DeFi

• Aave Proposal; Authorise the release of Aave <> Chainlink Proof of Reserve for Aave Avalanche.

  • This proposal authorizes BGD to proceed with the release of Aave <> Chainlink Proof of Reserve Phase 1, targeting Aave v2 & v3 Avalanche.

  • The Aave community also authorizes the Aave Guardian to provide protocol rights to the system's smart contracts.

  • The community's security providers (Certora and SigmaPrime) will complete their audits before releasing.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports this proposal as it will help offer more protection and extra layer of security for Aave v2 and v3.

• Aave Proposal; [ARFC] Aave v3 Polygon wMATIC Interest Rate Update

  • Llama presents a proposal to amend the wMATIC interest rate parameters on the Aave Polygon v3 Liquidity Pool.

  • The wMATIC Reserve is 42.5% used with 6.61% borrowing charges. 

  • The MATIC eMode lacks economic motivation since the borrowing cost exceeds the staked MATIC receiving token yield.

  • This concept aims to boost wMATIC Reserve capital efficiency by boosting pool usage and lowering borrowing costs.

  • At the inflection point, increasing the Uoptimal parameter 20% from 45% to 65% would allow users to borrow 20% more wMATIC from the Reserve at the same rate.

  • Slope2 interest rates are 300% when usage surpasses Slope1.

  • Interest rate volatility can be reduced by lowering Slope2 from 300% to 100%.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports this proposal as amending interest rate parameters will increase capital efficiency and reduce interest rate volatility.

• Aave Proposal; [ARFC] BAL Interest Rate Curve Upgrade

  • A proposal to amend BAL interest rate parameters on the Aave Ethereum v2, Ethereum v3 (when deployed), Polygon v3 and Polygon v2 Liquidity Pools.

  • BAL (interest rate = 28.18% on Polygon v3) is in strong demand throughout all Reserves.

  • BAL liquidity pools have low capital efficiency, with Reserve usage (48.27% on Polygon v3) at the optimal value of 45%.

  • This approach is projected to promote capital efficiency by decreasing interest rates on markets where borrowing is disabled and persuading capital to transfer to markets with high borrowing demand.

  • Users will borrow BAL to gain yield while interest rates allow, creating BAL borrowing demand. Reserves' capital efficiency will increase by changing the interest rate curve's Uoptimal parameter from 45% to 80%.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports this proposal as amending BAL interest rates will boost capital efficiency and also generate significant revenue for the DAO.

• Aave Proposal; Updated: Aave Grants DAO Renewal

  • We propose renewing Aave Grants DAO for two quarters with $3.25 million ($1.625 million per quarter).

  • The fourth Aave Grants DAO proposal. Aave Grants DAO is a community-led grants program that funds ideas, projects, and events to strengthen Aave's contributor ecosystem.

  • To sustain Aave's growth, we drive development on top of it and recruit talented builders.

  • We foster Aave ecosystem culture and community to attract top contributors.

• Balancer Proposal; [BIP-140] Introduce TimelockAuthorizer

  • Balancer's access control mechanism is built on permissions. The Authorizer contract, which went into effect in April 2021 along with the Vault, governs them.

  • This proposal aims to replace it with the TimelockAuthorizer, which provides more fine-grained control over permissions and new security features. 

  • It additionally addresses a bug in the AuthorizerAdaptor contract disclosed via the Immunefi bug bounty program.

  • TimelockAuthorizer gives permissions over a single contract so that an account may handle one pool's swap fees but not another.

  • The original Authorizer interface allowed this; the current Authorizer did not (for simplicity).

  • The TimelockAuthorizer, a complicated contract, will control all permissions in the Balancer ecosystem, including Protocol Fees and Liquidity Mining. It should be carefully reviewed.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports the introduction of TimelockAuthorizer as it improves permission control and provides additional security.

• Balancer Proposal; [BIP-141] Introduce VeBoost V2

  • Compared to non-veBAL LPs, veBAL holders benefit from liquidity mining. This method allows third parties to delegate enhancements, but it's rarely used.

  • This proposal aims to upgrade the boost delegation subsystem to make it compatible with other platforms, such as Paladin's boost market.

  • Curve's initial boost mechanism implements boost as ERC721 NFTs, complicating the code and preventing viable use cases.

