DeFi

• Aave Discussion; Claim Aave Liquidity Farming Rewards & Send to Aave Grants DAO

  • This ARC outlines (1) a strategy for reclaiming and distributing earned liquidity mining rewards that are currently held at Ecosystem Collector addresses on the V2 Ethereum, Polygon, and Avalanche markets, as well as (2) a strategy for the Treasury's future handling of earned liquidity mining rewards.

  • The V2 Ethereum, Polygon, and Avalanche markets each have claimable liquidity mining awards totaling about $116,500 as of July 24. Rhere are specifically 561.63 stkAAVE, 54,259.74 WMATIC, and 724.80 WAVAX claimable at the Aave V2 Collector addresses. 

  • Aave DAO will carry out the first of these steps by requesting and delivering to Aave Grants DAO all presently earned liquidity mining awards.

• Aave Proposal; [ARC] Increase Supply Cap of sAVAX on v3 Avalanche (Fast-track)

  • Within two weeks of the listing, the 500k sAVAX ($11.5m) current supply cap on v3 was achieved. 

  • Since sAVAX can only be used as collateral to borrow AVAX in E-mode, protocols built on top of aAVAsAVAX (AAVE Avalanche sAVAX) have experienced rapid development, with deposits already reaching their maximum supply ceiling. 

  • The purpose of the proposal is to propose a 100 percent increase to the 1 million sAVAX supply cap through the fast-track procedure described here.

  • DEX Liquidity and Conversion Rate: In spite of the state of the market, Pangolin, TraderJoe, and Platypus DEX liquidity have stayed at $40 million. If necessary, this can make healthy liquidations easier.

• Element Proposal; ​​Enable Temporary Protocol Incentives for Liquidity Providers

  • Considering only short-term incentive program before allowing ELFI transferability In order to maintain liquidity in the protocol when Element's vaults start to expire, it is becoming more and more essential to reward rollover.

  • We suggest distributing 1 percent of the entire ELFI supply over the course of six months among all vaults. This results in an annual emission rate of 2%. 

  • Even after the airdrop snapshot announcement, the individuals LPing in such vaults continued to use and support the protocol without receiving any compensation. We suggest rewarding them for their time spent in the vault by emitting energy at the same pace. With this plan, users would start receiving rewards at a daily proportional rate with the expiration of the April 29th vaults.

• Element Proposal; EGP-7: Bootstrap Workstream

  • In order to achieve full operational capabilities, the bootstrap work stream's goal is to temporarily non-formally initialize focused governance contributions. There is no systematic procedure in place right now for people to actively contribute to the DAO.

  • The authors think that until the workstream is prepared to switch to a more formal structure, there should be a temporary workstream to encourage the DAO to become active and accomplish the necessary tasks.

  • The fact that ELFI tokens only serve as voting tokens at the present and have no current liquid monetary value is a major factor.

• Balancer Discussion; Enable Temple/DAI 80/20 Gauge (Ethereum)

  • TempleDAO has approximately $52M in TVL and is a yielding coin with low volatility. 

  • By executing its presale only in FRAX, TempleDAO became an early supporter of Frax Finance and a top holder with one of the greatest FRAX reserves of about ($137M).

  • The TEMPLE/DAI 80/20 weighted pool will now have a veBAL gauge added. Platform BAL incentives would aid in extending TEMPLE liquidity, since the past 30 days' weekly trading transaction volume on the Temple custom Uni v2 AMM has varied between $4M and $5M. 

  • The author states that they have provided about $1 million USD worth of bribe incentives in FRAX and FXS to promote liquidity into our FRAX gauge, which presently has over $37 million in total value locked (TVL) on Frax Finance.

   

• Balancer Discussion; [RFC] Revoke Hexagon’s Friendly Fork Status

  • Four months ago, Hexagon received approval in a governance vote. Hexagon was not revoked at this time out of respect for governance's judgment; Symmetric was immediately refused FF status on the basis that it did not yet have a product or deployment to show. Hexagon has still not provided anything in the four months despite receiving FF status.

  • Additionally, their forced twitter/discord/tg actions for BAL holders were a prerequisite for airdrop eligibility. This is distasteful and spammy, and it also links on-chain addresses with public accounts, which is problematic because many users prefer to remain anonymous**.**

Public Goods

• Gitcoin Tempcheck; Remove Lifetime Funding Received from Gitcoin Grant Page

  • The author of this post would like to remove the lifetime funding received from the grant page because:

    • The number is inaccurate 

    • Many grants were given in governance tokens which have depreciated over the past year

    • Some grants have been live since 2019, so the timing is not accounted for

    • It creates a tax liability especially when tokens depreciate

Creator Economy

• Bankless Discussion; GSE: Financial Analysis of Guilds and Projects

  • These are the results that came from the financial analysis from GSE.

  • GSE came to the conclusion that Bankless is over-allocating funds by a large magnitude 

  • Using the average BANK price in season 3 it is shown that bdao overspent by 8.5M BANK or $370,000

  • It is suggested that the grants committee should use data and historical analytics to conclude funding amounts

Infrastructure & Tooling

• Rocket Pool Discussion; Liquidity Incentives

  • The author of this post poses the following questions:

    • Is there support to budget for liquidity incentives at all?

    • If yes, is there support for increasing the total annual inflation (currently 5%) to support this and/or reduce other allocations (oDAO or NO rewards), or should this exclusively come from the pDAO budget?

    • Within the constraints defined in 2., what should the budget for incentives be?

