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In practice, this is a default configuration change, not a consensus rule — validators and client defaults will naturally converge toward the new limit over time.

The change aligns with other Fusaka proposals:

• EIP-7825 (Transaction Gas Cap) ensures that no individual transaction exceeds ~16.7M gas, allowing 3–5 transactions to fill a 60M block safely.

• EIP-7642 (eth/69) improves network efficiency and synchronization, enabling clients to handle larger blocks with less overhead.

Together, they reflect a shift toward scaling L1 safely, focusing on throughput consistency rather than raw expansion.

Increasing the gas limit increases L1 blockspace supply by two-thirds.
If demand remains constant, the base fee (EIP-1559) will fall — a natural result of less congestion.
If demand expands proportionally, the base fee stabilizes; if it grows faster, congestion (and burn) rises again.

This creates a three-dimensional trade-off between capacity, revenue (burn), and user experience (UX).

Ethereum’s L1 demand is structurally inelastic.
Users and protocols that operate directly on mainnet — liquidators, DAOs, high-value DeFi, governance frameworks — are price insensitive because they need L1’s trust and atomicity.

Conversely, price-sensitive demand has already migrated to L2s:

• Rollups, gaming, and consumer transactions enjoy cheap execution there,

• While Ethereum L1 has evolved into a premium settlement layer — a scarce and high-value environment.

Empirically, demand elasticity on L1 is low (ε ≈ –0.2 to –0.4).
In other words, lowering fees doesn’t dramatically increase usage; it just makes existing users’ activity cheaper.

Reducing the cost of L1 execution doesn’t unlock untapped demand — because that demand already lives on rollups.
Instead, it reduces the effective “tax” paid by existing users who were willing to pay high fees anyway.

That can be beneficial if congestion was blocking essential operations (liquidations, oracle updates, governance executions).
But if capacity exceeds need, the economic capture of Ethereum — its burn and validator revenue — declines without a compensating rise in activity.

This is where the philosophy of L1 economics diverges from L2:

Ethereum’s base layer doesn’t compete on volume; it competes on credibility.

The most plausible scenario is between A and B, leaning toward A:

• L1 usage remains roughly constant,

• Base fees fall modestly,

• Burn stays stable or slightly lower,

• Validator tips and MEV decrease slightly,

• UX improves (less spiking, faster confirmations).

The outcome is economically neutral but systemically positive — Ethereum becomes more reliable, not necessarily more profitable.

A key concern is whether the 60M gas expansion could trigger a “blob effect”:
a rapid capacity increase leading to a collapse in fee revenue — as happened with blob prices post-Dencun.

But the analogy doesn’t hold:

The 60M gas limit is an incremental optimization, not a subsidy.
It should lower congestion volatility, not crater fee income.

From a macro perspective, this proposal reinforces Ethereum’s role as a trust premium network:

1. Improved reliability for critical operations
   High-value protocols (L2 sequencers, oracles, bridges) gain predictable execution times even during market stress.

2. No dilution of value capture
   As long as blocks remain largely full, total burn stays steady — preserving ETH’s monetary discipline.

3. Better alignment between L1 and L2
   L1 remains the security backbone; L2s absorb elastic retail demand.
   The division of labor becomes clearer, strengthening the multi-layer economy.

EIP-7935 doesn’t “make Ethereum cheaper” — it makes it more efficient at its current role.

• Short term: Slightly lower base fees, smoother UX, modestly lower validator income.

• Medium term: Higher throughput stability, more predictable block economics.

• Long term: A stronger equilibrium between capacity, security, and monetary value.

By optimizing supply without flooding the market, Ethereum preserves the scarcity premium of its blockspace — essential to sustaining ETH’s burn-driven deflationary model.

Ethereum L1 is not designed to be cheap — it is designed to be trustworthy.

Raising the gas limit to 60 million makes the base layer more resilient, not more commoditized.
It acknowledges that most cost-sensitive users already live on L2s, and that L1’s true value lies in credibility, composability, and final settlement.

The economic effect is neutral-to-slightly-positive:

• Base fees decline modestly,

• Burn remains stable,

• The network becomes more predictable,

• And ETH’s long-term value as the collateral of the crypto economy is reinforced.

EIP-7935 thus represents a measured expansion — one that scales reliability, not speculation.
It continues Ethereum’s maturation into a monetary system where efficiency, discipline, and security define economic strength.

Ethereum’s Fusaka Upgrade and EIP-7935: Raising the Gas Limit to 60 Million — Expanding Capacity Without Diluting Value

Ethereum’s base layer doesn’t compete on volume; it competes on credibility.

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