Polygon is one of the most established and ambitious projects in web3, leading development for a wide range of scaling solutions and zero-knowledge innovations that crypto-native and institutional projects can build on, including chains like Polygon PoS, Polygon zkEVM, and (the still in-development) Polygon Miden, as well as a ZK-focused chain development kit, Polygon CDK.

Now, Polygon Labs is a leading contributor to the AggLayer, a protocol to unify chain fragmentation and scale the web3 experience to the size of the internet. Given the rapid growth and complexity of the network— both in terms of technology and use cases—robust system smart contracts governance is critical.

CHALLENGE

Security is the highest priority for infrastructure builders, especially when it comes to upgrading system smart contracts. But for the chains, protocols, and tools we build to be resilient, it is also important to continue progressing towards greater decentralization.

Polygon made strides in addressing this persistent and industry-wide challenge by introducing the Polygon Protocol Council. Thirteen members were selected by the community for value-alignment and network resilience, as well as technical, security, and governance expertise. This council oversees various contracts across Polygon network infrastructure, ensuring efficient and safe oversight.

Given the scope and significance of its network infrastructure, Polygon needs specialized governance processes and tools to ensure security, transparency, and continued meaningful progress towards decentralization.

Pain Points:

• Efficient execution of both emergency and regular upgrades while maintaining robust checks and balances.

• Managing upgrades for different contract types, such as bridge and token contracts.

• Disjointed user experience across various SAFE contracts for Protocol Council members.

• Ensuring transparent and accountable governance decision-making.

• Existing solutions not accounting for multiple consensus paths.

• Adapting the governance process based on community feedback and network growth.

SOLUTION

To tackle these challenges, Polygon designed the following governance process for smart contract system upgrades:

At the core of this design are two paths:

• Majority Consensus: For scheduled, regular upgrades.

• Super Majority Consensus: For resolving critical vulnerabilities via an emergency upgrade.

Each path has a different consensus threshold and timelock:

• Majority Consensus: 10-day timelock, requiring Majority consensus (7 out of 13 council members).

• Super Majority Consensus: No timelock, requiring Super Majority consensus (10 out of 13 council members).

Regular upgrades have a 10-day timelock to give the community time to voice their concerns or exit the system. Emergency upgrades are rare circumstances that require immediate response and containment. By implementing both a Majority and Super Majority consensus paths, Polygon can prioritize security while continuing to make significant progress towards greater transparency and decentralization.

Benefits:

• Unified user experience: Protocol Council members can initiate and approve all upgrades from the same governance contract and interface.

• Enhanced security: The system ensures rapid response to emergencies while maintaining robust security protocols.

• Increased transparency: Regular and emergency upgrades are easy to track, and clearly communicated through transparency reports.

• User protection: Regular upgrades require a timelock delay of 10 days to ensure the ability for the community to exit the system before any change takes place, while emergency upgrades are limited in scope and rare.

• Adaptability: The flexible governance framework supports the growing Polygon landscape, accommodating future changes seamlessly.

UNDER THE HOOD

Polygon’s governance is built with Aragon OSx, a next generation modular governance framework. Aragon OSx isolates governance logic into plugins, making it safer and easier to customize and evolve governance contracts.

In order to build Polygon’s unique governance process, the Aragon Custom Builds team customized the standard multisig plugin by adding different consensus thresholds and transparency functionality to the multisig.

Here’s how it works:

First, a Protocol Council member needs to create a proposal. When creating the proposal, they can choose to initiate either the Majority or Super Majority consensus path:

Majority Consensus:

1. A Majority consensus (7/13) needs to approve the proposal;

2. Once approved, a member starts the 10-day delay period for a community vote and pins a Transparency Report to the proposal metadata via IPFS;

3. Once the delay period expires and community vote concludes, the members need to confirm the proposal once again with majority consensus (7/13);

4. Any address can execute the proposal onchain.

Super Majority Consensus:

1. A Super Majority consensus (10/13) needs to approve the proposal;

2. Once the approval is reached the proposal is automatically and immediately executed;

3. A member can pin the transparency report at any stage in the process.

The two distinct processes, supplemented by transparency requirements, are unified into a single multisig. This setup makes the process more efficient, straightforward, and easy to track for the community.

Key Features:

• Different timelocks: Two separate processes in the same multisig trigger different timelocks.

• Immediate execution for Super Majority proposals: Proposals with Super Majority consensus are executed automatically and immediately, ensuring quick responses to critical issues.

• Unified process: A single Aragon OSx multisig streamlines the process, enhancing security, efficiency, and responsiveness for the Protocol Council.

• Increased transparency: Transparency reports are pinned to the proposal metadata during the governance process.

• Adaptable governance: The Super Majority Multisig plugin can be changed for a new plugin via the existing governance process, ensuring the governance process can evolve with the network’s growth.

With this custom solution, Polygon is taking even more meaningful steps towards secure and decentralized governance of its network infrastructure. And it can evolve over time.

