Below I include a number of AI generated overviews of the current state of European defence capability, spending, and capacity, focusing on operational and technical independence issues.
Please be careful with relying on generative AI, it can help collate and analyse large amounts of data but it can also make major linguistic and category errors too.
Note:
These summaries do not include the wider issues with independent and integration issues with cloud software and intelligence sharing.
These summaries does not really account for the current scenario where Russia-US-Israel are a new Axis of powers that actively seek to undermine the EU and European territorial integrity. See further:
How Europe can survive the new Russian-American-Israeli Axis powers
Europe is full of American shaped holes: what's the plan if the biggest risk to European security is America?
France was right (video)
European countries have increased defence spending, but underinvestment in previous decades means gaps still exist.
To compensate for a potential absence of the U.S. security umbrella, increases in defence spending may need to reach €500 billion over five years .
If all EU NATO members were to meet the 2% of GDP spending target in 2024, defence spending would rise by EUR 60 billion.
Annual defence spending hike of at least €250 billion in the short term to deter Russian aggression may be needed.
Germany would have to raise at least half of the €125 billion to increase annual German national defence spending from €80 billion to €140 billion, or approximately 3.5 percent of GDP, to be topped up with joint EU funding.
European armed forces continue to rely on the U.S. for key equipment, most prominently in advanced combat aircraft and missile systems.
European states are highly dependent on non-EU defence solutions.
78% of defence acquisitions by EU member states between the start of Russia’s war and June 2023 were made from outside the EU, with the U.S. alone representing 63%.
Even with increased defence investment, member states continue to procure non-EU products and solutions.
The European defence sector has suffered from decades of underinvestment and depleted stocks.
Europe needs to increase its capacity to produce military equipment as 69% of Europeans believe that the EU needs to reinforce its capacity to produce military equipment.
Many NATO members lack medium- or long-range ground-based air defence .
The European Union relies on some critical US strategic enablers, including intelligence and satellite communications.
The European defence market remains fragmented.
The lack of joint procurement and national preferences for defence spending translate into small markets with low production numbers.
The European defence industry needs modernisation for wars of attrition.
The EU defence industrial landscape is populated mainly by national players operating in relatively small domestic markets.
A lack of coordination at the EU level and product standardisation weaken the EU’s defence industrial base.
There is no shared mapping of the EU’s manufacturing capacities in defence, including cross-border supply chains.
The European defence sector has an estimated annual turnover of EUR 135 billion in 2022 and strong export volumes.
Some EU products and technologies are superior or equivalent in quality to those produced by the US, such as main battle tanks, conventional submarines, naval shipyard technology and transport aircraft.
The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) aims to strengthen the competitiveness and readiness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).
The EU is trying to encourage the availability of EU equipment in time and in volume through the gradual creation of a European Military Sales Mechanism.
The EU is launching European Defence Projects of common interest to contribute – at EU level – to secure and protect the Union’s and Member States’ free access to the contested areas such as cyber, space, air and maritime.
The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) seeks to strengthen European air-defence capabilities in the context of NATO, envisioning the acquisition of a layered system to deal with multiple types of threats.
France, Germany, Italy and Poland signed a Letter of Intent to jointly develop a European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) ground-launched cruise missile.
The EU is putting in place an EU-wide Security of Supply regime, warranting greater resilience and offering a competitive advantage for EU defence supply chains.
Alternatives to US aircraft must be purchased when possible even if there is some trade-off (e.g. the Saab Gripen instead of the F-35)
Air and Missile Defence: Russia's invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the importance of layered air and missile defence. The challenge lies in manufacturing capacity, not options.
Land Forces: During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, European armed forces deprioritised armoured and mechanised capabilities.
Naval Shipbuilding: The complexity and cost of building large warships means that few countries can maintain a consistent level of capability and capacity over time.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Although other European states have produced unarmed UAVs for some time, they are only beginning to catch up when it comes to armed systems.
Guided Missiles: Rapid increases to capacity now have to be made to meet new demands. Here constraints on the supply of key materials, as well as the difficulties of hiring and retaining staff, pose significant challenges.
