The year is 1990. The United States is said to have won the Cold War. The Berlin Wall has fallen. Free markets, liberalism, freedom, and democracy have triumphed. With the apparent defeat of both fascism and communism in Europe, with the job of World War II and the Cold War complete, the question becomes: if all these evils have been defeated, why do we still need NATO? Why do we need troops in Europe? Why not bring our boys home, declare the job well done, cut spending, and distribute a “peace dividend” to the American people? This was the internationally and domestically pressing issue of the day.

On May 31, 1990, during his visit to the White House, President Mikhail Gorbachev posed this question to President George H.W. Bush: "if NATO does not plan to fight with us, then with whom? Not with Germany?" Bush responded, “I already said –with instability.” He was referring to his earlier statement: "People often jokingly ask me, given the transformative changes in Europe, who is the US's enemy now? My answer is clear: confusion, instability, unpredictability. As challenging as it might sound, I assure you that the American presence in Europe does not threaten the interests of the Soviet Union in any way. In fact, our current presence there ensures stability."

What exactly does Bush mean by "stability"? What is this new, intangible enemy he speaks of — unpredictability and confusion? How can the continuous occupation of Europe eliminate “confusion” among its inhabitants? These were the questions on Gorbachev's mind. He called Bush out on the hypocrisy of his stability argument: "Do you really think that the more weapons [you have] the more robust stability would be? It seems to me that the past decades should have convinced you that confrontation and arms race puts heavy burden [sic] on the shoulders of peoples.”

This tense exchange reveals a deep-seated contrast between two vastly different visions for Europe's future. Gorbachev envisioned a lasting peace in Europe, a peace that wouldn’t be based on division, confrontation, or delineated spheres of influence, but a permanent equilibrium between all political powers via peaceful diplomatic and political allegiances. On the other hand, Bush and the neoconservatives held onto the more orthodox, uniquely American notion that an American presence and ultimately American unipolarity in Europe was and would always be the optimal path to peace. At the center of negotiations over what the future of Europe would look like was Germany. With the Berlin Wall in ruins, there was a great deal of political maneuvering that occurred to determine the future alignment of a newly unified Deutschland: would it join NATO, the Warsaw Pact, or perhaps both? The Americans were advocating for Germany's complete integration into NATO. On the other hand, Gorbachev pursued a more nuanced solution, aiming to reassure his (soon-to-be former) communist colleagues that a unified Germany within NATO wouldn't threaten Soviet security. Moreover, Gorbachev hoped that through diplomatic and political cooperation, the adversarial nature of US/Soviet relations could finally be ended.

At one moment in their conversation, we see a significant distinction between the perspectives of the two leaders when Gorbachev reminds Bush of “the terrible losses that we suffered in World War Two—this is also the political reality of today. And no one should be able to forget about it.” Bush's response was somewhat cold, bordering on dismissive: “Still, it is hard for me to understand you. Maybe it is because I do not feel threatened by the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany), I do not see an aggressive power in this democratic state. If you don’t break your psychological stereotype, it would be difficult for us to come to an agreement. And an agreement is possible…” Bush, here, essentially portrays Gorbachev as having his mind clouded by an irrational fear of a former foe, describing his (justified) concern over potential German remilitarization or (more generally) the continuation of adversarial relations between the US and the Soviets leading to the repetition of the calamities of World War II as a mere “psychological stereotype.” Why does Bush seem so callous when it comes to the memory of World War II, while it seems very present in Gorbachev’s mind?

I would argue this divergence can be traced back to their respective experiences during World War II. Gorbachev’s hometown of Privolnoye was occupied by the Nazis when he was eleven years old. His maternal grandfather who had been arrested during the Great Purge discussed after being released having been tortured by the secret police, an account which allegedly influenced the young boy. He believed his father, who had joined the Red Army, had died (though he later returned home after the Battle of Kursk). Experiencing as an impressionable child both domestic terrors and foreign invasion likely shaped Gorbachev’s perspective for the rest of his life. Bush's wartime experience contrasted sharply. During the Depression, he, coming from money, went to private school in Massachusetts. As a navy pilot in the Pacific theater, he faced his harrowing moment when his plane was downed after a bombing run of the island Chichijima. Although his two crewmates died, Bush was able to bail quickly enough and was rescued. For Bush, the war was a holy mission for democracy, and he, a noble crusader. The difference in these crisis-time experiences — between a scarred youth and an emboldened warrior, between (as Neil Howe would put it) an artist generation and a hero generation — likely influenced their respective approaches to the international situation that would come along nearly half a century later. In addition, we are likely seeing another contrast here between the Soviet and American experiences of the war, with the American being marked by far more hope and romanticism than the bleak and horrific character of the Soviet.

