The multitude of cultural, economic, and political narratives threaded through the newsletters from Monocle, Bloomberg, Semafor, the Economist, Newsweek and ArtNews from September 4-7, 2025, presents a compelling tableau of late capitalist society's contradictions and transformations. Reading these fragments together reveals not merely a collection of contemporary events, but rather a systematic pattern of cultural production that reflects what Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1944/2002) identified as the "culture industry"—a sphere where cultural artifacts become commodities produced according to industrial logic rather than aesthetic or authentic expression.ewadirect+1

This commentary reads the newsletters as a distributed cultural signal-bundle: short dispatches that, together, map contemporaneous anxieties about cultural authority, infrastructural fragility, urban re-ordering, technological sovereignty, and the politics of spectacle. I treat the newsletter not as isolated reportage but as a constellation whose parts illuminate each other — a practice indebted to associative reading strategies in cultural sociology (Bourdieu) and critical theory (Benjamin, Jameson).

The newsletters, thus, present a view of the world, blending fashion elegies, geopolitical spectacles, urban revivals, and technological disruptions into a tapestry that mirrors the fragmented yet interconnected nature of contemporary existence. These snippets evoke Marshall McLuhan's concept of the "global village" (McLuhan, 1964), where distant events— from a North Korean heir's debut to AI's encroachment on labor—resonate locally, challenging us to discern patterns amid the noise.

Natalie Theodosi's incisive critique of fashion houses aspiring to become "media brands" penetrates to the heart of what Antonio Gramsci (1948-1951/1992) conceptualized as cultural hegemony. When a CMO declares his intention to "create a media brand," we witness the explicit subsumption of cultural production under the logic of capital accumulation. This represents a qualitative shift from what Walter Benjamin (1936/2008) described as the transition from "cult value" to "exhibition value" in artistic production—fashion houses now seek not merely to display their products but to control the entire apparatus of cultural meaning-making.wikipedia

The death of Giorgio Armani provides a poignant counterpoint to this trend. As the newsletter notes, Armani "remained the only shareholder—and sole spokesperson—resisting offers to join the bigger fashion conglomerates." This resistance to corporate consolidation represents what Benjamin would recognize as an attempt to preserve the "aura" of authentic craftsmanship against mechanical reproduction's standardizing tendencies. Yet even Armani's empire ultimately succumbed to the logic of lifestyle branding, expanding into hotels, restaurants, and residential developments—a process that Jean Baudrillard (1981/1994) would characterize as the production of simulacra, where the brand image becomes more real than the products themselves.wikipedia

The tension between authentic cultural expression and commodified spectacle manifests clearly in Theodosi's advocacy for collaboration with independent filmmakers and curators. Her praise for Miu Miu's Women's Tales film series, where artists receive "no brief" and "complete creative carte blanche," suggests a longing for what Jürgen Habermas (1962/1989) termed the "public sphere"—a space for genuine cultural dialogue unconstrained by commercial imperatives. However, this apparent freedom operates within the larger framework of luxury branding, revealing the contradictory nature of cultural autonomy under capitalism.opentextbc

The fashion pieces stage a debate about whether luxury houses should become media producers or return to making “clothes” as their principal cultural labour (Theodosi). This tension — between branded self-narration and the independent critic/curator — registers a deeper epistemic worry: commodified storytelling risks collapsing critique into marketing and public judgment into curated impression management.

Nordic-style minimalism or Armani’s carefully curated lifestyle empire are not merely aesthetic projects but institutional tactics for stabilizing symbolic capital in turbulent markets; Armani’s career is here presented as the architecture of such stabilization (the designer’s refusal to sell, the cultivation of a particular tempo and aura around shows).

Analytically this calls to mind Bourdieu’s account of cultural production as fields of struggle over legitimacy and distinction (Bourdieu, 1984): when fashion houses themselves claim the role of cultural mediators, they both monopolize the field and risk diluting the critical distance that confers value. Walter Benjamin’s meditation on reproducibility also matters: the shift from aura to reproducibility does not only technologically democratize images; when the producer controls the story, the political-critical potential of art diminishes (Benjamin, 1936/1968).