Important Considerations:
Germany's Role: German leadership and commitment will be critical. Germany would have to, on its own, raise at least half of the €125 billion to increase annual German national defence spending from €80 billion to €140 billion, or approximately 3.5 percent of GDP, to be topped up with joint EU funding.
Ukraine's Defence Industry: Ukraine and its defence industrial base are of great importance to the EU defence strategy and could be transformative for the EU’s military industrial capacity.
Transatlantic Cooperation: Since the Russia–Ukraine war transatlantic defence-industrial cooperation has intensified in some areas, but European defence producers have started to scale up production capacity following years of low or no orders from governments.
Supply Chain Resilience: There is renewed scrutiny on the size of stockpiles and on supply-chain security.
"European armed forces continue to rely on the United States to varying degrees across all military domains. In some cases, the advanced technology in some US equipment drives this relationship, such as for advanced combat aircraft, but in many cases these dependencies have been the result of European states’ own decisions to reduce their inventory holdings and defence-industrial capacity. Air defence and rocket artillery are two important examples of this. However, since the war in Ukraine, transatlantic defence-industrial cooperation has been increasing in new ways. For instance, there has been greater involvement by European-origin firms in the US defence sector as they look to become more active in this important defence market."
(Building Defence Capacity in Europe: An Assessment, The International Institute for Strategic Studies)
Europe is overly dependent on the U.S. for several critical enablers. These include:
Strategic enablers European countries depend overwhelmingly on U.S. forces for strategic enablers including strategic aviation and space assets. Addressing European shortfalls of strategic enablers is a major issue, and the gaps between the U.S. and Europe are much wider in this area than for major platforms. Acquiring strategic capabilities would allow Europe to perform a quasi-full range of tasks with limited or no U.S. assistance.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) This includes unmanned systems and space-based capabilities.
Integrated air and missile defence.
Long-range precision strike capabilities.
Strategic airlift and air-to-air refuelling . Europe also faces significant shortfalls in airborne early-warning and control aircraft, and tactical and strategic airlift capabilities.
Logistics and support European logistics and support capabilities have diminished below any reasonable threshold.
Fighter Aircraft: European armed forces continue to rely on the U.S. for key equipment, most prominently in advanced combat aircraft. The F-35 fighters, for example, serve as the cornerstone of NATO Europe’s tactical air power.
Raw materials European armed forces rely heavily on the United States across all military domains, scaling up domestic production of weapons systems and ammunition requires European defence producers to scale up their procurement of critical raw materials.
F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft: It requires continuous software updates from Lockheed Martin and, without U.S. approval, essential functions could be disabled.
Battlefield communication systems: Battlefield communication systems like Link 16, a NATO-standard tactical network, depend on American encryption keys and oversight.
Semi-Conductors: The EU relies on foreign countries for over 80% of digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property. Dependencies are particularly acute, however, for semi-conductors owing to the structure of the industry, which is dominated by a small number of large players. For chips production, 75-90% of global wafer fabrication capacity is in Asia.
Space-based capabilities: Europe depends on the U.S. for command and control and drones.
To reduce reliance, a ten-year plan should be developed to reduce dependency on US strategic enablers. With expanding European defence budgets, there need to be more deliberate efforts to jointly acquire some of the key missing strategic enablers, thereby reducing critical European capability shortfalls and the massive and excessive dependency on U.S. assets in this domain.
Europe can increase military production by scaling up its defence companies and allowing new firms to emerge. Also, securing defence supply chains by monitoring and assessing risks of over-dependency is needed.
"More fundamentally, across all domains and to varying degrees, the armed forces of European NATO members continue to rely on the US for many critical capabilities, including combat enablers. In the conventional realm this is most prevalent in the air domain, where the F-35 combat aircraft will increasingly form the heart of NATO Europe’s tactical air power over the coming decade. In the land domain, Europe relies mainly on US systems such as multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) for longer-range surface-to-surface attack and the MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile system for extended-range air defence. These decisions have all been political choices by European governments, evident also in Poland’s decision to procure Abrams main battle tanks, though production-capacity challenges in Europe and availability of the M1A1 variant in US government stocks were also important factors in Warsaw’s decision."
