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The New Big Three

F.P. Dunneagin avatar F.P. Dunneagin
7 min read
Cover image for The New Big Three

If you prefer to listen, click here for the spoken version. If you prefer to read, the dispatch continues below.

In February 1945, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin met at Yalta to discuss what the world might look like after World War II. They represented three great powers whose armies were engaged in defeating Nazi Germany. Their decisions would help determine the political future of Europe, although many Europeans would subsequently discover that their opinions had not been essential to the proceedings.

Eighty-one years later, Donald Trump has entertained the prospect of meeting with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.

The resemblance to Yalta is irresistible, provided one overlooks the history.

Roosevelt had spent nearly four years directing America's participation in a world war. Churchill had led Britain through the Blitz. Stalin had presided over a military struggle that cost the Soviet Union millions of lives.

Still, every generation deserves its own Big Three, and there is no reason the present one should be deprived of the opportunity merely because the qualifications have changed.

The original Big Three were attempting to settle a war. The new arrangement might be considerably more ambitious. It could attempt to settle the world.

There would, naturally, be some administrative difficulties. For one thing, the world is already occupied.

The Seating Arrangements

The first challenge would be determining where everyone sits.

At Yalta, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin arranged themselves for a photograph that became one of the defining images of twentieth-century diplomacy.

Trump would undoubtedly appreciate the opportunity to improve upon it.

He would prefer the center chair, naturally. Putin might agree, provided Russia received everything it wanted before the photographer arrived. Xi would probably be content to wait until the Americans and Russians finished discussing the furniture.

The flags would require particular attention. Three flags would be appropriate, although Trump might insist upon a fourth bearing his name.

There would also be the question of a communiqué.

The original Big Three produced declarations concerning liberated Europe, postwar arrangements, and the establishment of an international organization intended to prevent another global catastrophe.

The new Big Three could dispense with much of that paperwork. A statement announcing that the meeting had been tremendous, historic, and unlike anything anyone had ever seen would probably suffice.

The difficulties would begin when someone asked what had actually been agreed upon.

The Division of the World

The appeal of dividing the world into spheres of influence is that it greatly simplifies international relations.

Instead of dealing with nearly two hundred sovereign countries, one need only deal with three men.

This is an enormous improvement in administrative efficiency, particularly for anyone who finds democracy unnecessarily complicated.

Russia might receive assurances concerning its neighborhood. China might expect recognition of its interests in the western Pacific. The United States could claim a suitably expansive interpretation of its own hemisphere.

Everyone would be pleased.

Everyone, that is, except the countries being assigned.

Ukraine might object to being included in Russia's neighborhood without its consent. Taiwan would have considerable difficulty with the proposed Chinese arrangements. European governments might wonder whether their own alliances and political institutions had become optional.

India, meanwhile, might ask why a country containing more than a billion people had been omitted from the conversation.

Brazil could raise similar questions about South America.

Japan, South Korea, Australia, and numerous other countries might also express an interest in determining their own futures.

This would create an unfortunate complication: the entire purpose of dividing the world into three spheres is to avoid having to consult everyone who lives in it.

The Russian Position

Putin would enter the discussions with certain advantages.

He has spent years explaining that Russia possesses historical rights extending well beyond its internationally recognized borders.

The difficulty with historical rights is determining where history begins.

If the appropriate starting point is the Russian Empire, considerable territory becomes available for discussion. If the Soviet Union is preferred, the map changes again.

One suspects that the preferred historical period would be whichever produces the largest Russia.

Putin could explain that his objectives are entirely defensive. Russia requires security, and security requires neighboring countries to remain within its sphere of influence.

Should those countries resist, their resistance would demonstrate the danger against which Russia must defend itself.

It is a remarkably convenient doctrine.

A country that seeks independence becomes a threat. A country that seeks protection becomes provocative. A country that refuses Russian domination becomes evidence that Russian domination is necessary.

The arrangement is internally consistent, provided one accepts that Russia's security takes precedence over everyone else's sovereignty.

Trump might find the explanation persuasive: after all, it is much easier to reach an agreement when one party is permitted to define the interests of everyone who is absent.

The Chinese Position

Xi would approach the meeting differently.