The commercial turn in storytelling should be read alongside scholarship on platform capitalism and attention economies (e.g., Zuboff on surveillance capitalism), and on the privatization of cultural memory (Nora’s lieux de mémoire). In practice, the newsletter’s call for collaborations with independent filmmakers (Miu Miu’s Women’s Tales) shows an attempt to outsource narrative authority to preserve credibility — a strategic subsidiarity that still keeps the brand as patron rather than sovereign narrator.

The fashion discourse, particularly Natalie Theodosi's critique of luxury houses aspiring to become "media brands," underscores a cultural shift where commerce encroaches on journalism's domain. Theodosi warns against inherent bias in self-narration, arguing that brands like Miu Miu thrive by collaborating with independent filmmakers rather than controlling the story (Theodosi, 2025). This resonates with Jean Baudrillard's hyperreality, where simulacra—branded narratives—supplant authentic experience, leading to a "desert of the real" (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 1). Economically, this reflects luxury's pivot amid "consumer fatigue" and macroeconomic challenges, with CMOs restrategizing to reignite sales through podcasts and Substack, mirroring the platform economy's gig-ification of content creation.

The death of Giorgio Armani at 91 amplifies this theme, portraying him as a "trailblazer" who rewrote fashion's "rulebook" by expanding into lifestyle empires (Theodosi, 2025). Socially, Armani's legacy embodies Pierre Bourdieu's cultural capital, where fluid tailoring and muted palettes democratized elegance, yet his solitary shareholder status highlights neoliberal individualism (Bourdieu, 1984). Policy-wise, his resilience against conglomerates critiques antitrust debates, paralleling the EU's €2.95bn fine on Google for abusing ad-tech dominance (European Commission, 2025). Interrelating these, Armani's narrative control contrasts Theodosi's call for objectivity, evoking Edward Said's Orientalism (1978), where self-representation risks glossing over exploitation in global supply chains.

The political narratives emerging from various regions illuminate what Jennifer McCoy, Tahmina Rahman, and Murat Somer (2018) identify as the "global crisis of democracy" characterized by pernicious polarization. From Thailand's revolving-door leadership to Indonesia's violent protests over parliamentary benefits, we observe the systematic breakdown of what Habermas conceptualized as communicative rationality in public discourse.journals.sagepub+1

The account of J.B. Pritzker's combative stance against Trump's federal interventions exemplifies this polarization. When Pritzker declares Trump's actions "illegal," "unconstitutional," and "un-American," he employs what Michel Foucault (1975/1995) would recognize as a discourse of normalization—attempting to establish the boundaries of legitimate governmental power through rhetorical exclusion. Yet this very language of constitutional crisis reveals the fragility of democratic institutions when subjected to competing claims of legitimacy.

The rise of right-wing movements globally, from South Korean evangelicals emulating American MAGA tactics to Reform UK's ascendancy in British politics, demonstrates what Foucault analyzed as "governmentality"—the strategic conduct of conduct that operates through the production of subjectivity rather than direct coercion. These movements create what Foucault termed "technologies of the self," encouraging individuals to constitute themselves as particular kinds of political subjects through practices of identification and opposition.rauli.cbs+1

Diplomatically, Kim Ju-ae's Beijing debut at China's Victory Day parade symbolizes hereditary autocracy's endurance, with her father positioning her as "heir apparent" amid a "unified axis" with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin (Simpson, 2025). Culturally, this "Take Your Child to Work Day" irony critiques the performative nature of power, akin to Erving Goffman's dramaturgical analysis, where leaders stage legitimacy through spectacles like military parades (Goffman, 1959). Economically, it ties to Russia's pipeline deal with China via Mongolia, bolstering mutual dependence against Western sanctions (Babaev, 2025), reflecting dependency theory's core-periphery dynamics (Frank, 1967).

Policy implications extend to U.S. responses, such as tariffs on Venezuela and Ecuadorian gangs labeled terrorists (Rubio, 2025), evoking Hannah Arendt's "banality of evil" in bureaucratic aggression (Arendt, 1963). Socially, Ju-ae's grooming intersects with gender norms in autocracies, contrasting feminist critiques in Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex (1949), where women navigate patriarchal inheritance. Interlinking with urbanism snippets, like Barcelona's "back" narrative (Aldous, 2025), these reveal cities as stages for renewal amid crises—Barcelona's post-identity era mirroring post-Cold War realignments.

