Welcome to the third instalment of Moneyball, where we take a closer look at the business behind football. In this essay we will be reviewing Chelsea's recently released financial reports for the 2023/24 season.
This is definitely the most adventurous analysis we've done to date given Chelsea's 'unique' financial strategies which includes selling their Women's Club to themselves and routinely offering 8 & 9 year contracts to players. Let's dive in.
Chelsea FC’s total revenue for the 2023/24 season (financial year ending 30 June 2024) was £468.5 million, a drop from the club-record £512.5 million in 2022/23. This ~9% year-on-year decline was attributed mainly to the men’s team missing out on UEFA Champions League football. Despite the revenue fall, Chelsea swung from a pre-tax loss of £90.1 million in 2022/23 to a pre-tax profit of £128.4 million in 2023/24.
This remarkable turnaround was achieved by boosting profits from player trading and a one-off corporate restructuring – specifically, increased profit on player sales and the sale (“repositioning”) of the Chelsea Women’s team within the club’s ownership structure. After tax, the club reported a net profit of £129.6 million for 2023/24, marking one of the few times in recent history that Chelsea has been profitable on paper. However, it’s important to note that without those exceptional gains, the underlying operations would have still recorded a significant loss, as was the case in prior years. The previous two seasons saw net losses of £121.3m (2021/22) and £90.1m (2022/23) under the new ownership, highlighting that the core football business remains loss-making and heavily reliant on external income injections to balance the books.
Matchday revenue grew to £80.1 million in 2023/24, up from roughly £76–77 million the previous year. This increase was achieved despite the lack of European home fixtures, thanks to strong attendance and additional events. Stamford Bridge maintained an average league attendance of around 40,000, essentially at capacity. The club also hosted three additional women’s team matches at Stamford Bridge during the year, capitalising on the growing popularity of the Women’s team to drive ticket and matchday sales.
Furthermore, domestic cup runs provided extra home games – Chelsea’s men reached the FA Cup semi-final and League Cup final in 2023/24, which would have contributed extra gate receipts (though the latter stages are at neutral venues). Overall, the matchday income has returned to a healthy level post-pandemic and post-sanctions, remaining a stable pillar of the club’s revenue. For context, Chelsea’s matchday earnings are now comparable to those of Arsenal (who reported £102.6m in 2022/23, rising to £131.7m with Champions League games in 2023/24), albeit still constrained by Stamford Bridge’s relatively limited 40k capacity compared to some larger Premier League stadia.
Plans for a stadium expansion or redevelopment – while not yet formalised – are strategically important for Chelsea’s future, as increased capacity could significantly boost matchday revenue beyond the ~£80m range in coming years.
Chelsea’s broadcasting income took the biggest hit in 2023/24 due to the absence of Champions League football. The club’s total broadcast and media revenue is estimated to have fallen to roughly £163 million (down from ~£226 million in 2022/23) as a direct result of missing out on the Champions League TV pool.
The 2022/23 accounts had benefitted from Champions League participation, whereas in 2023/24 Chelsea had no European competition at all. Despite this, the club noted that its domestic broadcasting receipts were propped up by an improved league finish and domestic cup progress. After a disappointing 12th-place league finish in 2022/23, Chelsea climbed the table in 2023/24 to finish 6th in the Premier League. This higher finish earned the club a larger share of the Premier League’s TV prize money and merit payments.
In addition, making the FA Cup semi-finals and League Cup final provided extra broadcast revenue and prize funds from those competitions. The Chelsea Women’s team’s success also added a small boost – they reached the UEFA Women’s Champions League semi-finals for a second consecutive year and won the Women’s Super League, contributing additional media revenues and prize money. Even so, these positives could only partially offset the massive loss of Champions League income. The net effect was a substantial year-on-year decline in broadcasting revenue in 2023/24, reinforcing just how financially crucial Champions League qualification is for top clubs.
By comparison, Premier League rivals who were in Europe saw far greater media earnings – for example, Arsenal’s broadcasting income jumped to £262.3m after their return to the Champions League & reaching the quarter-finals. For Chelsea, returning to European competition, ideally the Champions League, will be vital to restore this key revenue stream in future seasons.
Chelsea grew its commercial revenues to £225.3 million in 2023/24, up about 7% from £210.1m in the prior year. This record commercial turnover was driven by multiple factors. Notably, the club reported an increase in player loan income and strong non-matchday sales. Chelsea’s business model in recent years has involved loaning out numerous players, and the fees from those loans are counted as commercial income, providing a boost.
