The Curation DAO framework is a token holder-based voting system with the goal of supporting artists and incubating collections. Token holders stake their tokens to accrue votes. Votes are utilized to show support for Artist Applications. The more votes an Artist receives, the higher the chance they are spotlighted by the DAO. The Curation DAO acts in conjunction with a Foundation partner such as a museum, studio, or other centralized entity. This framework allows for a larger sum of persons to support the incubation and new collections of artists entering the web3 space on Tezos.

Curation DAO become the curators of culture. Guiding the way for the foundational partner to make strive and see the artistic perspective of the masses. Tokens become the medium of voicing opinions and sharing the view. Democratizing the direction of artistic expression through tokenized representative voting allows for this community-driven guidance. Foundational partner gets a new audience keen on representation and the artistic expression.

The g-token model produces non-transferable vote tokens for use by individuals to show support for artists in the application. The g token is positioned to serve as a quantifiable on-chain earned vote within the DAO. gCDT represents shares within the rounds of voting, whether it be within the application process or royalties’ distribution. Quantifying high conviction within the DAO

Artist Application Process

Applications are submitted by an Artist. This application consists of past work, inspirations for hosted collection, medium, and samples + a proposal for a potentially featured collection. This application is then vetted by the Curation Foundation (or museum counterparty). This point of centralization allows for partner stakeholders to have their say, and act as a spam deterrent/filter. Deeming which applications should be voted on by the holders. Holders do not need to receive applications of spam or unvetted artists, the criteria will be established with the partner and posted ahead of applications opening so artists are aware.

Applications would consist of vetting from the Foundation (or any centralized entity). The application process is highly customizable relative to the need of the entity enacting the framework. Museums can put in place applications, competitions, contests; a multitude of frameworks and processes can be utilized as a means for voters to judge and show support. The means in which the information is presented to the DAO of voters can get as creative as the centralized entity is willing to be.

Voting and g-Tokens

Voting by token holders occurs based on a ve-token non-transferrable system. Staking the Curation DAO Token (CDT) for Governance CDT (gCDT) is how votes in the system are earned. Each earned g-token (referred to as gCDT) is equivalent to 1 vote. Votes can be distributed among several artists in the application field per quarter. Voting is also a rewarded activity in the Curation DAO. If token holders allocated 100% of their g-tokens to artists each voting window, the rewards for participating in voting are received. These rewards are paid in CDT.

Voting to earn is not an all-or-nothing system. Voters are encouraged to use 100% of their g-token allowance per voting cycle. They are incentivized to do so with the CDT emissions per quarter. These are paid in relation to the # of gCDT used. The more gCDT used, the more CDT earned for voting. This relationship is linear.

If 100% of gCDT are casted for the quarter, 100% of CDTs due are rewarded for that quarter. If 50% of gCDT are casted to vote by a Voter, then 50% of CDTs are rewarded. There is no slashing of staked CDT for not voting. Voting is an opt-in process and those holders that do vote are rewarded for their input. Inflation is capped at 3% per quarter if 100% of ve-token are casted. Initial supply is 500,000 CDTs.

CDT can be staked to generate gCDT. gCDT is neither transferable nor tradable due to the design of the smart contract, i.e. they are locked in the private wallet of the user.

1 staked CDT generates 0.042 gCDT every hour. The maximum gCDT held from a deposit is 100 times the CDT staked. In other words, it takes about 3 months to reach the gCDT cap. You can always stake more CDT to earn more gCDT. You can withdraw your staked CDT at any time. However, your accumulated gCDT will drop to 0 as soon as you unstake any amount.

Royalties & g-Tokens

Royalties are designed by the artist upon submitting the collection. Of the initial collection, the artist can choose to allocate all or a portion of his royalties to voters that support them. The gCDT casted by voters’ act as a pool to determine how royalties are shared.

