Albert Camus once accused Soren Kierkegaard of committing “philosophical suicide” primarily because Kierkegaard—according to Camus—does not have the courage to remain in the tension and ‘painful opposition’ of ‘the absurd’:  “what I am offered neglects [the absurd’s] basis, negates one of the terms of the painful opposition, demands of me a resignation.” (Camus, Myth of Sisyphus, p. 41).

To give a very quick crash course: what Camus refers to as ‘the absurd’ can be thought of as a place where our reason ceases to satisfy us. As an example: science can get down to extremely tiny ‘building blocks’ of existence. Reason is very useful here. But when we discover atoms and quarks and other things, the mind can begin to question ‘why’ or ‘where’ or ‘how’ these things originated. Camus posited that there is no ‘concrete’ answer to these questions: nothing that can survive the ‘blows’ of reason. Not atheism, not religious faiths, not agnosticism, not ‘pure’ science, etc. The absurd(for Camus) is a painful experience of existential dread where we are left without a satisfying sense of meaning or greater reason for being--either because the belief we look to doesn’t offer one(atheism, science, etc.) or it requires a bit of faith(religion, spirituality, etc.). Camus ultimately came to the conclusion that a healthy approach to the absurd is to face it completely and not try to suggest that reality is otherwise. Basically: Camus doesn’t like ‘bull-shitters’. He believed there is a contentment to be found in this acceptance of the absurd. This is his primary reason for criticizing Kierkegaard.

In short, Kierkegaard was a philosopher who wrote about the significance/importance of faith and its role in the face of a notion such as the absurd. More on this later.

Camus goes on to say that Kierkegaard’s overall philosophy is one of many existing ‘negations’ of the absurd.  Camus finds that these negations are an abandoning of reason: “Those redeeming negations…negate the obstacle which has not yet been leaped over,” (Camus, Myth, p. 42).  Another reason for Camus’s criticism of Kierkegaard is the appeal to anything that exists beyond the known world: “They always lay claim to the eternal, and it is solely in this that they take the leap.” (Camus, Myth, p. 42).  This criticism of Kierkegaard is very compelling.  But it is difficult to call it valid.

To evaluate whether Camus’s thoughts on Kierkegaard are valid, we must examine what Camus assumes to be true about reality.  Camus believes that what is real is only what is known as absolutely as possible.  He does not subscribe to the concept of a God or higher power.  This would be for Camus a cowardly attempt to avoid the pain of the absurd.  We see this when Camus imagines Kierkegaard proclaiming the existence of the eternal as an avoidance of despair: “If man had no eternal consciousness…what would life be but despair?” (Camus, Myth, p. 41).  Camus’s response is very telling: “Seeking what is true is not seeking what is desirable,” followed by, “…the absurd mind, rather than resigning itself to falsehood, prefers to adopt fearlessly Kierkegaard’s reply: “despair.”” (Camus, Myth, p. 41).

While Camus’s fierce commitment to the tension and ‘painful opposition’ of the absurd is admirable, it requires the assumption that reason can only get one so far.  The assumption is not, as Camus notes on page 51 of The Myth of Sisyphus, that there is nothing else to be known*.*  Rather, it is that what we have now is all we have to work with: “I don’t know whether this world has a meaning that transcends it.  But I know that I do not know that meaning and that it is impossible for me just now to know it.” (Camus, Myth, p. 51).  From this, Camus adopts a resolute stance toward the absurd: “It is merely a matter of being faithful to the battle…War cannot be negated.  One must live it or die of it.  So it is with the absurd.” (Camus, Myth, p. 93).  Again, Camus’s commitment to facing the absurd without compromise is admirable.  But this does not mean that the absurd is absolutely all we have.

Interestingly, when examining Kierkegaard’s philosophy as presented in Fear and Trembling, we find him speaking of the absurd and its role with the ‘knight of faith’ on page 70: “He resigned everything infinitely, and then took everything back on the strength of the absurd.” (Kierkegaard, Fear, p. 70).  It is worth noting that Kierkegaard’s ‘absurd’ is very much the same as Camus’s.  The primary difference is that for Kierkegaard, God is the embodiment of the absurd: “God blesses Abraham with a son, demands the son, then gives a ram and rescinds the demand for the son.  This is absurd.”  When reading more about Kierkegaard’s ‘knight of faith’, we find them renouncing everything as a form of submission to the absurd/God and being content much like Camus’s absurd man is content: “he has felt the pain of renouncing everything…and yet to him finitude tastes just as good as to one who has never known anything higher.” (Kierkegaard, Fear, p. 69-70). Kierkegaard’s approach to the absurd is demonstrated best in the story of Abraham sacrificing Isaac coupled with a concept Kierkegaard calls ‘the teleological suspension of the ethical’. Crash course incoming.

