The reports from Monocle and The Economist from April 14-15, 2025, paint a dynamic, almost dissonant, portrait of the contemporary world. These juxtapose the undeniable allure of South Korean soft power captivating Parisians with the stark realities of escalating trade wars, burgeoning economic anxieties, and the defiant optimism of international showcases like Expo 2025. The Monocle and Economist newsletters capture a moment of profound transition, where cultural influence shifts, established economic orders tremble, and nations grapple with finding stability and projecting strength amidst pervasive uncertainty.

The Monocle piece on South Korea’s burgeoning popularity in France is particularly telling. In a nation fiercely proud of its own cultural output, the embrace of Samsung, K-beauty, K-food, and phenomena like Squid Game signifies a significant cultural and economic shift. This isn’t merely about consumer preference; it reflects the successful cultivation of soft power – the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce (Nye, 2004). South Korea’s formula – “star-driven entertainment, intuitive technology, tasty food and innovative brands” – mirrors the strategy the US historically employed to great effect. However, the piece explicitly contrasts this rising influence with a contemporary “wariness about brand US,” subtly linking it to the aggressive trade policies detailed later in the newsletter. This suggests that coercive economic measures (hard power tactics) can actively erode the goodwill generated by cultural appeal (soft power). It’s a compelling illustration of how national image is built not just through cultural exports but also through global political and economic conduct.

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This theme of national projection continues at Osaka’s Expo 2025. The very concept of a World Expo feels like an echo from a more optimistic, integrated past – London 1851 aimed to showcase global achievement in an era of burgeoning industrialism. Today’s Expo, themed “Designing Future Society for Our Lives,” attempts a similar feat against a far more “parlous” backdrop. Nations put their best foot forward – French fashion, Italian art, Dutch charm, a British garden – performing their identities on a world stage. As Shakespeare wrote, “All the world’s a stage, / And all the men and women merely players” (As You Like It, Act 2, Scene 7). The Expo becomes a theatre of nations, showcasing curated strengths while global tensions simmer backstage. The slightly eyebrow-raising US theme of “togetherness” highlights the potential gap between aspirational messaging and political reality, a dissonance felt acutely in an era marked by the divisive rhetoric and actions described in the “World in Brief” overview by The Economist.

South Korea’s success in this realm – from Samsung’s brand popularity to the Squid Game phenomenon – exemplifies what cultural theorist Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) calls “cultural odorlessness” – products that travel well because they’ve been strategically designed to cross cultural boundaries.

The newsletters note that South Korea has “successfully generated goodwill by following the recipe that the US once used so successfully,” pointing to a deliberate strategy of cultural exportation. This transition of cultural influence from America to South Korea recalls Antonio Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony, where power operates through cultural institutions and social practices rather than direct force.

This shift parallels similar cultural transitions throughout history. As T.S. Eliot wrote in “Notes Towards the Definition of Culture” (1948): “The emergence of a new cultural center does not merely add to the existing plurality; it reconfigures the entire system of relations.”

The prominence of Samsung—France’s second‑favourite brand in the Opinionway poll—signals more than consumer preference; it reflects the efficacy of South Korea’s deliberate soft‑power strategy (Nye, 2004). Joseph Nye defines soft power as “the ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction” (p. 11). South Korea’s concerted export of popular culture (K‑pop, K‑drama), technology, and cuisine aligns precisely with this paradigm (Kim, 2013). In Paris, the mass reenactment of Squid Game’s “un, deux, trois, soleil” on the Champs‑Élysées exemplifies how mediated culture can translate into public ritual, transforming a global streaming phenomenon into a local spectacle.

“There is no greater agony than bearing an untold story inside you.”
― Maya Angelou, I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings (1969, p. 93)

Angelou’s words resonate here: the global circulation of Korean narratives frees Parisian participants to inhabit previously “untold” spaces of play and collective identification.

The proliferation of Korean cosmetics boutiques and restaurants in Paris over the past twenty years reflects what Appadurai (1996) calls “the social life of things”: commodities not only circulate as goods but carry with them “scripts” of identity and aspiration (p. 5). Korean beauty products (K‑beauty) promise both efficacy and a narrative of modernity, tapping into France’s haute‑cosmétique tradition while reconfiguring it through the lens of Korean innovation. Likewise, the quintuple increase in Korean restaurants speaks to a cosmopolitan palate that valorizes authenticity yet is deeply mediated by global branding.

