The idea that crypto could disrupt traditional social media has been one of the recurring promises ever since the early days of ICOs. Some of the first blockchain projects were already aiming to challenge the dominance of platforms like Facebook or Twitter. However, nearly five years later, the current state of crypto social networks has fallen well short of the expectations that were once set.

Despite this underwhelming progress, there is still strong consensus that such a disruption feels inevitable. The expectation is that this transformation would be led by new players native to the crypto ecosystem. Yet, the limited success of these initiatives so far raises a provocative question: could it be that the incumbents, rather than newcomers, end up driving this shift?

For legacy platforms, however, the challenge is significant. Disrupting themselves would require abandoning highly profitable business models built on entrenched monopolies. These platforms are currently able to extract significant value from their dominant market positions—often in ways that verge on exploitative—and only the most powerful nation-states are in a position to challenge their influence. And even then, not all states are willing or able to take on that fight.

Crypto-based social networks have managed to reach a steady plateau of activity, gradually carving out a niche as specialized platforms within the broader social media landscape. They are beginning to find their market fit—not as mass-market networks, but as communities tailored to crypto-native users and developers.

However, the reality is that they remain far from achieving the kind of explosive, sustained growth that could mark a true breakthrough. There have been brief moments of vertical traction, where growth accelerated rapidly, but these spikes have proven difficult to maintain. The promise is still there, but the product-market fit remains fragile and incomplete.

There are several reasons why crypto social networks have struggled to take off. One of the most fundamental challenges has been scalability. These platforms were not truly open in their early years, largely because they were technically unable to support the level of onchain activity required. As a result, most of them operated under invite-only systems. This scarcity even gave rise to speculative behavior—on platforms like Lens, user handles were being sold for over €100.

Farcaster, another leading crypto social protocol, addressed this challenge by introducing a paywall—charging users to join the network. While this may not seem like the most effective strategy in an early growth phase, it did reveal something important: there is meaningful demand from users willing to pay to access a decentralized, crypto-native social experience.

In a way, this shift marks a reversal of the dominant social media business model. We’re moving from "free for all" platforms, where users pay with their data, to subscription-based access. But that was never the original promise of crypto social networks. The core idea was to make users owners, not just participants. Ownership, in the form of token-based governance, was supposed to be the paradigm shift.

However, most projects have so far avoided launching their own tokens. In many cases, this is because they’ve received substantial venture capital funding—sometimes exceeding $150 million—which has reduced the pressure to decentralize governance. It's understandably difficult to give up control over a product that is already generating revenue early on.

Another major reason behind the slow adoption of crypto social networks has been the lackluster mobile experience. While there was hope that an open onchain architecture would spark the development of multiple high-quality clients, the reality is that these platforms have not had the funding required to build user interfaces that could rival traditional social media apps.

Farcaster, which has led the way in terms of client development, at least chose to centralize resources around a single main app. Lens, on the other hand, remained neutral and allowed third parties to build independently, further fragmenting the development effort. While this open environment has encouraged some innovation—such as the introduction of Frames (interactive posts) and deeper integration with NFTs and onchain activity—none of these features have been compelling enough to cause a mass migration of users from existing platforms.

Competing on usability with tech giants that have been refining their products for over a decade is a formidable challenge. True innovation in user experience will only emerge when there is a robust ecosystem of applications—and that, in turn, is impossible without adequate funding. Despite some impressive fundraising rounds, these projects have so far failed to create self-sustaining developer ecosystems.

The lesson from Layer 1 blockchains should have been clear: building an ecosystem without a native token is nearly impossible. And yet, in the case of crypto social networks, the token remains a taboo—shunned by leading projects despite being arguably essential for long-term success.

At the end of the day, outcompeting traditional social media may simply be a matter of capital. The real question we should be asking is:**How much would someone need to be paid to leave their current social network and join a new one?**How much would it take for you to delete your accounts on Meta or Twitter and commit to using Farcaster instead?

Not everything in life has a price—but switching social networks might be one of those things that does.

