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        <title>blockful</title>
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        <description>Governance security with and beyond codes

Helping DAOs to reach longevity w/ @anticapture</description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Thanks to Tally’s support, Uniswap DAO reached Stage 1 of gov security under Anticapture.]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/thanks-to-tally-s-support-uniswap-dao-reached-stage-1-of-gov-security-under-anticapture</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Aug 2025 02:17:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In 2024, the Blockful team got a grant from Uniswap Foundation to audit Uniswap DAO governance using the Anticapture governance security framework. After economic and smart contract reviews, we were able to identify robust security measures and well-configured parameters in place. However, Tally’s domains were still susceptible to DNS attacks. Uniswap delegates do most of their voting through Tally, and a compromised interface could render all security efforts useless and open the doors for a...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2024, the Blockful team got a <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://uniswapfoundation.mirror.xyz/SAPBIdMcJpo_gUUyHdMNuH8r7qpCqRtxFbDrui7Na-I">grant from Uniswap Foundation</a> to audit Uniswap DAO governance using the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://anticapture.com/">Anticapture</a> governance security framework. After economic and smart contract reviews, we were able to identify robust security measures and well-configured parameters in place. However, Tally’s domains were still susceptible to DNS attacks. Uniswap delegates do most of their voting through <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap">Tally</a>, and a compromised interface could render all security efforts useless and open the doors for a malicious proposal to sneak through.</p><p>DNS attacks are responsible for major losses across DeFi, and are one of the most overlooked risks in DAO governance. To close this gap, Tally helped to define and became the first to adopt Anticapture’s DNS risk reduction, <strong>enabling </strong><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://anticapture.com/uni"><strong>Uniswap to advance to Stage 1</strong></a><strong> in our security framework</strong>. The Tally team collaborated closely with our research team, providing critical input that helped refine this standard towards attainable milestones, ensuring governance interfaces are verifiably safe, as the contracts they interact with.</p><h2 id="h-how-dns-attacks-work" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>How DNS attacks work</strong></h2><p>The days of bank robberies are counted. In the past, it was common to hear about robbers stealing fortunes from financial institutions. Police chases. Gunfights. A fear for both service providers and bank customers.</p><p>With the digitization of life, money has also gradually become digital.</p><p>A super app has the power to grant loans, make payments, and hold investments for individuals and companies. All in the palm of each person&apos;s hand.</p><p>Nowadays, bank robberies don&apos;t happen by breaking into safes. They happen by breaking passwords, social engineering, and, often forgotten, <strong>attacking DNSs.</strong></p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/34da85c401e5730f0fd9d47f3ab2059b6a58e8931c0486c64fe90a4426042a6a.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>DNS, or Domain Name Service, refers to the domain of a person or entity. It is the gateway to getting to know a company and, sometimes, using the services provided by them.</p><p>When you use Amazon.com&apos;s DNS, you can be sure that you are interacting with applications and features that have been curated and approved by Amazon. Your trust in the company allows you to make a credit card payment without fear of it being cloned.</p><p>But a DNS isn&apos;t fault-proof. The owner needs to take security measures to protect their DNS, preventing attacks that could harm all users relying on their services.</p><hr><h2 id="h-dns-attacks-and-defi" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>DNS Attacks and DeFi</strong></h2><p>There are several types of DNS attacks, <strong>the most popular being DNS spoofing and </strong><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_hijacking"><strong>DNS hijacking</strong></a><strong>.</strong> Both <strong>aim to deceive people by directing them to a fake domain</strong> that looks like the real one in order to steal personal data, money, and whatever else they can.</p><p>This type of attack, focused on DNS, has been common in the market for years.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/27fdf92a8eacdae1e6d2ff4b5b136e98ce7f4c8a6946b36e9ea1ca80ac66fd8d.png" alt="Transactions involving the attacker to Badger DAO. All stolen tokens were converted to BTC using bridges." blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Transactions involving the attacker to Badger DAO. All stolen tokens were converted to BTC using bridges.</figcaption></figure><p>DeFi protocols have always been the main target of this type of attack in the web3 context. Projects with tens of millions of dollars in smart contracts, many far beyond the reach of any agency or state.</p><p>What keeps them going are their developers and users, with the guarantee of audits by competent and reputable security companies. Trustless contracts, with no intermediaries or managers, are still interacted with through websites that are often the weakest link in their security chain.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/trm-investigates-badgerdao-defi-protocol-hacked">The attack on Badger DAO (2021)</a>, one of the largest in the market’s history, took $120 million from its users. The reason: a vulnerability in its front-end, specifically in its DNS. In this case, the hacker directed users to a fake website, leading them to approve an interaction with a contract, which allowed their money to be drained from the protocol&apos;s pools.</p><p>Other relevant DeFi protocols have suffered DNS attacks:</p><ul><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://convexfinance.medium.com/post-mortem-of-events-june-23-3d6db955dc7d">Convex</a> (2022): Convex&apos;s DNS host (Namecheap) was compromised, allowing a hacker to access it and direct its users to a malicious contract. The same attacker replicated the attack on Ribbon Finance, DefiSaver, and Allbridge</p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.theblock.co/post/251970/balancer-dns-attack-frontend">Balancer</a> (2023): $238K was stolen after Balancer&apos;s DNS was stolen.</p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/0xdc519466f1cda17e8ae6735bB8652F47c0533CBe/2LzzrSSD5vcaTBPmcpOax7vZRYQNfDpYwDzqM3SydY4">Curve</a> (2025): Hackers took over Curve&apos;s DNS, redirecting users to another page capable of draining funds from users&apos; wallets. $570K was stolen in this attack.</p></li></ul><p>Recently, the strategy for DNS attacks has changed. Instead of attacking well-known DeFi protocols, attackers are looking for projects that have closed their doors and no longer maintain their domains.</p><p>This way, all you need to do is buy the domain of a “dead” protocol and trick its former users into interacting with it in order to steal from them.<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.coinspect.com/blog/zombie-dapps/"> It is estimated that there are more than 475 applications in this situation, and 90 have already been targeted by hackers.</a></p><p>While DeFi protocols are a target for DNS attacks, there is another sector running the same risk: the governance of DAOs.</p><hr><h2 id="h-potential-dns-attacks-in-governance" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Potential DNS Attacks in Governance</strong></h2><p><strong>In DAOs, votes can decide the future of organizations</strong>. While votes can be cast directly in the contracts, they are usually carried out on an interface maintained by third parties, hired to provide a secure and practical voting tool for the DAO. Examples <strong>of service providers are Tally, Agora, Lighthouse, and Aragon.</strong></p><p>These interfaces serve to facilitate interaction with the DAO&apos;s governance contracts. A delegate or holder of a governance token does not need to interact with the Governor: they simply click buttons to vote Yes, No, or Abstain, and leave their justification for their vote.</p><p>However, as intermediaries, interfaces become a risk vector for the DAO. A simple change in a governance front-end can cause disastrous results in the governance of a DAO.</p><p>This could become one of the best risk/return attack strategies in DAOs, especially in on-chain governance. DAOs like Uniswap, Arbitrum, Compound, Nouns, and ENS DAO depend on the quality and robustness of those interfaces for their members and delegates to cast their votes, delegate voting power, and keep track of what is going on with the system.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/64f77abac407b9c571be61d0f1dd52c9b52e1c73005c5ca736defc09bdfb4f22.png" alt="Humpy and the Golden Boys managed to get the proposal approved without resorting to other subterfuges. But with a DNS attack, the 633,636 votes against could be turned into votes in favor." blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Humpy and the Golden Boys managed to get the proposal approved without resorting to other subterfuges. But with a DNS attack, the 633,636 votes against could be turned into votes in favor.</figcaption></figure><p>In July 2024,<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/research.blockful.eth/v0GEP49oXP1gzMDlyP91-S4XIa8PIOd0vKq-6R8f54I"> Compound had its governance captured by Humpy and the Golden Boys</a>. Addresses bought millions in $COMP to approve a proposal that released money to the “attackers.”</p><p>If they wanted to improve the chances of the attack, they could’ve tried to attack Compound&apos;s DNS and create an identical voting interface, with minor changes in the background to trick the defenders into voting in favor of the proposal while they think they are rejecting it. It is a type of attack that would not need to affect delegates/voters individually, but would be able to drain a DAO&apos;s treasury. This attack vector is more technical, <strong>but comes at a lower cost than capturing a DAO by buying governance tokens.</strong></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://anticapture.com/uni">The Anticapture</a> team is aware of <strong>this potential vulnerability in governance.</strong></p><p>When analyzing the security of a DAO, one of the elements analyzed is the ability of someone to attack the organization&apos;s DNS or its voting interface providers. It is one of the criteria for a DAO to advance to a higher security stage.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/65e57d52fa2fed1cdbf5f0f4fa19a3098eb25293eebb6c8c1a88a8af6bf8a0b5.png" alt="anticapture.com" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">anticapture.com</figcaption></figure><p>We start from our framework for analyzing a DNS, <strong>defining different risk profiles for DAO domains:</strong></p><ul><li><p>🔴 <strong>High Risk:</strong> A domain without any protection, such as DNSSEC, DANE, TLS, and CAA records, is considered high risk. It can easily be captured by an attacker, redirecting delegates/voters to a fake platform.</p></li><li><p><strong>🟡 Medium Risk:</strong> Fit to web2 standards, with DNS protections, but a changeable, centrally managed interface. The domain follows DNSSEC, DANE, TLS, and CAA standards, but does not have a provably immutable platform approved by the DAO.</p></li><li><p><strong>🟢 Low Risk:</strong> A DNS with DNSSEC, TLS, DANE, and CAA records, with an immutable domain verified by the DAO and verifiable on access.</p></li></ul><p>The actions to reach a Low Risk level are complementary, meaning that it is not enough to have a domain registered on-chain: <strong>you must have all the DNS protections that precede it.</strong></p><p>Our Medium Risk classification takes the best of web2 security practices and demands that providers of governance interfaces are at least at that level. However, this is not sufficient to claim the risk is at its minimum, as evidenced by the ByBit + Safe incident this year. Even with proper DNS security, a domain can be compromised if a team contributor is compromised.</p><p>For Low Risk classification, the voting platform needs to be audited or approved by the DAO, then made immutable and hosted through a resilient system. This could involve using IPFS, eth.limo, SRIs and hashing of the files to create proofs against code tampering. We are not aware at this point of any interface that would fully comply with those requirements, but Tally’s “<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://docs.tally.xyz/tally-features/tally-zero">Zero</a>” interface is the best example of work towards that goal.</p><p>In our work with Uniswap, we identified a lack of “proof of protection” in Tally’s domain, making it a possible target for DNS spoofing or hijacking.</p><p>Our security definitions and Tally’s prompt action have made the DNS of many of the market&apos;s leading governance systems more secure.</p><p>Since it provides a voting interface for multiple organizations, it is responsible for projects such as Arbitrum, Uniswap, and Compound. The governance over billions of dollars can be accessed through its interface.</p><hr><h2 id="h-dns-attack-mitigation" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>DNS Attack Mitigation</strong></h2><p>Aware of this risk, Tally’s team has heard our worries and stepped up, helping us define security metrics for Anticapture&apos;s DNS framework, enabling us to elevate Uniswap to Stage 1.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://anticapture.com/uni">https://anticapture.com/uni</a></p><p>The Tally team worked closely with ours, contributing to refine the implementation from start to finish. Their collaboration was key to creating a standard that strengthens security for all DAOs, and that coming forward will define the base level of how we expect other governance platforms to define their domain security.</p><p>In doing so, Tally also demonstrates to the market the importance of concern for the security of governance front-ends. It sets a precedent for other providers of the same service to seek updates to protect their customers/DAOs from potential vulnerabilities in voting.</p><p><strong>Now, this security standard is available not only to Uniswap, but to all DAOs compatible with Tally.</strong></p><p>Check this out: <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://anticapture.com/uni">https://anticapture.com/uni</a></p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/77bdeeb227b6cac0006d00dd996c6be4309a3709e1492b4120d12c0c7ed78e4b.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Tally is leading the way in improving DNS security.</p><p><strong>We are looking forward to connecting with other governance providers</strong> to verify their security setup and help them make it publicly available to users so that it can be easily checked before voting by all security-aware delegates and members.</p><p>We are happy to contribute to the security of the DAO ecosystem and help Tally, as well as Uniswap and all other DAOs they support, offer more secure systems to their users.</p><p>Congratulations to the Uniswap DAO and all its members for reaching Anticapture Stage 1, by working towards improving its resilience, securing its treasury, and protocol preemptively!</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
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            <title><![CDATA[End-to-End Anticapture: The DAOs You're In Might Be at Risk]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/end-to-end-anticapture-the-daos-you-re-in-might-be-at-risk</link>
