If an institution, when scaled globally, creates too great a burden of necessary evils for humanity, it's a failed institution. Most people would think of the state-planned economic system during the communist wave, with its bureaucracy, sacrifice of economic efficiency, and persecution of dissent - if such systems scaled globally, they would cause human civilization to regress. Clearly, most institutions lack strong scalability; when expanded to all of human society, humanity cannot bear the necessary evils of their expansion, leading to collapse.

One argument defends modern capitalism: The modern capitalist system, a union of corporations and states, can coordinate production globally. This is the strongest known and verified scalable system. This defends current social systems - capitalism is at least better than communism.

Another interpretation of what affects the marginal function is innovation. Innovation brings massive economic growth and social change. Continuous innovation creates new industrial interests and power spaces, keeping society in a fluid state, attracting humans to unite and move forward together.

There are many other explanations: law, language, information mechanisms, currency, culture, beliefs, and the recently popular 'autonomy and commons'.

Are there other answers?

• Enspiral splits community service and corporate modules, with both contributing taxes to a collective fund pool, managed through community decision-making.

• HUMANs operates its own currency network and marketplace, with currency minted based on work hours rather than gold or bonds.

• Fairshares establishes four types of equity (workers, investors, consumers, founders) and designs relationships between them. The designers believe this structure will gradually transition ownership to workers and consumers for fair distribution.

• REV employs a highly complex prototype model that deconstructs, records, and analyzes value flows between enterprises to achieve sustainability and fair distribution of social value.

The DAO movement has inherited these ideas, often swinging between mimicking cooperatives and traditional companies. When prioritizing fairness, it innovates with cooperative-style models and organizational structures. When emphasizing efficiency, it reforms toward corporate structures and promotes private ownership incentives.

I tend to reject cooperative-style social innovation. It falls outside my personal definition of innovation. It resembles how my grandfather's generation approached problems - clumsy, lacking technical sophistication, full of spiritual contemplation.

The basic cooperative model typically:

1. Breaks down people's decision-making behavior

2. Divides it into tracking pre-event information and post-event review

3. Essentially modifies how information is tagged and managed

While I accept its effectiveness in standardizing cooperation between organizations, this model faces significant challenges in our modern context of stranger-based and networked societies, where power and responsibility flow dynamically rather than existing in static, symmetrical relationships.

This relates to membership issues. If all members' information is recorded equally:

• Excessive redundant data accumulates

• Information flow and coordination costs skyrocket

• Nobody can successfully extract actionable plans from the data

If only partial recording occurs, questions of data access, modification, and deletion rights remain unresolved. When information recording costs aren't distributed fairly:

• If few people bear the burden, management eventually ceases

• If everyone participates, the friction costs exceed traditional corporate management

• Many organizations initially attempting fair distribution through information recording ultimately fail or abandon the effort

During recording and tracking:

• Data can be compromised by noise

• Organizational "conclusions" may reflect forced rather than genuine consensus

• Information gets mixed with personal agendas, especially self-promotion and performance behavior

• Voting processes incorporate private desires, including:

  • Dissatisfaction with others' expression

  • Questioning of values

  • Data distrust

The system of "forced agreement" resembles a panopticon, compelling people to expose their actions and thoughts. This disrupts normal work flow and creates constant feelings of distrust and surveillance.

Cooperative models often retreat to small circles, combining their approach with intimate relationships to fulfill their self-realizing prophecy. However, when expanded to complex, normal social environments, they address a false problem. The real issues are:

• Prohibitively high information recording costs

• Uneven value distribution

These are the two tragedies that cooperative-style organizations inevitably face. People cope with these tragedies through:

1. Psychological compensation - imagining that information costs will decrease in the future

2. Mere survival - accepting whatever works, choosing existence over ideological purity

The Meta Solution approach starts with cryptography as its foundation. It seeks a pivotal, highly leveraged solution branching into data privacy, communication freedom, and monetary liberty. The goal is to infiltrate existing society, injecting a super Trojan horse that silently shifts social paradigms.

The paradigm shift process of this Meta Solution involves expert groups providing powerful, trustless neutral technology to society. Due to its openness and network effects, it would be adopted by all social strata. The political nature of the technology would then permeate society as the network expands, with its embedded political characteristics redefining the entire social structure.

We can refer to the anarchists among the previous generation of cypherpunks as metaist cypherpunks. Why did metaism fail?

The metaism of cypherpunks is a variant of technological determinism. This view has been substantiated by inventions like the printing press, gunpowder, steam engine, steel furnace, automobiles and oil, and information technology. Technological revolutions reshape entire societies, transforming production relations. However, over the past three decades, cypherpunk technology has met a fate different from these earlier technological revolutions.

