
As an Argentine who's lived through these situations firsthand over time—from the suffocating pandemic lockdown to the economic and political ups and downs that have shaped our daily reality—I'm offering here an objective perspective from the heart of the country. This isn't some distant or theoretical analysis; it's a reflection shaped by lived experience, grounded in verifiable facts and direct observations, aimed at shedding light on what's happened without veering into exaggerations or biases. It's a call for clarity amid the noise, to understand why, despite promises of radical change, the path we've taken hasn't been the one we hoped for.
Something that doesn't exist can't be dead. Over these past few days, as an Argentine and a communicator, I've started getting a ton of questions about whether "Milei and liberalism don't work in practice." But I've got something different to tell you. In Argentina, liberal policies still haven't been implemented. And I'll explain why.Let's recall a historical pattern: there are videos of Chávez giving speeches just like Milei's, which propelled him to power only for him to do the exact opposite once in office.
Milei is an economist, but with underdeveloped social communication skills or communication issues and impulsiveness.
We always knew that, and it was precisely what made Milei so appealing: he caught Argentina right as it was plunging into a massive economic and social crisis, just emerging from the pandemic. Argentina endured the world's longest lockdown (the continuous one in Buenos Aires lasted 234 days in 2020, the most extensive recorded globally, with strict phases that added up to over 200 days of mandatory isolation and intermittent restrictions through the end of that year, unleashing a devastating impact on the economy and collective mental health), the worst pandemic management under the Kirchnerist government.

There was a massive loss of purchasing power: the peso devalued by more than 200% between 2020 and 2023. At one point, with just 100 USD, you could afford a comfy rental on the outskirts of the city, known as Greater Buenos Aires—it's like renting in Philadelphia and commuting to downtown New York. And to get by month to month (for folks earning in USD), you could live in Argentina like a king on no more than 1,000 USD a month, indulging in luxuries: dining out, buying new clothes, getting beauty treatments, food, home stuff, etc. That's always assuming you're getting paid in foreign currency. What hit the average Argentine (the everyday Joe) was the loss of purchasing power. Picture this: you're working a steady job, and because of government decisions, bad management, and human interests, you make 1,000 in January and 500 by December (purchasing power loss) all thanks to the state—before, you could save up to 200 USD that the state allowed.
This brewed discontent at a vulnerable moment, and that's when Javier Milei rose to prominence, because he was supposedly apolitical, championed freedom, proclaimed himself a top economist expert in growth with or without money, and a liberal libertarian who wasn't there to herd sheep but to awaken lions. That effect intoxicated Argentine society with intellectual airs, with people wanting and asking even more about why Argentina was in such a bad spot. Plus, Milei quickly snagged the youth vote (we vote from age 16 here). Milei managed to get young people and post-teens to make a sovereign effort at free militancy, education, and outreach on social media and to their families. As a result, the Milei effect turned thousands of young folks into a Trojan horse in homes riddled with ignorance and Kirchnerism. That effect is what literally catapulted him to the presidency of Argentina. The thing is, there was fine print in the contract that none of the 35 million Argentine voters read: that Javier Milei wouldn't deliver on any of what he promised. Which is why, less than two years in—halfway through his term—he's already lost the voters who aren't die-hard political fanatics; today, they straight-up won't back him, not just for failing to deliver, but for something worse: defrauding the voters and, even worse, the homeland.
When Milei took power in December 2023, he assumed office with monthly inflation over 23 points (it peaked at 25.5%). But in the following months, inflation started dropping, and in the second quarter of his first year, Milei managed to bring it down from double digits to single, then lower percentages, setting the current average at 2 to 3 points monthly (the annual rate plunged dramatically from nearly 300% in April 2024 to 36.6% in July 2025, though cost-of-living challenges persist). But that's the only thing his model has achieved. Meanwhile, Argentina faces:
More social crises: The same poverty levels as before (according to independent measures like those from the Universidad Católica Argentina, it hit 53% in December 2024, the highest in 20 years, though the official INDEC reported a drop to 38.1% in the first year, sparking controversy over potential tweaks to the calculation methodology), since Milei's current model isn't a success and hasn't lifted people out of poverty; it just changed how it's measured. So internationally, they say Argentina is emerging from poverty and indigence, when really, only the measurement changed. This is classic Argentine politics; you can look it up from the CFK era, when she manipulated INDEC data (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, the official body for the country's economic and social stats) to make Guillermo Moreno—convicted for this (the former Interior Commerce Secretary was prosecuted and sentenced in 2024 to three years in prison for systematically tampering with INDEC data from 2007 to 2015, fiddling with indices like inflation to show lower, government-friendly figures)—alter the index from 2007 to 2015. That was to make the data look good abroad, but the reality is another story.