            <guid>HnlhERQRSlzY7oZ7jTPJ</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Apr 2025 01:22:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Governance Security needs to become a trend before governance attacks do.Governance attacks are happening—way too oftenWe’re watching governance attacks happen right in front of us—more often than anyone would like to admit. The worst part? Measures are usually reactionary. Emergency patches. Quick fixes. Or, worse, centralized responses to prevent entire treasuries from being drained. In some cases, the DAOs just vanish. https://x.com/CryptoChiefNews/status/1892574424127160388DAOs built grea...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 id="h-governance-security-needs-to-become-a-trend-before-governance-attacks-do" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Governance Security needs to become a trend before governance attacks do.</h2><h3 id="h-governance-attacks-are-happeningway-too-often" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Governance attacks are happening—way too often</strong></h3><p>We’re watching governance attacks happen right in front of us—more often than anyone would like to admit. The worst part? Measures are usually reactionary. Emergency patches. Quick fixes. Or, worse, centralized responses to prevent entire treasuries from being drained. In some cases, the DAOs just vanish.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/CryptoChiefNews/status/1892574424127160388">https://x.com/CryptoChiefNews/status/1892574424127160388</a></p><h3 id="h-daos-built-great-techbut-forgot-to-prepare-for-politics-economical-conditions-arbitrageurs-and-hackers" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>DAOs built great tech—but forgot to prepare for politics, economical conditions, arbitrageurs and hackers…</strong></h3><p>DAOs invested in contract audits, built impressive governors, and took care of the technical side. Look at Arbitrum DAO—arguably the gold standard of contract design today. Or Aragon with OSx and its modular approach. If we’re talking tooling, this stuff is art. The Mona Lisa of DAO infra.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/48f130b4dc36a4137f15833e8fa5ccff05c3bf01c463ffceb4f519fc6e62a9c8.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>But there are some things no audit can cover: politics, economical conditions and arbitrageurs. You can structure code, audit logic, and run tests. But governance lives in time. It lives in people. And that makes it messy.</p><p>DAOs with weak institutions and low participation are easy targets <em>(and yeah, I get it—the DAO you&apos;re in probably has 12 voters and 3 of them are whales. That’s exactly why I&apos;m here).</em> Even well-designed systems can be gamed. Political power moves often exploit institutional gaps or an <em>overreliance</em> on democratic norms—just like the 1973 Chilean coup, and many others.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/33593f18d5d8e6f90045d3b9907b64482787b0940b27bf13db56ff693b0a04bb.png" alt="Chilean coup of 1973 | libcom.org" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Chilean coup of 1973 | libcom.org</figcaption></figure><p>When governance underestimates antidemocratic actors, market conditions, behavior that are not addressed on some governance implementations or concentrates power without checks, collapse becomes <strong>a matter of when, not if.</strong></p><h4 id="h-some-governors-are-secure-but-their-implementation-doesnt-address-malicious-behavior-they-just-address-malicious-code" class="text-xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-3 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Some governors are secure, but their implementation doesn&apos;t address malicious behavior, they just address malicious code.</strong></h4><blockquote><p><strong><em>“What if the next big attack already started?” – blockful team, 2025</em></strong></p></blockquote><p>Same story in DAOs. It didn’t take much imagination to guess what could’ve happened at ENS or Compound not long ago. Compound has audits. Sure. But who foresaw Humpy and the Golden Boys taking control of a treasury? Who saw a whale slowly accumulating ENS tokens to submit a proposal that could drain its entire $150M liquid treasury?</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/research.blockful.eth/-PfMduhpxdypPrutofr6099T4ROpsAmX0fPNbvDgR_k">https://mirror.xyz/research.blockful.eth/-PfMduhpxdypPrutofr6099T4ROpsAmX0fPNbvDgR_k</a></p><p>And here’s the kicker: it’s not even illegal. It’s just a strategy. It’s “playing by the rules.” From the attacker’s point of view, it’s an investment. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.dlnews.com/articles/defi/aragon-dao-activist-highlights-peril-of-community-control/">As Jeff Dorman, CIO at Arca, put it</a>: “Simply lining up soldiers doesn’t mean an attack.” But in DAOs, sometimes that’s all it takes. The setup <strong><em>is</em></strong> the strategy. Capital gets quietly positioned, voting power is accumulated over time, and when the moment is right—execution looks just like governance. Nothing illegal. Just a calculated move, made within the rules.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/8f6a0c7f187079d5bd5175d77187781a21bdae642c7885336ecbdf32d5aebde5.png" alt="https://www.comp.xyz/t/trust-setup-for-dao-investment-into-goldcomp/5406/6" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">https://www.comp.xyz/t/trust-setup-for-dao-investment-into-goldcomp/5406/6</figcaption></figure><h3 id="h-when-a-treasury-drain-is-just-a-vote-away" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>When a treasury drain is just a vote away</strong></h3><p>But DAOs don’t want to lose their ecosystems. Say a few large Arbitrum delegates collude to pass high-budget proposals. Then more. Then more. The Security Council wouldn’t catch this—nor should they. On Tally, it’s just another funding proposal. But a pattern of unchecked approvals can gradually <strong>concentrate value and influence, weakening the DAO over time without triggering any formal alarms.</strong> But it could still be a slow, silent rug.</p><p><strong>The result?</strong></p><ul><li><p>Builders on this DAO can lose access to the treasury they counted on to build good stuff</p></li><li><p>Delegates with outsized influence can now veto anything</p></li><li><p>Uncertainty grows, resilience drops, credibility collapses</p></li><li><p>Builders and capital move elsewhere</p></li></ul><h3 id="h-turning-governance-risks-into-math" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Turning governance risks into math</strong></h3><p>After we uncovered this attack vector in ENS, we shifted the whole team to focus on governance security – <em>for real, we blinked and the whole company pivoted—thankfully, we’re all governerds so we kinda loved it.</em></p><p>The logic was simple: problems this deep need standards. Without a repeatable method, fixes become <em>ad hoc.</em> Some gaps get plugged, others remain wide open. So we built one ourselves: <strong>a structure to detect threats before they happen.</strong></p><p><strong>We studied over 30 DAO attacks</strong>—looking at what they had in common, which signals appeared beforehand, and what structural weaknesses turned risk into reality. Patterns started to emerge. From there, we built a set of criteria that could turn hindsight into foresight. That became the anticapture framework. No one had defined a standard for governance security. So we did.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/346cd3b503a3f515a864c3b008ed25913c7440f14913438deec7c5679dace95e.png" alt="anticapture.com" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">anticapture.com</figcaption></figure><p>It evaluates how exposed a DAO is to governance takeovers. We broke past attacks into data points, binary logic—0s and 1s. From that, we calculate actual risk. Some of the key indicators we analyze:</p><ul><li><p><strong>Cost of attack</strong> <em>(how much does it cost to rug this DAO and fly to the Bahamas?)</em></p></li><li><p><strong>Delegation rate</strong> <em>(aka how many people actually bothered to delegate something)</em></p></li><li><p><strong>Circulating supply</strong> <em>(how much is out there pretending to be decentralized)</em></p></li><li><p><strong>Delegated supply</strong> <em>(how much power is actually in play, not just vibing in wallets)</em></p></li><li><p><strong>DEX/CEX concentration</strong> <em>(centralized exchanges holding your “decentralized” governance, lol)</em></p></li><li><p><strong>Voting mutability</strong> <em>(can rules be changed mid-game?)</em></p></li><li><p><strong>DNS security</strong> <em>(because losing your domain to a phishing link is sooo 2005)</em></p></li><li><p><strong>Active supply</strong> (how much is actually moving, voting, and doing things—not just ghost-holding the token)</p></li></ul><p>...and more.</p><p>Individually, each one matters. Combined, they expose hidden vulnerabilities. We don&apos;t just show metrics. We cross-analyze and offer countermeasures (sounds powerful, right?).</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/e44aa6c594e0ef0076376999c8b8eafbebc5b6393ebfa08505e0baba7e398711.png" alt="anticapture.com" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">anticapture.com</figcaption></figure><p>With ENS, the solution was clear: if attack profitability is too high, create a Security Council. Done. That one move can keep the DAO safe for two years—enough time to plan for a secure, decentralized future <em>without</em> relying on the Security Council.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://docs.ens.domains/dao/proposals/5.13/">https://docs.ens.domains/dao/proposals/5.13/</a></p><h3 id="h-this-isnt-a-new-problemjust-a-new-format" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>This isn&apos;t a new problem—just a new format</strong></h3><p>Staying secure <em>and</em> decentralized is one of the hardest things. History shows us how fragile that balance is. Think about the Delian League in 478 BCE—Greek city-states forming an alliance against Persia. Shared governance, mutual defense. But over time, Athens centralized control, redirected funds, and imposed its will. Decentralization eroded. Eventually, it led to the Peloponnesian War.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/70f43c9f5b3d63fbcf7ff10af097d6955a369f0aa03386270f8942f289a0d617.png" alt="Delian League - Wikipedia" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Delian League - Wikipedia</figcaption></figure><p>Also <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hostiletakeover.asp">Hostile takeovers</a> in traditional markets tell a similar story—companies slowly or suddenly losing control through mechanisms that are technically legal but strategically predatory. The same logic applies to DAOs: governance tools can be used as weapons. And just like in those corporate cases, the damage is often done before anyone realizes what’s happening.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/ef5527ca00df6ae96c4e2d6ad68dba37ef0a7c4591d76988aa03e5764338795e.png" alt="https://www.comp.xyz/t/governance-security-notice-goldcomp-proposal-247/5220" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">https://www.comp.xyz/t/governance-security-notice-goldcomp-proposal-247/5220</figcaption></figure><p>Now we’re tokenizing governance. And just like that, we’re also replicating the same old power problems—but onchain.</p><p>Still, there’s a reason we’re here: to change how the story ends.</p><h3 id="h-dao-security-stages" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>DAO security stages</strong></h3><p>If you’re in DAOs, chances are you know <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://l2beat.com/scaling/summary">L2Beat</a>. They’re a public goods team that gave us decentralization stages for L2s. That changed everything. Suddenly, L2s wanted to “pass the test.” To be seen as legit. L2Beat didn’t just measure; they <em>defined</em>.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/1ca4395f45edff4508ac5a0b022e79b92f2bb6dbd863657e60574fdb3a39ad8d.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>So we’re doing the same for governance security.</p><p><strong>Anticapture stages:</strong></p><ul><li><p><strong>Stage 0</strong> – the DAO is in serious trouble</p></li><li><p><strong>Stage 1</strong> – basic security tools exist, but decentralization is lacking</p></li><li><p><strong>Stage 2</strong> – security measures are active, and the DAO shows strong resistance to capture — but decentralization is still a moving target</p></li></ul><p><strong>Here’s the scary part:</strong> no DAO has hit Stage 2 yet. As far as we analyzed. If you disagree, feel free to take it up with our research team—I’ll gladly send you their handles.</p><p>We built a dashboard based on these stages, plus the anticapture indicators. It&apos;s not a theory anymore. It’s working.</p><h3 id="h-this-is-about-survival-not-prestige" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>This is about survival, not prestige</strong></h3><p>This is about long-term survival. Over $400M has been lost in governance attacks already. Seems low? That’s the problem. Feels manageable. Feels like something you can deal with later. Until it’s not.</p><p>That’s <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/normalcy-bias">normalcy bias</a> at work—the tendency to assume things will keep functioning as they are, even when warning signs are clear. And DAOs, like systems before them, are especially vulnerable when they mistake silence for safety.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/98349bde031b1473b5771b961f8fa467f260f4bacd7bcfacb011494787749304.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Anticapture exists to give DAOs the clarity they need to stay safe—before it’s too late. It brings together contract data, governance mechanics, and social dynamics in one place, making power structures and risks visible.</p><p>DAOs were created to operate without gatekeepers, but that only works if their systems are resilient. Longevity requires more than good intentions or strong ideals—it needs tooling that understands how real attacks happen and how to stop them.</p><p>This is the groundwork for a new standard in governance security. One that helps DAOs stay decentralized, democratic, and defensible.</p><h4 id="h-standards-are-what-transform-reactive-responses-into-shared-preventative-practice" class="text-xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-3 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Standards are what transform reactive responses into shared, preventative practice.</strong></h4><p>Without them, every DAO reinvents its own defense—often too late. While governance failures in traditional companies might take years to unfold, in web3 they can happen in a single block. One vote, one transaction, and the damage is done. Security isn’t an option—it’s a must.</p><h2 id="h-whats-next" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>What&apos;s next?</strong></h2><p>ENS, Uniswap, and Optimism are already integrated into the anticapture dashboard to better understand their governance exposure and reinforce their defenses. Each integration is preceded by a <strong>full research process</strong> to ensure that the analysis reflects the DAO’s structure, token dynamics, and potential vulnerabilities. Now they have a clearer view of their governance risks.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/c630fe548d36922f6ccbb3806611ed607931188971a6b3f58c74e16f2f2a0bdc.png" alt="anticapture.com" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">anticapture.com</figcaption></figure><p>It’s been a year of research, iteration, and a lot of ground work—and there’s still a long way to go. The product is evolving week by week. There are no shortcuts here. Building meaningful governance infrastructure takes time, and that’s exactly the kind of work this is.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/5b9982e6ffa58131435e8380e8f9a982dde37d1ab906f23358101159ac5757b2.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>If you&apos;re a delegate, contributor, or foundation representative interested in making sure a DAO is secure or collaborating or sharing insights, feel free to <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://t.me/Danimimm">reach out</a>. We welcome thoughtful contributions and connections from those working on—or affected by—governance systems. You can follow our work, give feedback, or start a conversation through our open channels.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
            <enclosure url="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/a46b863d628ca659d55b7a7fafac8abf747c357c9b1fd0b080563cfd71137b73.png" length="0" type="image/png"/>
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            <title><![CDATA[A hidden threat to ENS: Uncovering and solving a major governance risk]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/a-hidden-threat-to-ens-uncovering-and-solving-a-major-governance-risk</link>
            <guid>WEWIQ2N3JHv7lFeAKznt</guid>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Oct 2024 03:03:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Special thanks to Avsa, Spence, Guiriba, Zeugh and Danimim for discussion and review throughout the whole process.“Security is always excessive until it’s not enough.” — Robbie SinclairIt&apos;s widely recognized that ENS is vital as the backbone of decentralized identity and enhanced UX on Ethereum. It&apos;s one of the most impactful and sustainable organizations while also strongly funding public goods.Given ENS&apos;s critical role in the ecosystem, ensuring its security and stability is ...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Special thanks to <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/avsa">Avsa</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/5pence_eth">Spence</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/guiribabrb">Guiriba</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/theZeugh">Zeugh</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/danimimm">Danimim</a> for discussion and review throughout the whole process.</p><blockquote><p>“Security is always excessive until it’s not enough.” — Robbie Sinclair</p></blockquote><p>It&apos;s widely recognized that ENS is vital as the backbone of decentralized identity and enhanced UX on Ethereum. It&apos;s one of the most impactful and sustainable organizations while also strongly funding public goods.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/e9307cca57b40ba5696a098490a5d158529d45e7716ada30fd1bbfadd97b01fd.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Given ENS&apos;s critical role in the ecosystem, ensuring its security and stability is paramount. However, even such foundational protocols are not immune to vulnerabilities. In March of 2024, we uncovered a critical vulnerability in ENS DAO&apos;s governance that could have led to a <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://dune.com/steakhouse/ens-steakhouse">~$150M theft</a> and protocol capture. This wasn&apos;t just a theoretical risk—similar attacks have already crippled other DAOs.</p><p>While often touted as fair, the &apos;1 token, 1 vote&apos; model tends to concentrate power based on wealth. In many DAOs, the top 15 holders usually control over ~50% of voting power, creating an oligarchic structure rather than a decentralized one. Low participation rates further compound this issue, making hostile takeovers dangerously easy.</p><p>An investor who can measure the average participation percentage and the quorum needed to approve a proposal can buy the necessary amount of tokens (that being the <strong>most capital-inefficient option</strong>) on the secondary market and pass a proposal that only benefits himself - capturing it and bringing it to its end.</p><p>With the Security Council, ENS is protected from this risk, giving time to the DAO to improve delegation and security healthily. Now, let&apos;s explore the research and collaborative work that led to this security enhancement.</p><h2 id="h-why-capture-a-dao" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Why capture a DAO?