(IISS)
Europe relies on the U.S. and Israel for various components of its missile ecosystem, but is also developing alternatives to reduce this dependence.
U.S. Dependence:
Components: European armed forces rely on the U.S. for key equipment, most prominently in advanced combat aircraft. Buying American is seen as a way of solidifying U.S. commitment to European security, with the Foreign Military Sales process offering potential financial support.
Systems: Europe depends on the U.S. for systems such as multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and the MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile system for extended-range air defence.
Command Structure: NATO's command structure is heavily reliant on U.S. assets, which has discouraged independent European capability development.
Air Defence Systems: Several European countries have ordered the U.S.-made Raytheon Patriot systems, with Germany and Spain acquiring additional systems and upgrades.
Naval Systems: Several European navies have purchased the Aegis combat system and operate versions of the Standard Missile air-defence weapon.
Kill Switch: The U.S. retains control over military systems supplied to its allies through hidden mechanisms. From F-35 fighter jets to HIMARS missile systems, Patriot air defenses, and critical communications networks like Link 16, these systems can be remotely restricted or disabled by the U.S.
Israeli Dependence:
Air Defense Systems: Germany is acquiring the Israeli Arrow 3 missile defence system, and other nations are acquiring systems like David’s Sling and Barak MX.
European Alternatives and Efforts to Reduce Dependence:
European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI): Germany's approach to ESSI is built around the Israeli Arrow 3 ballistic-missile interceptor, the Patriot, and the Diehl IRIS-T short-range system, but only the IRIS-T is a European design.
SAMP/T System: France and Italy jointly developed the Medium-Range Ground-to-Air/Ground System (SAMP/T), a European-made air defence system.
IRIS-T System: Latvia and Estonia have opted for joint procurement of the German IRIS-T system to optimise investment and coverage while strengthening cooperation.
MBDA: MBDA is a key developer of missile systems in Europe, with plans to increase production of its Mica missile system.
Investment in domestic production: Europe must significantly increase its domestic production of weapons, ammunition, and defence systems to ensure long-term sustainability.
Reduce reliance on foreign technology: Europe must reduce its reliance on foreign technology and strengthen its geopolitical standing by becoming a global leader in defence innovation.
Autonomous systems: Europe should cease purchasing military systems from the U.S. that contain embedded control mechanisms and redirect investments toward independent European solutions.
The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and Main Ground Combat System (MGCS): These are long-term European projects aimed at reducing dependency on U.S. air and ground warfare technology.
Fighter jets: The Saab Gripen and the F-35 Lightning II serve different roles, but the Gripen can be considered an alternative in some scenarios. Here’s how they compare:
Key Differences (AI generated)
Feature | Saab Gripen | F-35 Lightning II |
|---|---|---|
Role | Multi-role fighter (air superiority, ground attack, reconnaissance) | Stealth multi-role fighter (designed for deep strike, air dominance, network warfare) |
Stealth | Minimal stealth features | Advanced stealth technology |
Speed & Agility | Mach 2.0+, highly maneuverable | Mach 1.6, less agile than Gripen in dogfights |
Radar & Sensors | AESA radar, excellent electronic warfare capabilities | Superior sensor fusion, AESA radar, advanced electronic warfare |
Weapons Loadout | Wide variety, but smaller payload | Large payload, internal weapons bay for stealth missions |
Cost | $30–$60 million per unit (depending on variant) | $80–$100+ million per unit |
Operating Cost | ~$4,700 per flight hour (Gripen E) | ~$40,000 per flight hour |
Maintenance & Logistics | Designed for ease of maintenance, short takeoff/landing on roads | High maintenance, requires advanced infrastructure |
Is the Gripen a Viable Alternative?
For nations needing a cost-effective, modern fighter → Yes
Gripen provides excellent performance, electronic warfare capabilities, and modern avionics at a fraction of the cost of the F-35.
For countries focused on stealth and deep strike capability → No
The F-35 is designed to penetrate advanced air defenses undetected, a capability the Gripen lacks.
For NATO allies seeking interoperability → Partially
The Gripen integrates well with NATO systems, but the F-35 offers superior data-sharing and battlefield networking.