Bush and his cabinet displayed a degree of American arrogance in their belief in the universally beneficial and stabilizing nature of democratic and liberal influence. They viewed such influence as the very essence of peace, as the approach that ended World War II and would prevent future wars. Today, we recognize that this perspective when distorted and manipulated (as it was under both Bush administrations, as well as the Clinton and Obama administrations, i.e. during the age of American self-righteous and often destructive imperialism) is flawed. The straightforward causality – that democracy and democratic, peace-mission drone strikes leads to peace – has been debunked by the perma-wars of the Middle East. Still, in the time of Bush I, the belief that America was a force for good in the world was by no means an uncommon one. Certainly, benefits such as increased defense spending, trade liberalization, globalization, affordable goods, and boosts to the financial system were welcomed by members of the foreign policy elite, but, still, at its core, America, and at his core, Bush, were driven at the time by a mission of spreading what the American people saw as the pinnacle of American values: liberalism, democracy, and freedom. They believed that by doing so, global peace could be achieved.

Gorbachev, having experienced liberal democracy from an opposing perspective (albeit in its cold form), knew that this was at best bullshit and at worst represented the sort of dogmatic adherence to ideology that led to the Second World War and may lead to another. Thus, his disagreements with Bush were not just some negotiation tactic but stemmed from a fundamentally different but not inherently oppositional worldview. Gorbachev believed that lasting peace would not be achieved by the continued spread of liberal democracy first to Germany, then over time to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, and finally even Russia. He thought that the only way to avoid conflict was to eliminate the antagonistic foundation of these discussions, to end the NATO vs. WTO, West Germany vs. East Germany, NATO vs. WTO dichotomies. This is how he expressed the idea:

“There should no lack [sic] of clarity here. We do not have fear of anybody—not the U.S., not Germany. We just see the necessity of changing [our] relations, the need to break the negative and to create a constructive model. This is our free choice. I hope nobody here believes in the nonsense that one of the sides won the victory in the Cold War. Thoughts like these just glide on the surface grasping only the tip of the iceberg. The conclusion must be completely different: 50 years of confrontation have proven its absurdity and that it only leads to self-destruction…”

Bush replied, "I fully agree with that. But the Germans have already made their choice quite clearly." Gorbachev snapped back, “No, you are just trying to put them under your control.”

If someone expressed such an opinion today about the intentions of US foreign relations, they would be labeled a conspiracy theorist. Gorbachev, however, was no conspiracy theorist; his approach to this situation displays a level of historical sagacity, and his solution was certainly imaginative, but in retrospect seems imaginary. He sought a creative diplomatic situation where a unified Germany would be aligned with both NATO and the WTO adding an element of gray to a situation often portrayed in black and white, East and West. By blurring the lines between US and Soviet in East Germany where NATO forces would not be permitted to fully extend their influence and Soviet forces would temporarily maintain a presence, Gorbachev hoped to establish a precedent for diplomatic cooperation and synergy between the US and Soviet Union that would not just avoid but eliminate the potential of antagonism between the great powers.

Also influencing his decision was the practicality that if these diplomacies were not handled with care, a certain Soviet contingent might retaliate:

"But one has to have a clear understanding that if the Soviet people get an impression that we are disregarded in the German question, then all the positive processes in Europe, including the negotiations in Vienna, would be in serious danger. This is not just bluffing. It is simply that the people will force us to stop and to look around. And I would really prefer not to do it. I would like to move the Soviet-American dialog [sic] ahead, and to strive for fastest [sic] achievement of agreements in Vienna and in other forums."