  • Rocket Pool is going to be faced with a lot of budgetary hurdles in these upcoming months, especially when it comes to the oDAO

  • A proposal on fixing the structure of oDAO’s compensation is badly needed

DeFi

• Aave Discussion; Claim Aave Liquidity Farming Rewards & Send to Aave Grants DAO

  • This ARC outlines (1) a strategy for reclaiming and distributing earned liquidity mining rewards that are currently held at Ecosystem Collector addresses on the V2 Ethereum, Polygon, and Avalanche markets, as well as (2) a strategy for the Treasury's future handling of earned liquidity mining rewards.

  • The V2 Ethereum, Polygon, and Avalanche markets each have claimable liquidity mining awards totaling about $116,500 as of July 24. Rhere are specifically 561.63 stkAAVE, 54,259.74 WMATIC, and 724.80 WAVAX claimable at the Aave V2 Collector addresses. 

  • Aave DAO will carry out the first of these steps by requesting and delivering to Aave Grants DAO all presently earned liquidity mining awards.

• Aave Proposal; [ARC] Increase Supply Cap of sAVAX on v3 Avalanche (Fast-track)

  • Within two weeks of the listing, the 500k sAVAX ($11.5m) current supply cap on v3 was achieved. 

  • Since sAVAX can only be used as collateral to borrow AVAX in E-mode, protocols built on top of aAVAsAVAX (AAVE Avalanche sAVAX) have experienced rapid development, with deposits already reaching their maximum supply ceiling. 

  • The purpose of the proposal is to propose a 100 percent increase to the 1 million sAVAX supply cap through the fast-track procedure described here.

  • DEX Liquidity and Conversion Rate: In spite of the state of the market, Pangolin, TraderJoe, and Platypus DEX liquidity have stayed at $40 million. If necessary, this can make healthy liquidations easier.

• Element Proposal; ​​Enable Temporary Protocol Incentives for Liquidity Providers

  • Considering only short-term incentive program before allowing ELFI transferability In order to maintain liquidity in the protocol when Element's vaults start to expire, it is becoming more and more essential to reward rollover.

  • We suggest distributing 1 percent of the entire ELFI supply over the course of six months among all vaults. This results in an annual emission rate of 2%. 

  • Even after the airdrop snapshot announcement, the individuals LPing in such vaults continued to use and support the protocol without receiving any compensation. We suggest rewarding them for their time spent in the vault by emitting energy at the same pace. With this plan, users would start receiving rewards at a daily proportional rate with the expiration of the April 29th vaults.

• Element Proposal; EGP-7: Bootstrap Workstream

  • In order to achieve full operational capabilities, the bootstrap work stream's goal is to temporarily non-formally initialize focused governance contributions. There is no systematic procedure in place right now for people to actively contribute to the DAO.

  • The authors think that until the workstream is prepared to switch to a more formal structure, there should be a temporary workstream to encourage the DAO to become active and accomplish the necessary tasks.

  • The fact that ELFI tokens only serve as voting tokens at the present and have no current liquid monetary value is a major factor.

• Balancer Discussion; Enable Temple/DAI 80/20 Gauge (Ethereum)

  • TempleDAO has approximately $52M in TVL and is a yielding coin with low volatility. 

  • By executing its presale only in FRAX, TempleDAO became an early supporter of Frax Finance and a top holder with one of the greatest FRAX reserves of about ($137M).

  • The TEMPLE/DAI 80/20 weighted pool will now have a veBAL gauge added. Platform BAL incentives would aid in extending TEMPLE liquidity, since the past 30 days' weekly trading transaction volume on the Temple custom Uni v2 AMM has varied between $4M and $5M. 

  • The author states that they have provided about $1 million USD worth of bribe incentives in FRAX and FXS to promote liquidity into our FRAX gauge, which presently has over $37 million in total value locked (TVL) on Frax Finance.

   

• Balancer Discussion; [RFC] Revoke Hexagon’s Friendly Fork Status

  • Four months ago, Hexagon received approval in a governance vote. Hexagon was not revoked at this time out of respect for governance's judgment; Symmetric was immediately refused FF status on the basis that it did not yet have a product or deployment to show. Hexagon has still not provided anything in the four months despite receiving FF status.

  • Additionally, their forced twitter/discord/tg actions for BAL holders were a prerequisite for airdrop eligibility. This is distasteful and spammy, and it also links on-chain addresses with public accounts, which is problematic because many users prefer to remain anonymous**.**

Public Goods

• Gitcoin Tempcheck; Remove Lifetime Funding Received from Gitcoin Grant Page

  • The author of this post would like to remove the lifetime funding received from the grant page because:

    • The number is inaccurate 

    • Many grants were given in governance tokens which have depreciated over the past year

    • Some grants have been live since 2019, so the timing is not accounted for

    • It creates a tax liability especially when tokens depreciate

Creator Economy

• Bankless Discussion; GSE: Financial Analysis of Guilds and Projects

  • These are the results that came from the financial analysis from GSE.

  • GSE came to the conclusion that Bankless is over-allocating funds by a large magnitude 

  • Using the average BANK price in season 3 it is shown that bdao overspent by 8.5M BANK or $370,000

  • It is suggested that the grants committee should use data and historical analytics to conclude funding amounts

Infrastructure & Tooling

• Rocket Pool Discussion; Liquidity Incentives

  • The author of this post poses the following questions:

    • Is there support to budget for liquidity incentives at all?

    • If yes, is there support for increasing the total annual inflation (currently 5%) to support this and/or reduce other allocations (oDAO or NO rewards), or should this exclusively come from the pDAO budget?

    • Within the constraints defined in 2., what should the budget for incentives be?

  • Rocket Pool is going to be faced with a lot of budgetary hurdles in these upcoming months, especially when it comes to the oDAO

  • A proposal on fixing the structure of oDAO’s compensation is badly needed