How you vote for artists also affects the long-term individual holdings of the voters. gCDT allocated to artists acts as the % weigh in the royalties’ pool for the artists rewards. This allows voters to earn rewards to support the voting process. A detail of a successful artist launching and sharing royalties with voters below:

Ex. If Voter A votes 100 gCDT to Artist John, and Voter B votes 20 gCDT, and the entire pool is 120, Hodler A earn 83% of the royalties from the collection shared by Artist John.

Royalties can become a tool to win over voters that are looking for bigger shares of the secondary market profit. The royalties acting as an internal, structured bribe system for artists keep a transparent show of support and residual profit between investors, artists, and secondary markets. This level of transparency between creators and backers for the open market is unique.

Royalties’ payments would be automated via smart contracts, allowing payment directly to stakers addresses. Voters would then receive their benefits whether staked and token holders or not. This ensures voters receive rightful royalties regardless of status relative to the DAO.

Rewards & g-Tokens

Unstaking CDT ends and burns all gCDT accrued by the staker. This may have holders concerned regarding royalties for voters. gCDT balances used for royalties are snapshotted and recorded, so unstaking after a vote will not affect royalty payouts for past voting rounds.

This allows users to exit gCDT positions and even CDT positions after a vote has occurred and royalties from the artist will still be passed to the proper supporter of the artist. This can be seen as a potential issue rather than a benefit depending on the view of the individual. This can also be seen as a limitation of the protocol. Allowing voters to exit the DAO and positions but still receive benefits to take outside of the system can certainly be seen as a downside rather than a benefit of free choice.

Tokenomics

Liquidity Plan

The tokenomics for the Curation DAO Token (CDT) are broken down into six main sections: LP Reserves, Farm incentives, Vote-2-Earn, Foundation Reserves, IDO, DAO Reserves. This breakdown of tokens allows for the expanded usage of the token outside of voting purposes. A robust DEX liquidity plan supports the tokens healthy liquidity providers as well as offers the DAO and foundation the opportunity to host Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL).

Voting Inflationary Schedule

Vote-2-Earn offers a runway of liquidity hosted at a quarterly inflation rate of 3% when all g-tokens are utilized in the previous round of voting. What this system is designed to do is support an active DAO. If member voting tappers off, so do quarterly rewards. Having rewards lag and follow the DAO usage metric of previous round voting allows for closely controlled inflation relative to interest and usage. The closely tracked metric of voting usage by the protocol allows the Foundation and DAO to monitor the liquidity of the LPs and properly support the decentralized voters framework.

Curation DAO Tokens are distributed to stakers who vote (Voters). These active votes, when voting with 100% conviction rates per quarter, will cause an annual inflation rate of only 12%. With an allotment of 4 million CDT for voters, it would take until the end of Q1 2040 for CDT rewards for voters to end. The DAO has the option to vote and lower emission rates by the protocol, but a hard-coded cap of 3% per quarter would be enacted.

Quarterly inflation numbers are dependent on the conviction rate of voters. The curve of inflation is affected by the # of gCDT used to vote in the previous round. If 100,000 Votes are casted of the 1,000,000 used, only 10% of the potential inflation is delivered. This inflation is directed to voters. This directed inflation allows for super-directed inflation to active members, a no-determent policy (no slashing), and the ability to unstake with no fee (only the loss of gCDT accrual).

The combination of gCDT, Vote-2-Earn, and dynamic inflation based on usage allow for a unique DAO voting system. The system provided above paths one potential path forward regarding the tokenomic backbone for a DAO to work in conjunction with a centralized entity such as an Art Foundation, Museum, or Studio. The art of balancing a centralized entity with a decentralized component provides the framework to properly compensate participants for relative risk and energy spent. Voters are responsible for managing inflation, when the voting becomes overrun, the DAO has the option to further curb quarterly inflation both for short-term and long-term timeframes.

The centralized entity has the responsibility for vetting the applications the voters receive. High-quality material is required to have a highly educated and aware voter base. Giving the DAO a smaller, more pointed number of tasks to decide, allows the DAO to be more effective with the decision it makes. There is a must for the share of responsibilities and rewards between decentralized and centralized entities, especially within the art space.