Gorbachev indicated here that if the Soviet ruling elite felt sidelined or threatened, it would jeopardize the very peace that NATO was supposedly guaranteeing. He recognized the importance of maintaining a balance in Europe and ensuring that all interests were acknowledged and respected. He clarifies what this balance would look like:

"Instead of fixating on the membership of the future united Germany in NATO, let us better think about how we could bring the military-political blocs, that still divide Europe, closer together. Let us say, why would one reject from the get-go FRG’s membership simultaneously in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact? Such a double membership could become a binding element, some sort of a forerunner of the new European structures, and at the same time, it would anchor NATO. In the practical sense, united [sic] Germany could make a statement that it would abide by all the obligations inherited from both the FRG and the GDR. That the Bundeswehr would still be under the orders of NATO, and the troops in the GDR—to the government of the new Germany. Simultaneously, the Soviet troops would still remain in the territory of the present GDR during the transition period, and all this could be supplemented by some kind of an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This way we would alleviate concern [sic] of other countries and speed up the construction of the future structures of the European security system."

This vision is radical. For many Americans this concept might be challenging to grasp (and I do not mean this in a disparaging manner), as our psychology is predisposed towards dichotomous categorization: good against evil, win over loss. Gorbachev's proposal is subtle and complex, a Europe not pitted one side against another but harmoniously blended. He knew from his childhood experiences that the perpetuation of divisions and delineations and haughty moralizations would only lead to future animosity and conflict. His approach aimed at something unprecedented: a fluid, dynamic, and aesthetic view of politics, Europe as a beautiful array of human collaboration.

Now you can imagine the response to such an artistic, hopeful view of the world from the likes of Bush and Cheney. Their minds had not been shaped for such a vision; they did not indulge in this blurred, non-dichotomous thinking, so such an idea was almost inconceivable, not in the sense that it was abhorrent, but rather that they genuinely could not or did not want to grasp it. This level of incomprehensibility wasn't exclusive to them; the average American at the time would have struggled with this messy vision after having been barraged with the message that the Soviets were evil and that democracy was an incorruptible beacon of goodness. As soon as you begin questioning the idea that your universal values, your "kingdom of heaven," might not be so universal and good, that your perceived enemies might not be so evil and ostracized, the existential mental shift can be somewhat unbearable. Secretary James Baker, was one such American who would not be willing to bear such a paradigm shift. He interjected at one point in the conversation seemingly out of nowhere, as if he had been harboring the reaction throughout the whole meeting, saying to Gorbachev: "Whatever you say, but the simultaneous obligations of one and the same country toward the WTO and NATO smack of schizophrenia." And here we see again someone from the Bush administration calling Gorbachev crazy. They must have believed he was outlandishly naive, talking about peace and love and resisting the imperialism of each power’s respective military industrial complex, sounding like a hippie or JFK. These were the sort of thoughts, the kind of perspective that did not fly in post-war America, it was the kind of thinking that got you locked up in a mental institution or got your head blown off on a trip to Texas. Gorbachev responded with the patience of a wise sage addressing an impudent child: "It is only for a financier, who puts cents together into dollars. Politics, however, is sometimes a search for possible in the sphere of unfamiliar [sic]." Gorbachev here takes on the role of a shaman, highlighting that if true peace was the goal, they needed to think outside the box, approach politics in a radically new and innovative way. He knew that if you just follow the dollars and cents, if you kept your foot on the throat of your enemy in order to extract as much out of them as possible, no lasting peace would be achieved. Baker still doubled down, "But obligations to the WTO and NATO are adversarial obligations." We see Baker’s blatant cognitive dissonance, unable to let go of his black and white, adversarial thinking. Gorbachev responded, “Here, here, you are closer now. You started to talk about rivalry, and that would lead to confrontation. It means nothing is changing. Therefore, by pulling united Germany into one bloc you would be breaking the balance radically. And then we will have to decide what to do in that new situation — whether to continue to sit in Vienna, and so on. Let us after all reject the logic of confrontation and search for a constructive outcome.” His words seem prescient today: nothing is changing.

Gorbachev's vision of a constructive outcome — of transcending the dichotomies and embracing the nuances of the post-Cold War era — never materialized. The antagonism and arrogance persisted, particularly on the part of the United States and NATO, fueled by the belief that spreading democracy was an inherent good. These ingrained biases and flawed assumptions paved the way for NATO's expansion, further antagonizing Russia throughout the past three decades and leading to the conflict we know today. Now, we face the repercussions: the corrupted delusions of the Bush era have come back to haunt us. By forcing goodness and democracy on the world we have manifested their evil corollaries: the rising autocracies and humanitarian crises. These deceptive visions of the epitomical American mission of manifesting heaven on earth have given rise to temporal hells. They have perpetuated a cycle of escalation, aggression, and polarization, reinforcing the notion that our adversaries embody pure evil and that our holy war against them is existential. And while America’s elite — insulated from the consequences of their actions — might profit from the global tribute payments and defense spending resulting from this self-righteous crusade, real individuals suffer from stagnation at home and permanent war abroad, caught in the crossfire of the establishment’s delusions and greed.