</h2><p>The motivation for attacking a DAO is obvious: to make money. However, more motives or ways exist to extract value from the capture.</p><h3 id="h-gradual-value-extraction-slow-rug" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Gradual value extraction (slow rug)</h3><p>The attacker doesn&apos;t steal the treasury from DAOs but gains the power to manipulate organizations in his favor. It&apos;s a vampirizing strategy that aims to keep the protocol and DAO living while extracting profits for months/years. It demands a deep analysis and planning from the attacker; it&apos;s an attack that considers the mid-term success for being profitable but doesn&apos;t align with long-term values.</p><h3 id="h-metaprotocol-attack" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Metaprotocol attack</h3><p>Well-known examples of such cases can be found in projects using veNomics, such as Curve and Convex or Balancer and Aura. Today, the duos have synergies, but the main idea was to carry out vampire attacks on dominant projects in their respective sectors.</p><h3 id="h-competitive-takeover" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Competitive takeover</h3><p>In traditional markets, firms compete for market share through marketing, customer acquisition, legal actions, and patents (sounds familiar, huh?). In the DAO ecosystem, this competition can be far more aggressive and direct. The governance mechanisms of DAOs, relying on code and market conditions, create unique vulnerabilities.</p><p>Attackers can exploit governance systems to seize control of competing protocols, often anonymously. This makes traditional legal recourse challenging, if not impossible. The result? A swift, potentially irreversible loss of market share for the targeted DAO.</p><h3 id="h-direct-treasury-raid" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Direct treasury raid</h3><p>When a DAO&apos;s non-governance token treasury exceeds the value of all delegated tokens, it&apos;s a more straightforward and immediate profit opportunity.</p><p><strong>ENS was highly exposed to this type of attack, which was the most concerning and obvious attack.</strong> Let&apos;s expand on that.</p><h2 id="h-past-cases" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Past cases</h2><p>To ground our research in practical reality, let&apos;s examine a few notable incidents that illustrate the vulnerabilities we&apos;ve discussed.</p><p>These case studies provide concrete examples of how theoretical attack vectors have been exploited in practice, offering valuable insights into the real-world risks faced by DAOs and the importance of robust security measures.</p><h3 id="h-case-study-compound-gradual-value-extraction-attack" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Case study: Compound - Gradual value extraction attack</h3><p>Looking at the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/289">attack on Compound</a>, we realize that the pessimistic scenario is more real than it seems. Humpy, a famous attacker whale, bought 682K COMP (<strong>6% of token supply</strong>, ~U$34M at the time) to pass a proposal that would give them more 5% of the token supply as voting power, effectively capturing the organization.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/045d97eab17daf674c753b40fb166033fd2fc6112a376865907d5a37b9d72178.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Only 56.36%</strong> of the delegated votes were used in the vote that captured Compound, <strong>taking into account the attacker&apos;s tokens</strong>.</p><p>The proposal ended up not being executed, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://mirror.xyz/research.blockful.eth/v0GEP49oXP1gzMDlyP91-S4XIa8PIOd0vKq-6R8f54I">here</a> is an analysis we did while the attack was happening to support the Compound community.</p><p>Similar cases were done by the same attacker: <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://messari.io/report/governor-note-the-vebal-wars">Balancer</a>, Sushi, Cream finance, Badger DAO.</p><h3 id="h-case-study-aragon-direct-treasury-raid-attack" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Case study: Aragon - Direct treasury raid attack</h3><p>The RFV (risk-free value) raiders, a group that attacked several DAOs and was even backed by a hedge fund named Arca, attacked Aragon.</p><blockquote><p>Simply lining up soldiers doesn’t mean an attack’ — Jeff Dorman, Arca</p></blockquote><p>Passing a proposal to split the treasury among token holders. At the first moment, the Aragon Association (AA, the Swiss non-profit behind the project) vetoed the proposal, but after some months and a lot of pressure, they decided to split 86% of the treasury (86k ETH). Not satisfied, Aragon DAO members threatened AA with a lawsuit.</p><blockquote><p>‘Their goal is to target treasuries and manipulate the price of tokens for financial gain, at the expense of the organisation’s mission’ — The Aragon Association</p></blockquote><p>Similar cases were done by the same attacker: <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.theblock.co/post/76453/arca-gnosis-defi-project-call">Gnosis</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.dlnews.com/articles/defi/rebel-investors-say-hector-network-is-slow-rugging-them/">Hector Network</a>, Tribe (FEI), Rook</p><h2 id="h-cryptoeconomic-analysis" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Cryptoeconomic analysis</h2><p>The <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://dune.com/avsa/governancerisk/502ed0cc-d9e7-4b63-93e8-ac36ea50e5b1">following chart</a> illustrates the relationship between ENS DAO&apos;s total assets (excluding the native governance token) and the value of delegated ENS tokens over time:</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/e60e908a595b70c49fc7ba1ee973ffb74fdc2ef40c1224284ec39c4564a20b72.png" alt="Source: Dune Analytics by @avsa" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Source: Dune Analytics by @avsa</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Key observations:</strong></p><ol><li><p><strong>Treasury Value Exceeds Delegated Tokens</strong>: Since March 2023, the value of ENS DAO&apos;s treasury (excluding the native governance token) has consistently surpassed the total value of delegated ENS tokens. This imbalance creates a potential incentive for attackers.</p></li><li><p><strong>Significant Exposure</strong>: At its peak, the disparity reached nearly 3x, meaning the treasury was worth almost three times the value of all delegated governance tokens. This scenario presents a highly attractive target for potential attackers.</p></li><li><p><strong>Price Volatility Impact</strong>: The substantial fluctuations in the delegation value were primarily driven by ENS token price volatility rather than changes in delegation patterns.</p></li><li><p><strong>Insufficient Safeguards</strong>: Even significant initiatives like the introduction of veto.ensdao.eth, which doubled the number of delegated tokens overnight, was not enough to fully mitigate this economic imbalance.</p></li></ol><p>This gap didn&apos;t change if analyzing the current state. For exposing the state of ENS governance without the research and action towards security, the chart and statements below aren&apos;t considering <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://discuss.ens.domains/t/introducing-veto-ensdao-eth/19088">veto.ensdao.eth</a> neither <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://discuss.ens.domains/t/temp-check-enable-cancel-role-on-the-dao/19090">securitycouncil.eth</a>, which are outcomes from this research.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/6be13be49b0e92d9bd3644cb94cda4e21ce0dea8660bfb185f2efb0c5838d516.png" alt="Current state of ENS&apos; governance economics (Oct/24)" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Current state of ENS&apos; governance economics (Oct/24)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Liquid treasury</strong> here means assets that are not ENS, the governance token, since if it is attacked, its value will decrease, and it&apos;s not profitable to attack the DAO (considering a direct treasury raid). ENS DAO today holds ~$120mi in USDC, ETH, and DeFi positions that are managed by <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://reports.karpatkey.com/ens">Karpatkey</a>.</p><p><strong>Delegated cap</strong> is the value of all the delegated tokens. This means that the DAO has $65mi in &quot;organic&quot; delegation protecting the treasury, considering all delegated tokens engaging in the votes, which is unrealistic.</p><p><strong>Average quorum</strong> is a more reasonable metric to understand an aproximate cost of passing a proposal. Which currently is around 1.4m ENS, therefore ~$24mi protecting the DAO.</p><p><strong>Other mechanisms</strong> for lowering the cost of the attack must be considered since <strong>all you need is delegation</strong> and not the token itself.</p><ul><li><p>A campaign could be run, giving a high APY for token holders delegating for an address. It is a no-brainer since, at first moment, it looks like a low-risk operation for yield. This is explored a lot in veNomics and DeFi, where you have bribe markets and similar mechanisms.</p></li><li><p>Borrowing tokens is also an interesting instrument since the attacker has less skin in the game or can even use it as a short position.</p></li><li><p>CEXs also allow you to short the token on the futures market and leverage, lowering the cost of attack.</p></li><li><p>Proposal to split treasury with who votes yes. This one is the most dangerous, since delegation doesn&apos;t means economic skin on the game, this can create incentives enough to collude with the attacker.</p></li></ul><p><strong>Unknown whales</strong> are a huge risk and it&apos;s not something theoretical. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x245445940b317e509002eb682e03f4429184059d#tokentxns">This</a> address has been buying ENS for <strong>more than 450 days</strong>, now surpassing 2M ENS, passing the quorum alone by 600k, and being probably only one of the wallets it controls.</p><h2 id="h-governance-implementation" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Governance implementation</h2><p>The security of a DAO is heavily dependent on the specific details of its governance implementation. In ENS&apos;s case, two critical aspects of the implementation significantly increased its vulnerability to attacks:</p><p><strong>Minimal Proposal-to-Voting Delay</strong></p><ul><li><p>The delay between proposing and the start of voting is only 2 blocks.</p></li><li><p>This brief interval provides the snapshot for determining the voting power of delegates.</p></li><li><p>Such a short delay leaves little to no time for the community to react to potentially malicious proposals.</p></li><li><p>Attackers can sell their governance tokens immediately after voting, minimizing potential losses as the malicious proposal&apos;s information hasn&apos;t yet spread widely.</p></li></ul><p><strong>Ineffective Cancellation Mechanism</strong></p><ul><li><p>The existing structure lacked an efficient way to cancel malicious proposals in the timelock.</p></li><li><p>Any attempt to cancel would always lag behind the execution of a malicious proposal.</p></li><li><p>This effectively meant that once a malicious proposal was set in motion, it was nearly impossible to stop through existing governance mechanisms.</p></li></ul><p>These implementation details created a perfect storm of vulnerability, making ENS an attractive target for potential attackers. They underscore the importance of carefully considering every aspect of governance implementation, as even small details can have significant security implications.</p><h2 id="h-taking-action" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Taking action</h2><p>After completing our initial research and confirming the attack&apos;s feasibility, we promptly disclosed our findings to the Metagov stewards and Nick. Our primary goal was to create an emergency protection mechanism for the ENS DAO.</p><h3 id="h-short-term-solution" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Short-term solution</h3><p>ENS Labs acted swiftly to implement an immediate safeguard:</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/04451db3d617d98efebdb387cd24f0c6f935ca148214411fe07cd08ed13a24aa.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><ul><li><p>Contributors delegated 4.18M tokens to <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x552DF471a4c7Fea11Ea8d7a7b0Acc6989b902a95">a contract created by Nick</a></p></li><li><p>This contract acts like a 1/5 multisig setup to only vote &quot;Against&quot; on harmful proposals</p></li><li><p>As mentioned in the cryptoeconomic analysis, this was not enough to fully mitigate this economic imbalance, but created a higher barrier.</p></li></ul><h3 id="h-developing-a-mid-term-solution" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Developing a mid-term solution</h3><p>While the short-term solution provided immediate protection, we worked in parallel on a more sustainable safeguard: the Security Council. This mid-term solution doesn&apos;t rely on economic conditions to protect ENS DAO&apos;s governance.</p><p>After extensive discussions and research, we designed an implementation with key features:</p><ul><li><p>An intermediary contract limiting the council&apos;s power to veto only</p></li><li><p>A two-year expiration to prevent permanent centralization</p></li><li><p>Council composition based on jurisdictional diversity, economic and reputational stake, and historical participation</p></li></ul><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/325d7dcab3477920fd040d05a007daea52ae8237e6ec08c69151f55897e102e4.png" alt="Cycle of a malicious proposal" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Cycle of a malicious proposal</figcaption></figure><h3 id="h-implementation-process" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Implementation process</h3><ol><li><p>A <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://snapshot.org/#/ens.eth/proposal/0xf3a4673fe04a3ecfed4a2f066f6ced1539a5466d61630428333360b843653c54">temp-check voting</a> was submitted, which was approved unanimously, demonstrating the community&apos;s understanding of the initiative&apos;s importance.</p></li><li><p>Established <strong>the council multisig</strong> as a 4/8 multisig, with members <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://snapshot.org/#/ens.eth/proposal/0xa0b1bfadf6853b5b0d59d3c4d73c434fc6389339887d05de805361372eb17c3a">approved by the ENS DAO</a>.</p></li><li><p>Rigorously tested and reviewed the Security Council contract:</p><ul><li><p>Audited by 4 external auditors we had previously worked with</p></li><li><p>Additional review by ENS DAO community members</p></li></ul></li><li><p>Submitted the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.tally.xyz/gov/ens/proposal/42329103797433777309488042029679811802172320979541414683300183273376839219133">executable proposal</a> with caution and extensive testing, as it granted the PROPOSAL_ROLE to a contract, enabling proposal and cancellation of timelock operations.</p></li></ol><h3 id="h-operational-considerations" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Operational considerations</h3><p>We also conducted operational work to enhance the Security Council&apos;s effectiveness:</p><ul><li><p>Defined best practices for the council&apos;s operations</p></li><li><p>Benchmarked and researched methods to maximize wallet security for the multisig</p></li></ul><h2 id="h-next-steps" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Next steps</h2><p>A security council should not be a long-term solution, it&apos;s a tool for giving us time.</p><p>Participation is still far from ideal, and the number of delegates is at its <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://dune.com/karpatkey/ens-dao-governance">lowest level since the DAO&apos;s inception</a>.</p><p><strong>We need to discuss ways of engaging more relevant industry members to participate in the ENS.</strong> Bringing in external forces can create a culture shock for the DAO, but it will also bring more diversity to the discussions.</p><p>Whether it&apos;s distributing incentives and/or delegations to active DAO members or onboarding blockchain groups specialized in governance, we need to discuss best practices to foster participation in the ENS DAO.</p><p>That way, we won&apos;t need to activate our protections: the delegates themselves will have the votes and proactivity to protect the DAO&apos;s treasury.</p><h2 id="h-conclusion" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Conclusion</h2><p>The economic conditions and governance implementation of ENS made a potential attack not only feasible but highly profitable, with potential returns of 3-5 times the investment.</p><p>The lack of easily accessible, coherent data about the treasury inadvertently served as a temporary shield, but it was only a matter of time before this information reached malicious actors.</p><p>Currently, there are unknown wallets holding token amounts exceeding the average quorum, positioning them among the largest token holders. This presents a critical decision point for the DAO: whether to continue exposing itself to the risk of these dormant whales suddenly becoming active in governance or to implement a proactive action plan.</p><p>The blockful team has been integrally involved throughout this process, from the initial identification of the vulnerability to the development and proposal for the creation of the Security Council. Our comprehensive approach included:</p><ul><li><p>Data analysis and study of past attacker behaviors.</p></li><li><p>Smart contract research, implementation, and testing.</p></li><li><p>Proposal coordination, crafting, and simulation.</p></li><li><p>Legal research and benchmark of other security councils&apos; good practices.</p></li><li><p>Collaboration with meta-governance working group stewards, delegates, and the broader community.</p></li><li><p>Managing all associated fees and costs for smart contract deployment and audits.</p></li></ul><p>The Security Council was designed with several key features to balance security and decentralization.</p><p>These measures create a governance structure that is more resilient to capture by whale token holders and state actors while providing a crucial safeguard against potential attacks.</p><p>By implementing this solution, ENS has taken a significant step towards securing its future, setting a precedent for responsible and adaptive DAO governance in the face of evolving threats.</p><hr><p><em>Follow </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/blockful_io"><em>blockful on X (Twitter)</em></a> to support this kind of research*.*</p><p><em>Please consider delegating your governance tokens to </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://app.ens.domains/gov.blockful.eth"><em>gov.blockful.eth</em></a><em> if you believe in a sustainable way of governance that approaches security, public goods, and DAOs longevity.</em></p><p><em>See ya in the mempool and forums!</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Pubs to Boardgames: Talking about Governance and ENS in Curitiba]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/from-pubs-to-boardgames-talking-about-governance-and-ens-in-curitiba</link>
