#XMR #51%Attack #Blockchain

In August 2025, a piece of shocking news shook the crypto world — the XMR (Monero) network was suspected of suffering a rare 51% hash rate attack. The attack was launched by Qubic, a project with a market cap of only about $300 million. After a month-long high-risk technical confrontation, Qubic achieved 51% dominance over Monero’s hash rate, successfully taking control of the hash power of an XMR network worth nearly $6 billion, triggering a deep blockchain reorganization and sparking widespread attention and heated discussion in the industry.

This event not only challenged the bottom line of blockchain technology security, but also prompted a re-examination of the economic incentives and security balance of the PoW (Proof-of-Work) mechanism.

This article will explore the incident from multiple angles — the timeline, technical background, attack method, market impact, and future countermeasures — to give you a deep understanding of this sensational “crypto battle,” analyze why XMR was breached, and highlight the lessons this incident offers for the entire crypto ecosystem.

In a blockchain PoW consensus mechanism, network security depends on the majority of the hash rate honestly maintaining the on-chain state. If one party controls more than 50% of the hash rate, it can theoretically carry out “double-spend” attacks, reorganize blocks, and even censor transactions — a situation known as a “51% attack.” Such attacks severely undermine the decentralization and security of a blockchain.

XMR is a privacy-focused cryptocurrency that launched in 2014, famous for its anonymous transaction features and resistance to on-chain analysis. It has long been seen as a leader in the “privacy coin” sector. However, XMR also faces regulatory pressure and security challenges, and has consistently been a target for governments and large institutions. The stability and security of its network are crucial to the health of its ecosystem and user confidence.

Qubic, created by IOTA co-founder Come-from-Beyond, is a unique L1 blockchain based on DAG architecture. Its core innovation lies in “Useful Proof-of-Work” (UPoW) — using hash power to train its on-chain AI model AIGarth rather than performing traditional, purposeless hash computations. Qubic’s vision is to build a global decentralized outsourcing computing platform.

Rumors of Qubic’s mining pool possibly attacking XMR began circulating in the XMR community in late July 2025. Over time, these rumors proved to be true. On August 12, 2025, blockchain security firm SlowMist posted on X confirming that the XMR network had experienced a deep reorganization of up to 6 blocks. Notably, public mining pool distribution data showed no single pool openly exceeding 50% hash rate, sparking speculation about hidden hash concentration or “selfish mining” strategies. In other words, the attack did not publicly display an outright majority hash rate, but instead controlled the network more covertly.

The Qubic team later admitted that, after nearly a month of intense technical competition and resource investment, they had successfully achieved over 51% control of the XMR network’s hash rate. This battle was fierce — beyond competing with traditional mining pools, Qubic endured more than a week of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks aimed at crippling its infrastructure. Surprisingly, Qubic’s decentralized architecture showed strong resilience; its core network was not substantively affected and continued operating normally.

“Selfish mining” was one of the core technical strategies in this attack. In this approach, miners secretly mine new blocks without immediately broadcasting them to the network. This forces other miners to continue working on the old chain, causing the blocks they mine to become “orphans” and wasting their hash power. The attacker uses this time to build a longer private chain, eventually releasing it and replacing the public chain with the longer private one, forcing all network nodes to adopt it as the main chain. This greatly increases the attacker’s share of block rewards and accelerates control.

Technical data shows that starting August 11, in the XMR block height range [3475729, 3475850], Qubic mined 63 of 122 blocks — more than 51%. This not only confirmed Qubic’s hash rate dominance but also showed that its selfish mining strategy worked, successfully taking over XMR’s block consensus mechanism.

Beyond mining strategy, economic incentives played a critical role in this battle. Qubic adjusted its reward allocation, using part of its earnings to buy back and burn its QUBIC token, boosting its value and market recognition; another portion went directly to incentivize CPU miners to join its network.

This dual incentive attracted hash power away from various XMR mining pools to Qubic at speed. Industry estimates suggest Qubic’s mining rewards were about triple those of traditional Monero pools — a tempting rate that lured many CPU miners to switch. The proportion of CPU miners in Qubic’s network jumped from about 10% before the attack to 50% afterward, massively increasing overall hash rate.

Qubic’s custom mining model — combining traditional mining with AI computation — improved efficiency and boosted rewards. Miners not only earned from traditional hashing but also gained extra rewards by helping train Qubic’s AI model AIGarth. This unique setup accelerated hash rate migration toward Qubic.