The dispatch on Kim Ju-ae’s public debut at Beijing’s Victory Day parade underscores how regimes stage children as vessels of dynastic continuity and soft power pedagogy: the public “work-experience” trip for a dictator’s offspring is political theatre, a lesson in pageantry and legitimacy. The newsletter frames this as insight into political performance: pageantry trains both domestic audiences and foreign capitals in narratives of permanence, succession, and deterrence.

Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle is useful here: spectacle is not mere ornament but the social relation mediated by images and staged events; Ju-ae’s appearance is a rehearsed image that naturalizes regime continuity (Debord, 1967). That staging happens at the intersection of geopolitics (Xi–Putin choreography), regional diplomacy, and a broader authoritarian aesthetics of power.

The coverage of AI developments reveals the contradictory nature of technological progress under capitalism. Nick Clegg's warning about America's "waning dominance" in AI reflects deeper anxieties about what Manuel Castells (2010) identified as the "space of flows"—a global network where power operates through information control rather than territorial sovereignty. When Clegg argues that "American technology is not going to prevail without any hindrance," he acknowledges the fundamental instability of technological hegemony in an interconnected world.onlinelibrary.wiley

The discussion of AI's impact on governance particularly illuminates Foucault's concept of "biopower"—the management of populations through the optimization of life processes. When the newsletter describes AI systems that can "predict" homelessness or optimize bus schedules, we see the emergence of what might be called "algorithmic governmentality," where human subjects become data points in optimization algorithms designed to maximize efficiency rather than promote human flourishing.ohchr

The controversy surrounding deepfakes and AI-generated content connects directly to Benjamin's analysis of mechanical reproduction's effect on artistic aura. If Benjamin worried that photography and film would eliminate art's unique presence in time and space, AI-generated content represents the complete dissolution of originality itself. The newsletter's mention of NFTs as a solution to digital authenticity problems reveals capitalism's attempt to artificially recreate scarcity and uniqueness through technological means—a process that Baudrillard would recognize as the simulation of simulation.ijraset

A cluster of items — the panel on “Attention Is All You Need” (the transformer architecture), Karen Hao’s book Empire of AI, and broader reporting on chip markets and data center booms — situate an epochal infrastructural shift: cognitive infrastructures (models, chips, data centers) are now strategic assets that reproduce geopolitical asymmetries. The newsletter accurately notes the transformer’s outsized role in contemporary AI and the cultural-political effects of that technological turn.

Hao’s notion of “AI colonialism” (as cited in the newsletter) is analytically precise: extractive relations of data, compute, and labor link AI firms in the Global North with resource and labor extraction in the Global South; epistemic authority is being concentrated inside private platforms rather than plural academic institutions (Hao, 2024; newsletter).

Critical junctions:

Environmental and labor externalities: the transformer-scale model requires vast energy and labor (data labeling, moderation) that externalizes harms.

Sovereignty and competition: chip restrictions and platform control—mentioned in the newsletter—mean that technological sovereignty now has a geostrategic dimension. Investments in alternative, compute-efficient architectures (neuro-symbolic approaches, tiny models) are not just technical choices but political ones.

AI's pervasive threads—from Google's antitrust woes to Anthropic's $1.5bn copyright settlement (Anthropic, 2025)—expose economic monopolies, with Vaswani's transformer architecture valorized as world-transforming (Huang, 2025). Culturally, this hype recalls McLuhan's medium-as-message, where AI reshapes cognition (McLuhan, 1964). Policy-wise, FTC probes into child harms from chatbots (FTC, 2025) echo Shoshana Zuboff's surveillance capitalism, where data extraction commodifies behavior (Zuboff, 2019).

Social implications surface in labor shifts, like AI fixing potholes in San Jose or automating jobs, yet requiring human oversight (Mahan, 2025). This aligns with Karl Marx's alienation theory, where workers become appendages to machines (Marx, 1844). Interrelating with military recruitment via AI (Monocle, 2025), it evokes Foucault's biopower, disciplining bodies through tech (Foucault, 1978). Philosophically, DeepMind's gravitational wave detection (DeepMind, 2025) invokes Kant's sublime, bridging human limits with cosmic insight (Kant, 1790).

