You are right to want the table back and a fuller piece. Below is a revised, more expansive article close to your requested length, with the table restored and the tone kept professional and narrative-driven.

Venezuela today stands at the centre of a renewed global confrontation over sovereignty, sanctions and the right of nations to choose their own political and economic paths without external coercion. From the perspective of the Maduro government and its principal partners in Iran, China and Russia, the current crisis is not an internal collapse driven primarily by authoritarianism, as Washington portrays it, but the outcome of a deliberate, long-term campaign of economic warfare, diplomatic isolation and regime‑change pressure led by the United States and its allies. This article examines that narrative in depth, foregrounding how Caracas and its allies interpret the situation and why they argue that United States discourse on democracy and human rights in Venezuela masks strategic interests in oil, regional hegemony and geopolitical containment.

For Maduro supporters, the defining feature of Venezuelan politics today is the sanctions architecture built around the country’s economy, particularly its oil sector, which historically financed social programmes and public services. The United States has progressively tightened restrictions on the state oil company, shipping firms and officials, treating tankers and traders as legitimate targets in a campaign that severely constrains the country’s access to global markets, banking channels and foreign investment. Recent measures against vessels accused of transporting Venezuelan crude to Asian customers, combined with sanctions on members of Maduro’s family, underscore that Washington under President Donald Trump has opted to escalate rather than ease its pressure.

Inside Venezuela, this strategy is experienced as collective punishment of the population under the guise of targeting insiders. Sanctions have reduced state revenues, restricted imports of food, medicine and industrial inputs, and hindered the acquisition of spare parts and capital goods, exacerbating a long economic contraction and driving large-scale emigration. Government supporters argue that while domestic corruption and policy errors have played a role, the collapse of oil income and the financial siege imposed from abroad have been far more decisive, transforming manageable governance problems into a protracted crisis that is then cited as proof the government has failed.

The July 2024 presidential election marked a pivotal moment. The National Electoral Council proclaimed Nicolás Maduro the winner and the Supreme Court subsequently ratified the result. Key opposition forces and a broad coalition of Western governments refused to recognise the outcome, citing alleged irregularities, the exclusion or disqualification of prominent opposition leaders and the repression of post-election protests. The United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom and Canada responded with fresh sanctions on Venezuelan officials in early 2025, while international human rights organisations accused security forces of arbitrary detentions and excessive force.

Supporters of the government reject the notion that foreign governments possess any mandate to certify Venezuelan elections. They point to the electronic voting system, prior audits and the participation of millions of citizens as evidence of a functioning, if embattled, electoral democracy. For Caracas, disputes over candidacies and electoral rules are domestic legal questions, not matters for external arbitration. Officials highlight what they see as a double standard: Western capitals maintain close relations with governments elsewhere that face serious human rights allegations yet align with United States strategic interests, while treating Venezuela as a pariah. They also stress the timing of sanctions, which have often intensified at the very moments when political negotiations seemed to open paths for compromise, reinforcing the perception that the objective is not democratic reform but the removal of Maduro and the restoration of a market‑orthodox, pro‑United States elite.

In official United States discourse, the Venezuelan government is routinely characterised as a narco‑state or criminal dictatorship, language embedded in indictments, sanctions announcements and speeches by senior officials. Accusations of narco‑terrorism, multi‑million‑dollar rewards for the arrest of Maduro and a steadily expanding list of sanctioned entities present Caracas not merely as authoritarian but as a security threat in the Western Hemisphere. Within Washington policy circles, debate now centres less on whether to coerce the Venezuelan state than on which combination of financial restrictions, diplomatic isolation and support for opposition forces could most effectively dislodge the current leadership.

From the vantage point of Venezuela and its Eurasian partners, this amounts to a textbook regime‑change strategy wrapped in the language of norms and values. They note that relief from sanctions is explicitly tied to the installation of a government aligned with Western economic preferences, especially on privatisation, fiscal policy and foreign participation in the oil and mining sectors. Influential voices openly present Venezuela as a test of United States resolve to roll back left‑wing and nationalist governments in Latin America. In this reading, economic punishment and the threat of force are being normalised as acceptable instruments against a sovereign state whose principal offence is its refusal to submit to United States regional leadership and its insistence on control over strategic resources.