Aragon OSx plugins are open source. The smart contract framework enables any Aragon OSx DAO to safely and easily install governance plugins built by others. This includes plugins ideated and designed by industry leaders such as Polygon.

The Super Majority Multisig is the culmination of extensive research, community consultation, and collaboration. It can now be easily implemented by any other project in the industry grappling with similar challenges. If you’re building critical infrastructure, and need to balance security and decentralization, reach out to the Aragon Custom Builds team to explore how it could fit your needs.

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Aragon has been building onchain governance infrastructure for over 7 years, with its tech securing billions of assets. Govern your protocol onchain with Aragon OSx: the secure and modular DAO framework with customization built in. Or, launch a DAO in 10 minutes or less without writing any code on the Aragon App.

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As long time builders on Polygon, we are excited to empower the community with a unified and seamless governance experience that is secure, transparent, and adaptable. By leveraging the robust capabilities of Aragon OSx, our modular governance framework, we are creating a governance solution that is as dynamic and innovative as the Polygon landscape itself.

Our Role in Building the Polygon Governance Hub

The Governance Hub is set to be the home of community-driven decision-making for the Polygon aggregated blockchain network, as well as other network architecture. Our modular governance framework, Aragon OSx, and custom development services are bringing this vision to life.

By leveraging the security of our smart contract framework, flexibility of our custom development solutions, and human-centered design system, the Governance Hub will facilitate a unified and seamless experience, engaging the entire community in a multi-stage governance process.

Why Aragon OSx?

Aragon OSx, our next-generation modular governance framework, is optimized for customization and adaptability. Its plugin-based architecture allows for the secure and efficient customization of governance contracts, making it ideal for complex governance structures. Here’s how Aragon OSx supports a bespoke governance solution for Polygon:

• Security: The governance contracts safeguard the protocol with granular permission management and custom processes.

• Modularity: Our framework supports a wide range of governance models through customizable and interchangeable plugins, enabling multi-body and multi-stage governance.

• Adaptability: Plugins can be securely installed via the governance process, ensuring that the Governance Hub can evolve with the community’s growth.

Features of the Polygon Governance Hub

Our bespoke UI template and open governance design system consolidate every stage of Polygon governance into a single, intuitive interface. Human-centered design ensures that all community members, regardless of technical expertise, can engage with the governance process. This unified platform will include:

• Dashboard: A consolidated overview where members can find the latest updates from each section of the Governance Hub in one place.

• Members and Delegates: A directory of community members and delegates, fostering transparency and accountability.

• Multi-Stage Proposals: A unified interface for tracking and discussing proposals across multiple stages, from initial discussions to onchain execution:

  • Proposals are initiated and discussed in GitHub, as well as the forum, and made directly visible on the proposal page.

  • When the discussion is closed, the onchain proposal is created by the Protocol Council.

  • Afterwards, it is automatically populated for the community to voice their approval or disapproval.

  • Once the community has been heard, the security council executes the transaction.

• Resources: A library of governance-related resources to educate and inform the community, including the proposal creation process, and Protocol Council contracts.

The Road Ahead

Our journey with Polygon is just beginning. As long standing contributors to the Polygon community, we are dedicated to empowering the community with a governance platform for transparent and inclusive decision-making. At each milestone, we will invite the community to provide meaningful feedback, ensuring that the Governance Hub evolves in alignment with the community’s needs.

The future of protocol governance is here, and with our modular framework, any project can implement a governance model tailored to its unique needs. We are proud to be working with the Polygon community to advance a novel governance solution that is both secure and community-driven, leading the industry towards a more decentralized future.

Stay tuned for more updates as we continue to build the Polygon Governance Hub.

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Aragon has been building onchain governance infrastructure for over 7 years, with its tech securing billions of assets. Govern your protocol onchain with Aragon OSx: the secure and modular DAO framework with customization built in. Or, launch a DAO in 10 minutes or less without writing any code on the Aragon App.

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Author: Community Treasury Board; Board member Ajit Tripathi posting on CTB's behalf

Abstract

The proposal introduces the first Season Strategy for the Community Grants Program by the Community Treasury Board. The first season of community grants will distribute up to 35M MATIC to builders in the Polygon network. The first season will kick off from Jun11, 2024, and end after three months on Aug 31, 2024.

Rationale

The governance framework for the Polygon Community Treasury includes Polygon Funding Proposals (PFPs), and a Community Treasury Board (CTB) that will serve as a key decision-maker over the Community Treasury.

To make the grants program impactful and focused, the CTB has proposed the following Season Strategy, which dictates the overall direction and intent of the CTB in funding projects in some key categories.

After researching the current market landscape, and deliberating amongst each other, the CTB has zeroed in on Consumer Crypto as the key theme for the program. In addition to this, the CTB may during the course of the season, and based on community’s feedback introduce new themes/verticals/GA’s for better grant outcomes

While Crypto Consumer is a priority for CTB, to take into account the projects seeking support from Polygon Network, CTB has also decided to back teams building long tail dApps, Infra, and Public Goods as Polygon is committed to funding the growth of open source technologies for the growth of the larger Ethereum Network.