Support

Liam Aldous's euphoric account of Barcelona's "comeback" provides a particularly rich text for analyzing what David Harvey (2005) termed "neoliberalization" as a spatial process. When Aldous celebrates the city's transformation through reduced tourism, eliminated vacation rentals, and banned pub crawls, he unwittingly describes the production of what Foucault analyzed as "disciplinary space"—urban environments designed to optimize certain behaviors while excluding others.academic.oup

The rhetoric of Barcelona being "back" relies on what Henri Lefebvre (1974/1991) criticized as the "representation of space"—technocratic visions that abstract urban life into manageable categories like "resilience," "sustainability," and "quality of life." These discourses obscure the fundamental contradictions of urban capitalism, where the very success of city branding inevitably generates new forms of exclusion and displacement.

Aldous's description of Barcelona's residents "proudly singing their hometown's praises again" reveals what Lauren Berlant (2011) identified as "cruel optimism"—the attachment to ideals of collective flourishing that actually impede the conditions for such flourishing. The celebration of urban "authenticity" becomes another form of place-branding, generating exchange value from the commodification of local identity.

Barcelona's optimistic resurgence, per Liam Aldous, signifies urbanism's emotional metrics, with "collective joy" post-1992 Olympics yielding to pragmatic greening and Airbnb bans (Aldous, 2025). Culturally, this evokes Jane Jacobs' advocacy for organic city life, where plazas liberate from traffic foster community (Jacobs, 1961). Economically, it counters overtourism's fatigue, paralleling Hong Kong's property slump, where mainland capital flows could inflate bubbles (Kwan, 2025), akin to David Harvey's neoliberal urbanism critique (Harvey, 2005).

Sweden's Valhalla pool demolition threat highlights policy failures in heritage preservation, its Olympic medal underscoring architecture's cultural value (Jenne, 2025). Socially, this "loss of national significance" (Lewitschnik, 2025) invokes Walter Benjamin's "aura" of authenticity, eroded by modernity (Benjamin, 1936). Interrelating, environmental snippets like Iowa's water pollution from feedlots (Pickering, 2025) connect to global resource strains, evoking Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962) on agricultural toxins. Philosophically, these tie to Heidegger's "enframing," where technology reduces nature to resources, ignoring existential ties (Heidegger, 1977).

Two urban items speak to governance, memory, and civic re-imagining. Barcelona’s revived civic mood — “Back!” — is less a spontaneous joie de vivre than the byproduct of deliberate interventions: reconfigured public spaces, restrictions on short-term rentals, and bans on predatory tourist practices. The article frames this as a slow, resident-led recalibration toward the “right to the city” rather than spectacle-led regeneration.

Contrast this with the threatened demolition of Gothenburg’s Valhalla pool — an emblem of mid-century civic architecture and collective memory — where short-term calculus (new sports halls, bureaucratic assessments of “antiquated” infrastructure) risks erasing embodied histories that anchor civic identity. The Valhalla case exemplifies neoliberal logics of “development” that privilege replaceability over conservation even when conservation may be cheaper and socially richer.

Lefebvre’s and Harvey’s analyses of urban politics help: the contest is over urban use-value versus exchange-value; tourism and property finance carve up city life into tradable slices, while local politics attempt (sometimes clumsily) to reclaim commons and democratic deliberation (Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey, 2012). Barcelona’s incremental, resident-centered approach reads like a corrective to the mega-event urbanism of prior decades.

The scattered references to Venice's Chinese lion statue, Nazi-looted artworks, and various museum exhibitions reveal what Andreas Huyssen (2003) analyzed as the contemporary "memory boom"—an obsessive concern with preservation that often obscures more fundamental historical processes. When the newsletter reports that Venice's iconic lion was likely made in China during the Tang Dynasty, it inadvertently illuminates the long history of cultural hybridity that nationalism seeks to deny.

The recovery of Nazi-looted artworks, while obviously necessary for justice, also demonstrates what Susan Sontag (1977) identified as the aestheticization of politics. By focusing on individual objects and their provenance, these narratives risk obscuring the systematic nature of fascist cultural destruction and appropriation. The fetishization of particular artworks can become a substitute for confronting the social conditions that enabled such appropriation in the first place.