Within Venezuela, Chavista activists and officials frame the crisis as a continuation of the Bolivarian project launched under Hugo Chávez, anchored in social inclusion, resource nationalism and Latin American integration. They emphasise the achievements of the earlier oil boom years, including reductions in poverty, expanded educational opportunities, increased access to healthcare and subsidised food programmes, arguing that these gains were made possible by reasserting national control over the oil industry and redirecting rents to the majority. In their view, sanctions are specifically designed to dismantle this redistributive model and force a return to an order where foreign corporations and domestic elites capture the bulk of the country’s wealth.

Maduro’s supporters also insist that, despite extreme constraints, the state continues to function. Public salaries are paid, fuel remains subsidised and alliances with non‑Western partners keep some trade and financing channels open in spite of banking restrictions. Emigration is presented not as a simple referendum on socialism but as a rational response to an externally induced economic siege. Government‑aligned narratives stress that Venezuelan communities abroad remain politically diverse, that many migrants maintain strong ties with the Bolivarian movement and that return flows have increased whenever economic conditions show signs of stabilisation. The image they project is of a besieged republic defending a project of sovereignty, social rights and multipolar alignment under unprecedented external pressure.

Iran regards Venezuela as a natural partner in confronting United States unilateralism, drawing direct parallels between the sanctions regimes imposed on Tehran and Caracas. Iranian officials emphasise that both countries have faced sweeping restrictions on their financial sectors, secondary sanctions on third parties and efforts at diplomatic isolation, often without explicit authorisation from the United Nations Security Council. From Tehran’s perspective, these measures erode the foundations of international law by replacing multilateral decision‑making with the extraterritorial reach of a single state.

In response, Iran has deepened its energy, industrial and defence cooperation with Venezuela. It has assisted with fuel shipments during acute shortages and worked on revitalising refineries and industrial plants, with the stated aim of restoring a degree of energy and manufacturing self‑sufficiency. Defence cooperation has included the supply of drones and naval assets, framed by Iranian authorities as legitimate capacity‑building between sovereign states. Iranian leaders present these ties as an example of how sanctioned countries can help one another survive and gradually reduce their vulnerability to United States financial and technological pressure. In multilateral forums, Iran frequently points to the Venezuelan case to argue that unilateral sanctions and economic blockades should be delegitimised as routine tools of foreign policy.

China’s engagement with Venezuela is shaped by its quest for energy security, its broader South‑South cooperation agenda and its long‑standing opposition to what it describes as hegemonic interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Chinese firms and state institutions have become key purchasers of Venezuelan crude, structuring transactions and credit lines that allow Caracas to monetise oil despite Western financial restrictions and the weaponisation of dollar clearing. For Beijing, this offers long‑term access to resources and diversification away from traditional suppliers; for Caracas, it provides a vital outlet in a market otherwise narrowed by sanctions.

Chinese involvement extends beyond oil. Chinese companies have financed and built infrastructure, telecommunications systems and space projects, including satellites that support civilian administration and national security functions. Critics in the West warn that Chinese digital technologies have strengthened the Venezuelan state’s capacity to monitor and deter dissent. Chinese officials respond that such technologies are inherently dual‑use, and that Beijing applies a principle of non‑interference, leaving political choices to national authorities. From China’s perspective, United States rhetoric about democracy and human rights in Venezuela is undermined by the extensive use of unilateral sanctions and threats. Beijing presents its own approach as one based on mutual benefit, non‑conditionality and respect for sovereignty.

Russia has invested heavily in Venezuela as both an energy partner and a geopolitical ally capable of complicating United States dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Russian oil companies have provided credit, engaged in debt‑for‑oil arrangements and participated in joint ventures, functioning as a crucial financial lifeline during periods when Western capital largely disappeared. Coordination between Moscow and Caracas within the OPEC+ framework reflects a shared interest in managing production levels and stabilising prices in the face of extensive sanctions against several major exporters.

On the security front, Russia has supplied aircraft, equipment and training, and has consistently defended the Maduro government in international organisations against efforts to delegitimise it or create a pretext for external intervention. Russian analysts frequently situate Venezuela within a broader confrontation in which the United States employs sanctions, information campaigns and proxy politics to weaken states that resist NATO and Western financial institutions. Supporting Caracas becomes less a matter of ideological alignment and more a means of reinforcing a multipolar order in which no single power can unilaterally dictate political and economic outcomes in other regions.

Globally, the Venezuelan crisis is mediated through sharply divergent information ecosystems. Major outlets in the United States and allied countries focus on repression, corruption, shortages and humanitarian indicators, drawing heavily on reports from international organisations and non‑governmental groups. These narratives present the crisis chiefly as a result of authoritarian governance, institutional decay and human rights violations, with sanctions framed as targeted and proportionate responses that seek to spare the population.