Additionally, with a full year of unrestricted operations post-sanctions, stadium tours, hospitality events, and merchandise sales performed strongly, eclipsing the partially restricted sales of the prior year. The club also benefitted from new sponsorship deals, although the 2023/24 season presented unique challenges on that front.
Chelsea began the season without a main shirt sponsor after a previous deal ended, eventually signing a short-term front-of-shirt sponsorship with Infinite Athlete partway through the season. That stopgap deal helped fill the commercial gap for 2023/24, but it was not a long-term arrangement and has not been renewed for 2024/25. On a positive note, the club did secure various other partnerships and renewals – for instance, new sleeve sponsors and other regional partners – and overall sponsorship and advertising income saw net growth.
Commercial revenue in 2023/24 also includes the continued impact of the Women’s team’s success: the visibility from trophy wins (WSL champions, FA Cup winners) likely made Chelsea a more attractive proposition for sponsors, and indeed the club noted a net increase in sponsorship revenue from new contracts and renewals in the year following those successes. Chelsea’s £225m commercial figure now puts them in the upper echelon of the Premier League, behind global brands like Manchester United, but competitive with Liverpool (who reported £272m commercial in 2022/23) and Arsenal (£218.3m in 2023/24).
Looking ahead, securing a new long-term front-of-shirt sponsor and other big deals (potentially a stadium naming rights deal if redevelopment proceeds) will be crucial to sustain and grow Chelsea’s commercial income further.
Chelsea’s wage bill remains one of the highest in world football, reflecting the enormous squad investment made under the new owners. In 2022/23, the club’s total staff costs (primarily player wages) ballooned to £404 million, a 19% increase from £340m the year before.
This was largely due to the influx of new players on significant contracts during the first year of the Boehly-Clearlake era. For 2023/24, exact figures are not yet publicly broken down, but the club did indicate a decrease in operational costs year-on-year, which implies some reduction in the wage bill or other savings. Indeed, Chelsea undertook a major squad clear-out in summer 2023, offloading a number of high-earning veteran players.
The departures of stars like N’Golo Kanté, Kai Havertz, Mateo Kovačić, Christian Pulišić, Kalidou Koulibaly, Édouard Mendy and others not only brought in transfer fees but also shed tens of millions in annual salaries. These exits, combined with a focus on younger (often less highly-paid) signings, mean the 2023/24 wage expense likely came down from the previous year’s peak. Football finance analysts have noted Chelsea’s effort to trim the wage bill after years of growth – the club “made some reductions in the wage bill” as part of its restructuring in 2023/24. Even so, the wages remained extremely high relative to revenue.
At roughly £380–400m in wages against £468.5m revenue, Chelsea’s wage-to-revenue ratio is around 80-85%, far above the recommended sustainable level (often cited around 60%). By comparison, Arsenal’s wage bill was £327.8m on £616.6m revenue (53%), and Manchester City’s last reported ratio was near 60%.
Chelsea’s high wage base also includes the cost of managerial changes – the turbulent 2022/23 season incurred payouts for sacked coaches (Thomas Tuchel, Graham Potter) which inflated staff costs; 2023/24 was more stable on that front under Mauricio Pochettino, avoiding major one-off coaching compensation. To their credit, the new owners have been willing to underwrite these massive wages, but in the long term the club will need to keep salary growth in check.
Early signs of that came with a policy of incentive-heavy contracts for new signings and the sale of surplus players. The wage bill is expected to remain high but should stabilise or slightly decrease as the squad rebuild continues and if Chelsea can consistently qualify for Champions League, which brings both revenue up and might justify the wage spend.
For now, Chelsea still operate with a “Champions League wages on Europa League revenue” situation – a key reason underlying their financial losses absent extraordinary income.
Player trading had a profound impact on Chelsea’s 2023/24 finances, both in terms of profits on sales and the ongoing costs of transfer amortisation. On the outgoing side, Chelsea recorded a profit on disposal of player registrations of £152.5 million for the year.
This reflects the substantial number of players sold (or released) in 2023. The club undertook a dramatic squad overhaul in the summer 2023 transfer window, selling or moving on a dozen players – including several homegrown or fully amortised players which generate pure accounting profit. Major sales included Kai Havertz to Arsenal (~£65m fee), Mason Mount to Manchester United (~£55m), Mateo Kovačić to Man City (~£25m), plus the likes of Pulišić, Koulibaly, Mendy, Loftus-Cheek and others to various clubs. Many of these players had low remaining book values (for example, academy graduate Mount and long-tenured players like Azpilicueta left at nearly full profit, and even Havertz’s sale price exceeded his amortised value), resulting in that £152.5m profit on player sales that heavily boosted the accounts.
