In the Indonesian political and economic landscape approaching the end of 2025, one narrative is being amplified with increasing intensity by President Prabowo Subianto: "The State must not lose to big business."

This statement appears to be far more than populist rhetoric from the podium; it reflects a fundamental shift in Indonesia's political-economic philosophy. It is a doctrine emerging as the antithesis to the public anxiety of the last five years—a period where the line between rulers and business tycoons became increasingly blurred, creating the perception that state policy was often "hijacked" or dictated by the interests of a select oligarchic elite.

Yes, it is a doctrine! It is a foundational belief derived from Prabowo’s conviction regarding Indonesia’s constitutional economy, a return to an economy grounded in Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which mandates the realization of a just and prosperous Indonesian society. Prabowo holds an ideological belief that natural resources belong to the public and their management is a state mandate. The core belief that "the State’s position must be higher than the private sector" is the lens through which he views all economic issues.

Fundamentally, this doctrine stems from a fear of "State Capture"—a condition where strategic state decisions are no longer oriented toward the public good but are held hostage by the power of capital. Prabowo views this situation as an existential threat to sovereignty.

For a leader with a military background, the hierarchy must be vertical: the State holds the mandate of the people's sovereignty, while corporations are entities operating under state permission. When business owners bypass the law—whether through tax evasion, environmental destruction, or political lobbying—it is viewed as an insult to state authority.

This firmness finds its urgency in two main triggers.

#1. Fiscal Urgency. The pressing need to fund ambitious programs like the "Free Nutritious Meals" and food self-sufficiency. Prabowo believes the funds are available but are being sucked away by what he calls "economic vampires" or budget leaks caused by illegal practices. He refers to the business practices of these vampires as "Greedynomics."

#2. Ecological Disasters. The string of environmental catastrophes, such as the floods and landslides in Sumatra in late 2025, which were proven to be exacerbated by poor land management for corporate profit.

The foundation of this hardline policy is—hopefully—not mere fantasy, but an urgency grounded in staggering data regarding leakages.

The palm oil sector is under the spotlight. Findings from the BPKP audit and the Palm Oil Governance Task Force revealed approximately 3.3 million hectares of palm oil plantations operating illegally within forest areas. For years, these millions of hectares have been productive profit engines for corporations, yet the State has not received its full due. Through the ultimatum of administrative fines under the Job Creation Law currently being pursued by the government, there is a potential state revenue of IDR 300 trillion to IDR 400 trillion. This figure represents "lost wealth" that is now being reclaimed.

The mining sector also holds a dark record targeted by government operations. The explosion of the tin trading corruption case, with total economic and ecological losses reaching IDR 271 trillion, stands as a monument to the failure of past oversight. This case revealed that illegal mining practices are often backed by powerful forces that render the State helpless. This is to say nothing of leaks in the nickel and coal sectors through the manipulation of export data and royalties.

To combat this, the State no longer relies on appeals but uses technology as a weapon of enforcement. The integration of SIMBARA (Mineral and Coal Information System), now expanded to various commodities, has become a "kill switch" for rogue businessmen. If the system detects royalty arrears or document violations, export access is automatically locked. Barges cannot sail, forcing businesses to submit and settle their obligations without room for under-the-table negotiations.

The transformation of this narrative into an iron-fisted policy did not happen overnight; it was a systematic escalation.

#Campaign Era (2023-2024). The seeds were planted when Prabowo consistently voiced the issue of "budget leakage" in his book, The Indonesian Paradox. At the time, many dismissed it as mere political jargon.

#Post-Inauguration (Oct 2024 - Early 2025). The narrative turned into work instructions. The government formed various Task Forces and began issuing early warnings to palm oil and mining companies to report and pay fines. The approach was still persuasive: pay the fine or face the law.

#Mid to Late 2025. The government’s patience wore thin due to the market's sluggish response and natural disasters caused by environmental damage. Prabowo’s rhetoric reached a boiling point. He no longer speaks of forgiveness, but of indiscriminate law enforcement. Instructions to the Attorney General's Office and the National Police became crystal clear: seize assets and take over management if corporations rebel. The government emphasized it would not be cowed by counter-threats of economic instability or layoffs, often used as "hostages" by big business.

Ultimately, the narrative "The State must not lose to big business" is Prabowo Subianto’s attempt to restore the State's prestige in the face of capital power. It is a political message that under his leadership, the relationship between the government and the private sector must be one of adherence to the rule of law, not a transactional relationship.

For a public weary of oligarchic domination over the last five years, this move brings hope for justice. But for the business world, it is a harsh signal that the era of "whitewashing" and informal lobbying is over. The State is now present with a calculator in its left hand and a gavel in its right, ready to collect every cent that rightfully belongs to the people.***

In the Indonesian political and economic landscape approaching the end of 2025, one narrative is being amplified with increasing intensity by President Prabowo Subianto: "The State must not lose to big business."