            <guid>HnG8AnKnsD8ZmUvBuQFZ</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Oct 2024 18:04:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[We hit up Curitiba for the “Blockchain Weekend” at the end of September and jumped into three great events. We dove into governance, grants, and reputation, plus we ran an interesting ENS Workshop. It was the perfect opportunity to share insights with the enthusiastic web3 community in Curitiba. Here&apos;s a glimpse of how it all went down:Let&apos;s talk about TrustfulOn Friday night, we got the chance to speak at an event hosted by the Brazilian ambassadors of the Stellar network. We start...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We hit up Curitiba for the <strong>“Blockchain Weekend”</strong> at the end of September and jumped into three great events. We dove into governance, grants, and reputation, plus we ran an interesting ENS Workshop. It was the perfect opportunity to share insights with the enthusiastic web3 community in Curitiba. Here&apos;s a glimpse of how it all went down:</p><h2 id="h-lets-talk-about-trustful" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Let&apos;s talk about Trustful</strong></h2><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/ee7ae63f1a9a88ea9faf5bd90927b2ba1bbf1e2da5b9a3a4e7bf673d725567e5.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>On Friday night, we got the chance to speak at an event hosted by the Brazilian ambassadors of the Stellar network. We started things off by giving a simple overview of blockchain. Since it was an onboarding event, and some people were new to the tech, we wanted to make sure everyone was on the same page.</p><p>Later on, we dove back into governance and introduced <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blockful.notion.site/Trustful-4f93fed08fee4adcb8f0aa3dbd88632a">Trustful</a> as a great use case. Trustful is all about collecting data to build trust and reputation in our privacy-driven world. The product helps to create a database within an ecosystem, tracking everything a “wallet” has achieved—like how much it has contributed, engaged, and added value. Therefore, each DAO or ecosystem can decide how they are going to use that information.</p><p>Right now, we’re deploying a version of Trustful on Stellar, and we got to show off a bit of how it works in real-time.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/28312cff9e0a65db6420fb007da1264b461825ec752ba0246ec4327a55acc30f.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><hr><h2 id="h-ens-workshop-at-a-pub" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>ENS Workshop - at a pub!</strong></h2><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/d861a8f60d2760a5a11095f6230b094989cc57f70f69711a2c3c652122ecf8dd.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>The next day, we headed back to the same bar from Friday—yep, we can totally run a <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://ensdao.org/">workshop on Ethereum and its services</a> in a pub! The goal of the Blockchain Weekend was to deliver quality blockchain content in laid-back settings, so we could connect more with the participants—and have fun doing what we love.</p><p>So, back to the workshop; it was a sunny Saturday, and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/alextnetto">Alex</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://github.com/pikonha">Lucas</a> were all set to lead the ENS session. They started from scratch, covering everything from an introduction to Ethereum concepts, its addresses, and comparisons between DNS and ENS, all the way to contract architecture and buying an ENS domain on the testnet.</p><p>We’d already presented this in other cities, and it was awesome to bring it to Curitiba. During the happy hour after the presentation, we exchanged more project ideas with the participants.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/2fe6549db5259193fa57fa6e0ea52ae5bc56a622744cb8428aa301246b249688.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><div data-type="youtube" videoId="GAB3r3seTcA">
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      </div></div><hr><h2 id="h-governance-grants-and-how-to-make-it-better" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Governance, grants and how to make it better</strong></h2><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/d7225e25665bd0775f08ca6e1f1e56dcedeb030267629a6e5ed25379542f5692.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>To wrap up the weekend on a high note, we headed to a board game shop on Sunday! It might sound a bit odd, but governance and grants have a lot in common with board games. You need strategies, coordination, and communication because things can fall apart if someone isn&apos;t on the same page.</p><p>In a partnership between <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blockful.notion.site/Trustful-4f93fed08fee4adcb8f0aa3dbd88632a">Trustful (by Blockful)</a> and the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://sovs.notion.site/Cartographers-a574b48ae162451cb73c17326f471b6a">Cartographers Syndicate</a>, we hosted this event to cover a few grants-related topics. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/alextnetto">Alex</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/Gabriel_nvk">Novak</a> did a brilliant overview of how governance works within DAOs with various examples and introduced what grants are all about.</p><p>The downside of grants is that, without a standard model, each ecosystem creates its grant opportunities in its own way, which can be confusing and often frustrating for applicants. But that&apos;s the problem Cartographers aim to solve. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/danimimm">Dani</a> explained how the group seeks to improve this funding system by bringing together experts to collaborate, share ideas, and promote innovation, creating records, encouraging research, and testing new methods.</p><p>With that in mind, we also organized a group activity to brainstorm solutions for the biggest challenges in the grant system. And here&apos;s the kicker: the winning team walked away with an extra 20 USD in their wallet.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/7696c9bea66977bd97f4f65924594fa6dcbdbde4dbc645901972fd8345063f22.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><div data-type="youtube" videoId="J2ea8UAJphs">
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      </div></div><p>Pretty cool for a Sunday afternoon, don&apos;t you think?</p><hr><p>We were really happy to spend these days in Curitiba and to hang out with everyone who participated in the events. We exchanged a lot of ideas—and even had some open-source contributions to the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="">ENS project</a>, which is incredibly valuable for the entire community. We&apos;re very grateful for that!</p><p>Thank you to everyone who joined us these days, and we hope to be part of more events soon!</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
            <enclosure url="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/c1aa0d26c5d1e264e1b0ae4ebc5ee4847b99eb3d48d97db32bd3d9441abd49d4.png" length="0" type="image/png"/>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Complexities of Building an On-Chain Reputation Attestation Layer]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/the-complexities-of-building-an-on-chain-reputation-attestation-layer</link>
            <guid>YqcCYgbzjqesGpgKt2h1</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Oct 2024 21:27:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The Odyssey of Trustful in Finding the Best Path to Create an Attestation Layer and Exploring Potential Use Cases AheadThe Rise of On-Chain Reputation and The Plutocratic Governance ModelsThe growing narrative of on-chain reputation has become prominent since several Devcons ago. This narrative is often accompanied by an optimistic view of the ecosystem, especially when addressing voting power, resource allocation, and the selection of members for various roles within a community or DAO, whet...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 id="h-the-odyssey-of-trustful-in-finding-the-best-path-to-create-an-attestation-layer-and-exploring-potential-use-cases-ahead" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">The Odyssey of Trustful in Finding the Best Path to Create an Attestation Layer and Exploring Potential Use Cases Ahead</h2><h3 id="h-the-rise-of-on-chain-reputation-and-the-plutocratic-governance-models" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">The Rise of On-Chain Reputation and The Plutocratic Governance Models</h3><p>The growing narrative of on-chain reputation has become prominent since several Devcons ago. This narrative is often accompanied by an optimistic view of the ecosystem, especially when addressing voting power, resource allocation, and the selection of members for various roles within a community or DAO, whether it be a position within the DAO itself or as part of a Security Council, for example.</p><p>The governance models, which are unsurprisingly plutocratic, have led a portion of the community—those who do not yet hold tokens but still wish to contribute to governance—to look towards reputation. This serves as a form of track record, a request for active and positive contributions to be recognized as a certain type of power in a space that relies heavily on token-based systems (oh, hi tokenomics).</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2021/08/16/voting3.html">https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2021/08/16/voting3.html</a></p><p>There is so much to discuss regarding reputation. The first point to consider is in which spaces and DAOs on-chain reputation makes sense. I also understand the reasons behind the prevailing governance models. Plutocratic structures attract investors&apos; attention, and, well... everyone needs funding. This was how many DAOs found their footing initially.</p><h3 id="h-the-first-wave-of-investors-vs-the-second-wave-of-active-users" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">The First Wave of Investors vs. The Second Wave of Active Users</h3><p>A first wave of investors, who obtained tokens when everything was still bright and colorful during the DeFi summer (or even before), are reluctant to lose their power. However, it must be noted that many of these holders are no longer active in governance or have fallen into a cycle of repeating the same proposals, the same voting patterns, and the same predictable behaviors. This helps explain why many DAOs have stagnated—without even considering price fluctuations and focusing solely on governance structure.</p><p>A second wave of users, especially those who arrived post-DeFi summer, recognized the potential to be active participants in DAOs, seeing it as a win-win relationship. We all know that active member who contributes in various ways but lacks a significant amount of governance tokens or any on-chain proof of their contributions to the DAO. It’s clear that the member suffers from a lack of recognition, and the DAO loses out on having an engaged contributor.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/f0e73b962a0322f3c3cf7aff5805187d3f90d5091f12ef980a5bab61372a6024.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Acknowledging this situation, I embarked on the journey to build a reputation product. I have previously written an article outlining the history of this product, which started in Argentina in 2023, and the challenges of, first and foremost, understanding what reputation is. It is a rather vague definition, and we must work within that framework.</p><h2 id="h-trustfuls-development-journey" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Trustful&apos;s Development Journey</h2><h3 id="h-initial-mvps-and-key-insights" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Initial MVPs and Key Insights</h3><p>Trustful has gone through three MVP versions and involved discussions with key figures in the ecosystem to help me understand the product while the team builds it. I remember the moment I realized I was creating an attestation layer—despite it being obvious since we were using <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://attest.org/">EAS</a> as a foundation.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://attest.org/">https://attest.org/</a></p><p>It happened during a call with Matty, who is now building <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/legiondotcc">Legion</a>. He mentioned, &quot;Oh, we are not building this attestation layer,&quot; and I thought to myself, &quot;Oh, that&apos;s what I&apos;m building—an attestation layer.&quot; It seemed so obvious at the time, but thank you, Matty, that was quite helpful.</p><h3 id="h-aiming-for-sustainable-development" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Aiming for Sustainable Development</h3><p>From the outset, I have sought sustainable development. As a point of curiosity, Blockful, which is developing Trustful, is bootstrapped. Therefore, I pursued funding through grants that have allowed me to develop different phases of the product across various ecosystems to understand the best path forward and the array of potential use cases ahead.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/1ef77596219f49b4ded1f0db247d9ecd018f3b3b5a6889b8b98a7ed8e0b91f6b.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><h2 id="h-1-zuvillage-georgia" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">1. ZuVillage Georgia</h2><p>Some time ago, I applied for funding from the Zuzalu community. It was already an ecosystem where I felt it made a lot of sense to have a reputation layer, especially during events. We secured initial funding and built the first phase of what I (and Zeugh, of course, who did all the work to bring this product to life) envisioned for a roadmap: the Reputation Badges.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://trustful.ing/">https://trustful.ing/</a></p><p>At the event, people could give reputation badges to each other. To avoid defining what reputation means for them (and this is why we committed to being an aggregator), we allowed them to choose which badges would be interesting. We received various inputs, such as badges related to &quot;showed me a cool tech,&quot; &quot;good talk,&quot; and more. About 176 badges were issued during the event, all focused on quality interactions. Well, 176 quality interactions centered around good dialogues and active participation... which opens the door for the community to:</p><ol><li><p>Reward these members in the future</p></li><li><p>Increase voting power, whether in hackathons or not</p></li><li><p>Decide on organizers and key members who may participate in future events</p></li></ol><p>And more...</p><p>Why? Members with active and quality participation will better understand the needs of a particular community. The difference is that now they have a badge to prove it.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/9c3fd7a236b12782111621e1465a3097f11c0a0f92e641d441184da41755b822.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><h2 id="h-2-stellar-ecosystem" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">2. Stellar Ecosystem</h2><p>I met Anke during ETH Denver, and it was a very interesting coincidence; I was almost euphoric to meet someone who was also knowledgeable about reputation and already working in this area. It was incredible to discuss ideas with her, and she shared a lot of interesting materials with me.</p><p>I participated in a round of the Stellar Community Fund (SCF) as a way to understand more about the ecosystem and how this would work at the community level, both virtually and in a distinct programming language.</p><p>The MVP version consisted of reputation badges and a scorer, and we are now adding a second part of the roadmap: the added value for each reputation badge, that is, for each attestation.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://trustful-stellar.vercel.app/">https://trustful-stellar.vercel.app/</a></p><p>The product is ready; members can claim an early adopter reputation badge, and we are now participating in another round to facilitate the decentralization of the contracts. This will enable us to create a badge factory where each community can create its own badges (currently, they come from Stellar Quests, Soroban Quests, and similar sources) and assign a score to each of them.</p><p>Some other features and use cases I envision beyond full decentralization in Stellar include a more robust profile tab, utilization for the ambassador program, and SCF using Trustful to better gauge the teams already part of the Stellar ecosystem.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/6c0e788b929e6e48fb8bfa2f0478a4ad0beb235946855e009e7f850f524c40fb.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>I dream of running a QF round, reputation-based and on Stellar. This use case, indeed, I am excited to see.