A 48 percent year‑on‑year increase in French tourists to South Korea in 2024 suggests that cultural affinity translates into economic flows. Such tourism surges can be interpreted through Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of cultural capital: familiarity with Korean pop culture encourages travel, which in turn deepens transnational networks of knowledge and affect (p. 170). Moreover, Samsung’s reliability and innovation reinforce France’s own industrial self‑image, potentially stimulating joint ventures and technology transfer in sectors from semiconductors to green energy.

“Traveling—they leave you speechless, then turn you into a storyteller.”
― Ibn Battuta, The Rihla (translated by Lee, 2005, p. 42)

Monocle’s assertion that South Korea is “the new soft‑power sheriff” amid US tariffs highlights shifting geopolitical alignments. Nye’s later work (2011) argues that soft power becomes especially potent when hard‑power alliances fray (p. 58). In the context of US‑China trade tensions, Seoul’s cultural diplomacy affords it strategic autonomy, even as domestic politics in Seoul remain volatile. The French embrace of Korean brands thus also signifies a subtle political reorientation—a willingness to diversify partnerships beyond traditional Western blocs.

“Let us not speak of war, but of peace.”
― Jean‑Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762/2002, Book I, Chapter 6)

Rousseau’s appeal for a new social contract echoes today in the search for a global order not predicated solely on military might but on cultural affinity and mutual respect.

The Parisian fascination with South Korea illustrates Appadurai’s (1996) notion of “mediascapes”: electronic and print media produce images that shape social imaginaries (p. 33). The collective enactment of Korean cultural forms—be it Squid Game or K‑beauty rituals—creates ephemeral communities that transcend national borders. This mirrors Beck’s (2000) “cosmopolitan vision,” wherein individuals negotiate multiple identities within global flows (p. 16).

“We live in fragments, in juxtapositions, in metonyms.”
― James Joyce, Ulysses (1922, p. 178)

Joyce’s modernist fragmentation finds its counterpart in today’s fluid cultural assemblages, where Parisians don green tracksuits as easily as they might don haute couture.

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The newsletters starkly contrast the cultural exchange in Paris and the staged harmony in Osaka with the harsh realities of economic fragmentation. The interview with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis underscores the vulnerability of nations, even significant maritime powers, to trade wars initiated by larger economies like the US. His assertion that “Europe is based on the idea of an open international order with free trade at its core” clashes with the subsequent reports of US tariffs causing “significant short-term pain,” China retaliating against Boeing, German investor confidence collapsing (“the sharpest drop in the index’s history”), and South Korea scrambling to protect its vital semiconductor industry. This reflects a fundamental tension in international political economy between the logic of liberal interdependence and the resurgence of mercantilist, state-centric competition (Gilpin, 2001). The “complex supply chains and interdependent interests,” which Mitsotakis argues are difficult to dismantle, are being actively strained and potentially broken by unilateral actions.

Xi Jinping’s tour of Southeast Asia, framed by President Trump as an attempt to “‘screw’ America,” exemplifies the geopolitical maneuvering within this fractured economic landscape. China positions itself as a champion of trade against US “reciprocal” tariffs, seeking to bind regional economies closer while simultaneously causing anxiety about potential goods dumping. Nations in the region are caught in the middle, attempting to navigate between the two giants. This complex dynamic echoes historical patterns of great power competition, where smaller states must constantly adjust their alignment and strategy (Waltz, 1979).

Amidst the disruption, threads of adaptation and resilience emerge. Najwa Shihab’s journey in Indonesia, leaving traditional media to build the successful digital platform Narasi, exemplifies entrepreneurial adaptation within a rapidly changing media landscape. Her focus on “thoughtful, considered journalism that chimes with a younger audience” suggests a path towards rebuilding trust and engagement in an era often characterized by information overload and “noise.” This resonates with Manuel Castells’ (1996) work on the network society, where new communication structures enable alternative forms of influence and community building.

Similarly, South Korea’s massive support package for its semiconductor industry is a proactive measure to safeguard a critical sector against external shocks. Even luxury brands like Hermès demonstrate resilience, weathering the economic slowdown better than rivals, highlighting the enduring appeal of certain forms of craftsmanship and perceived value. Expo 2025 itself, despite its controversies and budget woes, embodies a determined, if perhaps fragile, optimism.

The ambition to “inspire a new generation” and the unifying potential ascribed to the mascot Myaku Myaku (“If Myaku Myaku can’t bring us together, who will?”) represent a social and political yearning for connection and positive vision in troubled times. It’s a collective performance of hope, seeking solace and shared purpose even as underlying anxieties persist, much like the “nostalgia” for Osaka’s 1970 Expo hints at a longing for a seemingly simpler, more unified past, perhaps akin to the way Proust explored memory’s power to reshape present experience (In Search of Lost Time).