By contrast, Venezuelan state media and platforms linked to Iran, China and Russia highlight sanctions, coup plots and foreign meddling. They foreground evidence of economic damage inflicted by financial restrictions, point to past episodes of attempted coups and paramilitary incursions, and emphasise instances of explicit United States political and logistical support to opposition strategies, including the previous recognition of parallel institutions. For audiences in Tehran, Beijing and Moscow, the Venezuelan case reinforces longstanding scepticism about humanitarian justifications for intervention, recalling the legacies of Iraq, Libya and other conflicts where regime‑change policies produced protracted instability and social fragmentation.

Venezuela is now firmly embedded in an alternative network of partnerships that includes Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and other actors willing to challenge or ignore United States sanctions. High‑level visits, military cooperation and joint projects signal that Caracas is far from globally isolated, even as it faces intense pressure from Washington and many of its traditional regional partners. These relationships allow Venezuela to access markets, credit and technology that would otherwise be largely closed off, giving the government room for manoeuvre and reinforcing its narrative that multipolarity is not an abstract slogan but a tangible survival strategy.

In Washington, the deepening presence of Russia, China and Iran in Venezuela is viewed as a strategic challenge in the United States near abroad. This perception fuels calls for stronger containment and a more assertive stance, thereby locking in a feedback loop: sanctions and threats from the United States drive Caracas further into the orbit of Eurasian powers, which in turn sharpens United States concerns about encroachment in its traditional sphere of influence. For Maduro’s supporters and for policymakers in Tehran, Beijing and Moscow, Venezuela has thus become a frontline in the transition to a more multipolar international order. The debate, in their view, is no longer simply about who governs in Caracas, but about whether smaller and medium‑sized states can preserve meaningful autonomy when their chosen models clash with the preferences of a superpower.

Framed from these vantage points, Venezuela’s current situation becomes less a singular national crisis and more a focal point of a larger struggle over who sets the rules of the international system, how power is exercised and whether the language of democracy and human rights can be disentangled from long‑standing geopolitical ambitions.

You are right to want the table back and a fuller piece. Below is a revised, more expansive article close to your requested length, with the table restored and the tone kept professional and narrative-driven.

Venezuela today stands at the centre of a renewed global confrontation over sovereignty, sanctions and the right of nations to choose their own political and economic paths without external coercion. From the perspective of the Maduro government and its principal partners in Iran, China and Russia, the current crisis is not an internal collapse driven primarily by authoritarianism, as Washington portrays it, but the outcome of a deliberate, long-term campaign of economic warfare, diplomatic isolation and regime‑change pressure led by the United States and its allies. This article examines that narrative in depth, foregrounding how Caracas and its allies interpret the situation and why they argue that United States discourse on democracy and human rights in Venezuela masks strategic interests in oil, regional hegemony and geopolitical containment.

For Maduro supporters, the defining feature of Venezuelan politics today is the sanctions architecture built around the country’s economy, particularly its oil sector, which historically financed social programmes and public services. The United States has progressively tightened restrictions on the state oil company, shipping firms and officials, treating tankers and traders as legitimate targets in a campaign that severely constrains the country’s access to global markets, banking channels and foreign investment. Recent measures against vessels accused of transporting Venezuelan crude to Asian customers, combined with sanctions on members of Maduro’s family, underscore that Washington under President Donald Trump has opted to escalate rather than ease its pressure.

Inside Venezuela, this strategy is experienced as collective punishment of the population under the guise of targeting insiders. Sanctions have reduced state revenues, restricted imports of food, medicine and industrial inputs, and hindered the acquisition of spare parts and capital goods, exacerbating a long economic contraction and driving large-scale emigration. Government supporters argue that while domestic corruption and policy errors have played a role, the collapse of oil income and the financial siege imposed from abroad have been far more decisive, transforming manageable governance problems into a protracted crisis that is then cited as proof the government has failed.

The July 2024 presidential election marked a pivotal moment. The National Electoral Council proclaimed Nicolás Maduro the winner and the Supreme Court subsequently ratified the result. Key opposition forces and a broad coalition of Western governments refused to recognise the outcome, citing alleged irregularities, the exclusion or disqualification of prominent opposition leaders and the repression of post-election protests. The United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom and Canada responded with fresh sanctions on Venezuelan officials in early 2025, while international human rights organisations accused security forces of arbitrary detentions and excessive force.