Falling back on these old moral stances to undertake any sort of meaningful and effective conflict today seems, given the healthy cynicism of both the American people and the many who have endured the brunt end of carry-a-big-stick American diplomacy, to be a fool’s errand. Gorbachev’s artistic political vision was eventually manifested in the many international organizations and the (imperfect) global cooperation of the nineties and early naughts. To reassert and restabilize this system to address the fractionalization of today would be similarly ineffective. Both are old ideas spouted by septuagenarian politicians of dying generations. What is necessary is to create new, more practical and less corruptible ideals, a redefinition of what’s black and what’s white, to set off on new crusades with holier justifications and more distributed benefits, to have new George H.W. Bushs fighting new evil enemies and new baby Gorbachevs hiding behind the arms of their mothers. Thus are the figures we read and write about in history class reincarnated, and the cycle continues.

This was originally a paper written for a US Presidency Class taught by David Eisenbach.

Excerpt from the second conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and G. Bush. Washington, White House, May 31, 1990. (Present from the Soviet side:  S. F. Akhromeev, A. F. Dobrynin, V. M. Falin, A. S. Chernyaev, E. A. Shevardnadze;  from U.S. side—J. Baker, B. Scowcroft and other officials). National Security Archive https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16135-document-21-record-conversation-between

Howe, Neil. The Fourth Turning Is Here: What the Seasons of History Tell Us about How and When This Crisis Will End. Simon & Schuster, 2023.

Wikipedia contributors, "George H. W. Bush," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_H._W._Bush) (accessed August 10, 2023)

Wikipedia contributors, "Mikhail Gorbachev," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Gorbachev (accessed August 10, 2023)

The year is 1990. The United States is said to have won the Cold War. The Berlin Wall has fallen. Free markets, liberalism, freedom, and democracy have triumphed. With the apparent defeat of both fascism and communism in Europe, with the job of World War II and the Cold War complete, the question becomes: if all these evils have been defeated, why do we still need NATO? Why do we need troops in Europe? Why not bring our boys home, declare the job well done, cut spending, and distribute a “peace dividend” to the American people? This was the internationally and domestically pressing issue of the day.

On May 31, 1990, during his visit to the White House, President Mikhail Gorbachev posed this question to President George H.W. Bush: "if NATO does not plan to fight with us, then with whom? Not with Germany?" Bush responded, “I already said –with instability.” He was referring to his earlier statement: "People often jokingly ask me, given the transformative changes in Europe, who is the US's enemy now? My answer is clear: confusion, instability, unpredictability. As challenging as it might sound, I assure you that the American presence in Europe does not threaten the interests of the Soviet Union in any way. In fact, our current presence there ensures stability."

What exactly does Bush mean by "stability"? What is this new, intangible enemy he speaks of — unpredictability and confusion? How can the continuous occupation of Europe eliminate “confusion” among its inhabitants? These were the questions on Gorbachev's mind. He called Bush out on the hypocrisy of his stability argument: "Do you really think that the more weapons [you have] the more robust stability would be? It seems to me that the past decades should have convinced you that confrontation and arms race puts heavy burden [sic] on the shoulders of peoples.”

This tense exchange reveals a deep-seated contrast between two vastly different visions for Europe's future. Gorbachev envisioned a lasting peace in Europe, a peace that wouldn’t be based on division, confrontation, or delineated spheres of influence, but a permanent equilibrium between all political powers via peaceful diplomatic and political allegiances. On the other hand, Bush and the neoconservatives held onto the more orthodox, uniquely American notion that an American presence and ultimately American unipolarity in Europe was and would always be the optimal path to peace. At the center of negotiations over what the future of Europe would look like was Germany. With the Berlin Wall in ruins, there was a great deal of political maneuvering that occurred to determine the future alignment of a newly unified Deutschland: would it join NATO, the Warsaw Pact, or perhaps both? The Americans were advocating for Germany's complete integration into NATO. On the other hand, Gorbachev pursued a more nuanced solution, aiming to reassure his (soon-to-be former) communist colleagues that a unified Germany within NATO wouldn't threaten Soviet security. Moreover, Gorbachev hoped that through diplomatic and political cooperation, the adversarial nature of US/Soviet relations could finally be ended.

