-Focusing on increasing the number of Validators instead of giving importance to stake distribution

-The lack of delegation increases the size of actors such as Lido and disrupts the distribution of stakes

-Unnecessary Slash rules scare potential Validators from running Nodes

-Validator number oriented design prevents proper Light Client design and increases Finality times excessively

-Lack of proper Light Clients makes it difficult to create good alternatives to RPCs

-The fact that the stake distribution is in the hands of a small number of US-based actors increases the likelihood of the post-Merge government forcing censorship

Should such a situation occur, these actors should be able to choose to stop providing the staking service, but the Slash terms of Ethereum's Consensus structure do not allow this.

-This situation can be mitigated somewhat by the fact that users using these services withdraw their stakes from censored places, but it cannot be done as Unstake will not be free after Merge.

-Focusing on increasing the number of Validators instead of giving importance to stake distribution

-The lack of delegation increases the size of actors such as Lido and disrupts the distribution of stakes

-Unnecessary Slash rules scare potential Validators from running Nodes

-Validator number oriented design prevents proper Light Client design and increases Finality times excessively

-Lack of proper Light Clients makes it difficult to create good alternatives to RPCs

-The fact that the stake distribution is in the hands of a small number of US-based actors increases the likelihood of the post-Merge government forcing censorship

Should such a situation occur, these actors should be able to choose to stop providing the staking service, but the Slash terms of Ethereum's Consensus structure do not allow this.

-This situation can be mitigated somewhat by the fact that users using these services withdraw their stakes from censored places, but it cannot be done as Unstake will not be free after Merge.