This figure was even higher than the prior year’s £142m profit on player trading, demonstrating Chelsea’s continued strategy of generating income from player sales. It’s worth noting Chelsea have historically been very effective at player trading – often selling academy graduates or fringe players for significant fees – and that remained true under the new ownership.
On the incoming side, Chelsea’s transfer spending remained extraordinarily high. Although the club reined in net spend compared to the record-shattering 2022/23 outlay, they still invested heavily in new talent in 2023/24. Big-money signings like Moisés Caicedo (£115m), Romeo Lavia (~£60m), Christopher Nkunku (~£52m), Cole Palmer (~£40m), Benoît Badiashile (~£35m, signed in January 2023 but falls partly in this fiscal year), Nicolas Jackson (~£30m), Axel Disasi (~£45m) and more joined the club.
Chelsea’s total transfer expenditure in the 2023 summer window was on the order of £300 million, nearly balanced by about £250 million of sales – but the net outlay still added to the club’s costs. These transfer fees do not hit the income statement all at once; instead, they are spread over the length of player contracts via amortisation. Chelsea have been notable pioneers of extremely long contract lengths (7-8+ year deals) to spread the amortisation cost thinner per year. Even so, the sheer scale of purchases means amortisation expense has skyrocketed. In 2022/23, Chelsea’s player amortisation charge was around £203 million (up 27% from the prior year’s £160m) – by far the largest in the Premier League.
This likely increased further in 2023/24 after another year of big signings, although exact figures aren’t yet reported. The accounting strategy of long-term amortisation was somewhat of a loophole the club exploited to enable the spending spree; however, the Premier League moved to cap amortization at 5 years for FFP purposes from 2024 onward, meaning Chelsea will not be able to repeat the extreme contract lengths in future deals.
It’s also important to highlight that owners Boehly and Clearlake have spent over £1 billion on transfers since acquiring the club in 2022, an unprecedented investment. This multi-year talent acquisition has built a very large squad, including many young prospects on loan or in development, which the club views as an investment in future success. The flip side is that squad size must be managed – hence the aggressive sales in 2023 and likely continuing in 2024 – both to comply with squad limits and to recoup some cash. In 2023/24, Chelsea also recorded a £198.7 million profit on disposal of subsidiaries, which came from selling Chelsea FC Women out of Chelsea FC Holdings.
Excluding that one-off, the £152.5m of player sale profits was the key factor offsetting the club’s ongoing transfer amortisation and high wages to avoid a huge loss. The underlying reality is that Chelsea’s operating model relies on player trading to balance books: even with £468m revenue, the club would have posted a large loss if not for selling players at a profit. This model is not unusual for Chelsea historically (the Abramovich-era Chelsea frequently sold players like Hazard, Oscar, Morata, etc., to manage FFP), but the scale is magnified now. Going forward, we can expect Chelsea to continue generating significant income from player sales – the academy and loan army provide a pipeline for that – but the club will hope that increased competition success (and the revenues that come with it) can reduce the dependence on selling assets to stay afloat financially.
While Chelsea achieved a headline profit in 2023/24, the underlying operating result was still a loss. The club noted that after the drop in revenue, there was a “decrease in operational costs … to offset the fall in revenue, resulting in a stable operating loss in comparison to the previous year.” In other words, management managed to cut or contain costs enough that the operating loss (before player trading and exceptional items) remained roughly the same as 2022/23.
In 2022/23, Chelsea’s operating loss (excluding one-offs) was on the order of tens of millions – for example, the prior year’s accounts show a £26.6m operating loss before exceptional expenses in 2021/22, and the figure was higher in 2022/23 due to the inflated wage bill and no Champions League.
For 2023/24, even with some cost cutting, it’s likely Chelsea’s core football operations lost somewhere in the low-to-mid nine figures (£100m+) range before transfer profits. The £128.4m pre-tax profit was only achieved after adding £152.5m of player sale profit and £198.7m from the women’s team sale.