This statement appears to be far more than populist rhetoric from the podium; it reflects a fundamental shift in Indonesia's political-economic philosophy. It is a doctrine emerging as the antithesis to the public anxiety of the last five years—a period where the line between rulers and business tycoons became increasingly blurred, creating the perception that state policy was often "hijacked" or dictated by the interests of a select oligarchic elite.

Yes, it is a doctrine! It is a foundational belief derived from Prabowo’s conviction regarding Indonesia’s constitutional economy, a return to an economy grounded in Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which mandates the realization of a just and prosperous Indonesian society. Prabowo holds an ideological belief that natural resources belong to the public and their management is a state mandate. The core belief that "the State’s position must be higher than the private sector" is the lens through which he views all economic issues.

Fundamentally, this doctrine stems from a fear of "State Capture"—a condition where strategic state decisions are no longer oriented toward the public good but are held hostage by the power of capital. Prabowo views this situation as an existential threat to sovereignty.

For a leader with a military background, the hierarchy must be vertical: the State holds the mandate of the people's sovereignty, while corporations are entities operating under state permission. When business owners bypass the law—whether through tax evasion, environmental destruction, or political lobbying—it is viewed as an insult to state authority.

This firmness finds its urgency in two main triggers.

#1. Fiscal Urgency. The pressing need to fund ambitious programs like the "Free Nutritious Meals" and food self-sufficiency. Prabowo believes the funds are available but are being sucked away by what he calls "economic vampires" or budget leaks caused by illegal practices. He refers to the business practices of these vampires as "Greedynomics."

#2. Ecological Disasters. The string of environmental catastrophes, such as the floods and landslides in Sumatra in late 2025, which were proven to be exacerbated by poor land management for corporate profit.

The foundation of this hardline policy is—hopefully—not mere fantasy, but an urgency grounded in staggering data regarding leakages.

The palm oil sector is under the spotlight. Findings from the BPKP audit and the Palm Oil Governance Task Force revealed approximately 3.3 million hectares of palm oil plantations operating illegally within forest areas. For years, these millions of hectares have been productive profit engines for corporations, yet the State has not received its full due. Through the ultimatum of administrative fines under the Job Creation Law currently being pursued by the government, there is a potential state revenue of IDR 300 trillion to IDR 400 trillion. This figure represents "lost wealth" that is now being reclaimed.

The mining sector also holds a dark record targeted by government operations. The explosion of the tin trading corruption case, with total economic and ecological losses reaching IDR 271 trillion, stands as a monument to the failure of past oversight. This case revealed that illegal mining practices are often backed by powerful forces that render the State helpless. This is to say nothing of leaks in the nickel and coal sectors through the manipulation of export data and royalties.

To combat this, the State no longer relies on appeals but uses technology as a weapon of enforcement. The integration of SIMBARA (Mineral and Coal Information System), now expanded to various commodities, has become a "kill switch" for rogue businessmen. If the system detects royalty arrears or document violations, export access is automatically locked. Barges cannot sail, forcing businesses to submit and settle their obligations without room for under-the-table negotiations.

The transformation of this narrative into an iron-fisted policy did not happen overnight; it was a systematic escalation.

#Campaign Era (2023-2024). The seeds were planted when Prabowo consistently voiced the issue of "budget leakage" in his book, The Indonesian Paradox. At the time, many dismissed it as mere political jargon.

#Post-Inauguration (Oct 2024 - Early 2025). The narrative turned into work instructions. The government formed various Task Forces and began issuing early warnings to palm oil and mining companies to report and pay fines. The approach was still persuasive: pay the fine or face the law.

#Mid to Late 2025. The government’s patience wore thin due to the market's sluggish response and natural disasters caused by environmental damage. Prabowo’s rhetoric reached a boiling point. He no longer speaks of forgiveness, but of indiscriminate law enforcement. Instructions to the Attorney General's Office and the National Police became crystal clear: seize assets and take over management if corporations rebel. The government emphasized it would not be cowed by counter-threats of economic instability or layoffs, often used as "hostages" by big business.

Ultimately, the narrative "The State must not lose to big business" is Prabowo Subianto’s attempt to restore the State's prestige in the face of capital power. It is a political message that under his leadership, the relationship between the government and the private sector must be one of adherence to the rule of law, not a transactional relationship.

For a public weary of oligarchic domination over the last five years, this move brings hope for justice. But for the business world, it is a harsh signal that the era of "whitewashing" and informal lobbying is over. The State is now present with a calculator in its left hand and a gavel in its right, ready to collect every cent that rightfully belongs to the people.***