At one moment in their conversation, we see a significant distinction between the perspectives of the two leaders when Gorbachev reminds Bush of “the terrible losses that we suffered in World War Two—this is also the political reality of today. And no one should be able to forget about it.” Bush's response was somewhat cold, bordering on dismissive: “Still, it is hard for me to understand you. Maybe it is because I do not feel threatened by the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany), I do not see an aggressive power in this democratic state. If you don’t break your psychological stereotype, it would be difficult for us to come to an agreement. And an agreement is possible…” Bush, here, essentially portrays Gorbachev as having his mind clouded by an irrational fear of a former foe, describing his (justified) concern over potential German remilitarization or (more generally) the continuation of adversarial relations between the US and the Soviets leading to the repetition of the calamities of World War II as a mere “psychological stereotype.” Why does Bush seem so callous when it comes to the memory of World War II, while it seems very present in Gorbachev’s mind?

I would argue this divergence can be traced back to their respective experiences during World War II. Gorbachev’s hometown of Privolnoye was occupied by the Nazis when he was eleven years old. His maternal grandfather who had been arrested during the Great Purge discussed after being released having been tortured by the secret police, an account which allegedly influenced the young boy. He believed his father, who had joined the Red Army, had died (though he later returned home after the Battle of Kursk). Experiencing as an impressionable child both domestic terrors and foreign invasion likely shaped Gorbachev’s perspective for the rest of his life. Bush's wartime experience contrasted sharply. During the Depression, he, coming from money, went to private school in Massachusetts. As a navy pilot in the Pacific theater, he faced his harrowing moment when his plane was downed after a bombing run of the island Chichijima. Although his two crewmates died, Bush was able to bail quickly enough and was rescued. For Bush, the war was a holy mission for democracy, and he, a noble crusader. The difference in these crisis-time experiences — between a scarred youth and an emboldened warrior, between (as Neil Howe would put it) an artist generation and a hero generation — likely influenced their respective approaches to the international situation that would come along nearly half a century later. In addition, we are likely seeing another contrast here between the Soviet and American experiences of the war, with the American being marked by far more hope and romanticism than the bleak and horrific character of the Soviet.

Bush and his cabinet displayed a degree of American arrogance in their belief in the universally beneficial and stabilizing nature of democratic and liberal influence. They viewed such influence as the very essence of peace, as the approach that ended World War II and would prevent future wars. Today, we recognize that this perspective when distorted and manipulated (as it was under both Bush administrations, as well as the Clinton and Obama administrations, i.e. during the age of American self-righteous and often destructive imperialism) is flawed. The straightforward causality – that democracy and democratic, peace-mission drone strikes leads to peace – has been debunked by the perma-wars of the Middle East. Still, in the time of Bush I, the belief that America was a force for good in the world was by no means an uncommon one. Certainly, benefits such as increased defense spending, trade liberalization, globalization, affordable goods, and boosts to the financial system were welcomed by members of the foreign policy elite, but, still, at its core, America, and at his core, Bush, were driven at the time by a mission of spreading what the American people saw as the pinnacle of American values: liberalism, democracy, and freedom. They believed that by doing so, global peace could be achieved.

Gorbachev, having experienced liberal democracy from an opposing perspective (albeit in its cold form), knew that this was at best bullshit and at worst represented the sort of dogmatic adherence to ideology that led to the Second World War and may lead to another. Thus, his disagreements with Bush were not just some negotiation tactic but stemmed from a fundamentally different but not inherently oppositional worldview. Gorbachev believed that lasting peace would not be achieved by the continued spread of liberal democracy first to Germany, then over time to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, and finally even Russia. He thought that the only way to avoid conflict was to eliminate the antagonistic foundation of these discussions, to end the NATO vs. WTO, West Germany vs. East Germany, NATO vs. WTO dichotomies. This is how he expressed the idea:

“There should no lack [sic] of clarity here. We do not have fear of anybody—not the U.S., not Germany. We just see the necessity of changing [our] relations, the need to break the negative and to create a constructive model. This is our free choice. I hope nobody here believes in the nonsense that one of the sides won the victory in the Cold War. Thoughts like these just glide on the surface grasping only the tip of the iceberg. The conclusion must be completely different: 50 years of confrontation have proven its absurdity and that it only leads to self-destruction…”

Bush replied, "I fully agree with that. But the Germans have already made their choice quite clearly." Gorbachev snapped back, “No, you are just trying to put them under your control.”

