最近美欧多家银行的暴雷，宣告了货币信用创造说的破产。按照该学说，货币可以由商业银行通过会计记账的方式，无限量地创造出来。因而银行永远不可能发生资金短缺的情况。不但如此，银行甚至可以通过发行信用的方式在纸面上创造出自有资本金来。例如，此次出现危机的银行之一的瑞信银行（Credit Suisse），曾被货币信用创造说的旗手Richard Werner树立为这方面成功操作的典范：

The link between bank credit creation and bank capital was most graphically illustrated by the actions of the Swiss bank Credit Suisse in 2008. This incident has produced a case study that demonstrates how banks as money creators can effectively conjure any level of capital, whether directly or indirectly, therefore rendering bank regulation based on capital adequacy irrelevant: Unwilling to accept public money to shore up its failing capital, as several other major UK and Swiss banks had done, Credit Suisse arranged in October 2008 for Gulf investors (mainly from Qatar) to purchase in total over £7 billion worth of its newly issued preference shares, thus raising the amount of its capital and thereby avoiding bankruptcy. A similar share issue transaction by Barclays Bank was "a remarkable story of one of the most important transactions of the financial crisis, which helped Barclays avoid the need for a bailout from the UK government". The details remain "shrouded in mystery and intrigue"... in the case of Barclays, but the following facts seem undisputed and disclosed in the case of credit Suisse, as cited in the press...:

The Gulf investors did not need to take the trouble of making liquid assets available for this investment, as Credit Suisse generously offered to lend the money to the Gulf investors. The bank managed to raise its capital through these preference shares. Table 11 illustrates this capital bootstrapping (not considering fees and interests).

Since it is now an established fact that banks newly invent the money that is 'loaned' by creating it out of nothing, the loan to the Gulf investor created (in step 1) a simultaneous asset and liability on the bank's balance sheet, whereby the customers' borrowed money appears as the fictitious customer deposit on the liability side, of £7bn. Considering the same change in step 2, but now after the liability swap, we see that the newly issued preference shares boost equity capital: They are paid for with this fictitious customer deposit, simply by swapping the £7bn from item 'customer deposit' to item 'capital'. Credit Suisse is then able to report a significant rise in its equity capital, and hence in its capital / asset ratio. Where did the additional £7bn in capital come from? Credit Suisse had lent it to the investor, using its own preference shares as collateral, and hence had invented its own capital. The risk to the borrower was also limited if the Credit Suisse shares, not other assets, served as collateral.

简言之，瑞信银行通过向海湾土豪发放优先股的方式筹集自有资本金。但是土豪们用来购买优先股的资本却反过来来自于瑞士银行的贷款。贷款的抵押品又恰是这些优先股。因此，土豪们在这笔交易中既不会消耗自己的资金，也不会有什么风险。他们因而乐意配合瑞士银行就以会计做账的方式自造资本金。

然而这样漂亮的账面操作在现实的挤兑压力下是不堪一击的。瑞士银行的资产负债表上虽然积累了大量的货币替代物，却没有多少真的货币／流动性／现金，当面对来自客户或同业银行的结算压力，却不能承担贱卖资产带来的浮亏转实亏，就只有寻求来自外部的流动性注入这唯一的途径。所以我们看到瑞信向沙特、瑞士央行等发出了注资请求，瑞士的外交官甚至开始与中国症腐积极接触。

正如我之前的分析，货币信用创造说的根本错误在于否认结算这一市场过程的现实必然性。当信贷市场正常运转时，结算的市场压力会限制银行信用扩张的范围，使其保持在基础货币所决定的一定区间之内。而信用扩张的具体水平（货币乘数）通过市场过程从根本上取决于市场参与者的时间偏好。因此当前我们看到的全球范围内的信用收缩实际反映了投资者们变得更偏好于当期消费而非未来投资。而对类似瑞信这样高信用低现金银行的重新估值，是必要的反映投资者偏好变化的市场过程。

但是相信货币信用创造说的人群大多持国家主义的立场，他们忽视，恐惧，并敌视现实的市场过程，转而相信可以通过国家机器实施“创新”的金融和会计技术来逃避危机。我们注意到，像Richard Werner 这样的货币信用创造说的重要旗手，近来接受了国家主义色彩浓厚的观察者网的专访。在访问中一方面抨击了美联储对硅谷银行的见死不救，一方面又大加赞赏中国殃衍反市场的信贷管制政策。可以说，种种的迹象显示，全球的国家主义者正在合流，并按照各自对货币发行权的垄断实力进行新的全球权力分配。这也引的国内的一些国家主义者们弹冠相庆了。只可忴早已病入膏肓的全球货币金融体系，只好一饮再饮这杯国家主义的鸩酒了。

Werner, Richard A. "A lost century in economics: Three theories of banking and the conclusive evidence." International Review of Financial Analysis 46 (2016): 361-379.