This combination of economic pull and technical innovation gave Qubic the power to carry out a 51% attack on XMR — and served as a wake-up call to the blockchain world: even multi-billion-dollar blockchains can be vulnerable if economic incentives break down and hash power concentrates. Balancing network security with economic viability will be a key design and governance challenge going forward.

Following the news, XMR’s market cap fell from about $6B to $4.6B — a drop of more than 20%. Many users required longer transaction confirmation times, increasing to at least 10 blocks to avoid double-spend risk, degrading transaction experience.

Several centralized exchanges increased security checks for XMR deposits and withdrawals, with some suspending XMR trading altogether. The Monero community faced a trust crisis, with users and investors worrying about network safety, reducing market liquidity and activity.

Qubic’s founder stated that the attack was a technical proof-of-concept to demonstrate UPoW’s feasibility, and expressed willingness to help XMR resist larger-scale attacks in the future. However, some community members and experts warned that the attack violated XMR’s decentralization ethos and should be taken as a serious security warning.

This event again proved that PoW security depends heavily on balanced economic incentives. The attacker lured miners with higher rewards, shifting hash power and ultimately seizing network control — showing the powerful influence of economic rewards on hash rate distribution.

Despite XMR’s high anonymity and decentralized design, the risk of hash rate centralization remains. The attack exposed the potential threat that large mining pools and hash monopolies pose to network security.

Qubic’s UPoW model attempts to use hash power for more valuable computations, pioneering an integration of blockchain and AI. While this attack is seen as a security incident, it also offers a point of reflection for the industry in exploring new consensus and incentive models.

The 51% attack on XMR stands as one of the most telling and impactful technical-economic battles in crypto history. It exposed economic vulnerabilities in PoW security and demonstrated Qubic’s distinctive on-chain computation model. For XMR, it is both a challenge and an opportunity — only through faster technical upgrades and ecosystem development can it safeguard its dominance in privacy coins.

For the entire blockchain ecosystem, the lesson is clear: decentralized security requires a combination of economic incentives and technical safeguards. Continuous innovation is the only way to stay unshaken in the unpredictable world of crypto.

#XMR #51%Attack #Blockchain

In August 2025, a piece of shocking news shook the crypto world — the XMR (Monero) network was suspected of suffering a rare 51% hash rate attack. The attack was launched by Qubic, a project with a market cap of only about $300 million. After a month-long high-risk technical confrontation, Qubic achieved 51% dominance over Monero’s hash rate, successfully taking control of the hash power of an XMR network worth nearly $6 billion, triggering a deep blockchain reorganization and sparking widespread attention and heated discussion in the industry.

This event not only challenged the bottom line of blockchain technology security, but also prompted a re-examination of the economic incentives and security balance of the PoW (Proof-of-Work) mechanism.

This article will explore the incident from multiple angles — the timeline, technical background, attack method, market impact, and future countermeasures — to give you a deep understanding of this sensational “crypto battle,” analyze why XMR was breached, and highlight the lessons this incident offers for the entire crypto ecosystem.

In a blockchain PoW consensus mechanism, network security depends on the majority of the hash rate honestly maintaining the on-chain state. If one party controls more than 50% of the hash rate, it can theoretically carry out “double-spend” attacks, reorganize blocks, and even censor transactions — a situation known as a “51% attack.” Such attacks severely undermine the decentralization and security of a blockchain.

XMR is a privacy-focused cryptocurrency that launched in 2014, famous for its anonymous transaction features and resistance to on-chain analysis. It has long been seen as a leader in the “privacy coin” sector. However, XMR also faces regulatory pressure and security challenges, and has consistently been a target for governments and large institutions. The stability and security of its network are crucial to the health of its ecosystem and user confidence.

Qubic, created by IOTA co-founder Come-from-Beyond, is a unique L1 blockchain based on DAG architecture. Its core innovation lies in “Useful Proof-of-Work” (UPoW) — using hash power to train its on-chain AI model AIGarth rather than performing traditional, purposeless hash computations. Qubic’s vision is to build a global decentralized outsourcing computing platform.

