Last week, on April 2nd at 4 PM Eastern Time (after the US stock market closed), Trump unveiled his "reciprocal tariff" plan.

He took the trade surplus of major trading partners with the US last year, divided it by their total goods export value, and then halved it to come up with the new "reciprocal" tariff rate.

The logic? It doesn't matter.

All he needs is a pretext to start a trade war.

Subsequently, global markets, including cryptocurrencies, were thrown into turmoil.

The current market's confusion regarding Trump's tariff plan lies in whether the imposition of additional tariffs is a long-term national policy of the Trump administration or a negotiation tactic to gain leverage over trading partners and major corporations.

If it's the former, then perhaps, as many have said, this will change the global trade landscape, pushing the US towards isolationism, which is clearly detrimental to the global economy in the long run.

But if it's the latter, then perhaps the moment the so-called "reciprocal tariff" was announced on April 2nd was the peak of fear in this trade war. The subsequent general trend would still be that, as negotiations progress, the US gradually reaches bilateral and multilateral consensus with its trading partners. Market panic would gradually subside, and asset prices would return to their rightful levels.

Although Trump has previously, during his campaign and after taking office, promoted tariffs as a "national policy," using them to force manufacturing back to the US and as a political promise to the Rust Belt and grassroots voters, his stance has been very firm.

However, the author still tends to believe that tariffs are just his negotiation chips, and the ultimate goal of his negotiations is to gain enough political achievements for himself, which may include:

• More overseas orders: other countries purchasing more US goods (grain, energy, weapons, passenger aircraft)

• More domestic job opportunities: major corporations investing and building factories in the US (TSMC)

• Rational containment of competitors: forcing countries that try to sit on the fence to join forces with the US to further contain China (Vietnam and South Korea have already announced high tariffs on steel exports to China today)

Moreover, the asset crashes and recession expectations caused by tariff disturbances also put immense pressure on Powell, whom Trump can't command. If Trump can't force the Fed to cut interest rates through administrative power, what about the economy on the brink of collapse and the stock market?

Therefore, as long as he and his team can withstand the current immense pressure, when the seemingly illogical tariff demands gradually turn into results in negotiations, his reputation will gradually improve.

These achievements will all be converted into energy to further strengthen his political influence, becoming a reason for him to expand his power and helping the Republican Party gain an advantage in next year's midterm elections.

So is there a possibility that Trump really takes tariffs as a long-term national policy, believing that tariffs can force manufacturing back and change the current hollowing out of the US manufacturing industry, providing more job opportunities?

But the problem is that there is neither enough time nor space now. With the midterm elections of the two houses next year, long-term high tariffs causing economic recession, stock market crash, and asset inflation will surely make the Republicans lose the current narrowly held House of Representatives (or even the Senate), making Trump a "lame-duck president" in the remaining two years of his term, with policies even harder to implement.

There is simply not enough time and space for him to pursue such a long-term national policy. When the stock market and the token market are not doing well next year, let alone a long-term national policy, he won't be able to hold on in the short term either.

So this possibility is still relatively small.

In fact, at present, less than a week after the introduction of reciprocal tariffs, with contact with many countries and the confirmation of actual negotiation interests, the Trump team has already begun to soften their stance on tariffs.

For example, today, Kevin Hassett, the director of the National Economic Council, said: "More than 50 countries have already contacted the White House to begin trade negotiations. President Trump is not trying to destroy the market by destroying the US market."

Then Peter Navarro, the US trade advisor, spoke up: Trump seeks to cut tariffs and non-tariff barriers. This guy is the main supporter of Trump's tariff policy in the Trump camp, and he has recently been fiercely criticizing Musk's free trade stance.

So, is there a possibility of unexpected situations occurring in this process?

Yes, there is.

For example, if the US has an unsuccessful negotiation with its most important few trade partners, especially the EU and China. Currently, the two have either already implemented countermeasures or threatened to do so if the negotiations fail (on April 13th), and Secretary of the Treasury Bessen warned on the day of the "reciprocal tariff" announcement: no retaliation, or the US will up the ante.

This situation could lead to a stalemate in negotiations, or even a short-term escalation of conflict (further mutual increases in tariffs), but considering that most other countries will actively negotiate with the US, the likelihood of the overall situation being worse than it is now is not very high.

After all, Trump's core task is still to gain more "political achievements" before the midterm elections next year, rather than letting high inflation and a stock market crash ruin the second half of his term.

Therefore, the earlier he "goes crazy" and starts negotiating, the more advantageous it is for Trump.

As a creator of "uncertainty," Trump also doesn't want to face "uncertainty" before the midterm elections next year.