"Even taking into account the challenging operating environment and requirements in Finland, including dispersed operations from highway strips, the F-35 was considered the best option. This is a puzzling claim that we are eager to hear more about in regards to how it was figured. The Saab Gripen, in particular, was designed specifically for these types of operations, for instance."
The Finnish competition judged the Joint Strike Fighter the most capable and cost-effective option to replace the Hornet.
The Joint Strike Fighter looks to have emerged successfully from its latest fighter competition, to replace Finland's F/A-18 Hornets.
The $745 million deal will give Poland the ability to destroy enemy radar emitters associated with air defense systems.
Challenges and Considerations:
Interoperability and Integration: There may be potential interoperability and integration challenges regarding systems like the Arrow 3, as not all NATO militaries operate it.
Political and Industrial Interests: Multilateral armaments cooperation arrangements, like ESSI, face challenges due to the high number of participants and increased demands for interoperability and training.
Strategic Autonomy: Genuine European strategic autonomy in air and missile defence would require long-term investment into the relevant development, manufacturing, and skills base, as well as prioritisation in acquisition decisions.
Supply Chain Security: Reliance on outside parties for raw materials threatens supply chain security. There is also worldwide dependence on China for materials such as gallium, germanium, silicon and REEs.
Several critical supply chain vulnerabilities hinder European defence industrial readiness. To address these vulnerabilities, the EU is considering measures such as onshoring, friendshoring, diversification and greater transparency.
Identified Vulnerabilities:
Raw Materials: The European defence sector relies on a limited number of external suppliers for raw materials. Thirty-nine raw materials are essential for defence-relevant subsystems and components, 22 of which are considered critical. Securing access to critical raw materials (CRMs) is vital for the clean tech and automotive industries.
Specific Materials:
Nitrocellulose: European manufacturers depend on China for a substantial amount of cotton linters, a critical component for nitrocellulose used in igniters.
Gallium and Germanium: The US has noted that gallium and iridium are primarily sourced from China and heavily used in defence applications. In 2023, China imposed export controls on gallium and germanium in response to Washington’s export restrictions on semiconductors.
Rare-Earth Elements (REEs): China provides 98% of the EU’s supply of rare-earth elements .
Titanium: The EU depends on Russia for aerospace-relevant titanium products. Titanium is used in structural components for aircraft, vessels, and missile systems.
Dual-Use Components: Shortages of civilian or dual-use components or raw materials can threaten the timely availability and supply of defence products.
Geopolitical Factors: Broader geopolitical factors could lead foreign actors to deny or disrupt the flow of materials.
Competition for Resources: The defence sector faces competition from other sectors for raw materials, subcomponents, and skilled workers.
Cyber Threats: Supply chains are vulnerable to cyber threats. Exploitation of the supply chain would allow foreign agents to manipulate components intended for defence systems.
Dependence on Single Suppliers: Over-reliance on one supplier threatens security.
Skilled Personnel: The European defence industry faces substantial skills shortages, affecting its ability to compete globally.
Financial Risks: Defence SMEs can face problems accessing funding and navigating the UK Ministry of Defence procurement infrastructure.
ESG Compliance: Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards and compliance can act as barriers to investment in companies with certain defence-related activities.
Measures to Improve Supply Chain Security and Readiness:
Monitoring and Risk Assessment: Regularly monitor and assess risks of over-dependency. The EU economic security strategy sets out critical technology areas and requests risk assessments from member states.
EU Security of Supply Regime: Establish an EU-wide Security of Supply regime to warrant greater resilience. This includes a modular and gradual approach to enhance solidarity and effectiveness in response to tensions along supply chains or security crises .
Prioritisation of Orders: Ensure the supply of components and/or raw materials for defence supply chains, ensuring priority over some or all civilian supplies.
Identification of Critical Products: Perform an identification and monitoring of critical products for certain defence supply chains.
Diversification of Supply: Diversify sources of supply.
Strategic Stockpiling: Implement strategic stockpiles for selected critical minerals in the EU .
Investment in Recycling: Increase investments in recycling capabilities.
Strengthening Domestic Production: Strengthen domestic production capabilities.
Onshoring: Onshoring is one way to mitigate supply-chain risks.