The newsletters also chronicle institutional struggles over cultural authority: the Smithsonian’s standoff with political pressure and debates over exhibition content, recovered Nazi-looted paintings in Argentina, and Calder Gardens’ new museum opening. These items indicate a global flashpoint over who curates memory: state actors, cultural institutions, or private patrons.

Museums increasingly sit at the intersection of restitution claims, political pressure, and the commercial art market. The Argentine looted-art case highlights transnational legal entanglements and moral claims that outlive provenance gaps; the Smithsonian episode shows how cultural institutions become battlegrounds in partisan struggles over national narrative. The Calder Gardens project, by contrast, reminds us of architecture’s role in shaping how publics encounter works — proximity and the physical encounter remain formative for meaning.

Art snippets, like the Nazi-looted Ghislandi recovery (AFP, 2025), underscore restitution's social justice, echoing UNESCO's 1970 Convention on illicit cultural traffic (UNESCO, 1970). Culturally, Rosalyn Drexler's death at 98 (ARTnews, 2025) and Calder Gardens' opening (Monaghan-Coombs, 2025) celebrate Pop Art's subversion, akin to Andy Warhol's commodification critiques. Policy interrelations appear in Smithsonian's Trump standoff (NYT, 2025), testing institutional autonomy against authoritarianism, evoking Habermas' public sphere erosion (Habermas, 1989).

The Venice lion's Chinese origins (Guardian, 2025) philosophically invokes Heraclitus' flux: "No man ever steps in the same river twice" (Heraclitus, ca. 500 BCE), as cultural artifacts evolve through migration. Interlinking with Ebola outbreaks (WHO, 2025), these highlight global inequities, per Amartya Sen's capabilities approach (Sen, 1999).

The economic reporting reveals multiple signs of what Giovanni Arrighi (1994) analyzed as hegemonic transition—the gradual shift of global economic power from one dominant center to others. When ConocoPhillips announces massive layoffs despite oil industry subsidies, or when Nestlé's board mishandles CEO succession, we observe the internal contradictions of late capitalism that Marx identified in his analysis of the falling rate of profit.

The account of China's military parade, featuring representatives from "more than 70 countries" but "no leaders of big Western democracies," visualizes this hegemonic shift. Xi Jinping's declaration that China is "unstoppable" functions as what Gramsci would recognize as a war of position—the construction of ideological hegemony that precedes direct political confrontation.

Reading the newsletter as an assemblage produces several cross-cutting patterns:

Privatized authority vs. public legitimacy. Whether in fashion (brands as media), AI (companies as epistemic centers), or museums (state pressure on exhibition content), we see privatized institutions claiming cultural authority that once belonged to intermediaries — critics, scholars, or civic institutions. This raises questions about who adjudicates truth, taste, and memory.

Spectacle as governance. From parade choreography in Beijing to staged cultural openings and fashion shows, spectacle practices are being used instrumentally to perform legitimacy and to naturalize power. The line between ceremony and policy narrows.

Infrastructural precarities. Water pollution in Iowa, threatened civic architecture in Sweden, transit cuts in Philadelphia, and the centralized compute stacks of AI are all infrastructural crises — some ecological, some fiscal, some technological. These reveal how public goods and commons (clean water, transit, cultural spaces) are vulnerable to political economy dynamics.

Geopolitical techno-economics. Energy pipelines, chip supply chains, and cross-border data flows are reconfiguring alliances and dependencies; the political economy of AI and energy projects is now central to national strategy.

The vignettes suggest three modest policy and cultural prescriptions:

Rebuild institutional buffers. Democracies and cultural institutions need protective mechanisms (legal, financial, civic) that shield curatorial and epistemic independence from capture, whether commercial or political. The Smithsonian episode illustrates how brittle those buffers can be.

Democratize technological governance. Because AI systems are infrastructural, governance should extend beyond narrow regulatory sandboxes to include labor protections, energy accounting, and transnational cooperation to prevent extractive “AI colonialism.” The newsletter’s synthesis of the transformer panel and Hao’s critique shows urgency here.

Prioritize public value in urban projects. Barcelona’s example — tactical, resident-focused public-space work and measured regulation of tourism platforms — offers a template for cities that seek resilience without spectacle. Conversely, decisions to demolish civic heritage (Valhalla pool) should weigh cultural capital and social value, not only immediate capital calculus.

