You're not going to attract quality users to Farcaster if the network is not meritocratic - if it rewards people based on who they know and not what they contribute.

Yet every system we have to reward creators and builders on FC right now is easily gamed by users with more clout in the network.

This is true not just for FC's Engagement Rewards, but also for funding rounds that are explicitly meant to reward users for contributing value to the network (Rounds, QF, retro funding, etc.)

Either the system is entirely opaque (with voting taking place behind closed doors), or it is easily gameable - users get their friends/groups with more clout in the network to vote for them, or have more followers (or better distribution) so they can attract support by getting more attention.

What we want (and need) is a system where the incentives of voters align with the interest of the network (ie. rewarding users based on merit, not clout).

We want a system that is much harder to game.

In Impact 2.0 I'll be introducing such a system to Farcaster.

I call it Randomized Voter Sampling (RVS).

The principal problem we're trying to solve is: how do you make sure that a community can trust that the voting process wasn't manipulated by users, and that the outcome of the vote broadly reflects the view of the community.

The process works like this:

1. 1) Anyone can make a proposal about the value of a project/app/etc. to the network

2. Based on this expected value, the system randomly selects a group of validators to vote on the proposal

   Proposals that carry more value require a larger sample of voters

3. After the vote concludes anyone can challenge the outcome, which would lead to another round of RVS

By randomizing the sample of voters, proposers have no influence on who votes for their proposal, which means that they have to consider its value to the community as a whole.

The voter sample still needs to be large enough so that it is representative of the community consensus view.

But how do you make sure that proposers don’t abuse the system?

What if they constantly make random proposals with the hope of extracting some value from the network (making a lot of proposals in itself strains the resources of the network)?

Also, how do you make sure that voters do what’s in the network interest and don’t just vote arbitrarily or based on other considerations?

To address these challenges both the proposers and voters will need to have skin in the game; in Impact 2.0 Proposers will stake their Impact Score in proportion to the value of the proposal.

If the proposal is successful the Proposer’s Impact Score grows. If not, it will be slashed in proportion to the stake.

This ensures not only that the system isn’t flooded with proposals, but also that proposers’ valuations are as fair and accurate as possible.

It also incentivizes Proposers to proactively look for valuable contributions to the network (and not necessarily just self-promote).

Similarly, voters will have a stake in their vote; if the vote passes they increase their Score, if the vote is challenged (successfully) their Impact Score will be slashed proportionally.

This way voters have an incentive to be active in the voting process, and to vote based on the merits of proposals.

This mechanism can be used both continuously, where proposals roll in on an ongoing basis, or within a specific time frame (eg. for a contest).

Either way the mechanism ensures that every proposal is evaluated fairly by voters based on its merits.

The community can trust that the system is fair for everyone, contributors can focus on value creation instead of competing with those who try to game the system, while the network can attract quality users.

Impact 2.0 will be rolling out with the RVS mechanism later this month.