That is, if a participant makes a misbehavior (including unexpected situations), the penalty they receive will increase with the number of other participants who misbehave at the same time as them. (measured as total ETH). This technique is already used in Ethereum's penalty mechanism. However, the emergence of edge case incentives in highly specific attack scenarios that may never occur in practice may Not enough to incentivize decentralization. This post proposes extending similar anti-correlated incentives to more “mundane” failure cases, such as missing a proof, which almost all validators experience at least occasionally. "

That is, if a participant makes a misbehavior (including unexpected situations), the penalty they receive will increase with the number of other participants who misbehave at the same time as them. (measured as total ETH). This technique is already used in Ethereum's penalty mechanism. However, the emergence of edge case incentives in highly specific attack scenarios that may never occur in practice may Not enough to incentivize decentralization. This post proposes extending similar anti-correlated incentives to more “mundane” failure cases, such as missing a proof, which almost all validators experience at least occasionally. "