Friendshoring: Nations group together to secure supplies or supply chains.
International Collaboration: Increase international collaboration and transparency.
Address Skills Shortages: Bolster supply chains in strategic industries by tackling skills gaps.
Financial Support: Develop financial solutions supporting the critical raw materials value chain.
Streamline Regulations: Expedite progress by harmonising component certification across Europe and streamlining the regulatory and permitting process for new facilities.
The European Commission proposes an EU security-of-supply regime under the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). Should EDIP be adopted, the commission would have the mandate to identify and monitor critical products and potentially fund strategic stockpiling of components used for military products.
"Commission spokesperson Thomas Regnier said Kyiv had already "expressed interest" in how it could use Govsatcom — a pooled network of the EU's existing national government satellite capacity — and IRIS², a new constellation only set to be operational in the 2030s...Other options would be sourcing commercial capacity from Eutelsat, Hispasat or SES satellites already in geostationary orbit or with the OneWeb constellation."
The European Commission is figuring out how it could help Ukraine secure satellite communication capacity in the wake of Elon Musk reportedly threatening to pull Kyiv's access to his Starlink...
See also: https://dev.ua/en/news/govsatcom-1741009745
GovSatCom is the EU's secure government satellite communications initiative, designed to provide reliable and secure communications for European defense, crisis management, and infrastructure protection. However, replacing Starlink with GovSatCom presents both advantages and challenges.
1. European Control & Strategic Independence
Unlike Starlink (owned by SpaceX, a U.S. company), GovSatCom is under EU and NATO control.
This prevents potential U.S. political restrictions or interference in military conflicts.
2. Secure Military Communications
Starlink is a civilian system with military adaptations, but GovSatCom is built for defense applications.
Provides encrypted and interference-resistant communications for military and government users.
3. Higher Resilience to Cyber Threats
Starlink terminals have been jammed and hacked by Russia in Ukraine.
GovSatCom’s encryption and NATO-grade cybersecurity make it less vulnerable to such attacks.
4. Interoperability With European Defense Networks
Works with NATO, Galileo PRS, and other EU military assets, ensuring seamless integration with European forces.
European defense projects (like IRIS², Galileo PRS, and Thales Syracuse) can expand GovSatCom’s role.
1. Limited Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Coverage
Starlink operates in LEO (~550 km altitude), providing low-latency, high-speed broadband worldwide.
GovSatCom mainly uses GEO (Geostationary Orbit) satellites (~36,000 km altitude), which have higher latency and lower performance for mobile battlefield applications.
2. Less Capacity for Mass Deployment
Starlink has 5,000+ satellites in orbit, while GovSatCom relies on existing European satellites (like Eutelsat, SES, and Hisdesat), which are fewer in number.
Starlink can provide thousands of terminals instantly, while GovSatCom has limited bandwidth and fewer ground terminals available for military operations.
3. Not Optimized for Battlefield Mobility
Starlink’s small, portable terminals make it ideal for fast-moving units (like drones, front-line troops, and armored vehicles).
GovSatCom mainly supports fixed command centers, ships, and large mobile stations rather than tactical battlefield units.
A full replacement of Starlink with GovSatCom is not yet practical, but a hybrid approach could reduce dependence on U.S. technology:
GovSatCom for strategic & command-level communications
Starlink for mobile battlefield operations & drone control (until EU LEO alternatives exist)
SES O3b, OneWeb, and future IRIS² for additional redundancy
Expanding GovSatCom & SES O3b mPOWER for low-latency communications.
Accelerating the EU’s IRIS² LEO satellite network (2027 launch).
Integrating European ground-based and fiber-optic backup networks.
🚫 Not fully, but it can be a core part of a European alternative.
Starlink remains superior for real-time battlefield mobility and drone warfare.
GovSatCom can replace Starlink for high-security strategic military communications.
A hybrid solution (GovSatCom + IRIS² + SES O3b + terrestrial backups) is the best path toward full European autonomy in military communications.
Galileo could potentially replace GPS for military purposes in Europe, but there are significant challenges. Here’s how it compares and what obstacles exist:
Independence from the US
Galileo is a European project, whereas GPS is controlled by the U.S. military. In a geopolitical crisis, the US could restrict access to GPS for European forces.