According to Kierkegaard, the teleological suspension of the ethical is a necessary concept to understand the paradox that lies in the actualization of faith.  The ‘ethical’ in this case refers to what we could call generally accepted concepts of right and wrong (do not murder, do not steal, etc.). Kierkegaard calls these general concepts of right and wrong ‘the universal’.  As said on page 83 of Fear and Trembling: “The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone…” (Kierkegaard, Fear, p. 83).  Kierkegaard then reasons that any one who does not align with this ‘universal’ is what we may refer to as a sinner: “As soon as the single individual wants to assert himself in his particularity, in direct opposition to the universal, he sins,” (Kierkegaard, Fear, p*.* 83).

This then means that an individual’s purpose(telos) could be found only in aligning with the universal and suspending or forfeiting any of their own individual sense of purpose for the sake of the universal.  Kierkegaard finds this highly inadequate and unacceptable.  For Kierkegaard, faith is expressed not by aligning with the universal, but by becoming a particular who sets themselves above the universal—specifically in their relation to the ‘absolute’.  The absolute, in Kierkegaard’s argument, can be thought of as God or some higher power that exists above and outside of humanity.

In their relation to the absolute, the individual goes beyond the universal to address and be addressed by the absolute directly: “the single individual as the particular is higher than the universal…as the particular, stands in an absolute relation to the absolute.” (Kierkegaard, Fear, p. 85).  This would traditionally be considered sinful because it requires operating outside of the dictation of the universal. But this, Kierkegaard says, is precisely where faith begins: “Then how did Abraham exist?  He had faith.” (Kierkegaard, Fear, p. 90).  It is only because of faith that going beyond the universal is not simply sin: “If that is not faith, then Abraham is done for and faith has never existed in the world.” (Kierkegaard, Fear, p. 84).  This is what is meant by the ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’: going beyond conventionally accepted concepts of right and wrong(universal) to relate to the absolute(god, higher power, etc.) according to one’s purpose(telos).

Much of Kierkegaard’s argument in Fear and Trembling hinges on this teleological suspension of the ethical.  He points to Abraham being hailed as the father of faith despite having every resolution to commit murder of his own son: “If this is not how it is with Abraham, then he is not even a tragic hero but a murderer.” (Kierkegaard, Fear, p. 95).  For Kierkegaard, faith cannot begin without suspending the ethical.  And if suspending the ethical is not done through relation to the absolute for some higher purpose, it is merely sinful. So to Kierkegaard, faith doesn’t receive the absurd(God demanding a sacrificed son that he had previously promised as a blessing) as meaninglessness, but rather takes a resolute stance--much like Camus’s resolute acceptance of the absurd.

Seeing that Kierkegaard’s submission to God and Camus’s facing of the absurd are the same in nature, one wonders why Camus takes such strong issue with Kierkegaard’s philosophy.

A key lies in what the implications of the absurd are for each.  Camus submits to the absurd and receives it as a signal of meaninglessness.  Camus’s submission to the absurd says ‘This is what I have before me to do.’ and there it stops with no request for meaning.  Kierkegaard also ultimately submits to the absurd but receives it differently.  Kierkegaard’s submission to the absurd says ‘This is what I have before me to do and I am convinced it is what is right to do’.  For one, the outcome of the absurd is meaninglessness.  For the other, it is certainty in rightness of action.  These conclusions, while having similar origins, are nearly complete opposites: one embraces meaninglessness, the other embraces everything as meaningful.

Kierkegaard makes the following proclamation in Fear and Trembling: “Philosophy cannot and should not give us an account of faith, but should understand itself and know just what it has indeed to offer, without taking anything away, least of all cheating people out of something by making them think it is nothing.” (Kierkegaard, Fear, p. 63).  He then says that while there is much he cannot understand or make sense of, this is not justification to abandon a sense of something higher: “God’s love is for me, both in a direct and inverse sense, incommensurable with the whole of reality.  I am not coward enough to whimper and moan on that account, but neither am I underhand enough to deny that faith is something far higher.” (Kierkegaard, Fear, p. 63). 

Camus’s criticism of Kierkegaard requires a heavy assumption that what we have in front of us now is indeed all we have.  As Camus himself states, this is not true absolutely (P51, Myth).  As demonstrated, both Camus and Kierkegaard begin with the absurd and, with a slight deviation in assumptions, land at very different conclusions. The above proclamation of Kierkegaard demonstrates that a lack of knowledge does not require one to abandon the notion of the eternal, and a clinging to such does not have to stem from cowardice as Camus suggests.  Therefore, Camus’s criticism of Kierkegaard is not valid. 

Works Cited

Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. Translated by Justin O'Brien. 2nd ed. Vintage International, 2018.

Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling. Translated by Alastair Hannay. Penguin Books, 2003.