Last week, on April 2nd at 4 PM Eastern Time (after the US stock market closed), Trump unveiled his "reciprocal tariff" plan.

He took the trade surplus of major trading partners with the US last year, divided it by their total goods export value, and then halved it to come up with the new "reciprocal" tariff rate.

The logic? It doesn't matter.

All he needs is a pretext to start a trade war.

Subsequently, global markets, including cryptocurrencies, were thrown into turmoil.

The current market's confusion regarding Trump's tariff plan lies in whether the imposition of additional tariffs is a long-term national policy of the Trump administration or a negotiation tactic to gain leverage over trading partners and major corporations.

If it's the former, then perhaps, as many have said, this will change the global trade landscape, pushing the US towards isolationism, which is clearly detrimental to the global economy in the long run.

But if it's the latter, then perhaps the moment the so-called "reciprocal tariff" was announced on April 2nd was the peak of fear in this trade war. The subsequent general trend would still be that, as negotiations progress, the US gradually reaches bilateral and multilateral consensus with its trading partners. Market panic would gradually subside, and asset prices would return to their rightful levels.

Although Trump has previously, during his campaign and after taking office, promoted tariffs as a "national policy," using them to force manufacturing back to the US and as a political promise to the Rust Belt and grassroots voters, his stance has been very firm.

However, the author still tends to believe that tariffs are just his negotiation chips, and the ultimate goal of his negotiations is to gain enough political achievements for himself, which may include:

• More overseas orders: other countries purchasing more US goods (grain, energy, weapons, passenger aircraft)

• More domestic job opportunities: major corporations investing and building factories in the US (TSMC)

• Rational containment of competitors: forcing countries that try to sit on the fence to join forces with the US to further contain China (Vietnam and South Korea have already announced high tariffs on steel exports to China today)

Moreover, the asset crashes and recession expectations caused by tariff disturbances also put immense pressure on Powell, whom Trump can't command. If Trump can't force the Fed to cut interest rates through administrative power, what about the economy on the brink of collapse and the stock market?

Therefore, as long as he and his team can withstand the current immense pressure, when the seemingly illogical tariff demands gradually turn into results in negotiations, his reputation will gradually improve.

These achievements will all be converted into energy to further strengthen his political influence, becoming a reason for him to expand his power and helping the Republican Party gain an advantage in next year's midterm elections.

So is there a possibility that Trump really takes tariffs as a long-term national policy, believing that tariffs can force manufacturing back and change the current hollowing out of the US manufacturing industry, providing more job opportunities?

But the problem is that there is neither enough time nor space now. With the midterm elections of the two houses next year, long-term high tariffs causing economic recession, stock market crash, and asset inflation will surely make the Republicans lose the current narrowly held House of Representatives (or even the Senate), making Trump a "lame-duck president" in the remaining two years of his term, with policies even harder to implement.

There is simply not enough time and space for him to pursue such a long-term national policy. When the stock market and the token market are not doing well next year, let alone a long-term national policy, he won't be able to hold on in the short term either.

So this possibility is still relatively small.

In fact, at present, less than a week after the introduction of reciprocal tariffs, with contact with many countries and the confirmation of actual negotiation interests, the Trump team has already begun to soften their stance on tariffs.

For example, today, Kevin Hassett, the director of the National Economic Council, said: "More than 50 countries have already contacted the White House to begin trade negotiations. President Trump is not trying to destroy the market by destroying the US market."

Then Peter Navarro, the US trade advisor, spoke up: Trump seeks to cut tariffs and non-tariff barriers. This guy is the main supporter of Trump's tariff policy in the Trump camp, and he has recently been fiercely criticizing Musk's free trade stance.

So, is there a possibility of unexpected situations occurring in this process?

Yes, there is.

For example, if the US has an unsuccessful negotiation with its most important few trade partners, especially the EU and China. Currently, the two have either already implemented countermeasures or threatened to do so if the negotiations fail (on April 13th), and Secretary of the Treasury Bessen warned on the day of the "reciprocal tariff" announcement: no retaliation, or the US will up the ante.

This situation could lead to a stalemate in negotiations, or even a short-term escalation of conflict (further mutual increases in tariffs), but considering that most other countries will actively negotiate with the US, the likelihood of the overall situation being worse than it is now is not very high.

After all, Trump's core task is still to gain more "political achievements" before the midterm elections next year, rather than letting high inflation and a stock market crash ruin the second half of his term.

Therefore, the earlier he "goes crazy" and starts negotiating, the more advantageous it is for Trump.

As a creator of "uncertainty," Trump also doesn't want to face "uncertainty" before the midterm elections next year.