The Curation DAO framework is a token holder-based voting system with the goal of supporting artists and incubating collections. Token holders stake their tokens to accrue votes. Votes are utilized to show support for Artist Applications. The more votes an Artist receives, the higher the chance they are spotlighted by the DAO. The Curation DAO acts in conjunction with a Foundation partner such as a museum, studio, or other centralized entity. This framework allows for a larger sum of persons to support the incubation and new collections of artists entering the web3 space on Tezos.

Curation DAO become the curators of culture. Guiding the way for the foundational partner to make strive and see the artistic perspective of the masses. Tokens become the medium of voicing opinions and sharing the view. Democratizing the direction of artistic expression through tokenized representative voting allows for this community-driven guidance. Foundational partner gets a new audience keen on representation and the artistic expression.

The g-token model produces non-transferable vote tokens for use by individuals to show support for artists in the application. The g token is positioned to serve as a quantifiable on-chain earned vote within the DAO. gCDT represents shares within the rounds of voting, whether it be within the application process or royalties’ distribution. Quantifying high conviction within the DAO

Artist Application Process

Applications are submitted by an Artist. This application consists of past work, inspirations for hosted collection, medium, and samples + a proposal for a potentially featured collection. This application is then vetted by the Curation Foundation (or museum counterparty). This point of centralization allows for partner stakeholders to have their say, and act as a spam deterrent/filter. Deeming which applications should be voted on by the holders. Holders do not need to receive applications of spam or unvetted artists, the criteria will be established with the partner and posted ahead of applications opening so artists are aware.

Applications would consist of vetting from the Foundation (or any centralized entity). The application process is highly customizable relative to the need of the entity enacting the framework. Museums can put in place applications, competitions, contests; a multitude of frameworks and processes can be utilized as a means for voters to judge and show support. The means in which the information is presented to the DAO of voters can get as creative as the centralized entity is willing to be.

Voting and g-Tokens

Voting by token holders occurs based on a ve-token non-transferrable system. Staking the Curation DAO Token (CDT) for Governance CDT (gCDT) is how votes in the system are earned. Each earned g-token (referred to as gCDT) is equivalent to 1 vote. Votes can be distributed among several artists in the application field per quarter. Voting is also a rewarded activity in the Curation DAO. If token holders allocated 100% of their g-tokens to artists each voting window, the rewards for participating in voting are received. These rewards are paid in CDT.

Voting to earn is not an all-or-nothing system. Voters are encouraged to use 100% of their g-token allowance per voting cycle. They are incentivized to do so with the CDT emissions per quarter. These are paid in relation to the # of gCDT used. The more gCDT used, the more CDT earned for voting. This relationship is linear.

If 100% of gCDT are casted for the quarter, 100% of CDTs due are rewarded for that quarter. If 50% of gCDT are casted to vote by a Voter, then 50% of CDTs are rewarded. There is no slashing of staked CDT for not voting. Voting is an opt-in process and those holders that do vote are rewarded for their input. Inflation is capped at 3% per quarter if 100% of ve-token are casted. Initial supply is 500,000 CDTs.

CDT can be staked to generate gCDT. gCDT is neither transferable nor tradable due to the design of the smart contract, i.e. they are locked in the private wallet of the user.

1 staked CDT generates 0.042 gCDT every hour. The maximum gCDT held from a deposit is 100 times the CDT staked. In other words, it takes about 3 months to reach the gCDT cap. You can always stake more CDT to earn more gCDT. You can withdraw your staked CDT at any time. However, your accumulated gCDT will drop to 0 as soon as you unstake any amount.

Royalties & g-Tokens

Royalties are designed by the artist upon submitting the collection. Of the initial collection, the artist can choose to allocate all or a portion of his royalties to voters that support them. The gCDT casted by voters’ act as a pool to determine how royalties are shared.

