each year, any unspent money from Treasury-A is burned, the funds from Treasury-B are transferred to Treasury-A for proliferation in the new year, and the funds from Treasury-C are transferred to Treasury-B.

In this case, each year, 50% of the spending will be based on the performance of the auction in the past two years, and the remaining 50% based on the auctions in the current year.

In the case of the fork, the forkers will have a right for a ~50% refund from Treasuries-B and C but not Treasury. Treasury-A is for proliferation in the current year or will be burned on December 31st.

If DAO splits the treasury now, we will have 4748, 2848, and 1899 ETH, respectively for Treasuries A,B,C. The adjusted total supply is 385, and the BV will be 12.33 ETH.

In this case, all tokens are equal (with no aging, etc.). The DAO doesn’t need to spend or burn money too quickly or unpredictably to counter the arbitrageurs. More importantly, the DAO will have capital secured for the next two seasons.

Lastly, this concept can be presented as a social contract hard-coded into the treasury contracts.

I think it is also fair to assume that all honest minority already left and DAO can be more vigilante with the arbitragers.

The whole Fork situation and proposal itself is difficult because it includes the fork, RQ, and the removal of the veto power (a veto can't stop a malicious fork). While the technical part of these upgrades is established, the social implications remain uncertain. I like to see the fork happen; it is an interesting experiment, but there is a high probability that it will not be used as intended. Opposition might choose not to join the fork or rejoin the DAO and persist in obstructing.

1. We should consider keeping the veto for the following reasons: firstly, the vetoers are trusted members and are unlikely to misuse it. Secondly, the absence of the veto could lead the DAO to extremes, as shown by the dynamic of recent retaliatory proposals. Maintaining the veto carries no harm, while removal might provide certain individuals with an opportunity to maliciously seize control of the DAO. It would be much safer to remove the veto in a separate proposal after the fork.

2. In my opinion, the sensible course of action is to delay the Fork. At present, even the most outspoken proponents of the fork openly stated that they might not even join the fork. I believe that hardly anyone from the other side is genuinely interested in leading the forked DAO, as evidenced by the scarcity of proposals and ideas originating from them. I do not see people joining the fork and working towards making it successful.

3. The fork mechanism may be used by some as an RQ opportunity exclusively. We can achieve the same results with fewer risks by launching a Nouns acquisition committee with five respected signers that would run a 3/5 multisig safe. In a few consequent proposals, with small intervals, the committee will request funds to acquire nouns from the secondary market. Priority will be given to first-hand nouns, and lower numbers and bids will be placed only for nouns lower than 815 numbers. The funds will be requested in phases starting with 990 ETH, 3300 ETH, etc. The committee will be operational only for 3 weeks.

In my humble opinion, both fork and RQ represent temporary solutions. The Jungle is a problem that requires addressing too. It locks new nouners in a hostile environment with a "wrong" culture. Many people who purchase nouns in Season 2 eventually sell and depart. I believe this is because they find themselves in the negative community. The Jungle is full of critics, some of whom do not even hold a noun. I propose the launch of a Nouns Private Club, an invitation-only Discord server where members have the privilege to invite others while taking full responsibility for their selections.

During Season 1, numerous nouners stepped forward with compelling proposals, and it was a good time. However, in Season 2, a significant number of individuals limited themselves to criticism without contributing any proposals. In my opinion, we should acknowledge that Season 2 marked a turning point, and we now find ourselves somewhat blocked by a group of members. We refrain from proposing ideas due to the fierce opposition that votes no by default. This trend has persisted for much of Season 2.