To conclude, we as the CTB, believe grant programs need focused effort, and our decision to focus on Consumer Crypto denotes our commitment to fund projects that serve and onboard millions of potential users to crypto

Specification

About Season and Key Themes

The CTB will distribute funds from the Community Treasury based on a transparent and objective season strategy. A season is defined as a collection of ideas, or themes supported by external experts to drive impactful outcomes.

A typical season will be three months long, and feature specific verticals, themes, and partners who will help the CTB execute the program, and achieve its goals.

Key Grant Themes

• Consumer Crypto

• General Grants

Note: The Consumer Crypto theme will be managed and run by external Grant Allocators who submitted a specific proposal detailing their experience and fit for a given theme to the CTB.. For the first season, Thrive Protocol has been approved and appointed by the Community Treasury Board as the first Grant Allocator. The GA will be solely responsible for shortlisting, reviewing, and deploying grants on behalf of the CTB. After the season, Thrive Protocol will submit an impact report to the Community Treasury Board.. PFP-2 details the specifics of GA engagement by the CTB.

Consumer Crypto

Consumer crypto continues to grow at both the infra and app layers. The six trends driving consumer crypto adoption are virtual beings, decentralized social, Onchain gaming, NFTs, Content Co-creation, and Digital/Physical intersection.

Consumer crypto key categories

AI X Crypto

Virtual beings or AI agents have use cases across nearly every sector including DeFi, Social, and Gaming. Implementing these models into products are still in the early phases, but every company is developing an AI strategy. Crypto rails and primitives, such as NFTs, provide infra for virtual beings to proliferate and act autonomously.

Virtual beings, sometimes referred to as AI agents, are onchain entities that can autonomously interact with social, DeFi, or generally any application. The acceptance and adoption of virtual beings are only being accelerated by the growing usage of large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT.

Example: Within crypto, virtual beings can be represented as NFTs. Historically NFTs have lacked the ability to develop identity and own assets themselves, but new standards like ERC-6551 give NFTs the ability to own other NFTs, such as a Lens profile, accumulate and trade tokens, and earn reputation from their onchain activities.

Decentralized Social

Decentralized social opens up each layer of the application stack. Users own the content they create, and have more flexible monetization options. Apps can tap into the shared data layer to side step the cold start problem. New monetization models are unlocked with decentralized social, ultimately creating new base layer for app value flows. Mobile-first is table stakes at this point for social platforms and applications. Many apps now building on top of Lens or Farcaster have launched mobile apps, but mobile wallet interactions still somewhat negatively impact the user experience (UX).

Example: Lens, Farcaster, and CyberConnect are some of the leading social graph layers. Lens, for example, leverages. Bundlr and Arweave for its data storage layer for posts. Each of the social graph layers now has a plethora of applications building on top of them at this point, ranging from Twitter-style apps to decentralized YouTube.

Gaming & Autonomous Worlds

Autonomous worlds break apart the traditional gaming stack. Game state and logic are fully on-chain, allowing assets to be composable, and interoperable across a variety of front ends. Onchain games, also known as autonomous worlds, represent a completely new architectural shift in the gaming stack. Autonomous worlds have their game state and logic fully onchain, allowing developers and users to take full advantage of the open and composable nature of blockchain infrastructure.

Example:

The infrastructure layer for autonomous worlds is led by Lattice’s MUD engine, Dojo, Curio’s Keystone OPchain, and Argus Labs’ World Engine. Each has its own design tradeoffs but shares the common goal of bringing autonomous worlds to life.

NFT Innovation

NFT Financialization allows NFT users to use their assets in financial markets. The primary use case has been taking leverage against NFTs. The evolution of NFTs could change how these markets function.

Example:

The core growth driver of NFT financialization continues to be the growing importance of digital items in society, as well as the efforts to develop the underlying IP of NFTs. For example, Pudgy Penguins have an active strategy to drive value to the brand, which, in theory, will create more liquidity and value for the core NFTs.

Content Co-creation

New platforms for IP creation have been developed for creators across many different mediums. A major theme has emerged around co-creation and driving community engagement. Co-creation will drive increased community engagement, and new ownership opportunities.

Example:

Projects like StoryCo and Storyverse enable creators (e.g., writers, film producers, and IP holders) to co-create content with each other. Platforms like Mad Realities encourage viewer participation, via the MAD token, to influence the direction of content production.

Digital/Physical Intersection

Physical goods outfitted with specific chips allow for these products to gain life onchain. These items effectively become equipped with a crypto wallet, allowing them to develop their own onchain history and meaning.

Example:

Now, projects like IYK and Kong can be used to supercharge physical items by attaching specially-made NFC chips to them. These chips effectively give physical goods a crypto wallet. Creators can leverage this as a new medium of interaction and engagement with their audiences. For example, musicians can sell chipped merchandise at their events, allowing fans to get corresponding digital items and for artists to connect digitally with fans who purchase those goods.