How you vote for artists also affects the long-term individual holdings of the voters. gCDT allocated to artists acts as the % weigh in the royalties’ pool for the artists rewards. This allows voters to earn rewards to support the voting process. A detail of a successful artist launching and sharing royalties with voters below:

Ex. If Voter A votes 100 gCDT to Artist John, and Voter B votes 20 gCDT, and the entire pool is 120, Hodler A earn 83% of the royalties from the collection shared by Artist John.

Royalties can become a tool to win over voters that are looking for bigger shares of the secondary market profit. The royalties acting as an internal, structured bribe system for artists keep a transparent show of support and residual profit between investors, artists, and secondary markets. This level of transparency between creators and backers for the open market is unique.

Royalties’ payments would be automated via smart contracts, allowing payment directly to stakers addresses. Voters would then receive their benefits whether staked and token holders or not. This ensures voters receive rightful royalties regardless of status relative to the DAO.

Rewards & g-Tokens

Unstaking CDT ends and burns all gCDT accrued by the staker. This may have holders concerned regarding royalties for voters. gCDT balances used for royalties are snapshotted and recorded, so unstaking after a vote will not affect royalty payouts for past voting rounds.

This allows users to exit gCDT positions and even CDT positions after a vote has occurred and royalties from the artist will still be passed to the proper supporter of the artist. This can be seen as a potential issue rather than a benefit depending on the view of the individual. This can also be seen as a limitation of the protocol. Allowing voters to exit the DAO and positions but still receive benefits to take outside of the system can certainly be seen as a downside rather than a benefit of free choice.

Tokenomics

Liquidity Plan

The tokenomics for the Curation DAO Token (CDT) are broken down into six main sections: LP Reserves, Farm incentives, Vote-2-Earn, Foundation Reserves, IDO, DAO Reserves. This breakdown of tokens allows for the expanded usage of the token outside of voting purposes. A robust DEX liquidity plan supports the tokens healthy liquidity providers as well as offers the DAO and foundation the opportunity to host Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL).

Voting Inflationary Schedule

Vote-2-Earn offers a runway of liquidity hosted at a quarterly inflation rate of 3% when all g-tokens are utilized in the previous round of voting. What this system is designed to do is support an active DAO. If member voting tappers off, so do quarterly rewards. Having rewards lag and follow the DAO usage metric of previous round voting allows for closely controlled inflation relative to interest and usage. The closely tracked metric of voting usage by the protocol allows the Foundation and DAO to monitor the liquidity of the LPs and properly support the decentralized voters framework.

Curation DAO Tokens are distributed to stakers who vote (Voters). These active votes, when voting with 100% conviction rates per quarter, will cause an annual inflation rate of only 12%. With an allotment of 4 million CDT for voters, it would take until the end of Q1 2040 for CDT rewards for voters to end. The DAO has the option to vote and lower emission rates by the protocol, but a hard-coded cap of 3% per quarter would be enacted.

Quarterly inflation numbers are dependent on the conviction rate of voters. The curve of inflation is affected by the # of gCDT used to vote in the previous round. If 100,000 Votes are casted of the 1,000,000 used, only 10% of the potential inflation is delivered. This inflation is directed to voters. This directed inflation allows for super-directed inflation to active members, a no-determent policy (no slashing), and the ability to unstake with no fee (only the loss of gCDT accrual).

The combination of gCDT, Vote-2-Earn, and dynamic inflation based on usage allow for a unique DAO voting system. The system provided above paths one potential path forward regarding the tokenomic backbone for a DAO to work in conjunction with a centralized entity such as an Art Foundation, Museum, or Studio. The art of balancing a centralized entity with a decentralized component provides the framework to properly compensate participants for relative risk and energy spent. Voters are responsible for managing inflation, when the voting becomes overrun, the DAO has the option to further curb quarterly inflation both for short-term and long-term timeframes.

The centralized entity has the responsibility for vetting the applications the voters receive. High-quality material is required to have a highly educated and aware voter base. Giving the DAO a smaller, more pointed number of tasks to decide, allows the DAO to be more effective with the decision it makes. There is a must for the share of responsibilities and rewards between decentralized and centralized entities, especially within the art space.