Comparable (or Better) Accuracy
Galileo’s Public Regulated Service (PRS), an encrypted signal for government and military use, is as accurate as GPS (or better in urban environments).
Civilian Galileo signals already offer better precision (down to ~20 cm) than standard GPS (~1 meter).
Resilience & Redundancy
Relying on both Galileo and GPS together improves positioning accuracy and resilience against jamming or spoofing attacks.
Lack of Full Military Capability
GPS has the M-Code, an advanced military signal with anti-jamming and encrypted access, which is battle-proven.
Galileo’s PRS is still in development and lacks widespread European military integration.
NATO Interoperability Issues
NATO forces (which include both US and European members) rely on GPS as the default system.
Switching to Galileo alone could create interoperability issues for joint operations.
Vulnerability to Jamming & Cyber Attacks
Russia and China have demonstrated jamming and spoofing capabilities against satellite navigation systems.
Galileo, like GPS, could be targeted in a conflict.
Political and Funding Hurdles
Some EU members are reluctant to fund military-grade enhancements for Galileo.
The US could apply political pressure to keep Europe reliant on GPS.
Short-Term (Now–2030) → Galileo will be used alongside GPS, improving redundancy and accuracy for European forces.
Long-Term (Post-2030) → If Galileo's PRS is fully operational and military-grade, Europe could phase out GPS reliance, but this requires more investment and political will.
Bottom Line: Galileo could replace GPS for European military use in the future, but for now, it’s more of a backup and complement rather than a full replacement.
Ukraine’s battlefield drone operations currently rely on U.S.-developed communications and AI-based targeting. Alternatives include:
🔹 European Drone Networks – Expanding Bayraktar (Turkey) and European defense industry UAVs.
🔹 EU & UK AI-driven Combat Systems – Developing independent AI-powered battlefield networks to process intelligence without relying on U.S. tech.
Short-term: No full replacement exists, but Galileo PRS can mitigate reliance on Starlink and GPS.
Medium-term (5–10 years): IRIS² and advanced European military satellite networks could make Europe self-sufficient.
Long-term (10+ years): Full European digital sovereignty is possible with investment in AI, drones, navigation, and battlefield comms.
For Ukraine, a hybrid approach (leveraging Starlink but developing backup European and terrestrial networks) is the most viable path.
Aggregate Spending Estimates -Announced Commitments (March 2023–March 2025)
Category | Estimated Value (USD) | Key Systems |
|---|---|---|
Combat Aircraft | $28.4 billion | F-35As, F-16 Vipers, Reaper Drones |
Ground Vehicles | $17.1 billion | Abrams Tanks, Stryker APCs |
Missiles & Munitions | $41.2 billion | Javelins, HIMARS, AMRAAMs |
Air Defense | $12.9 billion | Patriot, NASAMS, THAAD |
Naval Systems | $8.7 billion | Mk 41 VLS, Coastal Defense Missiles |
Total | $108.3 billion |
UK: $19.2 billion
Germany: $14.7 billion
Poland: $16.5 billion
Nordic States: $12.4 billion
Baltic States: $4.9 billion
Southern Europe: $13.2 billion
Eastern Europe (Non-EU): $27.4 billion
The $108.3 billion in announced European/UK spending on U.S. military equipment over the last 24 months underscores the scale of post-Ukraine rearmament. However, this figure captures only publicly disclosed FMS agreements, excluding covert programs and indirect subsidies through Ukrainian aid.
The coming decade will likely see European nations balancing between urgent U.S. imports and long-term EDIS goals. As German Defense Minister Pistorius cautioned, “We must find sustainable ways to increase spending without gutting social services”. For U.S. defense contractors, this environment presents both unprecedented opportunities and complex logistical challenges—a reality encapsulated in the 89% FMS surge that has reshaped transatlantic defense trade.
Note: All figures derived from disclosed contracts and government statements. Adjustments for inflation, currency fluctuations, and project cancellations not included.