Where Putin might invoke history, and Trump might invoke the success of the meeting itself, Xi would have the advantage of patience.

China's strategic ambitions are not limited to a single negotiation or presidential term.

Its economic relationships extend across continents. Its military capabilities have expanded considerably. Its government has demonstrated a willingness to pursue long-term objectives without requiring a favorable television review every afternoon.

Xi might therefore regard the proposed meeting less as an opportunity to divide the world than as an opportunity to discover what the other two gentlemen are prepared to concede.

There would be no need to hurry.

If Trump announced that China had agreed to something tremendous, Xi could congratulate him on the announcement.

If Putin demanded recognition of Russia's historic interests, Xi could express appreciation for the importance of history.

And if either man expected China to accept permanent limits upon its ambitions, Xi could suggest that the matter deserved further study.

The meeting might end with Trump declaring victory, Putin claiming recognition, and Xi returning home without having surrendered anything of consequence.

All three could describe the proceedings as successful.

Only two would need to know why.

The American Position

The United States would arrive with formidable advantages: an immense economy, a powerful military, an extensive alliance system, and institutions that have helped shape the international order for generations.

These advantages would ordinarily provide an American president with considerable influence. The difficulty arises when the president begins to regard those institutions and alliances as obstacles rather than assets.

A sphere-of-influence arrangement might appear attractive because it promises freedom from the irritating obligations of collective security.

Why consult allies when one can negotiate directly with adversaries?

Why defend international rules when powerful countries can simply agree upon exceptions?

Why concern oneself with the preferences of smaller nations when their preferences complicate an otherwise excellent deal?

However, this reasoning has a defect: American power has never depended solely upon the size of its military or economy. It also rests upon relationships with countries that have chosen to cooperate with the United States because they believe their interests are better served by doing so.

Those relationships cannot be transferred to a new owner like the deed to a hotel.

An ally that discovers its security has become a bargaining chip may begin looking for another table.

And a country that concludes American commitments are negotiable may eventually conclude that American assurances are negotiable as well.

Trump might still obtain his photograph.

Whether the United States would retain its influence is another matter.

The Problem with History

The comparison with Yalta is instructive, although perhaps not in the manner its admirers intend.

The original Big Three possessed enormous military power. Yet even they could not simply decree a stable postwar world into existence.

The arrangements made during and after the war contributed to a divided Europe, decades of confrontation, and a Cold War whose consequences remain visible.

Yalta was not a demonstration that great powers could permanently settle the world's affairs through personal agreement. It was evidence of how difficult such arrangements become when the interests of powerful states collide with the aspirations of the people whose futures are being negotiated.

The new Big Three would confront an even more complicated world: countries possess governments, economies, armed forces, alliances, and national identities of their own.

Many have little interest in returning to an international system in which geography determines their political masters.

They may not possess the power to prevent every arrangement made over their objections. But they possess considerable power to make those arrangements fail.

That is the inconvenient thing about sovereignty.

It does not disappear merely because someone leaves it off the agenda.

The Photograph

One can imagine the meeting concluding in a splendid ceremony.

Trump would announce that the three leaders had achieved an unprecedented understanding.

Putin would describe the discussions as constructive.

Xi would praise the importance of dialogue.

The cameras would flash.

The flags would flutter.

A communiqué would declare that the leaders had agreed upon the importance of peace, stability, prosperity, mutual respect, and continued consultations.

Everyone would return home to explain what the agreement meant.

Trump would insist that he had secured the greatest diplomatic achievement in modern history.

Putin would explain that Russia's legitimate security interests had finally received appropriate recognition.

Xi would announce that China remained committed to its long-term national objectives.

And the rest of the world would begin examining the fine print.

There might be one final difficulty: at Yalta, the Big Three were deciding how to manage the consequences of a war that had already transformed the world.

Our imagined successors would be contemplating how to rearrange a world that has not requested their assistance.

The distinction is considerable.

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin could point to armies, alliances, and the terrible results of a global conflict.

Trump, Putin, and Xi would have to explain why three men should possess the authority to determine the political futures of billions of other people.

Perhaps they would not bother.

After all, the photograph would already have been taken.

And in the modern age of autocratic diplomacy, that may be the most important agreement of all.

— Dunneagin

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