The Slow Hunch by Nick Grossman

Last week I wrote about the inherent tension between data portability and privacy, and suggested that one solution would be an exportable "privacy context" that could travel with ported data. Such an approach, however, would require a notion of identity that is broader than a single account at a single company. Rather, it would require the linking of one or more "proprietary identities" (i.e., accounts at tech companies) with some type of "cryptographic identity" (private key) that really "belongs" to that person and represents them in a more holistic and permanent way.

This is not a new idea. Since at least 2017, both Keybase and Blockstack have enabled social media users to attest to a linkage between social accounts and a cryptographic identity. Here's what it looks like on Keybase, and here's what it looks like on Blockstack. Neither Keybase nor Blockstack are currently promoting this routine front & center, as it is admittedly a geeky thing that appealed (back in 2017) to identity explorers, but not to mainstream consumers.

But today, we are starting to see some new signs of life on this pattern, and I think we may be nearing some drivers that have the potential to bring it to mainstream scale. They are:

1/ Fun. It may be that some sort of social game figures out a way to bring crypto identities mainstream. For example, 2100 is a project that popped last fall, which let people issue tokens corresponding to their Twitter accounts. Interesting idea, though it seems to have lost some steam, at least for now. Another project that's looking to connect crypto assets / identity to social identity is Roll, which lets anyone create "social money" connected to their social identity. You could imagine this taking off with social media influencers with large audiences, who are already super good at finding ways to commercialize their online presence.

Combining fun and money can be powerful. And from that, I think some of the more principled / architectural components will become more obvious and valuable over time.

2/ Privacy & Security. Speaking of Keybase, where they have focused more recently is secure, encrypted messaging, as a consumer use case building off of the core infrastructure. Related, are two separate projects called "Dmail" -- dmail.io and dmail.online -- the former lets you encrypt emails that you send across unsafe channels (like Gmail or any other email client) and the latter is a full system for sending private emails. One of the things you get with a cryptographic identity is the ability to encrypt and sign messages. It makes sense that this will be at the the center of a driving consumer use case. Privacy is more of a mainstream feature every day, and it can't just be Apple that provides it.

3/ Compliance. Compliance is where this post began, thinking about coming regulations around data portability, interoperability and privacy, and where I'll end it. While I don't expect that we will get direct guidance towards cryptographic identity from regulators, it may be that cryptographic identity becomes clear as part of various compliance solutions.

For example, all payments systems need to comply with so-called Know-Your-Customer (KYC), Anti-Money-Laundering (AML) and sanctions rules, including the so-called Travel Rule which requires that both senders and receivers of funds verify identities. On the surface, cryptographic identities are digital bearer assets and would therefore seem to be at odds with formal identity systems. However, it may be that we come to use cryptographic identity components (e.g., blockchain accounts, digital signatures, or even non-fungible tokens) in creative ways to satisfy some of these requirements, vs. traditional methods employed by companies like Persona, Alloy and others today.

To tie it all together: In this week's "On the Brink" podcast, Nic Carter and Matt Walsh from Castle Island Ventures talk with Balaji Srinivasan about social media handles as property, which potentially combines both the "fun" and "compliance" angles discussed here. It does feel like your online identity, whether it's a bitcoin or a twitter handle, is a form of property and should be treated as such.

Earlier this week, I spoke at a Justice Department / Stanford conference about antitrust issues in the tech sector. Our panel included Patricia Nakache from Trinity Ventures, Ben Thompson from Stratechery and Mark Lemley from Stanford. If you are interested you can watch the whole thing here:

https://twitter.com/trinityventures/status/1228085073435484161

The main point I tried to make was that cultivating the development of blockchain and cryptonetworks is actually a critical strategy here. Regular readers will know that I don't shut up about this, and I held to that on the panel. This point is painfully absent in most conversations about market power, competition and antitrust in the tech sector, and I will always try and insert that into the conversation.

To me, blockchains & crypto are the best "offense" when it comes to competition in the tech sector. Historically, breakthroughs in tech competition have included an offense component in addition to a defense component (note that the below only focuses on computing, not on telecom):

Credit: Placeholder / USV

The "defense" side has typically included a break up (US vs. AT&T) or some kind of forced openness. Examples of forced openness include the Hush-a-phone and Carterfone decisions which forced openness upon AT&T. Several decades later were the (ongoing) battles over Net Neutrality with the ISPs. The discussion about data portability and interoperability brings the same questions to the applications / data layer.