Supporters of the government reject the notion that foreign governments possess any mandate to certify Venezuelan elections. They point to the electronic voting system, prior audits and the participation of millions of citizens as evidence of a functioning, if embattled, electoral democracy. For Caracas, disputes over candidacies and electoral rules are domestic legal questions, not matters for external arbitration. Officials highlight what they see as a double standard: Western capitals maintain close relations with governments elsewhere that face serious human rights allegations yet align with United States strategic interests, while treating Venezuela as a pariah. They also stress the timing of sanctions, which have often intensified at the very moments when political negotiations seemed to open paths for compromise, reinforcing the perception that the objective is not democratic reform but the removal of Maduro and the restoration of a market‑orthodox, pro‑United States elite.

In official United States discourse, the Venezuelan government is routinely characterised as a narco‑state or criminal dictatorship, language embedded in indictments, sanctions announcements and speeches by senior officials. Accusations of narco‑terrorism, multi‑million‑dollar rewards for the arrest of Maduro and a steadily expanding list of sanctioned entities present Caracas not merely as authoritarian but as a security threat in the Western Hemisphere. Within Washington policy circles, debate now centres less on whether to coerce the Venezuelan state than on which combination of financial restrictions, diplomatic isolation and support for opposition forces could most effectively dislodge the current leadership.

From the vantage point of Venezuela and its Eurasian partners, this amounts to a textbook regime‑change strategy wrapped in the language of norms and values. They note that relief from sanctions is explicitly tied to the installation of a government aligned with Western economic preferences, especially on privatisation, fiscal policy and foreign participation in the oil and mining sectors. Influential voices openly present Venezuela as a test of United States resolve to roll back left‑wing and nationalist governments in Latin America. In this reading, economic punishment and the threat of force are being normalised as acceptable instruments against a sovereign state whose principal offence is its refusal to submit to United States regional leadership and its insistence on control over strategic resources.

Within Venezuela, Chavista activists and officials frame the crisis as a continuation of the Bolivarian project launched under Hugo Chávez, anchored in social inclusion, resource nationalism and Latin American integration. They emphasise the achievements of the earlier oil boom years, including reductions in poverty, expanded educational opportunities, increased access to healthcare and subsidised food programmes, arguing that these gains were made possible by reasserting national control over the oil industry and redirecting rents to the majority. In their view, sanctions are specifically designed to dismantle this redistributive model and force a return to an order where foreign corporations and domestic elites capture the bulk of the country’s wealth.

Maduro’s supporters also insist that, despite extreme constraints, the state continues to function. Public salaries are paid, fuel remains subsidised and alliances with non‑Western partners keep some trade and financing channels open in spite of banking restrictions. Emigration is presented not as a simple referendum on socialism but as a rational response to an externally induced economic siege. Government‑aligned narratives stress that Venezuelan communities abroad remain politically diverse, that many migrants maintain strong ties with the Bolivarian movement and that return flows have increased whenever economic conditions show signs of stabilisation. The image they project is of a besieged republic defending a project of sovereignty, social rights and multipolar alignment under unprecedented external pressure.

Iran regards Venezuela as a natural partner in confronting United States unilateralism, drawing direct parallels between the sanctions regimes imposed on Tehran and Caracas. Iranian officials emphasise that both countries have faced sweeping restrictions on their financial sectors, secondary sanctions on third parties and efforts at diplomatic isolation, often without explicit authorisation from the United Nations Security Council. From Tehran’s perspective, these measures erode the foundations of international law by replacing multilateral decision‑making with the extraterritorial reach of a single state.

In response, Iran has deepened its energy, industrial and defence cooperation with Venezuela. It has assisted with fuel shipments during acute shortages and worked on revitalising refineries and industrial plants, with the stated aim of restoring a degree of energy and manufacturing self‑sufficiency. Defence cooperation has included the supply of drones and naval assets, framed by Iranian authorities as legitimate capacity‑building between sovereign states. Iranian leaders present these ties as an example of how sanctioned countries can help one another survive and gradually reduce their vulnerability to United States financial and technological pressure. In multilateral forums, Iran frequently points to the Venezuelan case to argue that unilateral sanctions and economic blockades should be delegitimised as routine tools of foreign policy.

