One of the most attractive factors of working in DAO is that there seems to be no obligations. Unlike the organizations in reality, e.g., companies, most DAOs are supportive to a full autonomous mode that encourages spontaneous contributions and the bottom-up workflows. In particular, a member will first match his/her capacity with a DAO and find a task that meets the mutual interests. Then, he/she writes an application to apply for a reasonable budget. Once the budget is approved, he/she will start to contribute in his/her own pace with seemingly no obligation. The worst outcome is no contribution with no payment. Autonomous contribution is more flexible and could be more effective than classical workflows that based on top-down task assignments. It leads to many successes of DAOs and is sometimes considered to be a key element of DAOs.  From another perspective, it is also impractical to assign tasks to members in DAOs with certain obligations since there is usually no contract signed by the participants with the DAOs. It could also be the case that a person simultaneously participate in multiple DAOs, sometimes with different pseudonyms. Then, as the majority of DAO participants can only work in their spare time, they would prefer to work in such a way that is different from their daily jobs. Furthermore, it is not favorable for the DAOs to obligate the DAOers to do anything: such obligation might just scare off the potential participants.  However, in my opinion, DAOs with no obligation will not last long. An individual could make contribution spontaneously all other time. An organization could operate on spontaneousness some of the time, but not all of the time. This conclusion is simply drawn from the fact that people are different and tend to be lazy. If a DAO simply counts on the proactiveness and spontaneousness of its DAOer to run, it will certainly fail when some DAOers start to take free rides on other's contributions. Here, when a DAO fails, it will not go bankrupt or break into small groups, it simply fades away when members are less and less active and more and more reluctant in making contribution. In fact, this should not even be a problem for DAO, since the blockchain is basically proposed for the same reason: to replace the trust on human nature to the trust on codes. Hence, the concept of DAO is not against obligations. Instead, DAOs should contain obligations, which are written in codes, transparently posted, and ideally automatically ran on blockchain. Then, by autonomous, it means that DAOers could decide whether they want to participate in such DAOs, contribute, and be rewarded. However, once they take part in, they are obliged to the rules of the DAOs, just as they are obliged to the signed contracts with companies. Then, if they fail to fulfill their obligations, they will automatically step down leaving the rest to continue contributing according to the rules of the DAO.

This thought directly follows from the previous one: with no obligations on the participants, there isn't a way in DAOs to mimic a top-down workflow as in companies. There are already countless examples of pure bottom-up, autonomous projects failed or postponed. As a result, there are claims that maybe DAOs are not good for a certain things, e.g., "heavy" tasks that need clear planning, strong project dependencies, and fixed deadlines. On the contrary, it is more suitable in works that require creativity, proactivity, and passion. In other words, DAOs are more organized than communities but less organized than companies and could be used to create or achieve something "light" but not something "heavy". Then, for a heavy task, it is believed that we still need to do it in a traditional fashion, i.e., starting a company.   It is rather ironic since DAOs are characterized with efficiency, transparence, creativity, etc., and have always been introduced as replacements for traditional companies and the ultimate form for all organizations. However, nobody has ever mentioned that it also has organizational limitations. Tracing back to the basic principles of DAOs, which are the distributed ownership and on-chain governance, they seem to be only better than traditional organizations and there is not explanation on why some tasks are suddenly not accomplishable. Hence, the only acceptable explanation to us is that DAOs COULD handle heavy tasks. The blame should be put on the incapable and inefficient on-chain governance, which is quickly maturing. As a result, the tasks that DAOs are able to handle will grow heavier over time. In the future, DAOs should be able to fulfill the functions of most organizations, instead of only being a more-capable community and less-capable company. In that sense, the simple and minimalist workflow and organizational structure is not sustainable. We should start to discard the ideas like "no obligations" and "pure spontaneousness" in DAO tooling as eventually DAOs will have more complicated, structured, supervised, and dependent workflows just like traditional organizations. That being said, DAOs could be divergent in forms with a wide range of organization levels. However, as the blockchain technology matures, we do not see any excuses why DAOs could only succeed in the current organizational bracket.

