In the world of crypto, digital security often takes center stage, but physical risks are increasingly becoming a harsh reality. Jameson Lopp, a prominent Bitcoin advocate and security expert, maintains a comprehensive GitHub repository documenting physical attacks on cryptocurrency holders.

In addition to software safeguards, Lopp's work highlights the need for holders to prepare for physical confrontations, including putting together a "anti-kidnapping kit"—a collection of tools and strategies like duress codes, panic buttons, and contingency plans to mitigate coercion or abduction.

As of mid-2025, this list has grown to 219 recorded incidents since 2014, ranging from kidnappings and home invasions to torture and even murders intended to extract private keys or force transfers. These attacks underscore a troubling trend: as crypto wealth accumulates, so do the incentives for real-world violence.

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The idea draws from the infamous "$5 wrench attack" concept, popularized by an XKCD comic, which points out that no amount of cryptographic strength can withstand physical coercion. Attackers don't need to hack complex systems; they can simply use brute force to compel victims to reveal seeds or passwords. Lopp's repository catalogs numerous such cases.

For instance, in February 2022, a crypto founder in Pune, India, was kidnapped, zip-tied, and threatened with being thrown off a bridge to extract funds.

More recently, in 2025, high-profile incidents like the attempted kidnapping of Ledger co-founder David Balland in France have made headlines, where assailants targeted him for access to his hardware wallet. In another case, two individuals in New York were indicted for kidnapping a tourist to gain entry to his crypto holdings. These events span geographies, with hotspots in Europe, the US, and Asia, and show attackers evolving from opportunistic thieves to organized groups using surveillance and insider information.

So, what can crypto holders do to fortify against these risks? Experts like Lopp advocate for a multi-layered approach that combines digital and physical defenses.

• Avoid flaunting wealth: Don't post about crypto gains on social media or wear flashy items that signal affluence. Use anonymous handles and VPNs to obscure your online footprint.

• Home security upgrades: Install surveillance cameras, reinforced doors, and alarm systems linked to rapid-response services. Consider "safe rooms" for high-net-worth individuals.

• Assemble a kit including GPS trackers, personal alarms, and encrypted communication devices. I recommend including duress codes—secondary PINs or phrases that, when entered under coercion, trigger silent alerts, wipe devices, or transfer assets to safe locations.

• Hire bodyguards or security specialised in crypto risks.

• Trezor also has the option for self-destruct pin which ig users could use somewhat like a Duress pin.

I also had the crazy idea to apply a Caesar cipher to seed phrases and store a password seed for that in your brain or hidden elsewhere (perhaps with steganography?). If you did that then you could initialize a dummy cold wallet so if an attacker ever got their hands on your seed phrase, they wouldn't realize that that isn't your real cold wallet. That would give you an out if you ever were attacked to give up something but not everything.

I also came across:

Create wipe code to erase device

Learn how to enhance the security of your Trezor hardware wallet by setting up a wipe code-a self-destruct PIN that, when entered, immediately erases all private data from the device

https://trezor.io

…stating the usage of fake accounts in which users could employ the device account multi-tenancy once again to emulate Duress functionalities!

Timelocks and storing keys in different locations for multisigs are also the good options for preventing wrench attacks. You basically need sufficient friction such that it’s hard actually moving funds without an attacker, that way when there is an attacker it’s hard moving funds. Keep in mind, the decoy wallet approach is not recommended by leading self custody providers like casa.