The government-corporate duopoly is ruled by bureaucrats. These are not the officials of feudal society, but a vast, intricate rational system – the pinnacle incarnation of modern technological rationality. The bureaucratic systems of governments and giant corporations co-opt all technologies beneficial to themselves to reinforce their power, and do not resist being transformed by technology.

This is the context in which the technological determinism of the Meta Solution attempts to define a new society.

However, the cypherpunk technology stack and ideology are fundamentally opposed to the government-corporate duopoly. The management requirements of the bureaucratic system demand observability, which enables control, which in turn allows the exercise of power to manage society. Faced with this type of technology, they astutely sensed the incompatibility with their system, extracted elements beneficial to themselves, while preemptively neutralizing the political virus within.

The result is that the cypherpunks' Meta Solution was precisely targeted and deconstructed by the bureaucratic system.

The prerequisite for metaism to be effective is to rapidly expand throughout society before the existing power groups become aware, creating new interest groups that demand systemic change. However, when it comes to incompatible competition involving power systems, the bureaucratic system is not as sluggish, stupid, arrogant, or ineffectively contentious as portrayed in post-utopian fiction. On the contrary, it is highly sensitive, efficient, possessing strong foresight and proactivity, uniting to preemptively eliminate all threats.

The cypherpunks' Meta Solution lacks the ability to compete with the bureaucratic system, the soul of modern society. Crypto-anarchists might cynically say: "Nothing good can grow in a bad society." The evidence from reality shows that the failure of the metaist strategy is a competitive failure. It's not a story of evil triumphing over justice, nor of conservatism suppressing innovation. It's simply that it couldn't overcome contemporary civilization.

Primary phase: An inaugural structure emerges wherein organizers (policy architects) prioritize the interests of others, allocating public attention, reputation, and benefits to participants during community events. In essence, the policy architects opt to be the final beneficiaries of the community's advantages. During this phase, participants exhibit trust in the organizers, fostering a sense of security in the social order, enabling the nascent community to harmoniously integrate members with diverse ideologies and backgrounds, and promoting mutual trust among individuals.

Secondary phase: Building upon the primary phase, the community rapidly exhibits efficiency and dynamism, as most participants willingly contribute their time and endorse the community's reputation. Consequently, the community experiences substantial growth in user base, capital, and influence, fostering the emergence of numerous innovative and valuable projects.

Tertiary phase: The secondary phase is inherently scarce, and a community characterized by diversity, efficiency, and equity is inherently unstable. For instance, organizers may seek to allocate more resources to themselves, akin to startup founders claiming the majority of the benefits; alternatively, organizers may invest all their time and energy while participants eschew public contributions, preferring to free-ride, forcing organizers to shoulder an excessive workload in managing public affairs, resulting in the mental and physical collapse of public servants and community dysfunction. Alternatively, an influx of new members may lead to the formation of various subgroups among participants who experienced the primary phase, fostering increased distrust and conflicts, with tribalistic mentalities experiencing exponential growth. The resolution at this juncture involves prioritizing equity at the expense of efficiency and growth.

The tertiary phase emerges as the secondary phase destabilizes and begins to collapse, necessitating reform that prioritizes equity over efficiency.

Hypothetical quaternary phase: Does a scenario exist within the tertiary phase that maintains efficiency at the cost of equity?

Based on my observations, such an approach would only exacerbate conflicts—when organizers exhibit greed, others will abandon them; retaining free-riders or replacing organizers merely increases coordination costs and accelerates the next collapse cycle; once tribalism takes root, even if other factions are expelled, internal factions will continue to fragment and harbor mutual suspicions. Consequently, should the quaternary phase approach be adopted, Zuzalu-style ephemeral urban communities will serve as a cautionary tale and cease to exist.

Primordial phase: Initial structure -> Equity

Secondary phase: Equity -> Efficiency

Tertiary phase: Equity-efficiency cycle destabilizes, reform prioritizes equity over efficiency, reverting to the primordial phase.

This theoretical framework can be extrapolated to encompass broader communities, DAOs, and protocols.

Last month's most iconic news was Julian Assange's release. Next, we should perform a habitual action and question the whereabouts of the funds. Assange's legal defense was primarily funded by AssangeDAO, which raised 16,593 ETH. The funds were raised by auctioning NFTs, with proceeds going to the Wau Holland Foundation. Currently, AssangeDAO member Silke Noa is requesting the foundation to make the expenditure details public following Assange's release.

Turning to crypto governance, the first point of attention is the swift expansion of bureaucratic systems in the crypto world over the past year. The growth of the bureaucratic system is tied to representative and committee systems within crypto projects, creating a self-reinforcing loop. "Code is law" is diminishing, whereas the proportion of human intervention in rule-making and influencing regulations has significantly increased, particularly over the past year.