If someone expressed such an opinion today about the intentions of US foreign relations, they would be labeled a conspiracy theorist. Gorbachev, however, was no conspiracy theorist; his approach to this situation displays a level of historical sagacity, and his solution was certainly imaginative, but in retrospect seems imaginary. He sought a creative diplomatic situation where a unified Germany would be aligned with both NATO and the WTO adding an element of gray to a situation often portrayed in black and white, East and West. By blurring the lines between US and Soviet in East Germany where NATO forces would not be permitted to fully extend their influence and Soviet forces would temporarily maintain a presence, Gorbachev hoped to establish a precedent for diplomatic cooperation and synergy between the US and Soviet Union that would not just avoid but eliminate the potential of antagonism between the great powers.

Also influencing his decision was the practicality that if these diplomacies were not handled with care, a certain Soviet contingent might retaliate:

"But one has to have a clear understanding that if the Soviet people get an impression that we are disregarded in the German question, then all the positive processes in Europe, including the negotiations in Vienna, would be in serious danger. This is not just bluffing. It is simply that the people will force us to stop and to look around. And I would really prefer not to do it. I would like to move the Soviet-American dialog [sic] ahead, and to strive for fastest [sic] achievement of agreements in Vienna and in other forums."

Gorbachev indicated here that if the Soviet ruling elite felt sidelined or threatened, it would jeopardize the very peace that NATO was supposedly guaranteeing. He recognized the importance of maintaining a balance in Europe and ensuring that all interests were acknowledged and respected. He clarifies what this balance would look like:

"Instead of fixating on the membership of the future united Germany in NATO, let us better think about how we could bring the military-political blocs, that still divide Europe, closer together. Let us say, why would one reject from the get-go FRG’s membership simultaneously in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact? Such a double membership could become a binding element, some sort of a forerunner of the new European structures, and at the same time, it would anchor NATO. In the practical sense, united [sic] Germany could make a statement that it would abide by all the obligations inherited from both the FRG and the GDR. That the Bundeswehr would still be under the orders of NATO, and the troops in the GDR—to the government of the new Germany. Simultaneously, the Soviet troops would still remain in the territory of the present GDR during the transition period, and all this could be supplemented by some kind of an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This way we would alleviate concern [sic] of other countries and speed up the construction of the future structures of the European security system."

This vision is radical. For many Americans this concept might be challenging to grasp (and I do not mean this in a disparaging manner), as our psychology is predisposed towards dichotomous categorization: good against evil, win over loss. Gorbachev's proposal is subtle and complex, a Europe not pitted one side against another but harmoniously blended. He knew from his childhood experiences that the perpetuation of divisions and delineations and haughty moralizations would only lead to future animosity and conflict. His approach aimed at something unprecedented: a fluid, dynamic, and aesthetic view of politics, Europe as a beautiful array of human collaboration.