</p><h2 id="h-3-rfp-1-in-the-cartographers-syndicate" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">3. RFP 1 in the Cartographers Syndicate</h2><p>In this initiative, we flipped our approach upside down. The focus shifted from aggregating reputation for members to enhancing the grants program. The <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://sovs.notion.site/Cartographers-a574b48ae162451cb73c17326f471b6a">Cartographers Syndicate</a> is a community dedicated to mapping Web3 grants and incentives. Sov, who is primarily leading the community, introduced this brilliant vision of adding reputation to grants programs.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/846e678a3ea46af1ca7dc75dfa7ea7a5980629d637340465a7895109fa1588c5.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>In the future, we can even select which members are key for each grants program, creating a kind of reputation-based match. This way, good builders won&apos;t apply for grants programs that have objectives far removed from what they want to construct, and vice versa. We have integrated with the Grant Registry in Karma GAP, allowing users with a Karma GAP account to contribute reputation to grants programs. We are considering badges such as &quot;Smooth Application,&quot; &quot;Fair Rounds,&quot; and many others, aiming to enhance and standardize grants programs based on applicant reviews.</p><h3 id="h-future-developments-in-trustful-roadmap" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Future Developments in Trustful Roadmap</h3><p>While all three versions of Trustful are currently active, there is still much to build on our roadmap:</p><ol><li><p><strong>Issuer</strong>: The option to select a valid set of badges for specific actions and establish a list of valid addresses as issuers so that those badges are recognized.</p></li><li><p><strong>Implementation of ZK or Other Privacy Tools</strong>: This would allow users to know that one of the issuers issued a reputation badge to them without revealing which specific issuer did so, thereby keeping that information private.</p></li></ol><h2 id="h-use-cases" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Use Cases</h2><ol><li><p><strong>Resource Allocation</strong>: Utilizing reputation in a matching pool for grants, whether direct or through quadratic funding rounds, ensures that resources are allocated efficiently to deserving projects.</p></li><li><p><strong>Role Selection</strong>: Reputation can play a crucial role in selecting key members for DAOs or Security Councils, such as moderators, ensuring that the most qualified individuals are chosen for critical roles.</p></li><li><p><strong>Delegation Selection or Compensation</strong>: By assessing reputation, we can determine compensation for delegates or identify which members may receive more delegations during a re-delegation week.</p></li><li><p><strong>Voting Power Multiplier</strong>: Reputation can enhance voting power within the community, allowing those with proven contributions to have a greater influence on decision-making processes.</p></li></ol><h2 id="h-looking-ahead" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Looking Ahead</h2><p>Looking ahead, I envision Trustful incorporating identity solutions such as Gitcoin Passport, or even Legion and other interesting tools. The essence of being an aggregator is to avoid defining a fixed framework for reputation; instead, our goal is to aggregate various approaches and create composability among them. By doing so, we can foster a more dynamic and inclusive reputation ecosystem that adapts to the diverse needs of the community.</p><p>We are currently in the research phase for the construction of V1 and will be actively participating in Devcon. This is an opportunity for you to see the dApp at Devcon and provide us with valuable feedback. If you are interested in Trustful and would like to collaborate on building a use case with us, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://t.me/Danimimm">please reach out.</a> We have a path to pave when it comes to governance and impact.</p><p><em>See ya!</em></p><hr><p><em>I want to take a moment to express my heartfelt gratitude to the amazing Trustful team: Luiz, Leonardo, Zeugh, Rascar, Heron and Franco. Your dedication, creativity, and collaboration have been instrumental in bringing Trustful to life. Together, we are paving the way for a brighter future in governance and reputation!</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
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            <title><![CDATA[Anatomy and antidote for Compound War]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/anatomy-and-antidote-for-compound-war</link>
            <guid>s3SISoZuvj1lxJSnaPE5</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jul 2024 04:09:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Authors: alextnetto.eth, guiriba.eth, 0xneves.eth, zeugh.eth, danimim.ethTimelineMay 6 - Unexpected proposalHumpy and the Golden Boys presented a proposal to invest 5% of Compound&apos;s tokens in a strategy called goldCOMP, submitting it directly on-chain and then posting it in the forum. It works like a wrapped COMP: the tokens are deposited in a contract and return goldCOMP. The proposal aimed to get 92K COMP from Compound to provide the initial liquidity for goldCOMP. The COMP provided by...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 id="h-" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"></h2><p><em>Authors: </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/alextnetto"><em>alextnetto.eth</em></a><em>, </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/guiribabrb"><em>guiriba.eth</em></a><em>, </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/0xneves"><em>0xneves.eth</em></a><em>, </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/theZeugh"><em>zeugh.eth</em></a><em>, </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/danimimm"><em>danimim.eth</em></a></p><h2 id="h-timeline" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Timeline</h2><h3 id="h-may-6-unexpected-proposal" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">May 6 - Unexpected proposal</h3><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/1e876fe73d1baf11dbb34e0c6846b85b324e387f1026fbe389bb3ac88c301ec3.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Humpy and the Golden Boys <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.comp.xyz/t/treasury-to-invest-5-of-comp-holdings-into-goldcomp-vault/5221">presented a proposal to invest 5% of Compound&apos;s tokens in a strategy called goldCOMP</a>, submitting it directly on-chain and then posting it in the forum.</p><p>It works like a wrapped COMP: the tokens are deposited in a contract and return goldCOMP.</p><p>The proposal aimed to get 92K COMP from Compound to provide the initial liquidity for goldCOMP. The COMP provided by the DAO would be placed in the Golden Boys&apos; <em>vault</em> and deposited in a 99/1 goldCOMP/WETH <em>pool</em> at Balancer. This capital would then generate 10% p.a. for all goldCOMP holders, including Compound.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/59842cd0184984591f93752e599177ba97f38f290153e22910039fee00bc09ea.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>The idea was not well received, because the capital would be managed by a <em>multisig</em> of the Golden Boys. At the time, those responsible for arguing against the proposal were Open Zeppelin&apos;s cylon and Wintermute Governance.</p><p>According to the study from cylon, they had already found 325K delegate tokens with a similar pattern: withdrawal from Bybit and delegation to a new address. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.comp.xyz/t/governance-security-notice-goldcomp-proposal-247/5220">Only 75K tokens short of a quorum</a>.</p><p>These 325K tokens represent 47% of the tokens voted on in proposal 289, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/289">which culminated in the release of capital to Humpy.</a></p><h3 id="h-jul-9-another-try" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Jul 9 - Another try</h3><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/9c14127f221287eb496f5fa4a83974cd24683c88cc846ca8af1d9c048b2dfefb.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Humpy commented that the accusations that he was stealing or attacking governance were unfounded. For him, it&apos;s just a proposal requiring investment</p><h3 id="h-jul-15-coordination-bait" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Jul 15 - coordination bait</h3><blockquote><p>We think the goal here was getting the sense of how much votes the DAO could coordinate to defend from this proposal.</p></blockquote><p>Humpy submitted an <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/279">onchain proposal</a> for the second time, it ended up not passing.</p><h3 id="h-jul-24-production-ready" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Jul 24 - Production-ready</h3><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/77f31eddf049d8a0883d8336fe021140eb049a53b3c959b733e3b2b37b1a73ce.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Humpy and the Golden Boys upped the ante by asking for 499K COMP, ~5.5x more than what was expected on the forum. In addition, they added the grantPhase function, allowing the contract set up by Humpy to invest the money as soon as it was received.</p><p>The proposal passed, having 50k more votes &quot;against&quot; than the bait proposal, but it wasn&apos;t enough to block it.</p><h2 id="h-humpy-background-and-history" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Humpy background and history</h2><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/5af73869c2609f2212e08113a85051523cf246811c82778cfb6e4090b1629787.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Humpy is a well-known figure in DeFi. He has already exploited the governance vulnerabilities of other DAOs, most notably Balancer.</p><p>At Balancer, Humpy acquired millions of dollars of veBAL, aiming to capture the organization. At first, his focus was only on BAL emissions for the project&apos;s <em>pools</em>. By acquiring power in the governance of the protocol, he was able to direct token issues to <em>pools</em> that provided liquidity.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/b8682a2a20449f392e3e0ebc9666e5ec45991f856be20b20f0f3db674ce8100c.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>The strategy was simple:</p><ul><li><p>Create a <em>pool</em> in Balancer;</p></li><li><p>Uploaded a proposal for voting on issuance to the <em>pool;</em></p></li><li><p>Vote with your tokens and feed <em>bribes</em> to other wallets;</p></li><li><p>Extracted the possible issuance and replayed the <em>playbook</em>.</p></li></ul><p>When the siege tightened, Humpy even wanted to ban Aura (Balancer&apos;s sub-DAO) from participating in the votes, in order to maintain his dominance over Balancer.</p><p>Andrea, one of the members of the Golden Boys, was part of this capture of Balancer. At the time, he helped Humpy in discussions on the forums, approving proposals that were beneficial to both of their <em>bags</em>.</p><p>As Humpy had captured the governance of Balancer and Aura, the solution was to make a peace agreement with him. The agreement made in 2022, agreed that Humpy would only direct emissions to <em>pools</em> where the cost of the bribe per veBAL is greater than the dollar value of the veBAL emissions. In short, “aligning himself for the long term with Balancer”.</p><p>He also divested several of his positions in veBAL, reducing his dominance over the project. Still, it is one of the largest and most influential portfolios at Balancer and Aura.</p><h2 id="h-diving-deeper-in-the-proposal" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Diving deeper in the proposal</h2><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/11b2486440e46a182ac5e386973cb7a7865d2be7aaf5eafb65bb99c23ecc2124.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>The important insights here are</p><ul><li><p>The Golden Boys multisig can change the delegatee of the tokens deposited in goldCOMP.</p></li><li><p>COMP tokens will only be returned from the Trust setup to the DAO if the multisig allows.</p></li></ul><h2 id="h-possible-solutions" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Possible solutions</h2><p>Some argue is an attack, others not. The fact is that the Golden Boys now have 6% and will have 11% after executing the proposal (1.1M COMP) of token supply in delegation, and the last time where quorum hit 1M was proposal 139 (Dec 2022 to approve Open Zeppelin <strong>security</strong> partnership), so the DAO is captured.</p><p>We cannot count on the other top token holders, they are exchanges, VCs and other entities that are not engaging in delegation. The reasons are diverse: compliance, security in tokens custody or just voter apathy.</p><p>The last chance is bulding around the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/290">proposal</a> that Arr00 submitted 1 hour after the Golden Boys proposal passed, the snapshot for this voting will be taken before the 500k COMP can be delegated.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/26f0f31423910e1362b22e3a9a8cdf8717ad54354d4436bb28031379e09bb6b7.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>Note how close the first proposal&apos;s execution is to the voting start of the second proposal. If the voting start were after the execution of Humpy&apos;s proposal, the snapshot would include the 5% of COMP received by him.</p><p>The governor starts voting and takes a snapshot 13140 blocks after the proposal is submitted. A timelock delays execution by 172800 seconds (~14400 blocks) after the proposal is queued.</p><p>If the community considers it an attack and wants to get rid of the control and capture, the only way is to accept this proposal, transfer the timelock admin to the Compound&apos;s community, and then decide the future.</p><h3 id="h-scenario-1-new-governor-blocking-goldcomp-delegatee" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Scenario 1: New governor blocking goldCOMP delegatee</h3><p>Deploying a new governor that will not consider the vote of the address that the goldCOMP contract is delegating to neutralize the social power involved in the proposal. It will maintain the tokens that Humpy bought, and it&apos;s an easier solution, also giving time for delegates to engage and take some security measures.</p><h3 id="h-scenario-2-fork-token" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Scenario 2: Fork token</h3><p>Creating a new COMP token, which is airdropped to all previous wallets, excluding the ones that voted &quot;for&quot; in the Golden Boys proposal and the tokens obtained with the proposal.</p><p>That&apos;s may be hard proposal to pass because it will make the COMP token useless by decoupling it from governing the treasury and protocol. But it can be interesting if there are any incentives to vote ”for”, as we saw in <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://insights.glassnode.com/aave-token-analysis-migration-staking/">other token migrations</a>.</p><h3 id="h-scenario-3-accept-the-capture" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Scenario 3: Accept the capture</h3><p>As Humpy and the Golden Boys are heavily invested in COMP, is also in their interest to not lose money and make the protocol survive. There is no turning back if this happens and the proposal for transferring the timelock admin doesn&apos;t pass.</p><h2 id="h-preventing-it" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Preventing it</h2><h3 id="h-security-provider-that-takes-action" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Security provider that takes action</h3><p>Open Zeppelin (getting $4m/year), which is in charge of <strong>security,</strong> and Gaunlet, which makes most of the proposal and does risk analysis, didn&apos;t take any action or proposal toward increasing DAO security.</p><p>OZ got early insights about related wallets on the first on-chain proposal and made the possible risk clear in the forum. But security is not just monitoring and warning. Is taking action and proactively stewarding the governance towards a more secure place.</p><h3 id="h-security-council-for-vetoing" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Security Council for vetoing</h3><p>Back in March, blockful conducted a governance audit that exposed a concerning situation for ENS DAO, ending up in the immediate delegation of 4M ENS to a contract that can only vote &quot;Against&quot; and now the creation of the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.tally.xyz/gov/ens/proposal/42329103797433777309488042029679811802172320979541414683300183273376839219133">Security Council</a>, live since 2 days ago.</p><p>Recently, an <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://etherscan.io/tokentxns?a=0x245445940B317E509002eb682E03f4429184059d&amp;p=13">address</a> was noticed accumulating 1.5m ENS, buying it almost every day for the last 382 days, but it no longer represents a risk for the capture of the organization.</p><p><strong>In an adversarial and permissionless environment, security must be preventive and crucial.</strong> It takes motivation, passion, and attention to detail.</p><h2 id="h-similar-movements-are-not-new-in-history" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Similar movements are not new in history.</h2><p>The 1988 RJR Nabisco Takeover: A Case of Legal Manipulation and Strategic Voting: in 1988, the leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts &amp; Co. (KKR) showcased how legal manipulation and strategic voting allowed KKR to gain control, despite fragmented and apathetic large shareholders. This event highlighted vulnerabilities in corporate governance and led to significant financial market reforms.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/3c4b6b13c37aebc7057419fe38b9fdc7719b80fc9f5a8ddce2c0272cb0d90551.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Open question</strong></p><ul><li><p>Most of COMP came from exchanges, so they know who is behind it, or... they are behind it. Are Humpy and the Golden Boys somehow backed by exchange? If not, why would these individuals expose their identity to exchanges like that?</p></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blockful's Blocks in H1 2024]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/blockful-s-blocks-in-h1-2024</link>