Data portability & interoperability are important for two reasons: 1/ because they focus on a major source of market power in the tech sector, which is control of data ("break up the data, not the companies"), and 2/ because they represent a category of regulatory interventions that are just as easy for small companies to implement as large ones, unlike heavy approaches like GDPR that are easy for big companies to implement but hard on startups.

That said, when you dig into the issue of data portability, there are some hard problems to solve. I don't believe they are insurmountable, but I also believe they haven't been resolved as of yet.

For context, data portability is the idea that a user of a tech service (e.g., Google, Facebook, Twitter, etc) should be able to easily take their data with them and move it to a competing service, if they so choose. This is similar to how you can port your phone number from one carrier to another, or how in the UK you can port your banking data from one institution to another. Both of these examples required legislative intervention, with an eye towards increasing competition. Also, most privacy regimes (e.g., GDPR in Europe and CCPA in California) have some language around data portability.

Where it gets more complicated is when you start considering what data should be portable, and whose data.

For example, within tech companies there are generally three kinds of data: 1/ user-submitted data (e.g., photos, messages that you post), 2/ observed data (e.g., search history or location history), and 3/ inferred data (inferences that the platform makes about you based on #1 and #2 -- e.g., Nick likes ice skating). Generally speaking, I believe that most type #1 and type #2 data should be portable, but most type #3 probably should not.

To add to the complication is the question of when "your" data also includes data from other people -- for example, messages someone else sent me, photos where I was tagged, contact lists, etc. This was at the heart of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, where individual users exporting their own data to a third-party app actually exposed the data of many more people, unwittingly.

I'd like to focus here on the second category of complications -- how to deal with data from other people, and privacy more generally, when thinking about portability. This is a real issue that deserves a real solution.

I don't have a full answer, but I have a few ideas, which are the following:

First, expectations matter. When you send me an email, you are trusting me (the recipient) to protect that email, and not publish it, or upload it to another app that does sketchy things with it. You don't really care (or even know) whether I read my email in Gmail or in Apple Mail, and you don't generally think about those companies' impact on your privacy expectations. Whereas, when you publish into a social web platform, you are trusting both the end recipient of your content, as well as the platform itself. As an example, if you send me messages on Snapchat, you expect that they will be private to me and will disappear after a certain amount of time. So if I "ported" those messages to some other app, where, say, they were all public and permanent, it would feel like a violation - both by me the recipient and by Snap the platform. Interoperability / portability would change that expectation, since the social platform would no longer have end-to-end control (more like email). User expectations would need to be reset, and new norms established. This would take work, and time.

Second, porting the "privacy context": Given platform expectations described above, users have a sense of what privacy context they are publishing into. A tweet, a message to a private group, a direct message, a snap message, all have different privacy contexts, managed by the platform. Could this context be "ported" too? I could imagine a "privacy manifest" that ships alongside any ported data, like this:

# privacy.json
{
  "content": "e9db5cf8349b1166e96a742e198a0dd1", // hash of content
  "author": "c6947e2f6fbffadce924f7edfc1b112d", // hash of author
  "viewers": ["07dadd323e2bec8ee7b9bce9c8f7d732"], // hashes of recipients
  "TTL": "10" // expiry time for content
}

In this model, we could have a flexible set of privacy rules that could even conceivably include specific users who could and could not see certain data, and for how long. This would likely require the development of some sort of federated or shared identity standards for recognizing users across platforms & networks. Note: this is a bit how selective disclosure works with "viewing keys" in Zcash. TrustLayers also works like this.

Third, liability transfer: Assuming the two above concepts, we would likely want a liability regime where the sending/porting company is released from liability and the receiving company/app assumes liability (all, of course, based on an initial authorization from a user). This seems particularly important, and is related to the idea of expectations and norms. If data is passed from Company A to Company B at the direction of User C, Company A is only going to feel comfortable with the transfer if they know they won't be held liable for the actions of Company B. And this is only possible if Company B is held accountable for respecting the privacy context as expressed through the privacy manifest. This is somewhat similar to the concept of "data controller" and "data processor" in GDPR, but recognizing that a "handoff" at the direction of the user breaks the liability linkage.

Those are some thoughts! Difficult stuff, but I think it will be solvable ultimately. If you want more, check out Cory Doctorow's in-depth look at this topic.

The Slow Hunch by Nick Grossman

Cryptographic Identity

Data Portability and Privacy

Proof of Transfer (PoX)

The Slow Hunch by Nick Grossman