The Osaka Expo 2025 appears as an almost quaint attempt at global unity in an era of fracturing international relations. The newsletters’ description of nations that “can’t stand one another politically get[ting] along just fine in the confines of an expo” reveals the performative nature of international diplomacy and cooperation.

This tension between unity and division recalls Umberto Eco’s (1962/1989) concept of the “open work” – cultural productions that contain multiple interpretations and contradictions within a unified structure. The Osaka Expo represents an “open work” on a global scale, attempting to maintain the appearance of international cooperation while acknowledging underlying tensions.

The expo’s mascot, Myaku Myaku, serves as what Roland Barthes (1957/1972) might call a “mythological sign” – a cultural symbol that neutralizes political tensions through its innocent, childlike appearance. “If Myaku Myaku can’t bring us together, who will?” the text asks, revealing both hope and desperation in the search for unifying symbols in a fractured world.

The economic dimension of the newsletters focuses on the growing trade tensions and the impact of Trump’s tariffs on global supply chains. The Greek Prime Minister’s comments about interdependence – “Globalisation has created complex supply chains and interdependent interests, which will prove very difficult to dismantle” – reflect what economic historian Dani Rodrik (2011) describes as the “globalization paradox”: the tension between national sovereignty, democracy, and economic integration.

Germany’s collapsing investor confidence represents what economist Hyman Minsky (1986) would identify as a “Minsky moment” – a sudden collapse in asset values following a period of economic optimism. The text notes “the sharpest drop in the index’s history,” signaling a potential paradigm shift in European economic thinking.

Xi Jinping’s strategic outreach to Southeast Asian nations amid U.S. tariff threats brings to mind what international relations scholar John Mearsheimer (2001) called “the tragedy of great power politics” – the inevitable competition between major powers that leaves smaller nations maneuvering for position between them. As the Monocle and the Economist newsletters observe, “South-East Asian officials worry about another, growing threat: that Chinese manufacturers, unable to sell their goods to America, will dump them on their region.”

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The newsletters’ portrayal of global dynamics recalls Gabriel García Márquez’s (1985) “Love in the Time of Cholera,” where characters navigate complex relationships against a backdrop of societal transformation. Just as Fermina Daza and Florentino Ariza must adapt to changing circumstances while maintaining their essential connection, nations today must renegotiate relationships while preserving necessary ties.

The French-Korean cultural exchange described in the opening paragraphs evokes Roland Barthes’ “Empire of Signs” (1970), his meditation on Japanese culture that explores how Western observers interpret and sometimes misinterpret Eastern cultural forms. As Barthes wrote: “The possibility of difference, of mutation, of revolution in the systems of reading.”

The newsletters offer a snapshot of a world in transition. Old hegemonies are fading while new ones emerge; global cooperation persists within structures like expos even as trade relationships fracture; and nations large and small must navigate an increasingly complex matrix of alliances and antagonisms.

As poet T.S. Eliot (1942) wrote in “Little Gidding”: “We shall not cease from exploration / And the end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time.” The global community appears to be in such a process of exploration – rediscovering fundamental truths about interdependence even as it tests the limits of national sovereignty and competitive advantage.

The Monocle and Economist dispatches capture a world defined by stark contrasts: the smooth appeal of South Korean soft power versus the abrasive friction of trade wars; the collaborative aspirations of Expo 2025 versus the deepening divisions between nations; the innovative dynamism of figures like Najwa Shihab versus the paralyzing gloom gripping the German economy. These reflect a global system where interconnectedness breeds both unprecedented cultural exchange (like K-pop in Paris) and profound vulnerability (as seen in Greece’s reliance on stable maritime trade).

While forces of fragmentation driven by economic nationalism appear ascendant, exerting palpable pressure across sectors and continents, countervailing forces endure – the persistent allure of cultural connection, the drive for technological and media innovation, and the stubborn, necessary hope for a shared future, however performative or challenged it may seem on stages like the Osaka Expo. The newsletters leave us contemplating a world actively being reshaped, where the “new soft-power sheriff” might offer appealing distractions, but the deeper economic and political realignments promise continued turbulence.

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[Written, Researched, and Edited by Pablo Markin. Some parts of the text have been produced with the aid of ChatGPT, OpenAI, Claude, Anthropic, and Gemini, Google, Alphabet, tools (April 15, 2025).]

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OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Pablo Markin (April 15, 2025). Soft Power, Expo Culture, and Economic Uncertainty. Open Economics Blog. Retrieved April 15, 2025 from https://oeb.hypotheses.org/1458.

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