            <guid>bdJmyKg7ZbJ9CZaQSn4s</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jul 2024 14:50:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Building in Public Goods for a Stronger EcosystemWe optimize human coordination through open-source projects by building public goods. In the first half of 2024, we&apos;ve been busy enhancing governance mechanisms and securing ENS scalability.Strengthening GovernanceOne of our main goals has been to improve governance within DAOs. We tackled a major delegate power imbalance risk in the ENS DAO by introducing a veto proposer role and setting up a Security Council. This move has made the DAO m...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 id="h-building-in-public-goods-for-a-stronger-ecosystem" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Building in Public Goods for a Stronger Ecosystem</strong></h2><p>We optimize human coordination through open-source projects by building public goods. In the first half of 2024, we&apos;ve been busy <strong>enhancing governance mechanisms and securing ENS scalability</strong>.</p><h3 id="h-strengthening-governance" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Strengthening Governance</strong></h3><p>One of our main goals has been to improve governance within DAOs. We tackled a major delegate power imbalance risk in the ENS DAO by introducing a veto proposer role and setting up a <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://snapshot.org/#/ens.eth/proposal/0xa0b1bfadf6853b5b0d59d3c4d73c434fc6389339887d05de805361372eb17c3a">Security Council</a>. This move has made the DAO much more resilient against potential threats.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/ab746836e943cadb1402cde98c30b49bbe3278e70c253c3fa470038315938f65.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/c67c29eb7254eebd699f9c69991a4db925de204d53dcc0194526c49a5de8de6d.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><hr><h3 id="h-expanding-our-service-provider-reach" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Expanding Our Service Provider Reach</strong></h3><p>We&apos;ve broadened our service provider network through some key partnerships:</p><ul><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.tally.xyz/gov/ens/proposal/63865530602418424570813160277709124551851041237648860550576561576702951975816"><strong>Ethereum Name Service (ENS)</strong></a>: Selected for the &quot;Streams for Service Providers&quot; program, receiving annual funding.</p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://snapshot.org/#/shutterdao0x36.eth/proposal/0x8de85c46dc7306d88fcba27f39ea161aeb771b4186849b45bf9026cdf4adccb6"><strong>Shutter DAO</strong></a>: Chosen as the development house on retainer to provide ongoing support for the Shutter Network.</p></li></ul><hr><h3 id="h-scaling-ens" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Scaling ENS</strong></h3><p>As the official ENS service provider, Blockful is dedicated to improving the ENS ecosystem and supporting its expansion. We have secured grants to scale ENS on both <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://app.charmverse.io/op-grants/scale-ens-to-op-blockful-official-ens-service-provider-6112748728814419">Optimism</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://questbook.app/dashboard/?chainId=10&amp;proposalId=65b97f0ec78801149f5d1455&amp;grantId=0x706bc8efecb6002f00a052fe5688d0eb89ea45f4">Arbitrum</a>.</p><p>By reducing gas fees and subsidizing initial user onboarding costs, we aim to make ENS more accessible to a wider audience.</p><hr><h3 id="h-community-engagement" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Community Engagement</strong></h3><p>We&apos;ve been actively involved in the web3 community, sharing our insights and knowledge through talks, workshops, and panel discussions at major events:</p><ul><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/EthereumDenver/status/1763725869002932531">Talk on DAOs efficiency @ ETH Denver</a></p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/danimimm/status/1797705745137537186">Talk on Reputation @ ETH Belgrade</a></p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://lu.ma/ens-workshop-by-blockful">Workshop on ENS @ ETH Samba</a></p></li><li><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://lu.ma/vg3xwla9">Workshop EIP 3668 ENS x Chainlink meetup</a></p></li></ul><div data-type="youtube" videoId="TVbBKlmAEFU">
      <div class="youtube-player" data-id="TVbBKlmAEFU" style="background-image: url('https://i.ytimg.com/vi/TVbBKlmAEFU/hqdefault.jpg'); background-size: cover; background-position: center">
        <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TVbBKlmAEFU">
          <img src="{{DOMAIN}}/editor/youtube/play.png" class="play"/>
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      </div></div><hr><h3 id="h-hackathon-wins" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Hackathon Wins</h3><p>Our team has been making waves in the hackathon circuit, presenting innovative solutions and earning top spots in several competitions:</p><p><strong>ETH Samba:</strong> We clinched a win with <strong>AI Delegate</strong>, designed to participate in DAO governance and enhance decision-making.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/blockful_io/status/1772685301699203229">https://twitter.com/blockful_io/status/1772685301699203229</a></p><p><strong>ETH Belgrade:</strong> Our project <strong>DAOgram</strong> impressed the judges, offering a novel approach to DAO communication and coordination.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/danimimm/status/1797706428339413104">https://twitter.com/danimimm/status/1797706428339413104</a></p><p><strong>ETHGlobal Brussels:</strong> We won with <strong>Liquid Delegate</strong>, enabling ARB to WARB wrapping, revenue sharing, and extra liquidity removal rewards.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/PancakeSwap/status/1812584884835078379">https://x.com/PancakeSwap/status/1812584884835078379</a></p><hr><h3 id="h-product-development" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Product Development</strong></h3><p>Our product lineup keeps getting better with ongoing work on the following:</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blockful.notion.site/Trustful-4f93fed08fee4adcb8f0aa3dbd88632a"><strong>Trustful</strong></a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/OctantApp/status/1811850040802984219">https://x.com/OctantApp/status/1811850040802984219</a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blockful.notion.site/AI-Delegate-8296ff74623a4078b1ab7e7536adfabf"><strong>AI Delegate</strong></a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/blockful_io/status/1813218392234397701">https://x.com/blockful_io/status/1813218392234397701</a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://swaplace.xyz/"><strong>Swaplace</strong></a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/Swaplace_io/status/1808560901525504051">https://twitter.com/Swaplace_io/status/1808560901525504051</a></p><p><strong>Our work is grounded in open-source principles and a commitment to public goods.</strong> We actively contribute to the ecosystem beyond development, including governance and community building. We look forward to sharing more updates on our progress in the coming months.</p><hr><p><strong>Want to stay updated?</strong> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/blockful_io">Follow</a> us on X, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://github.com/blockful-io">explore our code</a> on GitHub, and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="">discover more</a> in our page.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
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            <title><![CDATA[It's time to break the reputation silos.]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/it-s-time-to-break-the-reputation-silos</link>
            <guid>fanRvk2yM7fYR28AMRoc</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Jun 2024 21:15:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[It&apos;s time to break the reputation silos. Trustful is coming!Trustful is a cross-community reputation aggregator based on the concepts of Valocracy and Trust Networks. It’s an open-source software that enables users to import reputation badges from other systems or create new ones, allowing those to be used in multiple communities with little to no need for structural adaptation. Trustful is currently participating in Octanct’s Epoch 4 of Public Goods Funding; you can show your support by...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 id="h-its-time-to-break-the-reputation-silos-trustful-is-coming" class="text-4xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">It&apos;s time to break the reputation silos. Trustful is coming!</h1><p><em>Trustful is a cross-community reputation aggregator based on the concepts of </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://castacrypto.notion.site/Valocracy-Manifesto-f1ca6d59fad54ab9a8aa15924026a05f"><em>Valocracy</em></a><em> and Trust Networks. It’s an open-source software that enables users to import reputation badges from other systems or create new ones, allowing those to be used in multiple communities with little to no need for structural adaptation.</em></p><p><em>Trustful is currently participating in Octanct’s Epoch 4 of Public Goods Funding; you can show your </em><strong><em>support by voting for us </em></strong><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://snapshot.org/#/octantapp.eth/proposal/0x91b8b02e7eba7dff9e05b4d5018d74ee2efdf7789942ce862401d0df45659348"><strong><em>here</em></strong></a><strong><em>!</em></strong></p><h2 id="h-why-build-on-reputation" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Why build on reputation?</h2><p>For nearly one year, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blockful.io/">Blockful contributors</a> have been researching different approaches to reputation, diving into historical developments from word of mouth, through writing and the printing press, and all the way to social media algorithms. We&apos;ve studied <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://researchseminars.org/talk/Metagov/200/">traditional peoples and their social structures</a>, many web3 solutions with their different pros and cons, and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://github.com/orgs/global-reputation-protocol/repositories">we&apos;ve hacked and won with our initial concept</a> of how to contribute to this space.</p><p>Most of the studied solutions either turn communities into popularity contests that disproportionally reward Public Relations over other skills and contributions or completely disregard the contextual nature of how humans attribute trust to each other. Those characteristics differ abruptly from long-evolving human practices, making the user experience uncomfortable and actively disengaging people. This makes it unsafe to use the results from those systems to decentralize power or create trusted environments.</p><p>Plutocracy is broadly present in DAOs and is arguably a core element of even their earliest conceptual structures. Over the last couple of cycles, it has caused engagement issues, created governance risks, and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2018/03/28/plutocracy.html">attracted criticism from allied</a> and opposing opinions.</p><p>In January, our team <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://checker.gitcoin.co/public/project/show/zutrust-by-blockful">applied with ZuTrust</a> to the Zuzalu tech round on Gitcoin, taking our first step towards making a public good product that would bring what we learned into a valuable solution for digital communities. With this initial funding, we dedicated efforts towards gathering insights from builders in different communities. We found converging opinions on how this dynamic, where your bag size is the only relevant metric to amplify your voice, limits and frustrates members, trimming their participation and creating mistrust in the voting or funding round results.</p><h2 id="h-the-full-picture" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">The full picture</h2><p>Gathering those diverse research points allowed us to define some core concepts that Trustful will carry throughout its uses:</p><ul><li><p><strong>Reputation is contextual.</strong> It is only possible to functionally assign a reputational value to an action if you specify the context in which it will be recognized.</p></li><li><p><strong>Reputation and trust go hand in hand.</strong> While the first is one-to-many, the second is one-to-one.</p></li><li><p><strong>Trust allows for reputational bridges.</strong> While I might not be able to confirm someone&apos;s long-term contributions to a community, I can recognize their reputation there if I trust that community&apos;s reputational consensus.</p></li><li><p><strong>Trust works very similarly regarding reputation and expertise.</strong> I might not be able to verify someone&apos;s knowledge of Particle Physics. Still, I can recognize their expertise if I trust a reputable educational institution like MIT or a group of experts to assert that expertise.</p></li></ul><h3 id="h-from-those-concepts-trustful-has-derived-its-core-features" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">From those concepts, Trustful has derived its core features:</h3><ul><li><p>Issuance of <strong>Statement Badges</strong> in the form of <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://docs.attest.org/docs/welcome">EAS Attestations</a>, which serve as statements of something about someone.</p></li><li><p>Creation of <strong>Reputational Scorers</strong> in the form of lists of &quot;badge:relevance&quot; pairs.</p></li><li><p>Issuance of <strong>Reputation Badges</strong>, also in the form of EAS Attestations, that are the result of checking an address against a Scorer.</p></li></ul><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/2c561543ff5268d038f7914e70514e0dd9296fc8a907a727bafa8646aa36f470.png" alt="Trustful dApp Homescreen" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">Trustful dApp Homescreen</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Statement Badges</strong> are the core of the user experience. Trustful&apos;s interface makes it easy for anyone to issue Statement Badges to another address by simply choosing from a list of types or creating their own. It also allows users to connect and import their reputation from various sources, enabling a broader usage of different systems that are already culturally integrated into their communities or offering specific functionalities to meet their needs. For imported badges, the issuance, the verification of values, and the adaptation to a standard data format are done by Trustful&apos;s back-end server, allowing off-chain data to be considered for on-chain scenarios.</p><p><strong>Reputational Scorers</strong> turn Statement Badges into usable scores. Users can create new scorers by defining what badges are relevant to them and specifying their relevance value, which serves as a multiplier. Flexibility on the valuation of a Statement Badge allows for the same contribution to be considered appropriately in different communities or contexts, such as voting proposals of a specific nature, allocating funds from a community treasury, or acknowledging reputable builders of another DAO inside your organization. Users can also select scorers from a list, identifying their creator and choosing to trust their parameters for what defines reputation in their context. We are excited to work with innovative governance systems like JokeRace to allow DAO members to curate their scorer values.</p><p><strong>Reputation Badges</strong> are generated by scorers and allow their resulting values to be used for on-chain interactions. They are EAS Attestations containing a numerical score value and a Scorer ID. They will be the core piece for using Trustful in your community structure, being easy to use in a governor contract extension for voting, with Passport for funding round matching scores, or with a Hats eligibility module for roles and permissions.</p><h2 id="h-launching-our-first-versions" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Launching our first versions</h2><p>Trustful is now under development, with an MVP built on Optimism and one on the Stellar Network. Those two early versions explore different aspects of improving the recognition of effort and expertise inside communities.</p><p><strong>ZuGeorgia MVP on Optimism</strong></p><p>The first OP version will focus on creating new Statement Badges and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://zuvillage-georgia.framer.website/">will be tested on ZuGeorgia in late July</a>. It will allow organizers and attendants of a Zuzalu pop-up village event to give badges to each other in recognition of their contributions and knowledge. This mobile-first version aims to enable the community to create its first badges, which members will later use to generate Reputation Scores.</p><p><strong>Stellar Quests MVP</strong></p><p>The Stellar version will focus on importing badges from the current Stellar Quests system and creating Reputational Scorers and Reputation Badges for different contexts inside Stellar&apos;s governance ecosystem. It will qualify developers&apos; expertise in certain areas, amplifying their voices on matters in which they have proof of knowledge.</p><h2 id="h-funding-a-public-good" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Funding a public good</h2><p>Trustful is an open-source software that aims to provide communities with a way to value member contributions and have resources for making more informed decisions.</p><p>Our initial funding came from the Zuzalu Gitcoin round earlier this year. We have also received <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://communityfund.stellar.org/">a grant from SCF</a> to fund the development of the Stellar MVP and are currently participating in the selection process for Octant&apos;s Epoch 4.</p><p>If you want to support Trustful to be open and accessible for everyone, please share this post or support us by <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://snapshot.org/#/octantapp.eth/proposal/0x91b8b02e7eba7dff9e05b4d5018d74ee2efdf7789942ce862401d0df45659348">voting on the Snapshot proposal for Octant</a>.</p><p>If you are interested in knowing more, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://blockful.io/">feel free to reach out</a> or follow us here or in social media to get more updates soon!</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