  • Curve's new VeBoostV2 contract has been used for a few months. It supports many integrations and is more straightforward than the previous iteration.

  • The worst thing the boost system could do is set enormous boosts for specific accounts and no boosts for others, but boosts are capped at 2.5x at the time.

  • The emergency subDAO would then call killDelegation, eliminating the boost system until a repair was made.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports VeBoost V2 since it significantly improved over the previous version and simplifies and opens the delegation system up to other platforms.

• Balancer Proposal; [BIP-142] Permission Granting - Recovery Mode - ComposableStable-V2

  • Authorize the PoolRecoveryHelper contract to put ComposableStable-V2 pools in Recovery Mode. This proposal is a follow-up to the original to cover the additional pool factory.

  • We just discovered that rate providers could cause processes to revert if getRate reverts. Most order routing algorithms assume rates fluctuate slowly and utilize the pool's rate cache to estimate transaction outputs.

  • Balancer Labs created the PoolRecoveryHelper, a smart contract that checks all rate providers in a pool and puts the pool into Recovery Mode if one reverts to avoid pools with defective rate providers from interfering with order routing algorithms.

  • PoolRecoveryHelper is permissionless. Anyone can initiate a check, but the pool will only enter Recovery Mode if the rate provider needed for it reverts.

  • With governance approval, Balancer Labs might add/remove factories from this collection.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports the authorization of the PoolRecoveryHelper contract to put ComposableStable-V2 pools in Recovery Mode.

Public Goods

• ENS Discussion; Should We Dissolve the ENS Token?

  • This discussion brings up the point that in the ENS airdrop, most of the tokens were distributed to a select few insiders in locked vesting schedules.

  • This means that the value is held by the top few (which is fair because they were the driving force behind it) and the governance decisions are essentially in the hands of these select few.

  • The two solutions in this discussion are either to maintain the oligarchy or DAO-wide divestment. However, the latter may not even be possible and most likely would never pass.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire is of the people, for the people. Changing the economic value of the tokens would not be feasible due to conflicting points of interest in the DAO. However, a new airdrop of specifically designed governance-only tokens that span eligibility from creation to the last few months could help balance the voting power in the DAO. The initial coin could act as a treasury coin in turn.

Creator Economy

• Bankless Disscussion; Coordinape Incident Report & Next Steps

  • This proposal seeks funding for an upcoming investigation of an incident revolving around bad actors in Coordinape.

  • Former DAO-wide Coordinape Admin, Whales, #7970, has admitted to impersonating 2 DAO members in coordinape: Tomahawk#3011 and Shaun/dancingpenguin.eth#2590

  • During this investigation, it was also discovered that many DAO members had transferred BANK to each others’ wallets to meet the minimum 35K requirement for L1/L2 during signup (i.e. they were not holding 35K BANK)

  • It was also discovered that many DAO members are allocating GIVE based upon relationships and initiatives OUTSIDE of the DAO (i.e. they were not allocating based upon contribution to BanklessDAO)

  • Operations Department needs some DAO consensus to continue

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire stands by using a medium size quantity of BANK for the investigation to properly incentivize the uncovering of truth and help brainstorm potential preventative measures. Wildfire would also be willing to vote the same size to replace the coordinape. This number would be around 150k BANK.

Infrastructure & Tooling

• OP Proposal; Grants Council Elections - Builders

  • This proposal seeks to elect 3 reviewers to the Builders Grants Sub-Committe.

  • The nominees are:

    • Dhante

    • Krysztof Urbański

    • Jack Anorak

    • OPUser

    • Juanbug

  • The link to the original post can be found here.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire does not have a specific stance on who should be chosen for this committee. Instead, we are going to endorse who the majority of the DAO chooses. In this case, the front runners as of writing this are Dhante, Krzystof, and Jack.

• OP Proposal; Grants Council Elections - Growth Experiments

  • This proposal seeks to elect 3 reviewers to the Growth Experiments Sub-Committe.

  • The nominees are:

    • Micheal Vander

    • Katie Garcia 

    • GFX Labs

Wildfire Stance: Wildfire does not have a specific stance on who should be chosen for this committee. Instead, we are going to endorse who the majority of the DAO chooses. In this case, the front runners as of writing this are ENS, Thales, Kwenta, BeethovenX & Balancer, Lyra, Connext, Polynomial Protocol & dHEDGE.