Gamified Commerce

By incorporating web3 game mechanics into commercial activities, businesses can create a participatory economy where consumers are active stakeholders rather than passive participants. Some examples of mechanisms used include: Rewards/Loyalty programs, NFTs as product authentication/activation, and automation of the sales experience through the use of smart contracts.

Example:

Nike’s rewards/loyalty program. Activated fashion such as MNTGE, 9dcc, Uniqly, and Arianee. Tokenized RWA platforms like Courtyard and Arena Club.

Scenecoins

“Scenecoins are “community-first memecoins” that “launch as a Schelling point for distributed communities with shared values and missions.”” This is the anticipated progression of turning culture into currency. As of now memecoins typically launch first then a community is created around them. Scenecoins are already developed communities or creators creating a memecoin.

Example:

Memecoin ecosystems like $DEGEN and $BONSAI, and dapps such as p00ls.io. |

Eligibility Criteria:

• Any project building in the consumer crypto landscape

• Looking to contribute long-term to the development of Polygon

Note: Grant Allocators will decide the per project allocation based on their review, and selection procedures

General Grants

The General Grants initiative aims to serve the long tail of builders, founders, and developers to submit their unique ideas and projects to secure support through the community grants program.

While there’s no hard-pressed rule against funding any specific vertical or project, the below list provides guidance to projects based on what we find most impactful to fund:

• Dev tooling & libraries

• Protocol Infra

• Any decentralized Applications across use cases For e.g. DePIN, Gaming, RWA, AI, Infra & Public Goods etc.

Eligibility details:

• Any project building in the long tail of crypto

• Looking to contribute long-term to the development of Polygon

Program grant details:

• Grant type: Milestone-based

• Grant cap: Up to 50K POL per project

Note: Grantees are free to submit their proposal with any grant amount they desire to secure; however, all grants above 50K POL will invite special scrutiny & diligence and will take a longer time frame to evaluate

Program duration and guidelines

Community grants are an ongoing program. As such, there is no end date for projects seeking grant funding to submit their proposals for CTB review and approval.

However, for operational purposes, the below table provides broad guidance around specific activities, and estimated duration or dates.

Applicants or grantees submitting their applications in June will reasonably expect a 4-week turnaround on their application status. The results will be announced on the last date of the month, June 30, 2024. The process repeats month after month until the end of the season.

Acknowledgments Additional thanks to Peter Liem for his assistance with data fetching.

Also published on Eth Research:

Voter Behavior in Blockchain Governance: A Comparative Study of Curve Finance and Polkadot

by Wenxuan Deng, Tanisha Katara, David Hamoui and Mateusz Rzeszowski Acknowledgments Additional thanks to Peter Liem for his assistance with data fetching. Also blogged here: polygon mirror; Voter Behavior in Blockchain Governance: A Comparative Study of Curve Finance and Polkadot - HackMD Abstract As the first comprehensive examination of voter behavior in Web3, the following research explores two significant blockchain ecosystems, Curve Finance and Polkadot, using a novel quantitative meth...

https://ethresear.ch

Abstract

As the first comprehensive examination of voter behavior in Web3, the following research explores two significant blockchain ecosystems, Curve Finance and Polkadot, using a novel quantitative methodology to decompose and highlight governance patterns.

The presented analysis shows, among other findings, a significant influence of market conditions on voter tendencies, diverse patterns relating to voting power accumulation, and a potential effect of financial incentives on voter participation.

As such, this research seeks to provide value to the growing field of blockchain-based governance frameworks in dealing with fundamental issues, such as low stakeholder activity, the impact of shifting market conditions, and various complexities at the intersection of economics and political science.

1. Introduction

Blockchain enables decentralized decision making[1]. The information once hidden is now displayed publicly in any block explorer[2]; what used to be the domain of a few now can be accessed permissionlessly[3]; what was perceived as status quo is now challenged with every executed transaction[4].

These qualities are revolutionary, but the decision-making of distributed networks is largely undocumented still. Consequently, this paper serves as an attempt to analyze and compare two blockchain-based governance systems quantitatively: Curve Finance[5] and Polkadot[6].

Firstly, in order to lay a common ground of understanding, we describe the relevant governance systems. Secondly, we explain the motivation for selecting Curve Finance and Polkadot as part of our analysis. Lastly, in each of the systems, we analytically deep dive into the voter personas, voter turnout, proposals and voter behavior in different market conditions.

1.1 Curve Finance and Polkadot

As the fields of tokenomics[7] and governance rapidly evolve, two protocols have emerged as particularly influential. Curve Finance pioneered[8] the vote escrow token model[9], introducing gauge voting[10] to decentralized finance (DeFi)[11]. Meanwhile, Polkadot's governance system has been notable[12] for its innovative approach to quorums[13] and governance lockers[14]. These protocols consequently stand out as significant pioneers in decentralized governance innovation, including novel concepts such as governance conviction[15].