One disconcerting thing that happened to voters and Milei supporters, eroding trust in the political setup big time, was this chain of events unfolding to this day: he fired a bunch of key political figures who gave him credibility, seriousness, and respect; tensions with Vice President Victoria Villarruel, ditched the Kid Ramiro Marra, and allies like Dana Mondino. Quoting him directly in interviews and on social media, he called them traitors or meddlers. He sidelined them not for not being liberal, but because—and this is a super sensitive topic—deep rifts emerged in La Libertad Avanza (LLA), with accusations of meddling by his sister Karina Milei. That's what kicked off the party's decline.
No policies to boost the microeconomy, just sucking up to Elon Musk—with whom he met at the Tesla factory in Texas and talked Argentine lithium interests—to maybe get a plant in the Pampas, making the only pro-business moves ones that favor monopolies and benefit a super select group of 15,000, when over 50 million actually live here.

Opened up imports, letting big companies operate without limits or with freer, less regulated new imports, while for the average citizen, it just bumped up the ability to bring in a few items from abroad, but there's a 3,000 USD limit per shipment annually, packages up to 50 kg, and more variety than before (with duty exemptions up to 400 USD).
But Milei promised more freedoms, that anyone could import whatever they wanted for whatever they wanted; that still ain't possible in Argentina, since one of the overseas buying rules is you can't bring multiple items of the same product 'cause it's seen as for resale, so your purchase gets rejected or you could face legal trouble. Didn't tweak economic or business deregulation laws to stimulate and narrow the gap with the current informal market—which is around 40 to 50% of Argentina's economic activity, per OECD estimates—leaving folks working off the books, unable to retire, keeping their SMEs in the black with no tax breaks or social market perks like better employee status, pension contributions, health insurance access, better credit odds, stifling the small guys and propping up the bigwigs who already own the market.Didn't truly float the exchange rate, squeezing the Argentine wage earner and the average person getting USD; kept the Argentine peso from appreciating or depreciating, holding a more fixed rate in a controlled band (a crawling peg with limited float between 951 and 1,471 pesos per dollar early in 2025)—turning a country where you could live on a few bucks a few years back into one of the region's priciest. So, someone earning 1,100 who now makes 600 living normal, those 600 USD barely cover an average rent now.
And since wages are in Argentine pesos, with inflation cooling, bosses didn't have to hike pay, so a devalued currency tied to a pseudo-fixed rate meant they didn't need to give folks raises... Then wages don't keep up with the USD, and an Argentine paid in pesos shells out pesos for products that in USD terms cost nearly double what's abroad (overall cost of living is 66% cheaper than the US, but imported goods and food have matched prices while local wages barely cover basics, akin to low-income economies in purchasing power); ended up with food prices like in the US but wages like Cuba's (with respect), sparking massive discontent since just a few bosses started living large, the ones who reaped the low-inflation stability and Milei-granted business perks the most.
Bottom line, Milei, with 30 million voters when he took office as president, only really benefits a group of no more than 20,000 people.Another issue is he fanned the social flames by labeling retirees, the disabled, the Garrahan (pediatric hospital), universities, or anyone disagreeing with his policies as the "political caste" (vetoing funding laws for these sectors, sparking multisector protests), when those vulnerable groups aren't the caste; they're part of a society that's already battered, branding them enemies when the real caste is Milei's crew, his lapdogs, the tarot cards, and his zero interest in helping the people.
He did all this claiming they'd cause fiscal imbalance that he was trying so hard to fix, but he only attacks from the spending side when his real problem is not generating revenue unless Donald Trump or the IMF bails him out, since he doesn't boost income from the micro side he stimulates or the macro international side he still can't tap.Right now, there's an investigation into Milei's sister; it kicked off with alleged audio where Diego Spagnuolo claims Karina Milei skims 3% of funds earmarked for disabilities (corruption scandal at the National Disability Agency, with raids and resignations).
This bred tons of instability in the party and ramped up distrust, since Milei's sister—the one handling political list-building—is also under probe for alleged irregularities in candidacies, as the real libertarians got booted by the same person who then slotted in controversial profiles, reigniting tensions with the Kirchnerism Milei came to topple after two decades. To voters, Milei promised no new debt, 'cause he was an expert in economic growth with or without money.
