In November, U.S. headline CPI rose 2.7 percent year over year, well below the previous 3.0 percent reading and market expectations of 3.1 percent. On the surface, this appeared to confirm a clean narrative: inflation was cooling quickly and the path toward rate cuts was opening.

The issue is that this data point cannot be taken at face value.

On December 19, John Williams, President of the New York Federal Reserve and a permanent voting member of the FOMC, offered an important clarification. He noted that the November CPI figure was influenced by technical factors and emphasized that the current policy rate range of 3.5 to 3.75 percent remains appropriate. There is no urgency to cut rates further, and additional confirmation from December data is needed to assess the true inflation trend.

This is a familiar but critical signal. The data itself is not rejected, but its reliability as a guide for policy is.

Following the October U.S. government shutdown, missing data intervals were filled using earlier months and assumptions of zero growth. While this approach may smooth inflation readings in the short term, it rests on strong technical assumptions. It is unlikely to persuade Federal Reserve officials who rely on independent judgment, or market participants who understand the underlying structure of inflation.

The implication is clear. When macro data is technically adjusted rather than structurally robust, policymakers tend to act more cautiously. In the absence of credible validation, maintaining current rates often becomes the more probable outcome.

The macro environment has not become simpler. It has become less reliable.

If data distortion undermines confidence in policy signals, geopolitical risk directly reshapes inflation dynamics.

Recently, the United States intensified pressure on Venezuela by seizing a third oil tanker carrying Venezuelan crude, despite the vessel being registered under a Panamanian state-owned entity. This has materially reduced Venezuela’s export capacity and begun to strain its fiscal position.

The U.S. objective is straightforward: apply sustained financial pressure on the Maduro government.

At the same time, markets are reassessing a far more destabilizing risk. Multiple sources suggest that Israel is evaluating the possibility of another strike on Iran, driven by concerns that Iran’s monthly missile production may have reached roughly 3,000 units.

During the previous Israel–Iran confrontation, Iran’s large-scale missile retaliation penetrated Israeli air defenses and ultimately forced direct U.S. involvement, including B-2 bomber strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, before the conflict temporarily de-escalated.

If Israel were to initiate an unannounced preemptive strike this time, Iran would likely respond with another high-intensity missile campaign. Even with reduced inventories, the resulting damage could be sufficient to trigger deeper U.S. involvement.

Such a scenario would have cascading consequences.

• The Middle East remains central to the global energy system.

• Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal would escalate sharply.

• Even under narratives of global oil oversupply, prices could rebound violently.

• Imported inflation would re-enter global pricing systems and affect the U.S. inflation outlook.

Under these conditions, U.S. policy toward Venezuela could also be forced to adjust, pushing the geopolitical landscape into a new phase of uncertainty.

The macro world is shifting away from algorithm-driven optimism and back toward a risk-driven reality.

As data credibility weakens, geopolitical risk resurfaces, and monetary policy becomes increasingly uncertain, the market’s core question has changed.

It is no longer about whether another rate cut will occur.

It is about:

• which yields do not depend on policy direction

• which cash flows do not rely on secondary market liquidity

• which assets remain viable under conditions of high rates and elevated uncertainty

The answers are not new. They have long existed in the real economy:

• Short-duration U.S. Treasuries

• Credit assets with clearly defined cash flow structures

• Trade and consumer finance assets with transparent design and explicit maturities

What is truly scarce is not these assets themselves, but the ability to bring them on-chain in a transparent, verifiable, and executable manner.

R2 operates in an environment defined by policy reversals, geopolitical instability, and distorted data. Its objective is to provide a more resilient yield structure:

• not depend on whether rate cuts occur

• not create the illusion of secondary market liquidity

• not promise returns that cannot be clearly explained

R2 focuses on yields that already exist in the real world:

• Treasuries and credit assets with defined maturities

• Cash flows that are traceable and settleable

• Yield structures that remain valid even in high-rate environments

When CPI data is technically distorted, when inflation is again influenced by geopolitical forces, and when central banks must proceed cautiously, the importance of real yield is amplified rather than diminished.

The macro world is entering a critical transition:

• Data is no longer inherently reliable.

• Risk is no longer distant.

• Policy is no longer one-directional.

In this environment, what matters most is no longer making the right directional bet once, but building a yield structure that holds across a wide range of macro scenarios.

R2 does not aim to predict how the world will change. It aims to ensure that regardless of how the world evolves, users understand what their capital is doing, where returns come from, and how risk is constrained.

That is the truly scarce capability in the next phase.