If one were to strip out those two extraordinary gains (~£351m combined), the club would have shown a substantial underlying loss (on the order of £220m+). This illustrates that Chelsea’s normal business – even with cost savings – is far from break-even. EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation) is not reported here, but given the massive amortisation and still large wages, Chelsea’s EBITDA is likely deeply negative without transfer sales. It’s a pattern common to many big clubs: operating losses covered by player trading profits. By contrast, clubs with more disciplined wages (or higher revenues) can sometimes post an operating profit; for instance, in 2023/24 Arsenal nearly broke even pre-tax (losing £17.7m) thanks to huge revenue, despite a wage spike.
For Chelsea, turning an operational profit will probably require both revenue growth (Champions League money and a bigger stadium) and further cost rationalisation. The bottom line for 2023/24 was a net profit of £129.6m, but analysts and even the club’s owners acknowledge this figure is buoyed by one-time moves. It provides short-term relief and a healthier looking balance sheet, yet does not indicate a sustainably profitable model unless changes are made. Chelsea will need to keep this in mind as they plan financially for future seasons without the benefit of repeated “extraordinary” sales.
Chelsea’s 2023/24 financial manoeuvres were heavily influenced by the need to comply with Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations – specifically the Premier League’s Profitability and Sustainability rules. The Premier League allows clubs to lose no more than £105m aggregate over a rolling three-year period (with some adjustments for COVID and infrastructure) without potential sanctions.
Chelsea were at risk of breaching these limits due to consecutive large losses and enormous transfer spending. By the end of 2022/23, Chelsea had accumulated around £211m in pre-tax losses over two years (121.4m in 2021/22 and 90.1m in 2022/23). Even with allowable add-backs (like COVID costs or women’s football investments), the club’s FFP headroom was shrinking.
The new owners responded by essentially “selling” assets to themselves to generate artificial profits – a controversial but currently legal tactic. In 2022/23, Chelsea sold two club-owned hotels near Stamford Bridge to the parent company (BlueCo) for £76.5m, which counted as income and reduced the recorded loss. In 2023/24, they escalated this approach by selling Chelsea FC Women to a separate entity controlled by the owners (BlueCo) before the year-end, yielding a £198.7m profit on disposal. This internal sale of the women’s team was effectively an injection of £198.7m into the club’s accounts, turning what would have been a large loss into a profit and bringing Chelsea back within the allowable loss threshold.
Club statements and analysis confirm that without this move, Chelsea would likely have failed the Premier League’s Profitability and Sustainability (P&S) test for 2023/24. By posting a £129.6m profit, Chelsea now have some buffer in the three-year window, giving them breathing room to continue investing next year. Conrad Wiacek, a sports finance analyst at GlobalData, noted that Chelsea’s results “highlight some of the prevailing issues” with FFP in the era of multi-club ownership – essentially, Chelsea found a loophole. By “selling themselves to themselves,” wealthy owners can inject funds under the guise of a legitimate transaction, circumventing the intent of rules that are meant to prevent owners simply writing big checks to cover losses.
This has not gone unnoticed: rival clubs reportedly raised concerns, and indeed a proposal to close this loophole by disallowing related-party sales like this was considered but other Premier League clubs voted against immediate changes. The situation has raised ethical questions, especially as the league is simultaneously pursuing charges against Manchester City for alleged financial rule violations – punishing one club while another exploits grey areas could appear inconsistent.
It’s also important to differentiate UEFA’s FFP from domestic rules. UEFA’s current financial regulations (the new Financial Sustainability rules) do not count profits from selling subsidiaries in their calculations. So, while Chelsea’s internal sale of the women’s team helps for Premier League compliance, it would not assist in UEFA FFP calculations. In UEFA terms, Chelsea’s 2023/24 would still be seen as a large loss. Chelsea were not in European competition last season, so UEFA’s rules didn’t directly apply; however, should the club qualify for the Champions League or Europa League in upcoming seasons, they will need to ensure they meet UEFA’s requirements, which include a limit on allowable losses ( and a squad cost ratio rule.
The club’s heavy investment and creative accounting will certainly be under the microscope. For now, Chelsea insist they continue to comply with all financial regulations, and the 2023/24 profit confirms compliance on paper. But the sustainability of this approach is questionable – there are only so many assets one can sell internally. The women’s team has been carved out, the club’s real estate (stadium freehold, etc.) could potentially be next, but each such move draws scrutiny. The ideal path to compliance is, of course, to run the club at or near break-even through revenues and sensible spending, rather than relying on accounting fixes.