Governance conviction, also referred to as lockup-based voting multipliers or vote escrow[16], is a mechanism used in decentralized governance models[17] to enhance the influence or voting power of token holders based on the duration for which they are willing to lock up their tokens in a smart contract. This type of system operates under the assumption that the longer a participant commits their tokens for, the more conviction they demonstrate towards the decisions being made within the network and the more incentive alignment they display. As a consequence of the process, their voting power is multiplied by a factor corresponding to the lockup period. This aims to incentivize longer-term commitment and stability within the governance process, aligning participants' interests with the long-term health and success of the platform.

Let's now briefly go over both projects and how their governance works in practice.

1.1.1 Curve Finance[18] is a protocol allowing for seamless exchange of ERC-20 tokens at a low cost. This is achieved through the use of liquidity pools[19], which are tokens locked in smart contracts to facilitate trades. Curve Finance offers rewards[20] to those who contribute, creating a mutually beneficial relationship where users can easily exchange tokens while liquidity providers receive rewards.

To vote, CRV token holders must possess veCRV. veCRV[21] represents CRV tokens that are locked for a certain period (Table 1). Users can lock their CRV for a minimum of one week and a maximum of four years.[22]

1.1.1.1 Governance Proposals - To distinct proposals were noted: gauge proposals and non-gauge proposals. Gauges and gauge weights determine how much token rewards the suppliers to a liquidity pool get. Therefore, a gauge proposal will have explicit financial consequences for some or all token holders. Non-gauge proposals, on the other hand, may or may not have financial consequences and may pertain to high-level maintenance and regular upgrades in the network. The impact of proposal types on voter behavior will be discussed more in this research paper.

1.1.1.2 Community Voting - A proposer must have a minimum voting power of 2500 vote-escrowed CRV (veCRV)[23] to create a proposal. A voter's voting power linearly decreases overtime until it reaches zero at the time of the unlock.

1.1.2 Polkadot[24] is a protocol which uses a nominated Proof of Stake (PoS)[25] consensus algorithm and aims to connect blockchains, also known as parachains[26], to enable seamless communication, and intermediary-free communication within its network. Fundamentally, parachains are independent PoS blockchains with their own functionalities and tokens. What binds these parachains is the relay chain[27], which is responsible for achieving consensus and ensuring that transactions are executed.

Note: This study analyzes data from Polkadot’s Governance V1[6], rather than the more recent Open Governance system[28]. This choice was made to ensure comparability in terms of the data size, data type and temporal alignment of the voter samples with those from Curve Finance.

1.1.2.1 Governance Proposals - Similarly to Curve Finance, two types of proposals can be distinguished in Polkadot: treasury proposals[29] and non-treasury proposals. According to Polkadot's Governance V1, when a stakeholder wishes to propose spending from the treasury, they must reserve a deposit of at least 5% of the proposed spending[29]. A treasury proposal will have explicit financial consequences for the protocol, subject to governance, while non-treasury proposals may or may not have financial consequences and pertain to high-level maintenance and regular upgrades in the network. The manner in how the proposal types impact voter behavior will be tackled in the “Governance Proposals Breakdown” section of this research paper.

1.1.2.2 Community Voting - To vote on proposals, DOT token holders must lock their tokens. The longer the DOT is locked, the more voting power is assigned. The voting power of a DOT holder in Polkadot is calculated as DOT tokens held multiplied by the relevant multiplier (Table 2), which increases as the locking period increases. The multipliers range from 0.1x for zero days to 6x for two hundred and twenty-four days.[30]

For instance, if Bobby has 100 tokens and locks them for 14 days, her/his voting power per the (Table 2) is (Dot Tokens Held) * 2 (14-day multiplier) = 200. Therefore, Bobby will have the voting power of 200 tokens.

1.2 Curve Finance and Polkadot Case Selection

Curve Finance and Polkadot serve as significant examples of decentralized governance and are distinct in their purposes and functionalities. At the same time, due to the need for upgradeable contracts and changeable system parameters[30][31], both projects incorporate governance structures, delegating system maintenance responsibilities to their respective communities, as proxied by token in order to facilitate for secure and decentralized decision-making. Both of those governance systems utilize permissionless on-chain execution, which means that the decision-making is directly translated into canonical code, without the need for an external authority or intermediary to apply the changes that tokenholders vote on.

Importantly, in both Polkadot's and Curve's cases, we can distinguish between proposals with explicit and direct financial consequences (financial proposals) and those where the financial consequence is implicit and delayed (technical proposals). Curve's gauge proposals and Polkadot's treasury proposals can be both considered financial proposals since they explicitly impact the allocation of financial resources shared by all tokenholders, i.e., as it concerns deciding reward structures for pools in Curve, and the distribution of Polkadot's treasury funds. On the other hand, technical proposals, i.e., non-gauge and non-treasury, impact the protocols, relate to maintenance and upgrades, and may not directly affect the allocation of financial resources shared by tokenholders.

There is one notable difference between the two governance systems in terms of the specifics of their token lock-up mechanisms. Curve Finance employs a governance mechanism that encourages participants to actively engage in decision-making processes by allowing them to gain financial rewards[20] for locking their tokens. On the other hand, Polkadot doesn't financially incentivize the locking up of tokens for voting (Democracy locker).