See more info and sources at:
https://www.perplexity.ai/page/european-and-uk-defense-procur-iiWzg2GOTZWilaFk2yxyBA
The UK's military capabilities, as well as its strengths and weaknesses, can be summarized as follows:
The UK has committed a substantial offer to the new NATO Force Model (NFM), assigning RAF Typhoon and F-35B Lightning combat aircraft and Royal Navy vessels, including Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers.
The majority of the British Army has been offered to NATO, including a battle-group in Estonia, reinforcing units, a strategic reserve corps, a mechanised division and an initial contribution of an infantry division to the new Allied Reaction Force.
The UK is recognised around the world as having quickly deployed certain capabilities.
The UK is a partner of choice for nations across the world, projecting a global presence.
The UK is deterring aggression by spending more than £71 billion over the next 10 years on submarines and atomic weapons facilities.
The UK's continuous-at-sea nuclear deterrent has kept the nation safe for more than 54 years, and a new generation of Dreadnought class boats are being built.
The UK Space Command has achieved initial operating capability of over 500 personnel.
The UK possesses strategic international partnerships and is working with allies, including Ukraine, to develop interoperable equipment, pool essential munitions, and encourage industry to build capacity.
The UK is recognised as having key capabilities and is a major contributor to NATO.
The UK has increased its 155-millimetre munition manufacturing capability eightfold by investing in BAE Systems.
The UK faces multiple capability shortfalls within its armed forces.
There are considerable limitations in UK forces' readiness for medium- and large-scale combat operations, including declining personnel levels, as well as capability, stockpile, and medical shortfalls.
The costs of the UK’s future equipment plan exceed allocated funding by up to £16.9 billion, and forecasted funding for other military capability is insufficient.
The MoD's Equipment Plan 2023-2033 reveals a £16.9 billion deficit between the Ministry of Defence’s capability requirements and its budget.
Recruitment and retention issues undermine the credibility of the UK’s Armed Forces.
The MoD is considering mothballing Royal Navy ships because of crew shortages, and the only Royal Navy ship able to fully replenish the UK’s aircraft carriers is unavailable this year because of a refit.
The MoD does not have a disciplined approach to budgeting, which keeps costs in line with available funding.
There are inconsistencies in the MoD's equipment plan, because some parts of the Armed Forces include costs of all capabilities, while others only include those they can afford.
Slow delivery of new systems undermines the MoD’s strategy for replacing aging capabilities, resulting in military capability gaps.
The MoD is increasingly reliant on the UK’s allies to protect the UK’s national interests, which carries the risk that such support might not always be available.
There are supply chain risks and industry capacity constraints, mainly due to skills gaps, shortages of key components, and an increased demand for defence equipment in other countries.
The intensive use of existing equipment is creating a maintenance backlog that will take more time and money to address, leaving the UK’s Armed Forces having to make do with fewer pieces of aging equipment.
The UK military has a weak independent defense industrial base.
The UK armed forces face major challenges in creating sufficient mass and meeting their recruitment and retention targets.
There are long-standing problems for certain skills in engineering and technology-intensive trades across the British armed forces.
The Royal Fleet Auxiliary is short of personnel, and pay issues have led to strikes.
The Army Reserve is smaller and declining in number every month .
If the United Kingdom were to withdraw from the nuclear Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) with the United States, the existing technology and corporate engagement would be withdrawn by the U.S. and U.S. companies.
Here are some considerations regarding the UK's nuclear capabilities without U.S. support:
A break with the United States would likely result in the total withdrawal of U.S. technology, expertise, machine tools, and so forth.
The UK would need to develop the skills, technologies, and production capacity that it has repeatedly decided it either could not create itself or chose not to devote the necessary resources to do so.
It is uncertain whether the United Kingdom has a sufficient skill and technology base to create modern weapons and delivery systems. Partnering with European partners would therefore be crucial.
The creation of an Hiroshima-type atomic bomb to be dropped from aircraft is possibly practical. However, successive governments have determined that such a system is too vulnerable to preemptive attack and lacks range and survivability against anti-aircraft weapons.
The United Kingdom has no independent long-range ballistic or cruise missile industrial capacity.
An entirely independent U.K. nuclear weapons industrial base in the twenty-first century appears to be impractical almost regardless of financial commitment.
