Ray Dalio just posted Chapter 6 of Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order on X, timed to the Munich Security Conference. His framing: the post-1945 world order is dead, we're in Stage 6 of the Big Cycle, great powers operating without rules. German Chancellor Merz, French President Macron, and US Secretary of State Rubio all said the same thing in different languages. Nobody seriously disputes this anymore.
All models are false, but some are useful. Dalio's is both useful and pressing. His chart of European deaths from conflict shows three peaks, averaging 150 years apart — the Wars of Religion, the Napoleonic Wars, and the World Wars — each preceded by long stretches of peace and prosperity that sowed the seeds of the next catastrophe. The pattern recognition is sharp. His 1930s parallels to today are uncomfortably precise: economic nationalism, tariff escalation, technology wars, capital wars, the slow slide from economic conflict toward military conflict.
But naming a cycle doesn't explain why it persists.
Every coordination system — the UN, Bretton Woods, the WTO — solves the same problem: how do you get autonomous actors to align behavior without destroying their autonomy? The answer has always been the same. You create a coordination monopoly. One set of rules, one enforcement structure, one hegemon underwriting the whole thing. This works until the hegemon shifts from maintaining the system to extracting from it. Then every other power capable of defecting does the math and starts defecting. That's not a mystery. That's a predictable failure mode. The post-1945 order didn't break because of some iron law of history. It broke because monopolized coordination always breaks. The coordinator eventually captures the coordination.
Dalio's five types of war — trade, technology, capital, geopolitical, military — are really five escalating attempts to extract value after the cooperative structure fails. His prisoner's dilemma analysis is right. His tit-for-tat escalation dynamics are right. What he doesn't ask is whether coordination has to be structured this way.
Every speaker at Munich — and Dalio's framework — shares one assumption: coordination requires a hegemon. That's been true for all of recorded history because coordination was expensive. Someone had to enforce rules, maintain institutions, and absorb the cost of free-riders. Power had to be concentrated. Concentrated power extracted. The cycle repeated.
Dalio's advice to prepare for disruption is sound within his frame. If the Big Cycle is all there is, positioning is the only game. But if the cycle persists because of how coordination has been structured — not because civilizations are destined to eat themselves — then there's a different question on the table.
The post-1945 order is dead. The next one is being built right now, whether it looks like every previous one — new hegemon, new rules, same extraction — or something structurally different is the only question that matters.
The End of the Coordination Monopoly — the full framework on why coordination monopolies fail.
Five Iterations of Digital Freedom — how five generations of technologists tried to solve this problem.
Ray Dalio just posted Chapter 6 of Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order on X, timed to the Munich Security Conference. His framing: the post-1945 world order is dead, we're in Stage 6 of the Big Cycle, great powers operating without rules. German Chancellor Merz, French President Macron, and US Secretary of State Rubio all said the same thing in different languages. Nobody seriously disputes this anymore.
All models are false, but some are useful. Dalio's is both useful and pressing. His chart of European deaths from conflict shows three peaks, averaging 150 years apart — the Wars of Religion, the Napoleonic Wars, and the World Wars — each preceded by long stretches of peace and prosperity that sowed the seeds of the next catastrophe. The pattern recognition is sharp. His 1930s parallels to today are uncomfortably precise: economic nationalism, tariff escalation, technology wars, capital wars, the slow slide from economic conflict toward military conflict.
But naming a cycle doesn't explain why it persists.
Every coordination system — the UN, Bretton Woods, the WTO — solves the same problem: how do you get autonomous actors to align behavior without destroying their autonomy? The answer has always been the same. You create a coordination monopoly. One set of rules, one enforcement structure, one hegemon underwriting the whole thing. This works until the hegemon shifts from maintaining the system to extracting from it. Then every other power capable of defecting does the math and starts defecting. That's not a mystery. That's a predictable failure mode. The post-1945 order didn't break because of some iron law of history. It broke because monopolized coordination always breaks. The coordinator eventually captures the coordination.
Dalio's five types of war — trade, technology, capital, geopolitical, military — are really five escalating attempts to extract value after the cooperative structure fails. His prisoner's dilemma analysis is right. His tit-for-tat escalation dynamics are right. What he doesn't ask is whether coordination has to be structured this way.
Every speaker at Munich — and Dalio's framework — shares one assumption: coordination requires a hegemon. That's been true for all of recorded history because coordination was expensive. Someone had to enforce rules, maintain institutions, and absorb the cost of free-riders. Power had to be concentrated. Concentrated power extracted. The cycle repeated.
Dalio's advice to prepare for disruption is sound within his frame. If the Big Cycle is all there is, positioning is the only game. But if the cycle persists because of how coordination has been structured — not because civilizations are destined to eat themselves — then there's a different question on the table.
The post-1945 order is dead. The next one is being built right now, whether it looks like every previous one — new hegemon, new rules, same extraction — or something structurally different is the only question that matters.
The End of the Coordination Monopoly — the full framework on why coordination monopolies fail.
Five Iterations of Digital Freedom — how five generations of technologists tried to solve this problem.
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The Post-1945 Order Is Dead.
Support jonathancolton.eth
The Post-1945 Order Is Dead.
The New Common Sense
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The Rise of the Distribution-First Founder
For decades, founders followed the same script: build a product, raise a round, then worry about customers later. In the 2010s, the script evolved—thanks to the Lean Startup playbook—into “ship an MVP, test for traction, raise a round, then prep your GTM.” It was faster, leaner, but distribution was still left at the end of the process. But even this MVP-first approach kept the hardest part—finding customers—pushed to the back of the journey. That gap is what a new type of founder is closing....
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The New Common Sense
Own Your Work. Own Your Audience. Own the Web.
The Rise of the Distribution-First Founder
For decades, founders followed the same script: build a product, raise a round, then worry about customers later. In the 2010s, the script evolved—thanks to the Lean Startup playbook—into “ship an MVP, test for traction, raise a round, then prep your GTM.” It was faster, leaner, but distribution was still left at the end of the process. But even this MVP-first approach kept the hardest part—finding customers—pushed to the back of the journey. That gap is what a new type of founder is closing....
The Physics of Distribution
How attention becomes motion.
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