DeFi

• Aave Proposal; Authorise the release of Aave <> Chainlink Proof of Reserve for Aave Avalanche.

  • This proposal authorizes BGD to proceed with the release of Aave <> Chainlink Proof of Reserve Phase 1, targeting Aave v2 & v3 Avalanche.

  • The Aave community also authorizes the Aave Guardian to provide protocol rights to the system's smart contracts.

  • The community's security providers (Certora and SigmaPrime) will complete their audits before releasing.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports this proposal as it will help offer more protection and extra layer of security for Aave v2 and v3.

• Aave Proposal; [ARFC] Aave v3 Polygon wMATIC Interest Rate Update

  • Llama presents a proposal to amend the wMATIC interest rate parameters on the Aave Polygon v3 Liquidity Pool.

  • The wMATIC Reserve is 42.5% used with 6.61% borrowing charges. 

  • The MATIC eMode lacks economic motivation since the borrowing cost exceeds the staked MATIC receiving token yield.

  • This concept aims to boost wMATIC Reserve capital efficiency by boosting pool usage and lowering borrowing costs.

  • At the inflection point, increasing the Uoptimal parameter 20% from 45% to 65% would allow users to borrow 20% more wMATIC from the Reserve at the same rate.

  • Slope2 interest rates are 300% when usage surpasses Slope1.

  • Interest rate volatility can be reduced by lowering Slope2 from 300% to 100%.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports this proposal as amending interest rate parameters will increase capital efficiency and reduce interest rate volatility.

• Aave Proposal; [ARFC] BAL Interest Rate Curve Upgrade

  • A proposal to amend BAL interest rate parameters on the Aave Ethereum v2, Ethereum v3 (when deployed), Polygon v3 and Polygon v2 Liquidity Pools.

  • BAL (interest rate = 28.18% on Polygon v3) is in strong demand throughout all Reserves.

  • BAL liquidity pools have low capital efficiency, with Reserve usage (48.27% on Polygon v3) at the optimal value of 45%.

  • This approach is projected to promote capital efficiency by decreasing interest rates on markets where borrowing is disabled and persuading capital to transfer to markets with high borrowing demand.

  • Users will borrow BAL to gain yield while interest rates allow, creating BAL borrowing demand. Reserves' capital efficiency will increase by changing the interest rate curve's Uoptimal parameter from 45% to 80%.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports this proposal as amending BAL interest rates will boost capital efficiency and also generate significant revenue for the DAO.

• Aave Proposal; Updated: Aave Grants DAO Renewal

  • We propose renewing Aave Grants DAO for two quarters with $3.25 million ($1.625 million per quarter).

  • The fourth Aave Grants DAO proposal. Aave Grants DAO is a community-led grants program that funds ideas, projects, and events to strengthen Aave's contributor ecosystem.

  • To sustain Aave's growth, we drive development on top of it and recruit talented builders.

  • We foster Aave ecosystem culture and community to attract top contributors.

• Balancer Proposal; [BIP-140] Introduce TimelockAuthorizer

  • Balancer's access control mechanism is built on permissions. The Authorizer contract, which went into effect in April 2021 along with the Vault, governs them.

  • This proposal aims to replace it with the TimelockAuthorizer, which provides more fine-grained control over permissions and new security features. 

  • It additionally addresses a bug in the AuthorizerAdaptor contract disclosed via the Immunefi bug bounty program.

  • TimelockAuthorizer gives permissions over a single contract so that an account may handle one pool's swap fees but not another.

  • The original Authorizer interface allowed this; the current Authorizer did not (for simplicity).

  • The TimelockAuthorizer, a complicated contract, will control all permissions in the Balancer ecosystem, including Protocol Fees and Liquidity Mining. It should be carefully reviewed.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports the introduction of TimelockAuthorizer as it improves permission control and provides additional security.

• Balancer Proposal; [BIP-141] Introduce VeBoost V2

  • Compared to non-veBAL LPs, veBAL holders benefit from liquidity mining. This method allows third parties to delegate enhancements, but it's rarely used.

  • This proposal aims to upgrade the boost delegation subsystem to make it compatible with other platforms, such as Paladin's boost market.

  • Curve's initial boost mechanism implements boost as ERC721 NFTs, complicating the code and preventing viable use cases.

  • Curve's new VeBoostV2 contract has been used for a few months. It supports many integrations and is more straightforward than the previous iteration.