Rumors of Qubic’s mining pool possibly attacking XMR began circulating in the XMR community in late July 2025. Over time, these rumors proved to be true. On August 12, 2025, blockchain security firm SlowMist posted on X confirming that the XMR network had experienced a deep reorganization of up to 6 blocks. Notably, public mining pool distribution data showed no single pool openly exceeding 50% hash rate, sparking speculation about hidden hash concentration or “selfish mining” strategies. In other words, the attack did not publicly display an outright majority hash rate, but instead controlled the network more covertly.

The Qubic team later admitted that, after nearly a month of intense technical competition and resource investment, they had successfully achieved over 51% control of the XMR network’s hash rate. This battle was fierce — beyond competing with traditional mining pools, Qubic endured more than a week of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks aimed at crippling its infrastructure. Surprisingly, Qubic’s decentralized architecture showed strong resilience; its core network was not substantively affected and continued operating normally.

“Selfish mining” was one of the core technical strategies in this attack. In this approach, miners secretly mine new blocks without immediately broadcasting them to the network. This forces other miners to continue working on the old chain, causing the blocks they mine to become “orphans” and wasting their hash power. The attacker uses this time to build a longer private chain, eventually releasing it and replacing the public chain with the longer private one, forcing all network nodes to adopt it as the main chain. This greatly increases the attacker’s share of block rewards and accelerates control.

Technical data shows that starting August 11, in the XMR block height range [3475729, 3475850], Qubic mined 63 of 122 blocks — more than 51%. This not only confirmed Qubic’s hash rate dominance but also showed that its selfish mining strategy worked, successfully taking over XMR’s block consensus mechanism.

Beyond mining strategy, economic incentives played a critical role in this battle. Qubic adjusted its reward allocation, using part of its earnings to buy back and burn its QUBIC token, boosting its value and market recognition; another portion went directly to incentivize CPU miners to join its network.

This dual incentive attracted hash power away from various XMR mining pools to Qubic at speed. Industry estimates suggest Qubic’s mining rewards were about triple those of traditional Monero pools — a tempting rate that lured many CPU miners to switch. The proportion of CPU miners in Qubic’s network jumped from about 10% before the attack to 50% afterward, massively increasing overall hash rate.

Qubic’s custom mining model — combining traditional mining with AI computation — improved efficiency and boosted rewards. Miners not only earned from traditional hashing but also gained extra rewards by helping train Qubic’s AI model AIGarth. This unique setup accelerated hash rate migration toward Qubic.

This combination of economic pull and technical innovation gave Qubic the power to carry out a 51% attack on XMR — and served as a wake-up call to the blockchain world: even multi-billion-dollar blockchains can be vulnerable if economic incentives break down and hash power concentrates. Balancing network security with economic viability will be a key design and governance challenge going forward.

Following the news, XMR’s market cap fell from about $6B to $4.6B — a drop of more than 20%. Many users required longer transaction confirmation times, increasing to at least 10 blocks to avoid double-spend risk, degrading transaction experience.

Several centralized exchanges increased security checks for XMR deposits and withdrawals, with some suspending XMR trading altogether. The Monero community faced a trust crisis, with users and investors worrying about network safety, reducing market liquidity and activity.

Qubic’s founder stated that the attack was a technical proof-of-concept to demonstrate UPoW’s feasibility, and expressed willingness to help XMR resist larger-scale attacks in the future. However, some community members and experts warned that the attack violated XMR’s decentralization ethos and should be taken as a serious security warning.

This event again proved that PoW security depends heavily on balanced economic incentives. The attacker lured miners with higher rewards, shifting hash power and ultimately seizing network control — showing the powerful influence of economic rewards on hash rate distribution.

Despite XMR’s high anonymity and decentralized design, the risk of hash rate centralization remains. The attack exposed the potential threat that large mining pools and hash monopolies pose to network security.

Qubic’s UPoW model attempts to use hash power for more valuable computations, pioneering an integration of blockchain and AI. While this attack is seen as a security incident, it also offers a point of reflection for the industry in exploring new consensus and incentive models.

The 51% attack on XMR stands as one of the most telling and impactful technical-economic battles in crypto history. It exposed economic vulnerabilities in PoW security and demonstrated Qubic’s distinctive on-chain computation model. For XMR, it is both a challenge and an opportunity — only through faster technical upgrades and ecosystem development can it safeguard its dominance in privacy coins.

For the entire blockchain ecosystem, the lesson is clear: decentralized security requires a combination of economic incentives and technical safeguards. Continuous innovation is the only way to stay unshaken in the unpredictable world of crypto.