Achieving that will be the challenge for Chelsea going forward, as owner-funded “loophole” transactions may not be an option indefinitely if rules tighten.
The 2023/24 results underscore the immense involvement of Chelsea’s owners (Todd Boehly, Clearlake Capital, and partners under the BlueCo umbrella) in financing the club’s ambitions. Since acquiring Chelsea in May 2022, the ownership group has demonstrated a willingness to inject capital at an unprecedented scale. According to filings, BlueCo’s consolidated loss for March 2022 to June 2023 was £653m (this likely includes takeover-related costs and investment in transfers), and they have continually infused equity to cover transfers and losses – evidenced by multiple share allotments to pump cash into the club. The 2023/24 internal transactions (hotels, women’s team) are another form of owner investment, effectively equity funding by another name. In short, Boehly and Clearlake have spent freely – not only on transfer fees but also absorbing operating losses – to kick-start a new era for Chelsea.
Strategically, the owners are pursuing a long-term vision: rebuild the squad with young talent, invest in infrastructure, and grow global revenues. The heavy transfer spending on young players is meant to provide a foundation for future on-pitch success, which in turn drives financial success. The multi-club model is part of this strategy: Chelsea’s owners purchased a majority stake in French club RC Strasbourg, and by carving out Chelsea Women into its own subsidiary, they signal plans to grow that side of the business independently as well. These moves aim to create synergies (player development pathways, global fanbase growth, commercial opportunities) across the BlueCo portfolio.
However, in the immediate term, Chelsea face a few financial hurdles and priorities. One is securing a new main shirt sponsor and other commercial deals to replace temporary arrangements – a critical task as missing a season-long primary sponsor can cost tens of millions in revenue. Another major strategic project on the horizon is the redevelopment of Stamford Bridge. The owners have been evaluating plans to either rebuild Stamford Bridge on its current site or construct a new stadium nearby. Any stadium project would be extremely costly (estimates around £1-2 billion) and likely require the club to relocate for a few seasons during construction. While in the long run a modern 55,000-60,000 seat stadium could dramatically boost matchday income and enterprise value, in the short run it represents a financial and logistical challenge.
The club would need to finance the construction (the owners may need to contribute significant funds or bring in partners), and a temporary move could actually reduce matchday revenue for a period. As of the 2023/24 report, no decision has been finalised, but the owners’ commitment to investing in infrastructure remains part of the stated vision for making Chelsea a sustainable elite club.
On the sporting front, missing the Champions League for a second consecutive year (2024/25 season) is a blow to revenue, but the club has invested in a new manager and an overhauled squad to challenge for top-four again. The ownership’s readiness to spend will likely continue, though perhaps more measured now that the initial overhaul is largely done. We may see a shift from net spending to a more balanced transfer approach – indeed summer 2024 saw some big purchases but also big sales (e.g., Mason Mount, Kai Havertz in 2023; more exits in 2024) to stay within FFP limits. Chelsea’s academy remains an asset in this strategy: it produces talent that can either reinforce the first team or be sold for profit, aiding both competitive and financial goals.
In summary, Chelsea’s financial outlook is a mix of great opportunity and clear risk. The club has one of the highest revenue potentials in world football, but unlocking that potential depends on on-pitch success and capital projects. The owners have shown ambition by spending and absorbing short-term losses – a stark contrast to more risk-averse ownership models – with the expectation that success will eventually yield returns. In the near term, Chelsea will aim to get back into the Champions League to boost revenues by 2025, continue growing commercial partnerships globally (building on the £225m commercial base), and carefully manage their wage bill and transfer amortisation under the new cost-control rules.
The financial results for 2023/24 highlight both the extreme measures the club took to comply with regulations and the underlying need for a more sustainable financial model. How the ownership navigates the next few years – balancing investment with compliance – will determine if Chelsea can achieve their dual aims of football success and business stability in the long run. For now, the club’s finances are effectively on a “booster shot” from ownership interventions, buying time to align the hefty cost structure with the goal of operating within its means.
Chelsea fans can be optimistic that the resources are being provided to compete at the highest level, but the financial discipline and strategic decisions in upcoming seasons will be crucial to ensure those resources are used wisely and without jeopardising the club’s future.
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New moneyball analysis up on @thefalsenine. Chelsea may have posted a profit, but I haven't seen accounting this creative since the Enron days A trend I'm noticing is the growth and importance of the Women's team on financial performance https://paragraph.com/@thefalsenine/moneyball-chelsea-202324-financial-results