            <enclosure url="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/ca4da5b98b84045cc2fc6dd860d8c7b31ad22b46b4891db5cbf1de643a9cf67c.png" length="0" type="image/png"/>
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            <title><![CDATA[Rakija, Talks, and Winning the Hackathon at ETH Belgrade]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/rakija-talks-and-winning-the-hackathon-at-eth-belgrade</link>
            <guid>RTBMY0rOfcmmQ6dIdDu7</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Jun 2024 20:47:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[ETH Belgrade is where the magic happens for anyone crazy about Ethereum and blockchain like we are. It&apos;s a web3 tech conference with a hakcathon™, where builders and enthusiasts come together to create awesome dApps, share the coolest ideas - and put them into practice. With hands-on workshops, inspiring talks from industry pros, and tons of networking opportunities, ETH Belgrade is all about community and innovation.So, why Belgrade? The event&apos;s manifesto talks about the idea that ...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://ethbelgrade.rs/">ETH Belgrade</a> is where the magic happens for anyone crazy about Ethereum and blockchain like we are. It&apos;s a web3 tech conference with a <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/ethbelgrade/status/1796872009357357275"><em>hakcathon</em></a><em>™</em>, where builders and enthusiasts come together to create awesome dApps, share the coolest ideas - and put them into practice. With hands-on workshops, inspiring talks from industry pros, and tons of networking opportunities, ETH Belgrade is all about community and innovation.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/b508d0feb497bd83060018028ce0569c07dcfa3432ab257a68cd8e5c319e34d6.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><p>So, why Belgrade? The event&apos;s manifesto talks about the idea that the city is more than just a place; it&apos;s a way of life and a way of thinking - and we couldn&apos;t agree more. Belgrade is quickly becoming a tech hotspot in Europe, packed with talented builders and many web3 companies.</p><p>Serbia&apos;s got this youthful, energetic vibe that fits perfectly with the forward-thinking spirit of the Ethereum community. After some rough times in the 90s, the government went all-in on tech, building infrastructure and supporting STEM education. This, combined with a strong talent pool, attracted major international companies to set up R&amp;D centers. Hosting ETH Belgrade here not only puts Serbia on the global blockchain map but also brings together diverse people to share different knowledge and ideas.</p><p>We were super excited to be part of ETH Belgrade for the second year! So we wanted to share our experiences and insights from the awesome days we had surrounded by beautiful sights, rakija, and really cool people.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/solangegueiros/status/1798066453922640306">https://x.com/solangegueiros/status/1798066453922640306</a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/blockful_io/status/1797720494646669368">https://x.com/blockful_io/status/1797720494646669368</a></p><h2 id="h-talking-about-defi-and-reputation" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Talking about DeFi and Reputation</strong></h2><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/danimimm">Dani</a> participated in a DeFi panel with big names like <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/l__c__m">James</a> from <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/OpenSuperchain">SuperChain</a>, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/TokenBrice">TokenBrice</a>, and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/MariiaYatskovs2">Mariia</a> from <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/CoWSwap">CowSwap</a>. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/MaxiNicky">Nicky</a> from <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/HelloTelos">Telos</a> moderated the chat where they dissected the future of DeFi and what&apos;s holding back mass adoption. It was a really interesting talk about the complexities and controversies shaping DeFi.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/HelloTelos/status/1797621712877498690">https://x.com/HelloTelos/status/1797621712877498690</a></p><p>We also had an amazing talk on reputation delivered by Dani. She spilled the tea on how hard it is to track these characteristics on-chain and gave a sneak peek at our upcoming product, Trustful - a reputation aggregator that&apos;s gonna make the Web3 space way more trustworthy!</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/danimimm/status/1797705745137537186">https://x.com/danimimm/status/1797705745137537186</a></p><h2 id="h-ens-chainlink-and-the-network-state" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>ENS, Chainlink and the Network State</strong></h2><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/ensdomains">ENS</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/chainlink">Chainlink</a> fans gathered for an event co-hosted by <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/namespace_eth">Namespace</a> and <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/blockful_io">Blockful</a>. The focus? How these two projects work together, thanks to EIP 3668. <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/alextnetto">Alex</a> is a top 10 ENS delegate, and he discussed the proposal&apos;s significance for both platforms. The ultimate goal is bringing a significant number of users (think billions!) on-chain. Alex and Dani are both Chainlink Advocates, so they can organize these kinds of events on behalf of Chainlink.</p><p>Check out how cool the event was:</p><div data-type="youtube" videoId="TVbBKlmAEFU">
      <div class="youtube-player" data-id="TVbBKlmAEFU" style="background-image: url('https://i.ytimg.com/vi/TVbBKlmAEFU/hqdefault.jpg'); background-size: cover; background-position: center">
        <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TVbBKlmAEFU">
          <img src="{{DOMAIN}}/editor/youtube/play.png" class="play"/>
        </a>
      </div></div><p>Alex also participated on a panel at <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://descibelgrade.com/">DeSci Belgrade</a> discussing network state, technological advancements, and the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/Zuzalu_city">Zuzalu community</a>. He shared his experiences as a Zuzalian, and it was a great chance for him to meet other folks who are keeping the community alive and developing it further.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/deda227999007870100123b7e20a7fb7bb5cefed6363a6ab1b105f81d3f376e1.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><h2 id="h-last-but-not-least-we-won-the-hackathon" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>Last but not least: We won the Hackathon!</strong></h2><p>Dani and Alex did awesome at the <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/ton_blockchain">TON hackathon</a>, and snagged the top prize – $7,000! They teamed up with <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/_Mouradif">Mourad</a>, a really nice and talented developer from Morocco, to build <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1RfSgdlb0MZ2p08Ny3vPci6Vpiwr6F5mrDHs9jeZdTqE/edit#slide=id.g2e1f2f9dfbf_0_121">DAOgram</a>. The tool gets rid of juggling all those different apps for DAO governance, making things much smoother.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/danimimm/status/1797706428339413104">https://x.com/danimimm/status/1797706428339413104</a></p><h2 id="h-a-shoutout-to-the-organizers" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0"><strong>A Shoutout to the Organizers</strong></h2><p>A huge thanks to the organizers of ETH Belgrade. You guys are amazing! Not only did you put together such incredible gatherings, but you also gave us Rakija, a traditional Serbian drink. It&apos;s local, it&apos;s cool, and we love it!</p><p>That&apos;s it for now! Let&apos;s keep pushing the limits in the blockchain space. Cheers!</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/blockful_io/status/1799033280576250356">https://x.com/blockful_io/status/1799033280576250356</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
            <enclosure url="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/b3051779f96e1a8cd76f462ceff30c437836bb454b8816e5ecdb4bd532e8205a.png" length="0" type="image/png"/>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lido Current State and Protocol Upgrade into Dual Governance]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/lido-current-state-and-protocol-upgrade-into-dual-governance</link>
            <guid>Bz94vIkweXLiUGJ3jjFO</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Jun 2024 19:16:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Disclaimer: The information presented in this article has not undergone empirical testing. It is based on an overview of forums, documentations, and scanners. Readers are advised to verify and validate the content independently before relying on it for decision-making purposes. A bit of context for those who don&apos;t know Lido yet The Lido protocol aims to bring liquidity to staked assets on Ethereum. It allows users to stake their Ether (ETH) into the protocol, which then issues a token re...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> The information presented in this article has not undergone empirical testing. It is based on an overview of forums, documentations, and scanners. Readers are advised to verify and validate the content independently before relying on it for decision-making purposes.</p><p><strong>A bit of context for those who don&apos;t know Lido yet</strong></p><p>The Lido protocol aims to bring liquidity to staked assets on Ethereum. It allows users to stake their Ether (ETH) into the protocol, which then issues a token representation of the staked asset (e.g., stETH for staked Ether). This token can be used in DeFi applications, providing liquidity and yield opportunities while the underlying assets are staked and earning staking rewards.</p><p>Lido ecosystem flows as follows: users stake their assets (e.g., Ether) into the protocol, which is then managed by validators who validate transactions on the underlying proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain network, earning staking rewards that are passed on to stakers who rebase their staked tokens (e.g., stETH); governance and protocol decisions are made by the Lido DAO, while node operators maintain the necessary infrastructure and token holders participate in governance and potential rewards.</p><p>Blockful researched the on-chain activities and the economic theory of the Lido DAO in its current state and generated a simple overview of the protocol&apos;s inner mechanics while also raising its concerns to understand the &quot;why&quot; of the incoming changes in the protocol. Looking forward to engaging in the debates regarding Dual-Governance (DG) that aims to be implemented in Q3/Q4 of 2024.</p><p><strong>How the governance is structured</strong></p><p>Understanding how the DAO operates starts at their discussion forum, where any idea, proposal, or grant request is published and discussed to gather community feedback. The next step is a Snapshot voting by hodling at least 1k LDO tokens. The proposal needs to reach a minimum quorum of 5% of the total token supply. The Snapshot vote is not integrated into the Lido contracts on-chain and holds no power to promote changes in the ecosystem. We can see the Snapshot vote as the measure of public opinion towards a proposal.</p><p>The real vote starts on-chain and 5% of the total token supply is needed for the proposal to be enacted. Lido utilizes the Aragon framework for on-chain governance and proposal creation is open to addresses holding any quantity of the LDO token, differing from Snapshot, which requires at least 1k ($1,700).</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://x.com/AragonProject/status/1555176035398066177">https://x.com/AragonProject/status/1555176035398066177</a></p><p>Proposals that change protocol rules or manage treasury must be submitted with an execution script in raw bytes format. The script will be executed by a low-level call once the proposal finalizes the timelock meeting validation criteria.</p><p>The Token Manager contract will forward the proposal and start a new vote in the Voting contract. The first phase of the on-chain vote, which lasts 48h, is the conventional voting, where one can vote both for and against. The second lasts 24h, and one can vote against or change their vote from for to against.</p><p>Vote executions are also called at the Aragon&apos;s Voting contract. This function can only be fulfilled if the four conditionals meet the criteria: when the voting period is over; the script is not yet executed; the support threshold is 50%; a minimum quorum of 5% of the  LDO supply.</p><p>Scripts can change almost everything in the ecosystem, from configurations to treasury management but the Kernel contract - which controls the implementation of proxy apps - cannot be modified by scripts.</p><p>Once the script is executed, the contracts will change into a new state with the new set of variables introduced according to the enacted proposal.</p><p>Another key component to work in parallel with the voting schema is the Easy Track. It&apos;s a mechanic introduced by Lido to easily assist with routine and uncontentious governance proposals. The motions can only be proposed by the multi-sig committees with a designated role and may only be enacted if no objections hit the 0.5% threshold of the total token supply within 72 hours after the proposal.</p><p><strong>Security concerns</strong></p><p>Unlike most protocols, Aragon contracts used by Lido don&apos;t have native delegation integrated into their contracts, which is a subject that has been and is still constantly under debate in the forum. Even in the new DG proposal, the token delegation mechanism and other types of vote delegation were left unmentioned by post authors and reinforced by the community in the comment section.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/a9fedadbcad6bfe1ecc5be13974071c987167c8431a231fe68f051083bf52528.png" alt="First Lido&apos;s response regarding the delegation issue inside the DG discussion" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">First Lido&apos;s response regarding the delegation issue inside the DG discussion</figcaption></figure><p>Although scrapped a little, the delegation matter was not included in the proposal. It looks like a topic that Lido wants to evade for now, especially because none of it was mentioned in the DG flowcharts. Delegation is important because empowers user participation without compromising the token balance of their sponsor. It&apos;s the most common exercise in the governance sector and Lido should lean towards this approach.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/c8247a036ba28ddfc2149bfca345ec124ae7b85e67b46f21e1ec46c3c0ff5abb.png" alt="A year later and delegation is left unmentioned nor included formally in the proposal" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">A year later and delegation is left unmentioned nor included formally in the proposal</figcaption></figure><p>The Kernel contract among other proxy implementations seems to be under the centralized control of a few addresses, allowing them to set up new apps outside the voting schema. However, this claim needed to be deeply verified. One of the addresses mentioned is not even a multi-sig but perhaps an HSM.</p><p>Lido Deployer is enrolled in multiple activities regarding the deployment and initialization of the Lido contracts. According to the current owners of the multi-sig, 2/3 of them seem to be personal wallets of developers that have recent interactions with other protocols in the ecosystem, reminding us that it is advisable not to use personal wallets for protocol management.</p><p>A griefing attack on Lido through governance vetoes could significantly disturb the protocol. The griefing could happen on the Easy Track contract with 0.5% of the total supply needed for the veto while indeterminate amounts would be needed for the Aragon Voting contract. In this attack, LDO holders could veto any governance proposal, effectively freezing the protocol, or use their veto power to push the protocol towards a desired outcome by selectively allowing censoring NOs to join. In the short term, this would lock up DAO governance and require coordination to exit the vetoed state. Market sentiment could cause the price of LDO or stETH to fluctuate, potentially allowing attackers to profit from short positions.</p><p>Lido&apos;s governance contracts lack measures to prevent proposal spamming, allowing anyone with a minimal token balance to submit proposals paying only the Ethereum gas fees. This vulnerability could clutter the front-end interface and make it difficult for users to identify legitimate proposals. Additionally, it would place a heavy burden on the governance process, requiring significant manual effort to review and manage these proposals, potentially slowing down decision-making, and generating costs attached to refusing the proposals.