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Ethereum Research

FOCIL Resource Design Considerations

Special thanks to Thomas, Julian, Barnabe, and Jihoonsong for reviewing it This document was motivated by our work on the FOCIL consensus spec, where we realized that the protocol required more thoughtful consideration around resource constraints since certain details were not explicitly specified in the FOCIL Ethereum research post. Prerequisite Before we begin, we assume the following setup to establish a clean baseline for our considerations: The setup is based on the Electra hard fork. I...

HackMD

ePBS Breakout #8 Notes - HackMD

ePBS Breakout #5 Notes

HackMD

ePBS Breakout #5 Notes - HackMD

There's not much movement on the spec as opened here: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/3854

Ethereum Research

Inclusion List Timing Constraints

Special thanks to @Julian, @barnabe and @manav2401 for the reviews Background Inclusion list have been an active topic since the early days. Various designs have emerged over time, each with inevitable trade-offs concerning What can be constrained within a single Ethereum slot?. This post explores these trade-offs from the perspectives of different actors involved in ILs and defines the dependencies required for each actor to fulfill their role in integrating ILs into the protocol. We will com...

Ethereum Research

Builder Bidding Behaviors in ePBS

Special thanks to @soispoke for the review Background Builder bidding strategies in the MEV-Boost world have been studied extensively over some time. Numerous excellent resources, literature, game-theoretic models, and archives capture the current builder bidding behaviors on how to win block building right for an Ethereum slot. Today, builder bidding war for MEV-Boost is a complex interplay between latencies, relays, and strategy effectiveness. In this post, we argue that builder bidding strat...

arXiv.org

Strategic Bidding Wars in On-chain Auctions

The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) rewards in an on-chain competition, known as the MEV-boost auction. While more than 90% of blocks are currently built via MEV-Boost, trade-offs between builders' strategic behaviors and auction design remain poorly understood. In this paper we address this gap. We introduce a game-theoretic model for MEV-Boost auctions and use simulations to study different builders' bidding strategies observed in practice. We study various strategic interactions and auction setups and evaluate how the interplay between critical elements such as access to MEV opportunities and improved connectivity to relays impact bidding performance. Our results demonstrate the importance of latency on the effectiveness of builders' strategies and the overall auction outcome from the proposer's perspective.

Google Docs

EPBS: Redefine Trust Between proposers and builders

EPBS: Redefine Trust Between proposers and builders while reaping extra advantages… Terence Tsao Offchain Labs

Google Docs

PBS: Pipelining Ethereum Consensus and Execution (+ some forkchoice attacks)

PBS: Pipelining Ethereum Consensus and Execution (+ some forkchoice stuff) Terence Offchain Labs

HackMD

ePBS breakout #4 notes - HackMD

A new version of the consensus specification, rebased on top of Electra, will be opened soon.

Ethereum Improvement Proposals

EIP-7732: Enshrined Proposer-Builder Separation

Separates the ethereum block in consensus and execution parts, adds a mechanism for the consensus proposer to choose the execution proposer.

Ethereum Research

Fork Choice Attacks and Protections in EPBS

Introduction This post explores fork choice attacks through the perspective of ePBS, focusing on the new fork choice boost parameters and the rationale behind their design. We’ll begin by examining why these parameters are crucial, followed by a review of the existing designs. For background reading, I recommend reading Payload Boosts in ePBS by Potuz. Additionally, for a deeper understanding of how the LMD GHOST fork choice operates today, consider Ben Edgington’s section on fork choice in his ...

Arbitrum

Constitutional AIP: Proposal to adopt Timeboost, a new transaction ordering policy

UPDATE as of MONDAY, 10/7/2024 Timeboost Implementation Adjustments Timeboost’s design is the culmination of over a year of research and development by the team at Offchain Labs. While the on-chain implementation will be independently audited by Trail of Bits before the Tally vote, the long term performance of Timeboost can only truly be evaluated with real-world data - data that can help hone and fine-tune Timeboost’s design for the benefit of the ArbitrumDAO. To that end, although the auctio...