In November, U.S. headline CPI rose 2.7 percent year over year, well below the previous 3.0 percent reading and market expectations of 3.1 percent. On the surface, this appeared to confirm a clean narrative: inflation was cooling quickly and the path toward rate cuts was opening.

The issue is that this data point cannot be taken at face value.

On December 19, John Williams, President of the New York Federal Reserve and a permanent voting member of the FOMC, offered an important clarification. He noted that the November CPI figure was influenced by technical factors and emphasized that the current policy rate range of 3.5 to 3.75 percent remains appropriate. There is no urgency to cut rates further, and additional confirmation from December data is needed to assess the true inflation trend.

This is a familiar but critical signal. The data itself is not rejected, but its reliability as a guide for policy is.

Following the October U.S. government shutdown, missing data intervals were filled using earlier months and assumptions of zero growth. While this approach may smooth inflation readings in the short term, it rests on strong technical assumptions. It is unlikely to persuade Federal Reserve officials who rely on independent judgment, or market participants who understand the underlying structure of inflation.

The implication is clear. When macro data is technically adjusted rather than structurally robust, policymakers tend to act more cautiously. In the absence of credible validation, maintaining current rates often becomes the more probable outcome.

The macro environment has not become simpler. It has become less reliable.

If data distortion undermines confidence in policy signals, geopolitical risk directly reshapes inflation dynamics.

Recently, the United States intensified pressure on Venezuela by seizing a third oil tanker carrying Venezuelan crude, despite the vessel being registered under a Panamanian state-owned entity. This has materially reduced Venezuela’s export capacity and begun to strain its fiscal position.

The U.S. objective is straightforward: apply sustained financial pressure on the Maduro government.

At the same time, markets are reassessing a far more destabilizing risk. Multiple sources suggest that Israel is evaluating the possibility of another strike on Iran, driven by concerns that Iran’s monthly missile production may have reached roughly 3,000 units.

During the previous Israel–Iran confrontation, Iran’s large-scale missile retaliation penetrated Israeli air defenses and ultimately forced direct U.S. involvement, including B-2 bomber strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, before the conflict temporarily de-escalated.

If Israel were to initiate an unannounced preemptive strike this time, Iran would likely respond with another high-intensity missile campaign. Even with reduced inventories, the resulting damage could be sufficient to trigger deeper U.S. involvement.

Such a scenario would have cascading consequences.

• The Middle East remains central to the global energy system.

• Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal would escalate sharply.

• Even under narratives of global oil oversupply, prices could rebound violently.

• Imported inflation would re-enter global pricing systems and affect the U.S. inflation outlook.

Under these conditions, U.S. policy toward Venezuela could also be forced to adjust, pushing the geopolitical landscape into a new phase of uncertainty.

The macro world is shifting away from algorithm-driven optimism and back toward a risk-driven reality.

As data credibility weakens, geopolitical risk resurfaces, and monetary policy becomes increasingly uncertain, the market’s core question has changed.

It is no longer about whether another rate cut will occur.

It is about:

• which yields do not depend on policy direction

• which cash flows do not rely on secondary market liquidity

• which assets remain viable under conditions of high rates and elevated uncertainty

The answers are not new. They have long existed in the real economy:

• Short-duration U.S. Treasuries

• Credit assets with clearly defined cash flow structures

• Trade and consumer finance assets with transparent design and explicit maturities

What is truly scarce is not these assets themselves, but the ability to bring them on-chain in a transparent, verifiable, and executable manner.

R2 operates in an environment defined by policy reversals, geopolitical instability, and distorted data. Its objective is to provide a more resilient yield structure:

• not depend on whether rate cuts occur

• not create the illusion of secondary market liquidity

• not promise returns that cannot be clearly explained

R2 focuses on yields that already exist in the real world:

• Treasuries and credit assets with defined maturities

• Cash flows that are traceable and settleable

• Yield structures that remain valid even in high-rate environments

When CPI data is technically distorted, when inflation is again influenced by geopolitical forces, and when central banks must proceed cautiously, the importance of real yield is amplified rather than diminished.

The macro world is entering a critical transition:

• Data is no longer inherently reliable.

• Risk is no longer distant.

• Policy is no longer one-directional.

In this environment, what matters most is no longer making the right directional bet once, but building a yield structure that holds across a wide range of macro scenarios.

R2 does not aim to predict how the world will change. It aims to ensure that regardless of how the world evolves, users understand what their capital is doing, where returns come from, and how risk is constrained.

That is the truly scarce capability in the next phase.