The above makes the case for a comparative study of the two systems. In the following parts, we analyze voter turnouts (Section 2) and break down governance proposals by type (Section 3). Then, we establish voter personas and seek to understand them in each system (Section 4). Finally, we analyze voter behavior and seek to identify the governing principles and patterns of these complex environments (Section 5). To do so, we break down the types of market conditions and consequent variations in voter behavior.

2. Voter Turnout Analysis

The below data comes from a comprehensive analysis on voter turnout for governance proposals. The calculation of voter turnout metrics is based on the number of veCRV tokens and DOT tokens used for voting over time, relative to the total veCRV and DOT tokens locked over the same period.

2.1 Curve Finance: On average, 65% of the circulating CRV is locked as veCRV. The below graph shows the monthly average number of veCRV tokens used for voting on gauge proposals and non gauge proposals over time. The red line shows the monthly average CRV locked as veCRV over time.

While there is no significant difference in the veCRV used for voting on gauge proposals and for non gauge proposals, it is interesting to note that out of the 65% locked, an average of 38% tokens have been used for voting. This highlights that although a significant proportion of CRV is locked, a relatively low percentage is used for voting. Further investigation is required to determine the exact factors contributing to the low percentage of utilized tokens.

2.2 Polkadot: On average, 54.5% of the circulating DOT is locked into multiple Polkadot lockers. The below graph shows the monthly average number of locked DOT tokens used for voting on treasury proposals and non treasury proposals over time. The red line shows the monthly average amount of DOT locked over time. In stark contrast to Curve Finance, out of these locked tokens, only 0.11% has been used for voting.

This highlights a significant disparity in voter engagement between the two blockchain ecosystems, with DOT showing a much lower level of voter engagement than CRV. While no direct connection can be drawn, the low percentage of utilized tokens for voting in DOT could be attributed to several factors, such as a lack of financial incentives dedicated to token lockups.

The voter turnout metrics shed light on the extent to which token holders actively engage in voting in both the ecosystems. This sets the stage for a deeper exploration into the nature of governance proposals and their implications on decision-making dynamics within the Curve Finance and Polkadot communities. By examining the types and frequencies of proposals submitted in governance, we can gain further insights into the priorities and interests driving the respective ecosystems' governance mechanisms.

3. Governance Proposals Breakdown

Governance proposals play a crucial role in decision-making within any community. Our analysis of two ecosystems, Curve Finance and Polkadot, reveals that financial proposals make up a significant portion of all proposals. Gauge proposals constitute approximately 70% of all proposals in Curve Finance, while treasury proposals make up approximately 80% of all proposals in Polkadot.

Interestingly, in Curve Finance, we found that most proposals are initiated by individuals associated with the Curve.fi team (Table 3), particularly two wallets linked to its founder, Michael Egorov[32]. The top wallet, identified as the Curve.fi deployer on the Arkham data platform[33], is notably active in both gauge and non-gauge proposal submissions. See the appendix for (Table 3) of top Curve Finance proposers, ranked in order of participation.

No similar pattern could be observed in Polkadot with the most referenda submitted by a single author amounting to only 6% of the total proposals.

Having provided an analysis of various proposals and consequent patterns, we move into the voter-centric part of the paper.

4. Voter Personas and Respective Patterns

The following research categorizes voter persona and analyzes their behavior towards the governance systems.

Voter personas are categorized based on the size of their token holdings, and the hierarchy is defined as follows: the top 1% is labeled as Whales, the next 5% as Sharks, the next 10% as Dolphins, the next 20% as Fish, and the remaining 64% as Shrimps.

4.1 Curve Finance: In the context of Curve Finance governance, over 58% of token holders choose to lock their tokens for the longest duration, i.e. four years. However, an intriguing trend surfaces among the different cohorts of holders.

In the graph below, the x-axis displays the initial lock-up windows, which range from 7 days to 4 years, and the y-axis displays the percentage of each of the voter personas who have locked their tokens. The more significant holders, i.e., Whales, Sharks, and Dolphins, show mild hesitation to commit for more extended lock periods. Conversely, they slightly prefer shorter commitments, particularly those under six months. Although the margin is slim, it is a telling divergence.

It hints that larger holders may not need to lock up their tokens for extended periods to wield significant voting power. For them, the flexibility not to lock in for an extended time could be a strategic move to mitigate risk and maintain liquidity options.

4.2 Polkadot: In the Polkadot ecosystem, analysis yields a similar, yet valuable, correlation to Curve Finance. 4% of DOT holders initially choose to lock their tokens for a maximum of 224 days (roughly seven months). Holders with more significant positions prefer shorter lock-up periods, and this pattern is glaringly apparent. Particularly striking in the Polkadot ecosystem is that about 93% of Whales and 98% of Sharks tend to lock up their tokens for 14 days or less. Contrastingly, shrimp holders display markedly different behavior, with approximately 30% opting for an 8-week lock-up and about 5% committing to a 32-week lock-up.

Among different holder categories, from Whales to Shrimps, there is an incremental increase in the preference for longer lock-ups as we move down the scale of holdings. The distinctions and preferences between prominent and smallholders are consistent within each protocol.

