tulluFuture MEV of Solana
Solana’s Parallelized Transaction ExecutionSolana has a very different architecture from Ethereum or EVM based chains, it is pretty known by now. The main difference is that Solana handles the transaction in a parallelized multi-threaded way instead of a single-thread EVM way. This is possible due to Solana separates a traditional Ethereum smart-contract in many separate accounts such as:Program Account – stores executable code (like the logic of an SPL token, Serum, or a lending protocol).Da...
tulluSelf Sandwiching is the new Mixer
Classic sandwich attacks rely on public mempool visibility:The attacker front-runs a victim’s swap to move price.The victim executes at a worse rate.The attacker back-runs to lock in the spread.Normally, private relays (Flashbots Protect, Jito, MEV Blocker, CoW Swap, etc.) shield you from this by hiding orders from public bots. But if you control both sides, it is called Self-Sandwich How Self-Sandwiching WorksStep 1 — The Setup The Main Wallet places a very large buy/sell transaction in an i...
tulluMEV MEV everywhere, where to go?
A Case Study of DAG-Based Consensus and MEV Exposure in Mysticeti, Raptr, Autobahn, and Vanilla Narwhal/BullsharkMaximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents the value that can be (and is!) extracted from blockchain networks by those who have the ability to influence how and when transactions are processed. We gather together some transactions, then put them in a waiting pool and then process them one by one - simple mechanism which is used in Bitcoin and Ethereum But why, no MEV on bitcoin but...
speculatorr mauj
tulluFuture MEV of Solana
Solana’s Parallelized Transaction ExecutionSolana has a very different architecture from Ethereum or EVM based chains, it is pretty known by now. The main difference is that Solana handles the transaction in a parallelized multi-threaded way instead of a single-thread EVM way. This is possible due to Solana separates a traditional Ethereum smart-contract in many separate accounts such as:Program Account – stores executable code (like the logic of an SPL token, Serum, or a lending protocol).Da...
tulluSelf Sandwiching is the new Mixer
Classic sandwich attacks rely on public mempool visibility:The attacker front-runs a victim’s swap to move price.The victim executes at a worse rate.The attacker back-runs to lock in the spread.Normally, private relays (Flashbots Protect, Jito, MEV Blocker, CoW Swap, etc.) shield you from this by hiding orders from public bots. But if you control both sides, it is called Self-Sandwich How Self-Sandwiching WorksStep 1 — The Setup The Main Wallet places a very large buy/sell transaction in an i...
tulluMEV MEV everywhere, where to go?
A Case Study of DAG-Based Consensus and MEV Exposure in Mysticeti, Raptr, Autobahn, and Vanilla Narwhal/BullsharkMaximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents the value that can be (and is!) extracted from blockchain networks by those who have the ability to influence how and when transactions are processed. We gather together some transactions, then put them in a waiting pool and then process them one by one - simple mechanism which is used in Bitcoin and Ethereum But why, no MEV on bitcoin but...
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Deterministic Outcome Requirement
Polymarket works well because markets resolve to binary or deterministic events.
Example: Will Biden win the election? Yes/No — and after the event happens, it’s clear who won.
In DAO token futarchy, you're trying to "resolve" to something fuzzy: Did this decision increase the token price?
Problem: Token prices are messy, lagged, manipulated, and don't give you a clean deterministic endpoint.
Plus, timing matters a lot: when do you measure the price post-decision? Immediately? After 24h? Over a 7-day TWAP?
Decision Market vs Spot Market Discrepancy
DAO decision markets simulate token price impact, but with poor liquidity and no real settlement, it becomes a self-referential game. People aren’t really incentivized to "predict correctly" — they’re incentivized to play the game for internal rewards, not external truth.
The moment you exit the decision market and compare it to the spot market, you're exposed to:
Thin liquidity
Manipulation ("fuckery")
Whales arbitraging your decision outcome
No arb constraints like TWAP / cooldowns / linear vesting, which were protecting you in the decision market
MetaDAO Implementation Weakness
MetaDAO's approach lacks a clean way to measure the actual outcome.
Without this, the whole thing risks being just a gamified voting mechanism, not a true prediction market or futarchy.
Futarchy needs reliable endgames. Without reliable endgames, you get gamification, not governance.
There must be a solution, or maybe polynya was right
Deterministic Outcome Requirement
Polymarket works well because markets resolve to binary or deterministic events.
Example: Will Biden win the election? Yes/No — and after the event happens, it’s clear who won.
In DAO token futarchy, you're trying to "resolve" to something fuzzy: Did this decision increase the token price?
Problem: Token prices are messy, lagged, manipulated, and don't give you a clean deterministic endpoint.
Plus, timing matters a lot: when do you measure the price post-decision? Immediately? After 24h? Over a 7-day TWAP?
Decision Market vs Spot Market Discrepancy
DAO decision markets simulate token price impact, but with poor liquidity and no real settlement, it becomes a self-referential game. People aren’t really incentivized to "predict correctly" — they’re incentivized to play the game for internal rewards, not external truth.
The moment you exit the decision market and compare it to the spot market, you're exposed to:
Thin liquidity
Manipulation ("fuckery")
Whales arbitraging your decision outcome
No arb constraints like TWAP / cooldowns / linear vesting, which were protecting you in the decision market
MetaDAO Implementation Weakness
MetaDAO's approach lacks a clean way to measure the actual outcome.
Without this, the whole thing risks being just a gamified voting mechanism, not a true prediction market or futarchy.
Futarchy needs reliable endgames. Without reliable endgames, you get gamification, not governance.
There must be a solution, or maybe polynya was right
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