First, the representative system fosters a group of professional legislators/delegates.  In actual operation, public proposal voting in DAOs is propelled by the consensus of this legislative class. In other words, the consensus of the legislative layer oversees the entire agenda, with the voting results decided by the consensus of the legislators. They actively engage in discussions and setting agendas, self-validate their achievements, and possess both external conditions for gaining power and self-motivation to expand it. This power concentration is growing, as evidenced by recent events:

• Arbitrum Foundation proposed a new transaction ordering mechanism with 0ms delay (auction) and 200ms delay (regular) channels, with auction revenue either entering the treasury or being burned (to be discussed). Burning directly affects the price performance; while entering the treasury, the revenue will be allocated through proposal voting, giving legislators/delegates more sustainable power to distribute the budget

• Tally's Frisson proposed that Arbitrum distribute 50% of sequencer fees to token stakers who delegate voting power to active delegates. The influence of active legislators, or those still engaged in the legislative circle, will undoubtedly grow further.

Simultaneously, crypto's unique ideology ("decentralization") naturally fosters inherently committee-based governance. Crypto enthusiasts inherently believe there should be no central authority, thus naturally embracing a flat structure of nested committees. Unlike the hierarchical systems typically used by companies and governments, a committee in a crypto project is formed for each issue, with numerous committees managing various nuanced domains of community authority. The allocation of responsibilities and power within the committee system lacks a top-level design, leading to the continuous formation of new committees to address new issues, with old committees seldom disbanded. Committee systems provide a path for professional delegates to gain administrative power, notorious for their inherent opacity and inefficiency due to blame-shifting.

• Optimism's new Grant Committee structure, comprising four sub-committees (two grant committees, an audit committee, and a post-grant data oversight committee), exemplifies this trend. While the structure appears more organized, it expands from a 5-person committee to potentially 20 members, justifying future expansion.

Professional delegates also face conflicts of interest. In the crypto world, they often serve multiple projects, soliciting votes across platforms. This multi-project involvement complicates interest alignment and accountability. For example,

• Gauntlet had served as Aave’s risk manager for four years, but after cutting ties at the beginning of the year, it then partnered with Aave’s competitor, Morpho. Gauntlet's community governance and political involvement were already notably low. The newest group of professional legislators earn tokens mainly through "talk," by posting on forums and exchanging minimal effort for substantial and sustainable tokens, along with control over their areas of responsibility.

Legislators hold positions in multiple projects, and the cost of acquiring tokens is not commensurate with the responsibilities they are expected to undertake. However, a good example exists:

• Cow DAO's council nomination standards, requiring nominees to hold at least 10,000 tokens and self-delegate. Though this amounts to only $2,000-$3,000, it's an improvement over most protocols' lack of clear nomination thresholds.

The confluence of these 3 factors results in a budget black hole for the community treasury:

1. Representative systems ensure delegates' legislative power.

2. Committee systems obscure the fact that legislators also hold executive power.

3. Delegates' interests fundamentally misalign with projects, incentivizing power expansion over community representation.

This trend represents the rapid techno-cratization of crypto governance. While bureaucratization currently signals progress from previous chaos, it's crucial to recognize its pitfalls and work towards more effective, aligned governance structures.

Crypto governance has an unavoidable trend wherein governance will essentially become open to everyone. It is essential that we surmount these challenges and establish principles of public cooperation, thereby averting a scenario where the zero-sum game of organizational resource allocation incites conflict between well-intentioned parties, leading to divisiveness and mutual critiques of ethics and motives.

The second issue concerns organizational "justice" - principles for allocation and division of labor. Sometimes, ideological drives in the crypto world lead to situations where those who do more get less, while those who shout slogans get more and do less.

• Optimism's retroactive public goods funding criteria has been criticized for potentially rewarding rhetoric over substantive contributions. Critics argue that projects with minimal original code but support for open-source could receive rewards, while those providing significant liquidity(50%+) but with partially closed-source code(10%) might not.

The "Impact = Profit" standard, defined by Citizens' House badge holders, faces criticism for its allocation method. It reduces OP allocations by previous OP grant amounts but not by other funding sources(i.e. VC, other projects' grants), leading to potential inconsistencies. This, along with the standard's definition of impact, has faced criticism from delegates. The situation highlights issues with the two-chamber system, where Citizens' House members, holding no tokens, lack direct constraints and rely solely on general moral intuitions for decision-making.

We recommend two articles:

1. Palladium's "How Late Zhou China Reverse-Engineered a Civilization" discussing how ancient Chinese philosophies deconstructed historical experience to create new social solutions.

2. An interview with Amir, noting the need to view his revolutionary portrayal critically while appreciating insights into the mindset of native inhabitants of free technology societies.

A clear political event has preceded every exponential economic growth in history. Similarly, large-scale economic/commercial growth cannot be sustained without political infrastructure paving the way. The social technologies being contemplated and built by figures like Amir (and ourselves) may well influence the next generations' social civilization, laying the groundwork for the next wave of large-scale growth.