Nowadays, the importance of talents in DAOs is heavily emphasized. Naturally, regardless of the goals of the DAO, it boils down to the individuals who work to achieve the goals. Then, as DAO remains a new concept with few know-hows, it is of the interest of most DAOs to attract as many talents as possible. Then, incentive mechanisms will be set up to motivate them to contribute to the final goals. It is a win-win situation when the DAOers are motivated to contribute to the goal with a satisfactory incentive and the DAO retain talents to devotedly achieve same goal. However, the honeymoon period will not last forever. DAOs will always run into a phase where personal interests conflict with the interest of the DAO. For example, the DAOers who have made significant contributions in the past lost their motivation or find other DAOs more attractive to them (which happens all the time). Then, DAOs have to adjust their rules to keep the momentum and remain productive. In particular, compromises have to be made in between talents and rules. Some DAOs will prefer talents over rules and tend to lower the bar of of participation. This preference is very much related to the fact that people believe that there is no obligation in DAOs and DAOs are less organized, which I have opposed previously. In general, despite of the very attractive and seemingly starter-friendly onboarding mechanism, there are very few DAOs that have a clear rule for dismissal. This fact also linked to my previous remarks to DeGov: due to governance token, people that acquired governance token, whether by contributions or purchase from the market, literally own the DAO and should be part of the governance by default. Hence, it is injustice to exclude them from the DAO or governance. However, if we redesign the governance model and separate the ownership and economical rights from the governance right, it is much easier to include a dismissal rule in DAO. The dismissed member could still own the DAO and indirectly participate in the governance of DAO, but not affect the daily operation and decision making in DAO. In summary, I believe in DAO as a more efficient value-creating form of organizations for the future, which is the base of all my thoughts. Then, my arguments are that DAO will be and need to be more organized, which includes higher involvement level, obligations, and strict rules that could lead to dismissal. DAOers that fail to follow the rules will be dismissed and lose their governance rights, regardless of how talented or renowned they are. DAOs should be more than just a community with talented individuals.

One of the most attractive factors of working in DAO is that there seems to be no obligations. Unlike the organizations in reality, e.g., companies, most DAOs are supportive to a full autonomous mode that encourages spontaneous contributions and the bottom-up workflows. In particular, a member will first match his/her capacity with a DAO and find a task that meets the mutual interests. Then, he/she writes an application to apply for a reasonable budget. Once the budget is approved, he/she will start to contribute in his/her own pace with seemingly no obligation. The worst outcome is no contribution with no payment. Autonomous contribution is more flexible and could be more effective than classical workflows that based on top-down task assignments. It leads to many successes of DAOs and is sometimes considered to be a key element of DAOs.  From another perspective, it is also impractical to assign tasks to members in DAOs with certain obligations since there is usually no contract signed by the participants with the DAOs. It could also be the case that a person simultaneously participate in multiple DAOs, sometimes with different pseudonyms. Then, as the majority of DAO participants can only work in their spare time, they would prefer to work in such a way that is different from their daily jobs. Furthermore, it is not favorable for the DAOs to obligate the DAOers to do anything: such obligation might just scare off the potential participants.  However, in my opinion, DAOs with no obligation will not last long. An individual could make contribution spontaneously all other time. An organization could operate on spontaneousness some of the time, but not all of the time. This conclusion is simply drawn from the fact that people are different and tend to be lazy. If a DAO simply counts on the proactiveness and spontaneousness of its DAOer to run, it will certainly fail when some DAOers start to take free rides on other's contributions. Here, when a DAO fails, it will not go bankrupt or break into small groups, it simply fades away when members are less and less active and more and more reluctant in making contribution. In fact, this should not even be a problem for DAO, since the blockchain is basically proposed for the same reason: to replace the trust on human nature to the trust on codes. Hence, the concept of DAO is not against obligations. Instead, DAOs should contain obligations, which are written in codes, transparently posted, and ideally automatically ran on blockchain. Then, by autonomous, it means that DAOers could decide whether they want to participate in such DAOs, contribute, and be rewarded. However, once they take part in, they are obliged to the rules of the DAOs, just as they are obliged to the signed contracts with companies. Then, if they fail to fulfill their obligations, they will automatically step down leaving the rest to continue contributing according to the rules of the DAO.