The UK does not have, and never has had, a fully independent nuclear capability. The United Kingdom does have a nuclear weapons program, but it is and always has been dependent on U.S. technology and supplies.
The operational independence of the UK's nuclear weapons is questionable for several reasons:
Dependence on the US for key components and technology: The UK relies on the US for nuclear weapons designs, manufacturing, nuclear reactor technology, and materials. The U.S. supplies the missiles and associated strategic weapon systems equipment, certain warhead-related components and services, and missile preparation and refurbishment services. Without this support, the Trident system would remain functional for only eighteen months.
Use of U.S. systems for targeting and communication: The United Kingdom uses U.S. satellites to aim Trident missiles, and it would be very difficult to fire the missiles without them. U.S. communications and satellite facilities are normally used for keeping in touch with the submarines and for targeting the missiles.
Vulnerability to U.S. interference: In a crisis where the United States and the United Kingdom were at odds, the United States would have economic, technical, and military means to prevent the United Kingdom from using its system. The United States has the physical ability to interrupt U.K. communications by jamming or kinetic action.
The U.S. is aware of the location and deployments of Trident submarines: The United States is aware, through the NATO command structure and the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), of the location and deployments of Trident submarines.
Historical dependence and support: Since the early 1940s, economic constraints have driven the United Kingdom to ever greater dependence upon the United States, resulting in reduced rather than increased national independence.
An independent nuclear force is not an option in the short or medium-term, regardless of the funding, since the United Kingdom simply does not have an adequate nuclear defence-industrial base to build on now.
Continuous dependence has meant that, in contrast to France, the United Kingdom does not have the ability to produce ballistic or cruise missiles, nuclear submarines, nuclear weapons production facilities, and the full range of nuclear explosive materials and associated electronics.
The unfortunate reality for the British people is that they have a nuclear weapon that does not do what it says on the can, meaning that it is not an independent deterrent.
Europe has long relied on US weapons but the US military industrial base faces constraints and its production may be redirected elsewhere
Any strategy will need to take account of evolving Russian capacities, evolving political willingness and evolving defence industrial capacities
Europe could need 300,000 more troops and an annual defence spending hike of at least €250 billion in the short term to deter Russian aggression
Launching at the IISS Prague Defence Summit, the IISS Strategic Dossier Building Defence Capacity in Europe: An Assessment examines European NATO countries' efforts to increase their military readiness following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Read Mario Draghi's report on the future of European competitiveness, which lays out clear recommendations on how Europe can boost its economic growth.
EDIS Joint Communication
"The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the aid that Europe subsequently sent to Ukraine revealed that the European defense industry was in a dire situation."
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/
The EU must articulate a comprehensive security strategy to answer the most fundamental question: whom does the EU aim to defend itself against?
As Donald Trump begins his second presidential term, transatlantic security debates once again revolve around US pressure on Europe to boost defence spending. However, Trump's escalating demands risk overshadowing the fundamental issue: the US-enforced transatlantic incentive structure which reinforces Europe's ongoing security dependence and ultimately benefits neither side in today's global geopolitical context.
Shifting US priorities and a degrading security environment - not to mention the possibility of a second Trump presidency - mean Europeans finally have to take more responsibility for their own...
"When we saw what was happening with Ukraine ... we passed on a clear message that we remain committed to German national security ...," former Israeli ambassador to Germany Jeremy Issacharoff told Breaking Defense.
An Aster 30 B1NT missile was fired successfully for the first time, as Paris and Rome try to lure European capitals away from Washington and Berlin.
Latvia has signed an agreement with the US to purchase Kongsberg and Raytheon's Naval Strike Missile (NSM) Coastal Defence Systems.
UK
A state in denial: Britain’s WMD dependency on the United States, by D Plesch, 2008.
The Equipment Plan Parliamentary Inquiry & Report 2023–2033
An Overview of the Ministry of Defence, National Audit 2024
How to prepare for the fire and the storm
Project 2025 Tracker
How Europe can survive the new Russian-American-Israeli Axis powers
Do you remember where you were, when the union of Europe finally began? It wasn't in 1957 or even 1993. It was the day that President Zelenskyy of Ukraine went to the White House and was ambushed live on TV by some mafia thugs.
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