These snippets interweave as a Foucauldian archive, revealing power/knowledge nexuses (Foucault, 1980). Fashion's media ambitions mirror AI's narrative control, both commodifying identity amid economic precarity. Geopolitical parades echo urban revivals, staging collective memory against fragmentation. Environmentally, water crises and heritage demolitions critique unsustainable growth, invoking Aldo Leopold's land ethic (Leopold, 1949).

Ultimately, this mosaic prompts Stoic reflection: Marcus Aurelius' call to perceive the "web of interconnection" (Aurelius, ca. 180 CE, 4.40) urges resilience amid flux. As newsletters fragment reality, they echo Walter Ong's orality-literacy shift, where secondary orality—digital snippets—fosters associative thinking (Ong, 1982). In navigating these, we confront Camus' absurd: finding meaning in the void (Camus, 1942).

Reading these fragments together reveals not chaos but pattern—the systematic logic of what Fredric Jameson (1991) identified as "late capitalism's" cultural contradictions. The simultaneous celebration of local authenticity and global connectivity, the proliferation of democratic rhetoric alongside authoritarian practices, the promise of technological liberation coupled with algorithmic surveillance—all reflect capital's need to constantly revolutionize social relations while maintaining fundamental power structures.

The fashion industry's media ambitions, political polarization, AI governance, urban branding, and cultural memory practices emerge as interconnected elements of what might be termed "spectacular capitalism"—Guy Debord's (1967/1995) concept updated for the digital age. The spectacle is no longer merely the realm of images but the comprehensive organization of social life according to the logic of simulation and control.

Yet within these totalizing tendencies, moments of genuine resistance appear. When Theodosi advocates for genuine artistic collaboration, when protesters in Indonesia challenge elite privilege, when communities resist technological displacement, we glimpse what Benjamin called "constellation"—the possibility that critical consciousness might emerge from the collision of past and present, revealing alternatives to the seemingly inevitable trajectory of social development.

The task of critical analysis is neither to celebrate these developments as progressive nor to dismiss them as merely regressive, but to understand their contradictory nature as expressions of deeper social relations that can be transformed through collective action informed by historical consciousness. In this light, the newsletter's fragments become not merely information but potential sources of what Paulo Freire (1970/2000) termed "critical pedagogy"—tools for understanding and potentially transforming the conditions of our existence.

The newsletters are, in effect, a mirror of our moment: institutions in flux, technologies consolidating unprecedented power, and publics struggling to retain voice. Reading those snippets together reveals a world negotiating between private power and public value, spectacle and substance, technical mastery and democratic accountability. The work for scholars, critics, policymakers, and publics is to resist reduction — to keep interpretive distance where brands, states, and platforms most want control — and to insist that cultural, technological, and urban decisions be assessed not only for short-term returns but for their long-term civic and epistemic effects.

Subscribe

Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. (2002). Dialectic of enlightenment: Philosophical fragments (J. Cumming, Trans.). Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1944)

Aldous, L. (2025). Get the word out: Barcelona is back. The Monocle Minute.

Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil. Viking Press.

Arrighi, G. (1994). The long twentieth century: Money, power, and the origins of our times. Verso.

Aurelius, M. (ca. 180 CE). Meditations (G. Hays, Trans., 2002). Modern Library.

Babaev, K. (2025). Xi, Putin and the Russian Gas Deal to Resist Trump and the West. Newsweek.

Baudrillard, J. (1994). Simulacra and simulation (S. F. Glaser, Trans.). University of Michigan Press. (Original work published 1981)

Benjamin, W. (1936/1968). The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. In H. Arendt (Ed. & Trans.), Illuminations (H. Zohn, Trans.). Schocken. (Original work published 1936).

Benjamin, W. (2008). The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. In Illuminations: Essays and reflections (H. Zohn, Trans., pp. 217-251). Schocken Books. (Original work published 1936)

Berlant, L. (2011). Cruel optimism. Duke University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste (R. Nice, Trans.). Harvard University Press.

Camus, A. (1942). The myth of Sisyphus (J. O'Brien, Trans., 1955). Alfred A. Knopf.

Carson, R. (1962). Silent spring. Houghton Mifflin.

Castells, M. (2010). The rise of the network society (2nd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.

de Beauvoir, S. (1949). The second sex (H. M. Parshley, Trans., 1953). Jonathan Cape.