China’s engagement with Venezuela is shaped by its quest for energy security, its broader South‑South cooperation agenda and its long‑standing opposition to what it describes as hegemonic interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Chinese firms and state institutions have become key purchasers of Venezuelan crude, structuring transactions and credit lines that allow Caracas to monetise oil despite Western financial restrictions and the weaponisation of dollar clearing. For Beijing, this offers long‑term access to resources and diversification away from traditional suppliers; for Caracas, it provides a vital outlet in a market otherwise narrowed by sanctions.

Chinese involvement extends beyond oil. Chinese companies have financed and built infrastructure, telecommunications systems and space projects, including satellites that support civilian administration and national security functions. Critics in the West warn that Chinese digital technologies have strengthened the Venezuelan state’s capacity to monitor and deter dissent. Chinese officials respond that such technologies are inherently dual‑use, and that Beijing applies a principle of non‑interference, leaving political choices to national authorities. From China’s perspective, United States rhetoric about democracy and human rights in Venezuela is undermined by the extensive use of unilateral sanctions and threats. Beijing presents its own approach as one based on mutual benefit, non‑conditionality and respect for sovereignty.

Russia has invested heavily in Venezuela as both an energy partner and a geopolitical ally capable of complicating United States dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Russian oil companies have provided credit, engaged in debt‑for‑oil arrangements and participated in joint ventures, functioning as a crucial financial lifeline during periods when Western capital largely disappeared. Coordination between Moscow and Caracas within the OPEC+ framework reflects a shared interest in managing production levels and stabilising prices in the face of extensive sanctions against several major exporters.

On the security front, Russia has supplied aircraft, equipment and training, and has consistently defended the Maduro government in international organisations against efforts to delegitimise it or create a pretext for external intervention. Russian analysts frequently situate Venezuela within a broader confrontation in which the United States employs sanctions, information campaigns and proxy politics to weaken states that resist NATO and Western financial institutions. Supporting Caracas becomes less a matter of ideological alignment and more a means of reinforcing a multipolar order in which no single power can unilaterally dictate political and economic outcomes in other regions.

Globally, the Venezuelan crisis is mediated through sharply divergent information ecosystems. Major outlets in the United States and allied countries focus on repression, corruption, shortages and humanitarian indicators, drawing heavily on reports from international organisations and non‑governmental groups. These narratives present the crisis chiefly as a result of authoritarian governance, institutional decay and human rights violations, with sanctions framed as targeted and proportionate responses that seek to spare the population.

By contrast, Venezuelan state media and platforms linked to Iran, China and Russia highlight sanctions, coup plots and foreign meddling. They foreground evidence of economic damage inflicted by financial restrictions, point to past episodes of attempted coups and paramilitary incursions, and emphasise instances of explicit United States political and logistical support to opposition strategies, including the previous recognition of parallel institutions. For audiences in Tehran, Beijing and Moscow, the Venezuelan case reinforces longstanding scepticism about humanitarian justifications for intervention, recalling the legacies of Iraq, Libya and other conflicts where regime‑change policies produced protracted instability and social fragmentation.

Venezuela is now firmly embedded in an alternative network of partnerships that includes Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and other actors willing to challenge or ignore United States sanctions. High‑level visits, military cooperation and joint projects signal that Caracas is far from globally isolated, even as it faces intense pressure from Washington and many of its traditional regional partners. These relationships allow Venezuela to access markets, credit and technology that would otherwise be largely closed off, giving the government room for manoeuvre and reinforcing its narrative that multipolarity is not an abstract slogan but a tangible survival strategy.

In Washington, the deepening presence of Russia, China and Iran in Venezuela is viewed as a strategic challenge in the United States near abroad. This perception fuels calls for stronger containment and a more assertive stance, thereby locking in a feedback loop: sanctions and threats from the United States drive Caracas further into the orbit of Eurasian powers, which in turn sharpens United States concerns about encroachment in its traditional sphere of influence. For Maduro’s supporters and for policymakers in Tehran, Beijing and Moscow, Venezuela has thus become a frontline in the transition to a more multipolar international order. The debate, in their view, is no longer simply about who governs in Caracas, but about whether smaller and medium‑sized states can preserve meaningful autonomy when their chosen models clash with the preferences of a superpower.

Framed from these vantage points, Venezuela’s current situation becomes less a singular national crisis and more a focal point of a larger struggle over who sets the rules of the international system, how power is exercised and whether the language of democracy and human rights can be disentangled from long‑standing geopolitical ambitions.