However, there is a significant difference between the two protocols. As shown in the pie charts below, in Curve Finance, 67.2% of voters across all groups opt for a four-year lock-up, while in Polkadot, only 4% of the users choose the most extended lock-up window of 224 days. Even among the most minor stakeholders, the Shrimps, less than 5% chose the most prolonged lock-up period of 32 weeks.

This divergence could be attributed to the fundamental differences in the underlying rewards and incentives of Curve Finance and Polkadot. Curve's gauge weight voting system[34] incentivizes users to boost their voting power by locking their tokens for extended periods. This may indicate that sustained rewards are crucial in incentivizing token holders to stay longer.

With this understanding of voter personas and their lock-up behaviors, we now dive into how they accumulate voting power in different market conditions.

5. Voting Power Accumulation Patterns in Different Market Conditions

The study of voting power accumulation patterns and the associated dynamics between voters and their locked-up tokens are of great importance in understanding how voters use their tokens in upward and downward market conditions.

Fundamentally, the two primary ways in which voters can augment their voting power (VP) are by purchasing additional tokens and locking them up, or by extending their lock-up period for already-owned tokens, resulting in an increased multiplier. VP calculation is derived from the multiplication of token balance and a multiplier based on the lock-up period.

Voting Power (VP) = token balance * multiplier based on lockup time

However, analyzing the behavior of voters in response to changes in token prices and market conditions presents a significant challenge - it's hard to determine whether voter behavior is influenced by changes in token locked amounts and lock-up duration or whether they are affected by the daily routines of the average Externally Owned Account (EOA) wallet.

To overcome this challenge, a reliable quantitative methodology has been developed to simplify this complex analysis. The approach we present is based on a decomposition of the changes in voting power into its constituent factors. By quantifying the changes in voting power ($$\Delta vp$$) over time, an analysis of the two constituent factors, changes in balance ($$\Delta b$$) and changes in conviction ($$\Delta c$$), can be made.

The change in voting power between two consecutive time points, $$t$$ and $$t-1$$, can be derived through arithmetic calculations as follows:

This equation can be expanded as:

Here, $$b(t)$$ and $$c(t)$$ represent the balance and conviction at time $$t$$, respectively. The terms $$\Delta b$$ and $$\Delta c$$ denote the changes in balance and conviction from time $$t-1$$ to $$t$$.

For this study, each timestamp where a new transaction occurs on the blockchain is considered a discrete-time point. This approach captures the dynamic nature of voting power changes with high granularity. To represent the changes in voting power across different voters and time points, a matrix formulation is used. The matrix of changes in voting power ($$\Delta VP$$) is defined as follows:

Here, $$T+1$$ represents the total number of time points, while $$W$$ indicates the number of voters. The changes in voting power can be represented using the following formula:

The formula can be represented in matrix form as:

The matrix $$\Delta VP$$ represents the change in voting power for each voter at each timestamp, while $$B$$ represents the balance of each voter at time $$t$$, $$\Delta C$$ represents the change in conviction between $$t$$ and $$t-1$$ for each voter, and $$C(t-1)$$ represents the conviction of each voter at time $$t-1$$. The matrices $$\Delta B$$ and $$\Delta C$$ represent the changes in balance and conviction, respectively, for each voter between $$t$$ and $$t-1$$. The symbol $$\odot$$ represents the element-wise multiplication of matrices.

If $$\Delta vp_{t, i}$$ is non-zero, the voting power of voter $$i$$'s wallet has been altered at time point $$t$$. A non-zero change in VP due to a change in conviction occurs because $$b \cdot \Delta c$$ is non-zero. Conversely, a change in balance results in a non-zero value because $$c(t-1) \cdot \Delta b$$ is non-zero. Typically, these two terms hold non-zero values simultaneously if the user changes the lock-up window and balance in the same transaction.

The crux of the analysis then becomes determining whether the term $$B \odot C$$ or $$C(t-1) \odot \Delta B$$ is more dominant in influencing $$\Delta VP$$. To this end, we define two metrics:

1. Balance Impact: This is quantified as the L1 norm of $$|C(t-1) \odot \Delta B|_1$$.

2. Conviction Impact: This is quantified as the L1 norm of $$|B \odot \Delta C|_1$$.

Here, the notation $$||_1$$ denotes the L1 norm, which essentially sums up the absolute values of all elements in the matrix.

In summary, this methodology for governance conviction provides a more in-depth and comprehensive approach to analyzing voting power accumulation patterns in different market conditions. Through the matrix formulation, the changes in voting power across different voters and time points can be represented and analyzed with high granularity, providing valuable insights into voter behavior dynamics.

5.1 Accounting for Market Conditions in Curve and Polkadot

In this study, we aim to assess the impact of market conditions on how voters accumulate voting power. To achieve this, we analyze upward and downward trends in the market by employing a combination of short-term and long-term moving averages, namely the 7-day moving average (MA7) and the 30-day moving average (MA30). We define an upward trend when the MA7 exceeds the MA30 and a downward trend when the MA7 falls below the MA30.