We skip the "without" part; he put Toto Caputo as Economy Minister, who under Macri racked up about 50 billion dollars in debt (including 44 billion from the IMF), buying a few months of stability. Since they botched everything back then, they blew through that borrowed cash, leaving Argentina more indebted, in deeper trouble and crisis. The same guy came back with Milei and did it again: borrowed more, piling on at least 20 billion extra from the IMF and pushing total debt over 400 billion dollars. Just Toto Caputo saddled Argentina's external debt with at least 50 billion dollars overall, and we've gotta pay back more than that official payout. I mean, one guy has the power to burden every born or unborn Argentine (since even the unborn got stuck with the debt...).
He appointed as Security Minister someone he himself called a terrorist, Montonera (member of Montoneros, the left-wing Peronist guerrilla group active in the 1970s, behind armed actions against the military regime and civilians), child killer (accusing her of planting bombs in daycare centers) and drunk, but "politically correct"—that she is.


The crazy part is he made her Security Minister: not only was Patricia Bullrich in the 2000-2001 government as Labor Minister, which under De la Rúa literally cooked up the corralito—meaning, yanking funds from private Argentine citizens who'd deposited foreign currency in any national or international bank on Argentine soil; anyone with deposits lost access to their money, 'cause the state back then had no funds to cover external debt payouts, and with our economic mess blocking internal or external borrowing, they straight-up robbed Argentines of all their savings—leaving the iconic line in history:
And on top of that, Milei started blasting from his social perch and presidential power anyone who thought differently, pushing to adopt and promote social media surveillance, with raids in corruption probes tied to his circle (like the Disability Agency case), though there are complaints that critical posts on social media have led to legal scrutiny. Bottom line: speaking out against Milei or anything related on socials can land you legal heat. So, Milei's basically pushing to shut down any chance of another Javier Milei rising up.
He didn't roll out policies to spark economic growth. Know why? 'Cause the country's not growing. It ain't about time; it's 'cause we base our economy on outdated U.S. diagrams. The country could be booming, but for some reason, they don't want it to. Plus, he widened the social gap, keeping Buenos Aires safe, but just cross Avenida General Paz (the avenue splitting the country's richest city from the rest of the hoods), and under another minister, folks are dealing with worse policies like higher fees on digital wallets and runaway insecurity in nearby areas. That's why he lost: people chose the usual subjugation, voting for the devil you know over handing it to "Milei the madman." What a mess. So, Milei's loss in the latest elections (in September 2025, La Libertad Avanza got crushed in Buenos Aires provincials, scraping just 34% in a key stronghold that reps 40% of voters) straight-up shows contempt for Milei.
And don't get me started on the suitcase scandal from his February 2025 trip to the U.S., where video shows the official delegation—including Milei after his Trump meet and CPAC—coming back with 10 extra undeclared, unchecked suitcases by Customs, on top of what they took going out, and nobody knows what's in 'em, stinking of irregularities that have the prez himself on edge. Milei distanced himself, saying checks are "discretionary" and the U.S. already scans everything, but the video clearly shows those bags breezing through without a look, dragging in a Customs official now wanted for questioning, and it all reeks of a private flight by Laura Bélen Arrieta dodging protocols. It's the height of hypocrisy for a guy preaching transparency and freedom, but tangled in a baggage mystery that benefits who-the-hell-knows-who.
And don't even get me started on the $Libra case, that crypto bombshell that blew up in February 2025 when Milei himself hyped a cryptocurrency called $LIBRA on socials—it ballooned in value super fast then crashed like a house of cards, scorching a bunch of investors in a pump-and-dump scam that reeks of corruption from a mile away. It dragged in Karina, his sister, with lawsuits in the U.S. and Argentina over her role, including audios and hints that a Javier social post ran up to 500,000 bucks like a bribe menu, widening the corruption probe that's giving his government no peace and linking to the web of kickbacks and scams swirling around the Milei family. It's the ultimate irony for a guy who sold himself as the anti-system libertarian, but ends up neck-deep in a digital con that lines a few pockets and screws the rest, proving it's all smoke to cover the chaos.
In the end, what we're debating here isn't defending policies or parties, but the raw reality we face: a gap between promises and facts that keeps feeding cycles of distrust and inequality. In Argentina, where history's drilled us to question with rigor, the real challenge is owning these patterns to carve out a more inclusive and transparent path, beyond ideological labels. Only then, with an honest, collective gaze, can we aim for a future that doesn't repeat the past's mistakes.
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Leonor Toledo
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