原文：
https://dirtroads.substack.com/p/-1-decentralised-banking
回顾
I have argued that, along the continuum that goes from absolute centralization to total atomistic decentralization, the local equilibrium of banking might soon shift towards a more decentralized model.
隐藏的去中心化
In this world, the Central Bank — which is typically responsible for monetary policy and some level of prudential banking regulation, outsources a lot of decision making to authorised banks. While complying with some generic qualitative and quantitative guidelines, authorised banks manage relationships with clients and take the ultimate decisions on where to deploy (clients’) liquidity. There are currently more than 350 authorised banks (or MFI — Monetary Financial Institutions) in the UK alone. The Central Bank acts merely as a parametrical authority — in this context. This, to me, amounts to a lot of decentralisation.
黑箱，非最优的操作
Authorized banks have been suboptimal, or more often than not cumbersome, in dealing internally with those client management and allocation responsibilities. An infinite series of controlling or merely bureaucratic overlays often created more opacity than benefits. Rather than managing risk, they hide it beyond the parameters monitored by the regulators, where they sit on waiting to come back and bite.
Banks & MakerDAO
The authorized bank
…allow borrowers…
…to create currency in the form of deposits…
…to finance certain projects on credit…
…in exchange of specific guarantees…
…through bank’s infrastructure
The MakerDAO protocol (the authorised bank)…
…allows users (borrowers)…
…to create (crypto)currency (currency in the form of deposits)…
…in exchange of selected tokens (to finance certain projects on credit)…
…placed as collateral (in exchange of specific guarantees)…
…through the use of smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain (bank’s infrastructure)
优：
Transparency. Running on the Ethereum blockchain, Maker’s algorithmic logic, remuneration, and performance are transparent and auditable real time (!), and its financial results are available only few days after the closing of monthly accounts. DAO (read the Board) discussions are also fully auditable and searchable.
Efficiency. At the end of May, Maker’s 2021 YTD net banking income amounted to c. USD 52.1m, vs. operating costs of c. USD 807k, this is 1.6% cost-to-income ratio. No provision for losses was recorded
Profitability.Recorded profits have been used to burn (destroy) MKR tokens (the tokens giving holders governance and implied financial rights over the Maker protocol — the thing as close as possible to shares in the crypto-world). Maker estimates USD 151.6m net profits for 2021, corresponding to a burn (buyback) rate of c. 50k tokens over the year at the current c. $3k MKR price.
Scalability. Arguably, a significantly larger MakerDAO wouldn’t mean a significantly larger cost base or more complex infrastructure, assuming the protocol is solid.
缺：
Protocol risk. MakerDAO is a DeFi application running on the Ethereum blockchain, and operating through the use of several bits of blockchain infrastructure (including external actors such as oracles, keepers, and development teams). In addition, the protocol is designed to ensure security and efficacy. This means that Dai owners (and Maker’s MKR token holders) inherit Ethereum’s fragilities as well as Maker’s.
Credit risk. We argued in the previous post that, in its purest existential qualities, a bank is simply a trustable and (hopefully) knowledgable group of people supported by a bit (a lot) of infrastructure. Let’s assume that a working blockchain-based protocol solves the trust problem and the infrastructural problem; what about the knowledgable part? At Maker, risk parameters are set by a decentralised governance committee, do we trust that those parameters are solid enough to guarantee the bank’s funds?
Regulatory risk. By soft-pegging Dai to USD, Maker remains an automated lending and saving protocol that outsources some of its trust-making to a centralized authority, and particularly to the FED, which might not be happy to anchor an unregulated pseudo-bank. Whether this will result in some form of blockchain infrastructural regulation (difficult) or in limitations to the exchangeability of Dai (more likely) remains to be seen.Potential competitor : CBDC.
Currency stability risk. Dai has sustained its soft-peg with the USD quite well in the past, but what would happen if the Maker protocol would show internal fragilities resulting in a significant depreciation of Dai vs. USD (and consequently collateralized tokens)?
帮助回归银行本质：
Maker is forcing banking analysts to look at banking in its purest core qualities, stripping it of all unnecessary ancillary services.
Asking whether Maker is a good bank equals to asking whether:
The protocol facilitates a good alignment of incentives among borrowers (Vault owners) and equity providers (MKR token holders)
The Maker community (or the required majority) is able to take sound decisions regarding credit underwriting via setting the right risk parameters
The Maker protocol is successful in decentralizing and automatizing the price stability mechanisms that keep the value of Dai stable (relative to the USD) — traditionally the task has been dealt with craftsmanship by the Central Bank
抵押品的价值
Hidden by the overwhelming speculative activity we are currently experiencing, the merit of each supported collateral (i.e. token) is linked to the financial viability of its underlying project. Assessing this merit, which is the essence of banking, is what a good protocol alone cannot guarantee.