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Winning Congress Is Not the Same as Repairing Government

F.P. Dunneagin avatar F.P. Dunneagin
4 min read
Cover image for Winning Congress Is Not the Same as Repairing Government

The Democrats have won control of Congress. The voters have handed them an opportunity to restore constitutional accountability, and the Republicans have handed them a considerable amount of material with which to begin.

One might reasonably expect the Democrats to be delighted. Instead, they have already begun debating how much investigating is too much investigating, whether impeachment is worth pursuing, and how to avoid appearing more interested in Donald Trump than in the Americans who voted against his administration.

These are legitimate questions. They would be more reassuring if Democrats had not demonstrated, over many years, a remarkable capacity to turn agreement on an objective into disagreement over how to achieve it.

The election settled one question: voters were dissatisfied with the direction of their government. It did not settle what the incoming congressional majorities should do about it.

That distinction matters.

When the new Congress convenes in January, Democrats will acquire the authority to conduct investigations, compel testimony, examine executive decisions, scrutinize federal expenditures, and demand explanations from officials who have grown accustomed to providing none.

They will also inherit the responsibility to address the war in Iran, the cost of living, and the consequences of decisions made during the administration's first two years.

These obligations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they are closely related.

A government that cannot explain how it spends public money, why it commits military forces, or whose interests influence its decisions is unlikely to inspire confidence in its ability to solve the problems confronting ordinary citizens.

The incoming Congress must resist the suggestion that investigating abuses of public authority somehow interferes with the business of governing.

The constitutional obligation to investigate does not become less important because the findings may be politically uncomfortable. Nor does the obligation to address the cost of living, the war, or other national concerns disappear because Congress is conducting oversight.

A legislature capable of doing only one of these things at a time is not exercising the full responsibilities entrusted to it.

The temptation to summon every controversial administration official before a committee will be considerable. So will the temptation to turn each hearing into a televised competition for the most indignant opening statement.

There is, after all, a difference between conducting an investigation and producing a performance about conducting an investigation.

The first may strengthen constitutional government. The second merely provides additional programming.

But there is an equally important distinction between exercising restraint and avoiding responsibility.

Congressional oversight is not an optional activity to be undertaken when the political climate is favorable. It is among the constitutional mechanisms by which the legislative branch ensures that executive authority remains subject to law.

If Democrats decline to investigate consequential allegations because they fear accusations of partisanship, they will effectively permit the administration to determine the boundaries of congressional oversight.

That would constitute a failure of responsibility before the first witness was sworn.

Impeachment presents a related question. The Constitution provides that remedy for serious misconduct, not as an obligatory expression of congressional displeasure. Whether proceedings are warranted must depend on evidence, constitutional standards, and the gravity of the alleged offenses.

But the difficulty of securing a conviction is not, by itself, an argument against examining conduct that may warrant impeachment.

The responsibility to establish the facts precedes the political calculation of what consequences may follow.

Nor should Congress confine its attention to individual wrongdoing.

The more consequential question concerns what has happened to the institutions of American government themselves.

The removal of experienced officials, the concentration of decision-making authority, the weakening of professional independence, and the treatment of statutory limitations as obstacles to be overcome rather than obligations to be observed all deserve examination.

Congress must establish not only whether particular decisions were lawful, but whether the institutions responsible for evaluating those decisions remain capable of exercising independent judgment.

This is especially important in matters of national security, where the consequences of institutional failure may be measured in lives rather than election returns.

And here the incoming majorities must look beyond January 2027.

An investigation may establish that an official exceeded his authority. A hearing may expose a breakdown in oversight. An impeachment may address misconduct of sufficient gravity.

None of these, by itself, repairs the system that permitted the failure.

That requires legislation, enforceable safeguards, responsible appropriations, and a renewed commitment to the principle that public authority belongs to offices established by law—not to the individuals temporarily occupying them.

The next Congress will face substantial obstacles. Presidential vetoes remain possible. Senate procedures will constrain legislation. Courts may become involved. And the administration is unlikely to welcome renewed scrutiny with an outpouring of cooperation.

None of this excuses congressional inaction.

Nor should the existence of those obstacles become an excuse for substituting theatrical confrontation for sustained legislative work.

Democrats need not choose between accountability and governing. They must demonstrate that accountability is part of governing.

That means conducting disciplined investigations, establishing an authoritative public record, pursuing consequences where the evidence warrants them, and developing legislation that addresses the institutional weaknesses those investigations reveal.

It means distinguishing evidence from accusation without confusing constitutional restraint with political timidity.

And it means recognizing that the voters did not elect a new Congress merely to review the conduct of the old administration. They elected representatives who must also confront the consequences of that conduct.

The election was not a transfer of unlimited authority from one party to another.

It was an opportunity to restore the limits that make authority legitimate.

The voters have delivered their judgment. Congress must now demonstrate its own.

Winning an election changes who holds power. Restoring constitutional government requires ensuring that its limits endure after the next election—and that those entrusted with enforcing them are willing to do so.

— Dunneagin

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