This thought directly follows from the previous one: with no obligations on the participants, there isn't a way in DAOs to mimic a top-down workflow as in companies. There are already countless examples of pure bottom-up, autonomous projects failed or postponed. As a result, there are claims that maybe DAOs are not good for a certain things, e.g., "heavy" tasks that need clear planning, strong project dependencies, and fixed deadlines. On the contrary, it is more suitable in works that require creativity, proactivity, and passion. In other words, DAOs are more organized than communities but less organized than companies and could be used to create or achieve something "light" but not something "heavy". Then, for a heavy task, it is believed that we still need to do it in a traditional fashion, i.e., starting a company.   It is rather ironic since DAOs are characterized with efficiency, transparence, creativity, etc., and have always been introduced as replacements for traditional companies and the ultimate form for all organizations. However, nobody has ever mentioned that it also has organizational limitations. Tracing back to the basic principles of DAOs, which are the distributed ownership and on-chain governance, they seem to be only better than traditional organizations and there is not explanation on why some tasks are suddenly not accomplishable. Hence, the only acceptable explanation to us is that DAOs COULD handle heavy tasks. The blame should be put on the incapable and inefficient on-chain governance, which is quickly maturing. As a result, the tasks that DAOs are able to handle will grow heavier over time. In the future, DAOs should be able to fulfill the functions of most organizations, instead of only being a more-capable community and less-capable company. In that sense, the simple and minimalist workflow and organizational structure is not sustainable. We should start to discard the ideas like "no obligations" and "pure spontaneousness" in DAO tooling as eventually DAOs will have more complicated, structured, supervised, and dependent workflows just like traditional organizations. That being said, DAOs could be divergent in forms with a wide range of organization levels. However, as the blockchain technology matures, we do not see any excuses why DAOs could only succeed in the current organizational bracket.

Nowadays, the importance of talents in DAOs is heavily emphasized. Naturally, regardless of the goals of the DAO, it boils down to the individuals who work to achieve the goals. Then, as DAO remains a new concept with few know-hows, it is of the interest of most DAOs to attract as many talents as possible. Then, incentive mechanisms will be set up to motivate them to contribute to the final goals. It is a win-win situation when the DAOers are motivated to contribute to the goal with a satisfactory incentive and the DAO retain talents to devotedly achieve same goal. However, the honeymoon period will not last forever. DAOs will always run into a phase where personal interests conflict with the interest of the DAO. For example, the DAOers who have made significant contributions in the past lost their motivation or find other DAOs more attractive to them (which happens all the time). Then, DAOs have to adjust their rules to keep the momentum and remain productive. In particular, compromises have to be made in between talents and rules. Some DAOs will prefer talents over rules and tend to lower the bar of of participation. This preference is very much related to the fact that people believe that there is no obligation in DAOs and DAOs are less organized, which I have opposed previously. In general, despite of the very attractive and seemingly starter-friendly onboarding mechanism, there are very few DAOs that have a clear rule for dismissal. This fact also linked to my previous remarks to DeGov: due to governance token, people that acquired governance token, whether by contributions or purchase from the market, literally own the DAO and should be part of the governance by default. Hence, it is injustice to exclude them from the DAO or governance. However, if we redesign the governance model and separate the ownership and economical rights from the governance right, it is much easier to include a dismissal rule in DAO. The dismissed member could still own the DAO and indirectly participate in the governance of DAO, but not affect the daily operation and decision making in DAO. In summary, I believe in DAO as a more efficient value-creating form of organizations for the future, which is the base of all my thoughts. Then, my arguments are that DAO will be and need to be more organized, which includes higher involvement level, obligations, and strict rules that could lead to dismissal. DAOers that fail to follow the rules will be dismissed and lose their governance rights, regardless of how talented or renowned they are. DAOs should be more than just a community with talented individuals.