It is crucial to acknowledge that token behavior is circumstantial, and varying market conditions may elicit different responses from holders with varying stakes, thereby exhibiting diverse behavior patterns. Therefore, we adopt a nuanced approach, which considers these factors to provide a precise understanding of how balance and conviction impact the ebb and flow of voting power within the Curve Finance and Polkadot governance systems.

The charts presented above illustrate how the MA7-MA30 differential correlates with the token price. Our analysis leverages these definitions to explore how market trends affect Shrimp voter behavior, specifically the influence of the token price and lock-up duration on the dynamic voting power within the governance frameworks of Curve Finance and Polkadot. Since the sample size for Whales, Sharks, Dolphins and Fish is insignificant, we choose to exclusively analyze the Shrimp voter group. Having said that, it’s useful to note that for all the aforementioned groups, similar tendencies can be distinguished to the ones presented below.

5.2 Findings: Voting Power Accumulation in Curve Finance and Polkadot

5.2.1 Curve Finance: In the case of Curve Finance, we encountered a challenge when studying Shrimp voters due to their number exceeding 12,000 and the high computational complexity of our method. As a result, we adopted a sampling strategy, randomly selecting 2000 Shrimp voters in each experiment, and repeated this process 500 times. We calculated the log ratio of conviction impact to balance impact in each experiment and grouped the results by upward and downward market trends. The grouped histograms below show distinct patterns.

During downward trends, the log ratio values were mainly concentrated between 0 and 0.5, displaying a distribution similar to a normal distribution. This suggests that Shrimp behavior is more uniform in downward markets, and most log ratios exceeding 0 indicate a tendency among Shrimp to increase their lock-up duration to alter their voting power.

During upward trends, the scenario was notably more complex, as three peaks around -0.3, 0.5, and 1 indicate that Shrimp behavior is inconsistent during upward markets. However, most Shrimps preferred increasing their lock-up window, a tendency that was even more pronounced than during downward trends.

5.2.3 Polkadot: When analyzing Polkadot's market trends, we observed a deviation from the typical pattern observed in Curve Finance. Instead of a normal distribution, there was a noticeable long tail in the data. Upon closer inspection, we discovered a fascinating insight: a particular group of Shrimp voters in Polkadot had a strong inclination towards raising their lock-up window rather than increasing their balance during bullish market conditions. This behavior was particularly prominent and suggestive of a unique pattern among this subset of voters.

6. Conclusion

The research focused on identifying key trends in voter behavior by examining voter personas, types of governance proposals, and patterns of voting power accumulation.

1. There is a noticeable correlation between financial incentives at the token lock-up level in Curve Finance and the absence of such incentives in Polkadot, which may directly affect voter turnout - relatively high in Curve Finance than in Polkadot.

2. The analysis indicates that financial proposals, specifically Curve Finance- gauge proposals and Polkadot's treasury proposals, constitute the majority of proposals in both systems and are central to all significant voting activities.

3. The study defines and analyzes various voter personas and shows interesting patterns, the most crucial of them being that Whales, Sharks, and Dolphins, prefer shorter lock-up periods, while the majority of low-staked holders, referred to as Shrimps, opt for longer lock-up durations.

4. In Curve Finance, most voters choose the longest available lock-up period. This behavior contrasts sharply with that of Polkadot voters, underscoring the potential influence of financial incentives on long-term voter alignment with the protocol.

5. A new methodology is introduced to analyze voter behavior under various market conditions. The results indicate that market trends significantly influence voter behavior. For instance, during market upswings, shrimps in both governance systems have differing preferences, utilizing both adjustments to their lock-up durations and increasing their token holdings to maximize voting power. During market downturns, on the other hand, there is a pronounced tendency among the shrimp voter group to extend their lock-up periods. While the sample size for other voter personas is too small to establish the above trends with confidence, similar tendencies could be seen in preliminary analysis of those sets as well.

This research contributes to our understanding of decentralized governance within blockchain ecosystems and aims to provide insights that could help in the design and optimization of governance mechanisms. Continued research in this field is vital to enhancing the scalability and effectiveness of decentralized decision-making as the blockchain landscape continues to evolve.

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Appendix

As an official Mirror account of the Polygon Governance team, the purpose of this space is consequently to allow for in-depth community deliberations around complex concepts of decentralized decision-making, system design, as well as protocol and treasury governance, among others.

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Other Resources

The Polygon Community Forum serves a complimentary purpose to this page, with the aim of providing a central hub within the Polygon ecosystem, promoting community collaboration among developers, infrastructure providers, and projects utilizing Polygon protocols.

If you’re looking to contribute to the governance of Polygon protocols, make sure to check out the Polygon Improvement Proposal framework, alongside the Polygon Protocol Governance Call to stay up-to-date.

Last but not least, you can also dive deeper into the Governance vision for Polygon 2.0 using the vision board here or review the 3 Pillars of Governance announcement.

We’re looking forward to populating this page with great ideas from the community.