A Decentralized Internet Organization framework that instrumentalizes fungibility to facilitate access to fully trustless and explainable collective efforts. It primarily accomplishes this by means of three low-complexity devices: inflation, majority vote and membership.

DIO? Decentralized Internet Organisations are anarchically constituted membranes that move towards a continuously defined forward.

tldr; wut wallaw? Self-replicates, uses "guild.xyz"-like authorisation and coordinape-like circles to determine its identity and direct its energy. No proposals.

How does it work Membrane The membrane determines if an agent is within or outside the organisation. It is constituted out of a list of tokens and balances and, provided an agent satisfies them as eligibility conditions, associated with a membership token. The membership token gives one access to all internal functionality of that specific entity and it can be revoked through the fault of the possessor or change in eligibility conditions. Each sub-DAO instance is independent in its determinations of membership. As such external specialised work or other DAOs can be appended. The membrane is expected to link to metadata such as social media communication channels or membership-gated workspaces.

Movement Movement occurs through agent-driven initiative and retroactive, contiguous allocation of resources. Resource allocation is a feedback mechanism. Whether taking the form of a separate working space (subDAO) or within an existing one, insufficient allocations for or dwindling support in favour of other, potentially more pressing efforts, is to be interpreted as feedback reflecting on the work in context. Initiating movement or calibrating energy allocations is primarily available only to members. Local power is proportional with an agent's stake.

Value Flow

Pluralism and Versatility

Majority vote driven governance is not known for granting much room to emergent, novel, potentially destabilising diversities of expression. While the base decision mechanisms for the definition of an existing space (membrane and identity changes) within WalllaW relies on circumstantial majorities, the right to create new autonomous spaces within contexts is bound by simple membership. It is as such likely for a type of 'majoritarian pluralism' to be the norm given that the parameters one can use to define what constitutes a majority are boundless.

The layout formed by the ways in which value quite literally trickles down might be of concern. I will not be able to stress this enough, but, any such space has the capacity to perform almost any arbitrary action an ethereum account can. That means, among other things, that a sub-DAO can at any point migrate outside the field of gravity of its incubating parent. [...] While this opens the door to a very wide range of security concerns, it is nonetheless a capability worth fighting for. Time delays, or more creative protection mechanisms can work to this end.

A hypothetical example of versatility: 5% MKR$ owners create a WalllaW for the purpose of running experiments that do not find their place within the core organisation. They do their thing, but also retain their ability to vote as a block within the original, dominating governance process. One aspect worth entertaining here is what happens when such a block vote becomes decisive. What WalllaW means for dissent and coalition building given that preferred resource allocations highlight the operating ideology of agents should also be considered.

Anticapture

Economic Resilience There's a set of beliefs and assumptions that grounds the security model of WalllaW. Among those is that "DAOs are for uncommon shared interests". As such, DAO governance, participating in it, is not for profit but for the advancement of said shared interest. It follows that it not only can but also logically should operate at a loss. In WalllaW there is no direct economic benefit for purely formal participation. Quite the contrary.

While capital deposits do increase one's swaying power, they do so at economic cost due to inflation. You not only get let’s say, .9 of same token value, but also likely provide an advantageous exit opportunity for others given that any new deposit is a deflationary event. Governance costs and one ought to participate in governance only if they believe their input is valuable to the extent they are willing to sacrifice economic value to make themselves heard. And that should by no means be controversial. There is a cost to you reading this as there is a cost to keeping up with interminable chains of opinions and proposals. Governance is for those that care enough to accept some economic downside for the future progress to be brought upon the collective through their input. For all others, holding the token should be good enough.

Social Resilience Membranes are what primarily defines the identity of a (sub)DAO. A membrane can change and a member can find itself outside of it. Member or not, they are entitled and can access their legitimately gained share of capital. Members can coordinate outside of pure majoritarian consensus and migrate and legitimise another entity in the face of attacks. A closing of rank of sorts. And the cool thing about it is that just as well as it can reconfigure for immune purposes so it can for merging or cross-DAO coordination simply by using the same membrane id.