  • The worst thing the boost system could do is set enormous boosts for specific accounts and no boosts for others, but boosts are capped at 2.5x at the time.

  • The emergency subDAO would then call killDelegation, eliminating the boost system until a repair was made.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports VeBoost V2 since it significantly improved over the previous version and simplifies and opens the delegation system up to other platforms.

• Balancer Proposal; [BIP-142] Permission Granting - Recovery Mode - ComposableStable-V2

  • Authorize the PoolRecoveryHelper contract to put ComposableStable-V2 pools in Recovery Mode. This proposal is a follow-up to the original to cover the additional pool factory.

  • We just discovered that rate providers could cause processes to revert if getRate reverts. Most order routing algorithms assume rates fluctuate slowly and utilize the pool's rate cache to estimate transaction outputs.

  • Balancer Labs created the PoolRecoveryHelper, a smart contract that checks all rate providers in a pool and puts the pool into Recovery Mode if one reverts to avoid pools with defective rate providers from interfering with order routing algorithms.

  • PoolRecoveryHelper is permissionless. Anyone can initiate a check, but the pool will only enter Recovery Mode if the rate provider needed for it reverts.

  • With governance approval, Balancer Labs might add/remove factories from this collection.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire supports the authorization of the PoolRecoveryHelper contract to put ComposableStable-V2 pools in Recovery Mode.

Public Goods

• ENS Discussion; Should We Dissolve the ENS Token?

  • This discussion brings up the point that in the ENS airdrop, most of the tokens were distributed to a select few insiders in locked vesting schedules.

  • This means that the value is held by the top few (which is fair because they were the driving force behind it) and the governance decisions are essentially in the hands of these select few.

  • The two solutions in this discussion are either to maintain the oligarchy or DAO-wide divestment. However, the latter may not even be possible and most likely would never pass.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire is of the people, for the people. Changing the economic value of the tokens would not be feasible due to conflicting points of interest in the DAO. However, a new airdrop of specifically designed governance-only tokens that span eligibility from creation to the last few months could help balance the voting power in the DAO. The initial coin could act as a treasury coin in turn.

Creator Economy

• Bankless Disscussion; Coordinape Incident Report & Next Steps

  • This proposal seeks funding for an upcoming investigation of an incident revolving around bad actors in Coordinape.

  • Former DAO-wide Coordinape Admin, Whales, #7970, has admitted to impersonating 2 DAO members in coordinape: Tomahawk#3011 and Shaun/dancingpenguin.eth#2590

  • During this investigation, it was also discovered that many DAO members had transferred BANK to each others’ wallets to meet the minimum 35K requirement for L1/L2 during signup (i.e. they were not holding 35K BANK)

  • It was also discovered that many DAO members are allocating GIVE based upon relationships and initiatives OUTSIDE of the DAO (i.e. they were not allocating based upon contribution to BanklessDAO)

  • Operations Department needs some DAO consensus to continue

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire stands by using a medium size quantity of BANK for the investigation to properly incentivize the uncovering of truth and help brainstorm potential preventative measures. Wildfire would also be willing to vote the same size to replace the coordinape. This number would be around 150k BANK.

Infrastructure & Tooling

• OP Proposal; Grants Council Elections - Builders

  • This proposal seeks to elect 3 reviewers to the Builders Grants Sub-Committe.

  • The nominees are:

    • Dhante

    • Krysztof Urbański

    • Jack Anorak

    • OPUser

    • Juanbug

  • The link to the original post can be found here.

  • Wildfire Stance: Wildfire does not have a specific stance on who should be chosen for this committee. Instead, we are going to endorse who the majority of the DAO chooses. In this case, the front runners as of writing this are Dhante, Krzystof, and Jack.

• OP Proposal; Grants Council Elections - Growth Experiments

  • This proposal seeks to elect 3 reviewers to the Growth Experiments Sub-Committe.

  • The nominees are:

    • Micheal Vander

    • Katie Garcia 

    • GFX Labs

Wildfire Stance: Wildfire does not have a specific stance on who should be chosen for this committee. Instead, we are going to endorse who the majority of the DAO chooses. In this case, the front runners as of writing this are ENS, Thales, Kwenta, BeethovenX & Balancer, Lyra, Connext, Polynomial Protocol & dHEDGE.