Brandon Donnelly — Daily insights for city builders. Published since 2013 by Toronto-based real estate developer Brandon Donnelly. — Page 398

The stated policy goal of inclusionary zoning is to to produce more affordable housing. We can debate who ultimately pays for this below-market housing, and we have many times before on the blog , but for the purposes of this post let's just focus on its stated goal.

Given this ambition, it makes sense to carefully measure the number of affordable homes produced. And that is ordinarily what is done: "We implemented this new policy on this date, and since then we have produced X amount of new affordable housing."

It is then likely that we will take X and form opinions on whether it was a successful policy or not. If X seems like a lot, then maybe we think it's a good policy. And if X doesn't seem like a lot, then maybe we think it was a bad policy, or perhaps just an ineffective one.

But what is largely impossible to measure with any real precision is the number of new market-rate homes that are now not being built as a result of a policy. Let's call this number Y. It is, of course, possible to come up with an estimate by looking broadly at rents across the city, plugging in some development costs, and seeing what pencils. But this is a rough approximation.

It does not capture the countless times that a developer has looked at a possible housing site, only to come to the conclusion that it is not feasible to build. There is no official Y figure. And any amorphous estimates of Y are going to be easy to ignore by the general public anyway. Unbuilt homes? Opportunity costs? What?

I am saying ( okay repeating) all of this because I continue to feel like most people believe that development will just happen no matter what is thrown at it. There is a housing shortage, right? So developers should just do what they do best and build today. Surely they could if they were genuinely nice people and really wanted to. Hmm.

What many people seem to ignore (or not know) is that development, and in turn new housing supply, operates under this very simple decision tree:

• Find development site

• Underwrite said site

• If math works, seek capital/investors and then build

• If math does not work, do not build

• If math works, but capital doesn't like it, also do not build (most can't in this scenario)

• Repeat

Just because you aren't seeing or noticing something, it does not mean that it doesn't exist and that it's not happening behind the scenes.

Early on in my career, I worked on a new office development where the decision was made to start construction having only pre-leased 25% of the building. (It may have actually been closer to 22% if my memory serves me correctly.)

Our big constraint at the time was that this first tenant had to be out of their current space by a certain date, and the only way we could meet their deadline was to immediately start construction. Otherwise, we knew we would lose them to another development or to an existing building.

To convince ourselves that this was a reasonable thing to do, we looked at all of the upcoming lease expiries in the market, and then came to the conclusion that there would be enough demand in the coming years to fill the rest of the building.

Still, we were taking a leap of faith, even if it was an informed one. And it meant running the project entirely on equity until we could secure a construction loan. Thankfully, in this particular instance, our hypothesis proved true. The lease expiries did end up creating the demand we were hoping for and so we were able to fill the rest of the building.

The project was a success.

But that was then. And in hindsight, this move feels scary. What would have happened had we made this exact same decision at the end of 2019? Things would have been very different. Not because of a fundamentally different decision on our part, but because of a black swan event that was truly impossible to predict. Our timing would have been bad.

This is just one example of the many risks associated with the building of buildings. Development never happens in a vacuum. You're always solving for a long list of constraints. And sometimes you need to solve for things that you don't even know exist yet.

Singapore isn't exactly saying that foreigners can't buy homes there, but it did just increase the stamp duty on purchases by foreigners to 60% . So it is saying that maybe you shouldn't do it, unless you want to pay a lot of tax.

On the other hand, if you're a foreigner with permanent residency in Singapore, the stamp duty is only 5%. But if you then want to buy a second property, the rate jumps to 30% (up from the previous rate of 25%). Companies or trusts that buy any sort of residential property also now need to pay a stamp duty of 65% (up from 35%).

The official message is that these are "pre-emptive measures" to cool demand, which I guess is mostly aimed at mainland Chinese buyers. This is the largest group. Last year, they accounted for about 25% of foreign condo purchases in Singapore. However, the total number of homes purchased by foreigners remains pretty low at just 4.7% (2022). Though first quarter data from this year does suggest the number has increased to about 7%.

Even still, how many homes is this?

Based on this information , there were 20,909 private home sales in Singapore in 2020. So let's assume this has since increased and the number is, oh I don't know, somewhere around 25,000 homes per year. At 7%, that's 1,750 homes being sold to foreigners each year. Going forward, I don't know how many people are going to be willing to pay the 60% stamp duty, but presumably some will still do it.

If we pick a random number and assume that this higher tax wipes out 80% of the foreign demand, then that's an additional 1,400 homes for locals and only 350 homes going to foreigners each year. Maybe this is something?