A Decentralized Internet Organization framework that instrumentalizes fungibility to facilitate access to fully trustless and explainable collective efforts. It primarily accomplishes this by means of three low-complexity devices: inflation, majority vote and membership.

DIO? Decentralized Internet Organisations are anarchically constituted membranes that move towards a continuously defined forward.

tldr; wut wallaw? Self-replicates, uses "guild.xyz"-like authorisation and coordinape-like circles to determine its identity and direct its energy. No proposals.

How does it work Membrane The membrane determines if an agent is within or outside the organisation. It is constituted out of a list of tokens and balances and, provided an agent satisfies them as eligibility conditions, associated with a membership token. The membership token gives one access to all internal functionality of that specific entity and it can be revoked through the fault of the possessor or change in eligibility conditions. Each sub-DAO instance is independent in its determinations of membership. As such external specialised work or other DAOs can be appended. The membrane is expected to link to metadata such as social media communication channels or membership-gated workspaces.

Movement Movement occurs through agent-driven initiative and retroactive, contiguous allocation of resources. Resource allocation is a feedback mechanism. Whether taking the form of a separate working space (subDAO) or within an existing one, insufficient allocations for or dwindling support in favour of other, potentially more pressing efforts, is to be interpreted as feedback reflecting on the work in context. Initiating movement or calibrating energy allocations is primarily available only to members. Local power is proportional with an agent's stake.

Value Flow

Pluralism and Versatility

Majority vote driven governance is not known for granting much room to emergent, novel, potentially destabilising diversities of expression. While the base decision mechanisms for the definition of an existing space (membrane and identity changes) within WalllaW relies on circumstantial majorities, the right to create new autonomous spaces within contexts is bound by simple membership. It is as such likely for a type of 'majoritarian pluralism' to be the norm given that the parameters one can use to define what constitutes a majority are boundless.

The layout formed by the ways in which value quite literally trickles down might be of concern. I will not be able to stress this enough, but, any such space has the capacity to perform almost any arbitrary action an ethereum account can. That means, among other things, that a sub-DAO can at any point migrate outside the field of gravity of its incubating parent. [...] While this opens the door to a very wide range of security concerns, it is nonetheless a capability worth fighting for. Time delays, or more creative protection mechanisms can work to this end.

A hypothetical example of versatility: 5% MKR$ owners create a WalllaW for the purpose of running experiments that do not find their place within the core organisation. They do their thing, but also retain their ability to vote as a block within the original, dominating governance process. One aspect worth entertaining here is what happens when such a block vote becomes decisive. What WalllaW means for dissent and coalition building given that preferred resource allocations highlight the operating ideology of agents should also be considered.

Anticapture

Economic Resilience There's a set of beliefs and assumptions that grounds the security model of WalllaW. Among those is that "DAOs are for uncommon shared interests". As such, DAO governance, participating in it, is not for profit but for the advancement of said shared interest. It follows that it not only can but also logically should operate at a loss. In WalllaW there is no direct economic benefit for purely formal participation. Quite the contrary.

While capital deposits do increase one's swaying power, they do so at economic cost due to inflation. You not only get let’s say, .9 of same token value, but also likely provide an advantageous exit opportunity for others given that any new deposit is a deflationary event. Governance costs and one ought to participate in governance only if they believe their input is valuable to the extent they are willing to sacrifice economic value to make themselves heard. And that should by no means be controversial. There is a cost to you reading this as there is a cost to keeping up with interminable chains of opinions and proposals. Governance is for those that care enough to accept some economic downside for the future progress to be brought upon the collective through their input. For all others, holding the token should be good enough.

Social Resilience Membranes are what primarily defines the identity of a (sub)DAO. A membrane can change and a member can find itself outside of it. Member or not, they are entitled and can access their legitimately gained share of capital. Members can coordinate outside of pure majoritarian consensus and migrate and legitimise another entity in the face of attacks. A closing of rank of sorts. And the cool thing about it is that just as well as it can reconfigure for immune purposes so it can for merging or cross-DAO coordination simply by using the same membrane id.