If we take Twitter’s last known valuation as a benchmark, each user is “worth” roughly $75, based on a $45 billion valuation and around 600 million monthly active users. Now imagine this: what if a new crypto social network offered $1,000 per user, on the condition that they permanently delete their profiles on other platforms and remain active on the new network for at least one year?

Here’s the math:$1,000 per user × 600 million users = $600 billion

That’s 13 times the current valuation of Twitter (X). This puts things into perspective: the market values a user at a much lower price than what it might take to truly buy their commitment. If crypto networks want to bootstrap meaningful migration, they may need to rethink what user acquisition means—possibly blending token ownership, incentives, and monetary compensation in ways Web2 never dared to explore.

Such a migration strategy—paying users to switch—might be more viable than it seems at first glance, especially with smart optimizations. For instance, it’s likely that the last 20% of users wouldn’t even need to be paid, as they wouldn’t want to remain on a deserted platform once a mass migration is underway.

Moreover, the economics of crypto could potentially deliver returns that far exceed the current $75 valuation per user, making such an investment more justifiable. Still, raising $600 billion to execute a direct user buyout is unlikely. But there’s an alternative—tokenized ownership.

Instead of paying users directly in dollars, a new crypto-native social network could issue a token, valuing each user’s participation at $1,000 and distributing rewards continuously based on activity and contribution. In doing so, the network could unlock a massive latent asset: our social capital. But such a network can only succeed with coordination—without collective participation, there is no value. The network effect is only powerful when it is shared.

That’s why real commitment is essential. Simply joining Farcaster while maintaining profiles on legacy platforms is like buying a call option—it doesn’t reflect real conviction or “skin in the game.”

This next-generation social network could even go a step further by launching its own stablecoin, distributing profits to users and further incentivizing engagement. With this kind of token economy in place, the network could finally fund a robust innovation ecosystem—something essential if we hope to see meaningful product advancements that can rival or surpass traditional social platforms.

To many, this article will read like an ode to speculation—fuel for the “airdrop mercenaries” who relentlessly chase short-term profit. Speaking openly about tokens and making money in the context of social networks remains, for now, politically incorrect. But perhaps we need to reframe the discussion entirely.

What if we saw users of legacy social networks not simply as consumers, but as exploited labor? Millions spend countless hours creating content, engaging communities, and generating attention—feeding the profit machines of Big Tech. Maybe the real injustice is not that people earn tokens for participating in a new network, but that they earn nothing at all from the platforms they helped build.

Of course, such thoughts rarely emerge from the leadership of these projects—the same people who comfortably extract or anticipate extracting all the value that users create. And yet, it's precisely tokens that have sparked a social spring in crypto-native platforms.

On Farcaster, for instance, the emergence of the $DEGEN token became one of the strongest engines of growth—catalyzing a burst of creativity and inspiring dozens of derivative initiatives. However, despite this contribution, Degen (like many community-led projects) is not entitled to any share of the value it helped create. Once again, the innovators have become unpaid workers for platforms that capitalize on their momentum without offering ownership or sustainability in return.

These networks need their own DeFi Summer. They need a SushiSwap moment—a bold vampire attack that forces incumbents to act, to decentralize, to launch their tokens or risk being displaced. After all, would Uniswap have launched its token without that direct threat from SushiSwap? The pressure of competition can move mountains.

And yet, the latest initiatives—like Farcaster PRO—are once again pivoting back to subscription-based models. Instead of embracing token-based ownership, we see a retreat to Web2 monetization strategies. We'll have to wait and see how the space evolves, but one thing is clear:

**Disrupting social media is, at its core, a financial problem.**It’s about recognizing that millions of people currently work for free for today’s social media giants.They’re not “mercenaries”—they’re unpaid labor, and crypto has the tools to finally flip that equation.

It’s about mobilizing capital to hire the millions of people who currently work for free for today’s dominant platforms. Ironically, those people—often dismissed as “mercenaries”—may actually be the builders of the next generation of digital public goods.