Modern warfare increasingly relies on low-cost, unmanned devices operated either autonomously or under remote human control. This approach has managed to successfully challenge the superiority of conventional weapons of war. As India plans to upgrade its fleet it would do well to embrace this change.
This is a link-enhanced version of an article that first appeared in the Mint. You can read the original here. For the full archive of all the Ex Machina articles, please visit my website.
On 1 June 2025, a number of transport trucks parked within range of selected Russian airbases silently sprang into action. Roofs slid back to reveal hidden launchers, and wave upon wave of small first-person-view (FPV) drones lifted off. By evening, TV channels had footage of burnt aircraft and damaged facilities across Russia. It was Ukraine’s most audacious strike of the war.
It was called Operation Spiderweb—a highly coordinated operation conducted through unconventional means deep inside Russian territory. By infiltrating Russia’s road transport network, Ukraine was able to place short-range drones within striking distance of multiple targets, enabling near-simultaneous attacks on strategic Russian assets even 4,300km away from the border. At sea, Ukraine’s Magura V5 crew-less surface vessels have repeatedly hit Russian naval assets, pushing the
These techniques, alongside missiles, artillery and electronic warfare, are now central to contemporary campaigns. As a result, the economics of warfare has begun to go against legacy platforms. An FPV drone costs a few thousand dollars, while a bomber costs millions. As a result, those who can build fast, accept losses and adjust tactics between sorties have an advantage over those who cannot. It is not that drones are unstoppable. But when cheap, easily repairable systems are deployed en masse, they can disrupt defensive strategies in ways that traditional armed forces often have no effective way to adapt to.
At the same time, Ukraine also shows the limitations of drones, as Russian ballistic missiles have frequently breached its air-defence networks, forcing hard choices on its use of interceptors and spares. Clearly, logistics and the depth of wartime armoury are still important. Which seems to suggest that even as these new technologies rise in relevance, there is still a need for integrated air and missile defences (IAMD).
Why is this relevant to India? Because we are, even as we speak, in the middle of a major recapitalization. With MiG-21 fighters retiring and our squadron strength under pressure, we have major decisions to make. As we replace our ageing fleet, the question we must ask ourselves is whether we want to rebuild the past or invest in its future.
We would do well to design at least a part of our airpower around an attritable airborne fleet that we can pair with fighter jets, counter-drone systems and a strengthened IAMD layer. By investing strategically in relatively inexpensive unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), we will be able to enhance the effectiveness of our manned fighter fleet. To be clear, I am not making an argument for dispensing with manned fighter aircraft entirely. To the contrary, this is an argument to make them more effective by pairing each fighter with a swarm of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), so that manned aircraft are not the sole source of our airpower.
If we embark on this path, our metrics must change and we should fully buy into this philosophy. Combat units should have organic UAS and counter-UAS capabilities, universal training in FPV tactics, and defensive and offensive playbooks that leverage the benefits of airborne swarms. For defence, we need to refit existing artillery systems to adapt them to the new requirements of drone warfare.
So, what will it take to pivot towards this new approach? If we anchor our strategy around buying rather than building, it is likely that costs will spiral, not to mention our strategic dependence on foreign UAS suppliers. Instead, we must invest in industrial pipelines that will allow us to make and repair drone systems at scale, so that procurement is measured solely on its cost per effect, rather than the replacement cost of each unit.
The trouble is that we still depend on foreign supply chains for essential components. These are shortcomings that we must urgently address by implementing targeted incentives to encourage domestic manufacture. One way to achieve this might be to encourage civil-military fusion projects that let us integrate the best street-level technologies with military needs. An intake mechanism that enables fast contracting in small tranches with user-led trials should feature as part of our iDEX programme, allowing startups and small businesses to contribute. This, coupled with guaranteed defence orders and targeted production subsidies, will derisk private investment and incentivize startups to invest in this space.
All said and done, the hardware is likely to be the easy part. What will be harder to develop is a new intuition around how we approach our defence objectives to take best advantage of the agility and flexibility that this new mode of warfare offers. We need to lean into attrition, not fear it, so that we can learn to place our drone swarms in offensive situations where we would not dream of risking our manned aircraft. We also need to develop swarm intelligence, so that our drone fleets can adapt quickly to changing combat conditions most effectively.
We don’t need to choose between the old and new. For now, we just need to establish a smaller manned core that is augmented by low-cost UAS, layered UCAS and stronger IAMD.
That way, India is buying resilience, not just inventory.
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