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/019a3c02226802e35e38befa0c7c9ba1431d0f21c99ea48209786c740bf7492a.png" alt="TokenManager contract requirement for allowing new proposals." blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">TokenManager contract requirement for allowing new proposals.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Dual Governance: Lido&apos;s next stage</strong></p><p>Lido&apos;s new Dual Governance (DG) mechanism represents a significant evolution in protocol governance. This iteration introduces changes to minimize governance through ossification and resolve principal-agent issues with a dispute and resolution mechanism for misaligned incentives between stakers and LDO holders.</p><p>The core problem the protocol faces is the principal-agent problem (PAP) because its code and parameters are controlled by the Lido DAO through LDO token voting. The DAO collects a 5% fee from staking rewards for its treasury, which could lead to conflicts of interest. While LDO holders are incentivized to maintain the protocol&apos;s success, their interests do not always align with those of the protocol users. Governance minimization and eventual ossification of the protocol code and parameters is the final solution but yet not feasible in the current Ethereum state.</p><p>The DG includes a dynamic, user-extensible <em>timelock</em> on DAO decisions. This allows stakers to have a direct influence on the timing of changes, enabling a more flexible and responsive governance structure that can adapt to the needs and preferences of its users.</p><p>The DG mechanism also incorporates a &quot;rage quit&quot; feature. This is tailored to the specifics of Ethereum withdrawals, providing stakers with an option to exit the protocol under certain conditions if they disagree with upcoming governance decisions. This ensures that stakers have a safeguard to protect their assets and interests, adding an extra layer of security and autonomy.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Lido has the single asset with the biggest liquidity in the market, its governance is robust and carries a lot of defensive walls. Decentralizing the protocol is an enormous challenge because of the impact on the ecosystem it might create by managing it wrongly. The flaws in the system were identified in the last three years and are being addressed with the introduction of a new update that has been the major discussion recently but has been a topic for the past two years. Most raised topics regarding the security of Lido Holders, Stakers, and Ethereum users are covered by DG&apos;s approach, and the only thing left for the public to understand is why the tokens cannot be delegated.</p><p><strong>Know Your Entity</strong></p><p>Stakers: These are users who stake their assets into the Lido protocol to earn staking rewards. In return, they receive staked tokens (e.g., stETH) representing their stake in the protocol.</p><p>Validators: Validators are responsible for validating transactions and creating new blocks on the blockchain. In the context of Lido, validators are often part of the underlying proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain network (e.g., Ethereum 2.0) where the assets are staked.</p><p>Lido DAO: The Lido Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) governs the protocol. It allows Lido token holders to participate in governance decisions, such as protocol upgrades and parameter changes.</p><p>Node Operators: Node operators run the infrastructure required for the Lido protocol to function, including running Ethereum nodes and validators.</p><p>Liquid Staking Providers: These are entities that provide the infrastructure and technology to enable liquid staking, allowing users to stake their assets and receive liquid tokens in return.</p><p>Token Holders: Token holders are individuals or entities that hold Lido&apos;s governance token (LDO). They can participate in governance decisions and potentially receive rewards from the protocol&apos;s revenue streams.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
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            <title><![CDATA[Implications of Onchain Reputation: From Plutocracy to Valocracy]]></title>
            <link>https://paragraph.com/@research.blockful/implications-of-onchain-reputation-from-plutocracy-to-valocracy</link>
            <guid>Ftj2uNRinONfPu2cIRPq</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:30:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA["Consider yourself to be a good man because others consider you to be so." - Socrates, as reported by Plato in the dialogue "Protagoras".The governance system of DAOs as we know it today is too recent to call it functional, and that&apos;s no news to anyone. The golden years of DAO governance (and I would say that happened around 2021 to 2022), years after The DAO proved effective even after the hack, came with two major demands: an effective way to spend the large treasuries after a memorabl...]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p><em>&quot;Consider yourself to be a good man because others consider you to be so.&quot; - Socrates, as reported by Plato in the dialogue &quot;Protagoras&quot;.</em></p></blockquote><p>The governance system of DAOs as we know it today is too recent to call it functional, and that&apos;s no news to anyone. The golden years of DAO governance (and I would say that happened around 2021 to 2022), years after The DAO proved effective even after the hack, came with two major demands: an effective way to spend the large treasuries after a memorable DeFi summer and a way to secure the core of decentralization while spending those funds. And so, a sort of race for more elaborate governance systems began, which also brought us this doubt about how functional these governance models really are, after all, this rush for well-crafted governance models came with the specters of hurry on our shoulders. The market doesn&apos;t wait.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/punk4156/status/1400154938186031104?lang=pt">https://twitter.com/punk4156/status/1400154938186031104?lang=pt</a></p><p>The models created are amazing, both for being a kind of tokenization of some governmental models we know today IRL, and for their mathematical or technical complexity (see the quadratic voting model or the model of institutionalized delegation). But all models, and I believe almost everything in the world, presuppose an expected action of what, by the way, is the most phenomenological thing there is: the action of man.</p><p>From here, we can address chronic issues (which I often refer to as tumors) of DAOs:</p><ul><li><p>Bribery</p></li><li><p>Low participation</p></li><li><p>Centralization</p></li><li><p>And well... Perhaps plutocracy (depending on the perspective, it can be positive)</p></li></ul><p>But how to solve all these problems that the created models couldn&apos;t fix? After such a DeFi summer (oh, how I miss it), it&apos;s hard to predict the issues of a bear market applied to a governance model. And mind you, when a DAO&apos;s treasury starts to dry up, things get complicated.</p><h2 id="h-to-what-extent-is-plutocracy-a-problem" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">To what extent is plutocracy a problem?</h2><p>I don&apos;t want to reinvent the wheel and try to tackle here the next revolutionary protocol that will fix all governance issues, especially because we have to analyze some things before saying that plutocracy is the villain of our decentralized fairy tale:</p><ul><li><p>DAO&apos;s objective</p></li><li><p>Governance structure</p></li><li><p>Number of members (yes, that matters)</p></li></ul><p>It&apos;s interesting to analyze these points because if we talk about a DAO that has the governance model of one token = one vote, we know that plutocracy will be higher, but we also know that it&apos;s a DAO with the potential to attract more investors, for example.</p><blockquote><p><em>&quot;Frequently, democracy ends in plutocracy, because the power of money is more effective than the power of morals or intelligence.&quot; - </em><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficiency"><em>Vilfredo Pareto</em></a></p></blockquote><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/b2ec763f15a44d470ec6ad85b097337161caab90ca7c8eefd13c587d5f85b6af.png" alt="You should also read about Pareto Efficiency" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">You should also read about Pareto Efficiency</figcaption></figure><p>So if we have democracy, capital attraction, and treasury utilization efficiency, we have the trilemma of DAO governance. 1) Once we maintain democracy and treasury efficiency (considering the community as a parameter for what would be effective), we lose capital; 2) If we maintain the efficiency of treasury utilization and want large values ​​inside the DAO, we lose in democracy; 3) And if we want democracy and capital attraction, we lose treasury utilization efficiency, since democratic decisions can lead to slower processes and mutual concessions, which can impact resource allocation efficiency (once again, the market does not wait), not to mention that this can lead to decisions that prioritize only return on investment at the expense of other values ​​oriented towards the community and its members (and the problem here is the restriction of focus, not the return on investiments itself).</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/ebacc90dd6e9beccd95b4c69faa77c2d2b6151be0995b006392a762071e6c839.png" alt="The Trilemma of DAO Governance" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">The Trilemma of DAO Governance</figcaption></figure><p>But back to plutocracy: it is a limitation. Not a seven-headed beast, however, it is interesting to consider how we can maximize democracy participation, even within a predominantly plutocratic environment, in order to avoid suffering from the chronic problem of low participation.</p><h3 id="h-a-bit-of-context" class="text-2xl font-header !mt-6 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">A bit of context:</h3><p>At the Ethereum Argentina hackathon in 2023, I was able to participate with an illustrious team, and it&apos;s no wonder <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://br.cointelegraph.com/news/brazilians-conquer-three-prizes-during-ethereum-argentinas-hackathon">we won 3 prizes</a> and were the only ones in the entire hackathon to win this amount of awards. We came together proposing a reputation protocol, Lauro Gripa brought an idea that followed a bit of the ideas of <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://www.rmrk.app/">RMKR.app</a>, an initiative born in the Polkadot ecosystem that brings an interesting concept of reputation based on NFT badges.</p><p>Finally, I wanted to delve deeper into the idea and embarked on the journey of researching onchain reputation…</p><h2 id="h-reputation-applied-in-daos" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Reputation applied in DAOs</h2><p>Reputation is the slippery fish of web3. Nobody knows how to feel or define it. The narrative goes back and forth, but we still don&apos;t know how to define it or who will define it. A great example of this is that if you go to the Alchemy list of reputation protocols you will find several distinct products, some focused on identity proof, others on social score based on engagement in social networks, others with a score based on community participation... Anyway. What would reputation be? All these facets together perhaps?</p><blockquote><p><em>By definition in the dictionary: &quot;Concept obtained by a person from the public or society in which he lives.&quot;</em></p></blockquote><p>Emphasis, great emphasis on the part that highlights the society in which the subject lives, let&apos;s not forget that we are talking about an ecosystem constituted by communities. And that the reputation created in these communities in which we want to insert ourselves is what will count. And by the way, how much is a community&apos;s reputation worth to another? And if that reputation were cross-organization? Would we also have the possibility of creating an on-chain relationship between how much one community&apos;s reputation is worth to another? If so, this would be an interesting analysis of the approximation of two or more ecosystems.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://twitter.com/danimimm/status/1767528281652228183">https://twitter.com/danimimm/status/1767528281652228183</a></p><p>Imagine you have a significant reputation in MakerDAO, and Balancer DAO decides to consider your reputation. This, in a way, indicates that Balancer DAO trusts the reputational parameters of MakerDAO.</p><p>Or in a member and DAO-level use case: suppose you have a voting weight equivalent to 2, but there&apos;s a reputation multiplier embedded. You assisted in community management, organized events, contributed to bug hunts, and had some proposals approved because they propelled the DAO you participate in. Now your voting weight isn&apos;t just 2 anymore, but 2 + 0.5% of your voting weight, for example. And as your reputation grows, your voting weight becomes 2 + 0.7%, 3, and so forth...</p><p>And what&apos;s most interesting is that, once again, I don&apos;t want to reinvent the wheel, so the DAO defines the reputation criteria. The intention is merely to create a framework that enables the effective use of this on-chain reputation. So, another interesting criterion when diving into DAOs is: does what this DAO considers as reputation align with what I consider as well?</p><blockquote><p><em>&quot;Our social connections shape our reputation and influence our behavior in surprising and profound ways.&quot; - Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler</em></p></blockquote><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/659d4367c9c0aad3da5eb34c2fb6c1b0003da809962b6514f93ab3b06cec1bb5.png" alt="" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="hide-figcaption"></figcaption></figure><h2 id="h-valocracy-concept-and-definition" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Valocracy: Concept and Definition</h2><p>Some time ago, I came across a very interesting text by Casta, a Brazilian technophilosopher with very interesting thoughts. The text, in fact, is a manifesto, the Valocracy Manifesto. One of the interesting points is that one of the advisors is Guilherme, a member of the Blockful team.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://castacrypto.notion.site/Valocracy-Manifesto-f1ca6d59fad54ab9a8aa15924026a05f">https://castacrypto.notion.site/Valocracy-Manifesto-f1ca6d59fad54ab9a8aa15924026a05f</a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://castacrypto.notion.site/Valocracy-Manifesto-f1ca6d59fad54ab9a8aa15924026a05f">https://castacrypto.notion.site/Valocracy-Manifesto-f1ca6d59fad54ab9a8aa15924026a05f</a></p><blockquote><p><em>&quot;Hence, &apos;Valocracy&apos;: A novel and structured social, economic, and political framework that attempts to leverage blockchain technology in order to create new forms of organizations with the goal of empowering communities along with their individuals and their combined efforts.&quot;</em></p></blockquote><p>When we talk about efforts, both combined and individual, we need to chart a path that delivers these efforts in a tangible way to governance capable of reading this type of data. So, when we talk about on-chain reputation that considers efforts, we also speak of a DAO ecosystem that is moving towards being based more on valocracy than on plutocracy or political influence power in DAOs.</p><p>So now we have a social problem, which already exists but which we must transpose into the digital organizational universe: the trilemma of power. Democracy, valocracy, and plutocracy. 1) On one side, you can have governance that values equal participation but tends towards the monetary side: a demo-plutocratic governance. 2) On the other side, you can have governance that leans towards both participation considering the efforts of members, but prioritizes capital: a valo-plutocratic governance. 3) And finally, a more complex governance due to lack of capital, which encompasses equal participation of all and considers the efforts of members: a demo-valocratic governance.</p><figure float="none" data-type="figure" class="img-center" style="max-width: null;"><img src="https://img.paragraph.com/cdn-cgi/image/format=auto/https://storage.googleapis.com/papyrus_images/426e46491efa8837b1d6564eb9628279b7ba612806a7dee369743b9665ed1edd.png" alt="The Trilemma of Power" blurdataurl="" nextheight="600" nextwidth="800" class="image-node embed"><figcaption HTMLAttributes="[object Object]" class="">The Trilemma of Power</figcaption></figure><h2 id="h-conclusion" class="text-3xl font-header !mt-8 !mb-4 first:!mt-0 first:!mb-0">Conclusion:</h2><p>Notice that when reputation becomes a variable, we open a new avenue and break the dilemma of democracy vs. plutocracy in DAOs. Of course, we don&apos;t solve (and I don&apos;t believe this is capable of being solved) the chronic problems of governance. However, now we have a new avenue in which some DAOs will be able to fit using on-chain reputation.</p><p>We are developing ZuTrust, a verifiable reputation protocol that can consider various factors (the DAO&apos;s choice) and can be cross-organization. Thus, we address some of the problems mentioned in this article and benefit somewhat from governance closer to valocracy. We will live a new trend in governance.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow ugc" class="dont-break-out" href="https://far.quest/zeugh/0x93ac690f802e8f05548d898fa4684945f1268bf5">https://far.quest/zeugh/0x93ac690f802e8f05548d898fa4684945f1268bf5</a></p><hr><p><em>A big shout out to Casta, the author of the manifesto, and Lauro Gripa who has provided us with so much knowledge.</em></p>]]></content:encoded>
            <author>research.blockful@newsletter.paragraph.com (blockful)</author>
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