Debord, G. (1967). The society of the spectacle. Buchet-Chastel.

Debord, G. (1995). The society of the spectacle (D. Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). Zone Books. (Original work published 1967)

DeepMind. (2025). AI looks deep into space. Newsletter Snippet.

European Commission. (2025). EU fines Google €2.95bn. Newsletter Snippet.

Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality: Volume 1: An introduction (R. Hurley, Trans.). Pantheon Books.

Foucault, M. (1980). Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977 (C. Gordon, Ed.). Pantheon Books.

Foucault, M. (1995). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison (A. Sheridan, Trans.). Vintage Books. (Original work published 1975)

Frank, A. G. (1967). Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America. Monthly Review Press.

Freire, P. (2000). Pedagogy of the oppressed (M. B. Ramos, Trans.). Continuum. (Original work published 1970)

Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Anchor Books.

Gramsci, A. (1992). Prison notebooks (J. A. Buttigieg, Ed. and Trans.). Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1948-1951)

Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society (T. Burger & F. Lawrence, Trans.). MIT Press. (Original work published 1962)

Hao, K. (2024). Empire of AI: A critical account of platform power and politics. Penguin Press.

Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press.

Harvey, D. (2012). Rebel cities: From the right to the city to the urban revolution. Verso.

Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology. In The question concerning technology and other essays (W. Lovitt, Trans.). Harper & Row.

Heraclitus. (ca. 500 BCE). Fragments (T. M. Robinson, Trans., 1987). University of Toronto Press.

Huang, J. (2025). The Cost of AI Progress. Bloomberg Businessweek.

Huyssen, A. (2003). Present pasts: Urban palimpsests and the politics of memory. Stanford University Press.

Jacobs, J. (1961). The death and life of great American cities. Random House.

Jameson, F. (1991). Postmodernism, or, the cultural logic of late capitalism. Duke University Press.

Jenne, J. (2025). Sink or swim: Sweden’s Olympic medal-winning pool at risk. The Monocle Minute.

Kant, I. (1790). Critique of judgment (W. S. Pluhar, Trans., 1987). Hackett Publishing.

Kwan, S. (2025). Peking Buck: Is this the moment the property market will finally get a lift? Bloomberg.

Lefebvre, H. (1968). Le droit à la ville [The right to the city]. Anthropos.

Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space (D. Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). Blackwell. (Original work published 1974)

Leopold, A. (1949). A Sand County almanac. Oxford University Press.

Lewitschnik, L. (2025). Quoted in Sink or swim. The Monocle Minute.

Mahan, M. (2025). San Jose’s AI bet. Semafor.

Marx, K. (1844). Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844 (M. Milligan, Trans., 1964). International Publishers.

McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the global crisis of democracy: Common patterns, dynamics, and pernicious consequences for democratic polities. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16-42.

McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding media: The extensions of man. McGraw-Hill.

Ong, W. J. (1982). Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word. Methuen.

Pickering, W. (2025). What’s in the Water. Bloomberg Businessweek.

Rubio, M. (2025). US, China in soybean standoff. Newsletter Snippet.

Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism. Pantheon Books.

Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford University Press.

Simpson, J. (2025). School’s out: Kim Jong-un’s daughter makes her international debut. The Monocle Minute.

Sontag, S. (1977). On photography. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Theodosi, N. (2025). Fashion houses are not media brands – and it should stay that way. The Monocle Minute.

UNESCO. (1970). Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Vaswani, A., Shazeer, N., Parmar, N., Uszkoreit, J., Jones, L., Gomez, A. N., Kaiser, Ł., & Polosukhin, I. (2017). Attention is all you need. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 30.

Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power. PublicAffairs.

[Written, Researched, and Edited by Pablo Markin. Some parts of the text have been produced with the aid of Research, Perplexity, ChatGPT, OpenAI, and Grok, xAI, tools (September 12, 2025). The featured image has been generated in Canva (September 12, 2025).]

[Support the Open Access Blogs: https://ko-fi.com/theopenaccessblogs/tip.]

OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Pablo Markin (September 12, 2025). Spectacular Capitalism: Privatized Cultural Authority, AI and Technological Sovereignty, Urban Resilience and Infrastructural Precarity. Open Economics Blog.

Share