Now you can imagine the response to such an artistic, hopeful view of the world from the likes of Bush and Cheney. Their minds had not been shaped for such a vision; they did not indulge in this blurred, non-dichotomous thinking, so such an idea was almost inconceivable, not in the sense that it was abhorrent, but rather that they genuinely could not or did not want to grasp it. This level of incomprehensibility wasn't exclusive to them; the average American at the time would have struggled with this messy vision after having been barraged with the message that the Soviets were evil and that democracy was an incorruptible beacon of goodness. As soon as you begin questioning the idea that your universal values, your "kingdom of heaven," might not be so universal and good, that your perceived enemies might not be so evil and ostracized, the existential mental shift can be somewhat unbearable. Secretary James Baker, was one such American who would not be willing to bear such a paradigm shift. He interjected at one point in the conversation seemingly out of nowhere, as if he had been harboring the reaction throughout the whole meeting, saying to Gorbachev: "Whatever you say, but the simultaneous obligations of one and the same country toward the WTO and NATO smack of schizophrenia." And here we see again someone from the Bush administration calling Gorbachev crazy. They must have believed he was outlandishly naive, talking about peace and love and resisting the imperialism of each power’s respective military industrial complex, sounding like a hippie or JFK. These were the sort of thoughts, the kind of perspective that did not fly in post-war America, it was the kind of thinking that got you locked up in a mental institution or got your head blown off on a trip to Texas. Gorbachev responded with the patience of a wise sage addressing an impudent child: "It is only for a financier, who puts cents together into dollars. Politics, however, is sometimes a search for possible in the sphere of unfamiliar [sic]." Gorbachev here takes on the role of a shaman, highlighting that if true peace was the goal, they needed to think outside the box, approach politics in a radically new and innovative way. He knew that if you just follow the dollars and cents, if you kept your foot on the throat of your enemy in order to extract as much out of them as possible, no lasting peace would be achieved. Baker still doubled down, "But obligations to the WTO and NATO are adversarial obligations." We see Baker’s blatant cognitive dissonance, unable to let go of his black and white, adversarial thinking. Gorbachev responded, “Here, here, you are closer now. You started to talk about rivalry, and that would lead to confrontation. It means nothing is changing. Therefore, by pulling united Germany into one bloc you would be breaking the balance radically. And then we will have to decide what to do in that new situation — whether to continue to sit in Vienna, and so on. Let us after all reject the logic of confrontation and search for a constructive outcome.” His words seem prescient today: nothing is changing.

Gorbachev's vision of a constructive outcome — of transcending the dichotomies and embracing the nuances of the post-Cold War era — never materialized. The antagonism and arrogance persisted, particularly on the part of the United States and NATO, fueled by the belief that spreading democracy was an inherent good. These ingrained biases and flawed assumptions paved the way for NATO's expansion, further antagonizing Russia throughout the past three decades and leading to the conflict we know today. Now, we face the repercussions: the corrupted delusions of the Bush era have come back to haunt us. By forcing goodness and democracy on the world we have manifested their evil corollaries: the rising autocracies and humanitarian crises. These deceptive visions of the epitomical American mission of manifesting heaven on earth have given rise to temporal hells. They have perpetuated a cycle of escalation, aggression, and polarization, reinforcing the notion that our adversaries embody pure evil and that our holy war against them is existential. And while America’s elite — insulated from the consequences of their actions — might profit from the global tribute payments and defense spending resulting from this self-righteous crusade, real individuals suffer from stagnation at home and permanent war abroad, caught in the crossfire of the establishment’s delusions and greed.

Falling back on these old moral stances to undertake any sort of meaningful and effective conflict today seems, given the healthy cynicism of both the American people and the many who have endured the brunt end of carry-a-big-stick American diplomacy, to be a fool’s errand. Gorbachev’s artistic political vision was eventually manifested in the many international organizations and the (imperfect) global cooperation of the nineties and early naughts. To reassert and restabilize this system to address the fractionalization of today would be similarly ineffective. Both are old ideas spouted by septuagenarian politicians of dying generations. What is necessary is to create new, more practical and less corruptible ideals, a redefinition of what’s black and what’s white, to set off on new crusades with holier justifications and more distributed benefits, to have new George H.W. Bushs fighting new evil enemies and new baby Gorbachevs hiding behind the arms of their mothers. Thus are the figures we read and write about in history class reincarnated, and the cycle continues.

This was originally a paper written for a US Presidency Class taught by David Eisenbach.

Excerpt from the second conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and G. Bush. Washington, White House, May 31, 1990. (Present from the Soviet side:  S. F. Akhromeev, A. F. Dobrynin, V. M. Falin, A. S. Chernyaev, E. A. Shevardnadze;  from U.S. side—J. Baker, B. Scowcroft and other officials). National Security Archive https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16135-document-21-record-conversation-between

Howe, Neil. The Fourth Turning Is Here: What the Seasons of History Tell Us about How and When This Crisis Will End. Simon & Schuster, 2023.

Wikipedia contributors, "George H. W. Bush," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_H._W._Bush) (accessed August 10, 2023)

Wikipedia contributors, "Mikhail Gorbachev," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Gorbachev (accessed August 10, 2023)