Crypto's broken moral compass
I’ll begin by saying - obviously, there’s good in crypto. Indeed, I have written over 150 blog posts over the last 3 years about them (and plenty more with previous pseudonyms), and making the best of crypto and related tech. But none of that matters right now - things have swung too far away to the bad side. (Addendum: just for more clarity,FarcasterA decentralized social networkhttps://farcaster.xyzOver the years, crypto has declined into ever more predatory and evil territory. In 2010, the...
A Vision of Ethereum - 2025
Please consider this as a work of hard science fiction. I had written present tense prose (from 2025’s perspective), but had to rework this post to add in some future tense (i.e. 2021 perspective) for context so it has turned out to be a total mess! So, it’s a terrible work of fiction, but certainly more informative than it was before. — Ethereum is the global settlement layer. Or more technically, the global security and data availability layer. There’s a flourishing ecosystem of external ex...
The horrific inefficiencies of monolithic blockchains
Nothing here is new, and indeed, I’ve repeated all of this ad nauseum in 2021. Moreover, it’s completely absurd the industry is mostly obsessing over infrastructure in this day and age, when there are dozens, if not hundreds, of L1s and L2s alike which have barely any non-spam utilization after years of being live. Not to mention exponential growth of blockspace supply incoming in 2024, 2025 and beyond with basically an infinite supply of data availability (with different properties). The ove...
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Crypto's broken moral compass
I’ll begin by saying - obviously, there’s good in crypto. Indeed, I have written over 150 blog posts over the last 3 years about them (and plenty more with previous pseudonyms), and making the best of crypto and related tech. But none of that matters right now - things have swung too far away to the bad side. (Addendum: just for more clarity,FarcasterA decentralized social networkhttps://farcaster.xyzOver the years, crypto has declined into ever more predatory and evil territory. In 2010, the...
A Vision of Ethereum - 2025
Please consider this as a work of hard science fiction. I had written present tense prose (from 2025’s perspective), but had to rework this post to add in some future tense (i.e. 2021 perspective) for context so it has turned out to be a total mess! So, it’s a terrible work of fiction, but certainly more informative than it was before. — Ethereum is the global settlement layer. Or more technically, the global security and data availability layer. There’s a flourishing ecosystem of external ex...
The horrific inefficiencies of monolithic blockchains
Nothing here is new, and indeed, I’ve repeated all of this ad nauseum in 2021. Moreover, it’s completely absurd the industry is mostly obsessing over infrastructure in this day and age, when there are dozens, if not hundreds, of L1s and L2s alike which have barely any non-spam utilization after years of being live. Not to mention exponential growth of blockspace supply incoming in 2024, 2025 and beyond with basically an infinite supply of data availability (with different properties). The ove...
Share Dialog
Share Dialog
In a previous post about how tokenholder DAOs can move beyond plutocracy, I noted how something like OP Collective’s Citizen House has potential. However, it is faced with a stiff challenge - how does one onboard citizens?
The problem is, of course, what makes a “citizen” is a highly subjective matter, and subjective matters need significant human input. At the end of the day, the value of a person’s contributions can only be judged by other people with expertise in the matter. It’s dangerous to think a set of numbers will ever capture the complexities of a person’s reputation. That leads to the obvious solution - bureaus or councils of naturalisation.
But before that, it’s imperative to note that such a community will need a clear and well-defined constitution, part of which includes what the goals for a citizen are. The naturalisation council, so to speak, will obviously need to be elected and have checks and balances as well.
The scope of such a council will depend purely on the goals of the DAO. If it’s simply a profit-making enterprise, then a DAO is perfectly fine with plutocratic voting. For most DAOs, just onboarding a few reputable people, just enough for adequate checks and balances is fine. On the other end, it’s theoretically possible to experiment with a full-blown democratic network state, which will need pretty extensive processes - this is the only one where the word “citizen” may be used appropriately. Let’s focus on the middle scenario, though, acknowledging once again “citizen” is inappropriate, but maybe something like “enthusiast”, “fellows”, “badgeholder” or “evangelist” should work better.
Objective attempts at identity do exist, including attestations or reputation scores. While I’ve highlighted the hazards of these, and they are inherently very limited, they can still be one of many useful tools. One way they can be used is as a base requirement or filter for people to apply as “fellow” or whatever it’s called. Or they can just be used as one metric.
The Naturalization council will process each application individually, and will also have the right to invite individuals who have contributed a lot. Depending on the nature of the DAO, it may be sufficient to have a few hundred such people, or it may require more. Adding a few hundred highly reputable people as checks and balances to a plutocratic voting apparatus is a significant step forward over the pure plutocracy status quo. But maybe some communities/DAOs will want to go further.
Now, some will complain that the Naturalization council is a “centralized” body. Well, not quite, as they will be elected by both tokenholders and existing “fellows”, and have considerable checks and balances and veto rights against them. Indeed, by adding this subjective assessment of a person’s contributions, it makes the DAO significantly more decentralized than de-facto being controlled by a few whales.
As I’ve been writing for years now, I’d like to see more experimentation with DAOs, and moving beyond pure plutocratic voting. I believe something like a naturalisation council, even if in a very limited form to begin with, can be worth experimenting with.
In a previous post about how tokenholder DAOs can move beyond plutocracy, I noted how something like OP Collective’s Citizen House has potential. However, it is faced with a stiff challenge - how does one onboard citizens?
The problem is, of course, what makes a “citizen” is a highly subjective matter, and subjective matters need significant human input. At the end of the day, the value of a person’s contributions can only be judged by other people with expertise in the matter. It’s dangerous to think a set of numbers will ever capture the complexities of a person’s reputation. That leads to the obvious solution - bureaus or councils of naturalisation.
But before that, it’s imperative to note that such a community will need a clear and well-defined constitution, part of which includes what the goals for a citizen are. The naturalisation council, so to speak, will obviously need to be elected and have checks and balances as well.
The scope of such a council will depend purely on the goals of the DAO. If it’s simply a profit-making enterprise, then a DAO is perfectly fine with plutocratic voting. For most DAOs, just onboarding a few reputable people, just enough for adequate checks and balances is fine. On the other end, it’s theoretically possible to experiment with a full-blown democratic network state, which will need pretty extensive processes - this is the only one where the word “citizen” may be used appropriately. Let’s focus on the middle scenario, though, acknowledging once again “citizen” is inappropriate, but maybe something like “enthusiast”, “fellows”, “badgeholder” or “evangelist” should work better.
Objective attempts at identity do exist, including attestations or reputation scores. While I’ve highlighted the hazards of these, and they are inherently very limited, they can still be one of many useful tools. One way they can be used is as a base requirement or filter for people to apply as “fellow” or whatever it’s called. Or they can just be used as one metric.
The Naturalization council will process each application individually, and will also have the right to invite individuals who have contributed a lot. Depending on the nature of the DAO, it may be sufficient to have a few hundred such people, or it may require more. Adding a few hundred highly reputable people as checks and balances to a plutocratic voting apparatus is a significant step forward over the pure plutocracy status quo. But maybe some communities/DAOs will want to go further.
Now, some will complain that the Naturalization council is a “centralized” body. Well, not quite, as they will be elected by both tokenholders and existing “fellows”, and have considerable checks and balances and veto rights against them. Indeed, by adding this subjective assessment of a person’s contributions, it makes the DAO significantly more decentralized than de-facto being controlled by a few whales.
As I’ve been writing for years now, I’d like to see more experimentation with DAOs, and moving beyond pure plutocratic voting. I believe something like a naturalisation council, even if in a very limited form to begin with, can be worth experimenting with.
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